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ABSTRACT 
This research is aimed at identifying and proposing a managerial model to prevent and control 
fires during construction works. The research was based on an extensive review of relevant 
literature and an in-depth analysis of major fires in the UK and France. The outcomes and 
research findings enabled the development of a managerial model highlighting the 
implementation of safety systems throughout the project life cycle. Critical analysis of 
professional interviews enabled the author to develop an in-depth qualitative review of 
current practices. This was significant in establishing the managerial model. Through the post 
analysis of relevant cases of fires originating during construction activities, a comparison is 
made between recognised good and bad practice, and a Fire Safety Management Model 
(FSMM) is developed to meet the requirements for fire prevention. This Model addresses the 
requirements of practitioners, their needs and their concerns regarding the possible effect of a 
fire during construction activities. The FSMM has been validated and tested by two Expert 
Panels (one in France and the other in the UK). These panels were formed by representatives 
of the construction industry and experts in the field of fire safety. A guideline for review and 
analysis were proposed and these formed the basis of the validation exercise for each member 
of the Expert Panel. 
The Fire Safety Management Model considers a global approach towards fire prevention on 
construction sites and for a given organisation. The set of requirements highlighted in the 
Model is generic and will be refined and adapted by the organisation using it. However the 
framework proposed in this research must be considered in full, from the conception of the 
project, its construction and finally throughout subsequent stages of the life cycle including 
maintenance and refurbishment. It was an iterative Model, flexible and adaptable to change. 
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1 INTRODUCTION : 
This research emerges from a need to consider the economics impact of fires on construction 
sites, a problem for too long ignored by members of the construction industry. In the UK, the 
total cost of premium reach £100m per year, and it is estimate that 60-70% of this amount is 
claimed every year. Within the last ten years, major fires with excessive losses (above 
£100m) forced insurers, clients and contractors to investigate the problem and evaluate this 
risk of fire. 
Marchant (1976) was one of the first researchers to investigate the problem in the UK in the 
1970s. A major ICE Conference in 1992 gave rise to a series of informative papers (Abbott, 
Kidd, Smith, Toone, Rimmer, Barber, Evans) on the fires on construction sites but didn't 
provide outstanding pieces of work to eradicate the problem. In 2001 it is still impossible to 
accurately assess the real quantities of fires on construction sites and their impact. The work 
of Puybaraud & Barham (1997a, 1997b, 1999) and Hinks & Puybaraud (1999) were leading 
in identifying the real threats of fires during construction activities and pointing out the 
devastating impact on the business as a whole. The increasing pressure of insurers and 
reinsurers to raise awareness of the problem and their leading industrial research in the field 
(Munich. Re, 1987,1998; Swiss Re, 1993,1998; Ebner, 1994) forced the construction 
industry to change their approach and implement a proactive fire safety process for sites. As a 
result, over the last decade, we witnessed a cultural change in health and safety on 
construction sites encompassed by the implementation of fire safety management approach to 
support the prevention of fires during construction activities on sites or in occupied facilities 
(refurbishment works, maintenance operations). 
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A construction site presents very specific characteristics and the typical site environment 
(including waste, construction activities, storage areas and materials stores) could contribute 
to a rapid development and spread of fire, major damages and often an uncontrolled situation. 
The unusual engineering aspects in such a fire scenario is important to consider to built a 
good understanding of the mechanism of development on site. A quantitative and engineering 
approach to this problem was difficult as access to a reliable set of data on fires, their causes 
and consequences for a large sample was impossible. The author orientated her research 
around a qualitative research based on the assessment of construction site fire safety failures 
post analysis and identified where the managerial system failed and the reason why. 
The overall approach is based on the concept that the JCOP did not provide a satisfactory 
level of control over the construction works, and that a managerial framework needed to be 
developed in parallel to support a free fire environment on site and address the fire safety 
management during the complete life cycle of the project: conception, execution and 
exploitation. The implementation of a fire safety management system needed to be 
encompass by a cultural change in organisation to support the full and successful 
integration of a total fire safety concept. 
The methodology followed to complete this research comprises four different stages (Chapter 
5 and 6). The initial formulation of basic ideas through the development of the research 
proposal, the specification of research design after the literature review, followed by the 
fieldwork (site investigations), then the data processing and analysis and finally the 
preparation of the final research report. 
Following an extensive review of the current literature available on the research subject 
(Chapter 2 to 4), the author identified some weaknesses and problems arising from the 
analysis of specialist documents. Amongst the main areas of problems, the availability and 
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access of reliable statistics on the number, cause and consequences of fires during the 
construction was first identified. Furthermore, the lack of economical data on the subject, a 
lack of understanding by the parties (contractors/clients... ), poor prevention measures on site, 
no detailed guidance offered to contractors on the problem of fire on sites, a pressure from 
insurers to reduce the number of fires incident during construction works and a reactive 
approach towards the problem by the government, professional bodies (LPC, FPA, Home 
Office... ) and parties (contractors/ clients) were later assessed as major weaknesses within the 
research process. 
In order not to keep the research solely orientated on UK data, the author decided to keep a 
broader approach and analysis practices in other European countries. A review of legislative 
and regulatory provisions in the six major European countries (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, 
Belgium, and Netherlands) was developed. The objectives of this review was to identify best 
practice models overseas and how they could be transferred or implemented in the UK in 
view of a future harmonisation of the regulation within the EU. Following the possible 
formulation of a European approach, a parallel will be draw with the North American 
approaches (US/Canada). The author identified similarities between the way the Canada and 
US developed their legislative systems and the forthcoming development of European 
legislation/regulation for fires on construction sites. 
The pilot study revealed a need to emphasis on certain questions and to develop ideas and 
research hypotheses rather than to gather facts and statistics. In this case the interview 
becomes exploratory and an in-depth interview. This later helps in the formulation of the 
research problem, in the articulation of the dimensions and hypotheses and in the details of 
instrument building. 
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The scope of the FSMM highlighted the need to consider a global approach towards fire 
safety, rather than a project specific approach. In fact, considerations for the complete project 
cycle and its relationship to the organisational and managerial strategy were essential to built 
up an appropriate concept and implement the procedure. As such considerations for the 
integration of the Recovery and Continuity Systems were essential to appropriately manage 
the risks of fire during construction works. 
The uniqueness of this research demonstrated the dearth of research in fire safety on 
construction sites. Limited publications could be identified in this area and forced the author 
to wider the scope of the research to other industries. The robustness of the data collected 
through the qualitative research and analysis demonstrated the validity of the research concept 
and how a qualitative approach could solve managerial problems and contribute to build the 
managerial approach. 
1.1 Overview Chapter by chapter. 
This thesis is divided in ten chapters from an introduction (present chapter 1) to the 
conclusions and formulation of recommendations (chapter 10). The introduction defines the 
relation of the thesis to other work in the same field and refers appropriately to any findings, 
propositions and new discoveries contained in this thesis. The first three chapters after the 
introduction present the results of the literature review and the analysis of major publications 
in the field of fire safety on construction sites and related papers. 
In chapter 2 the author analyses the legislative fire safety framework in the UK and France as 
well as in a selected number of Member States of the EU. The aim is to identify any 
weaknesses or strengths within the Member State Fire Safety Frameworks. Such 
investigations raised a number of issues that were developed in forthcoming chapters. 
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Chapter 3 aims to provide an overview of the characteristics of a construction site, its 
definition and a detail survey using an engineering approach. In the second part of this 
chapter, an attempt is made to quantify the fires on construction sites and their losses. A 
review and discussion of major literature published on the subject was presented. Finally the 
author looks at current practices and the construction companies response to a fire safety 
situation. This chapter indicates a dearth of research in the evaluation of fire safety on 
construction sites. Additional avenues of investigations were presenting themselves. These 
include a review of the process of organisational change and its management for effective fire 
safety on site incorporating factors such as culture, communication, and adopting new 
management philosophies. The clear need for a study of fire safety during the construction 
process is identified in this chapter. The chapter concludes by planning a thorough 
investigation of the problem in depth, through a series of field-based. 
Chapter 4 examines the characteristics of risk in construction site fires and how to develop a 
sound project safety case to control and manage the risk of fire during construction activities. 
The risk of fire is spread throughout the complete life cycle of the facility from its conception 
and construction through its life and occupation and maintenance, and finally through its 
demolition. The emphasis, in this chapter, is on the importance of the early consideration of 
the possibility of a fire during the construction phase. The fire safety cases demonstrates: 
i. the importance of having an operational Emergency Plan to protect employees 
ii. the general public; the potential value of Training of and Awareness in (primarily) 
employees and the workforce, (and also the general public/customers for their own 
safety); 
iii. the potential usefulness of a Fire Safety Action Plan (FSP) which develops and 
embraces both by the Client/Owner and the Contracting Company; 
iv. The value of advance liaison with the Fire Services in the unfortunate event of a fire 
occurring; and of particular relevance to the Facilities Management context of the 
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indirect business process -the interface between the business continuity and the 
temporary site operations- hence the need for Business Continuity Planning (BCP) to 
ensure minimum interruption to the normal business operations. 
The research methodology chapters are split in two. Chapters 5 details the research concept 
and set the ground for developing empirical research and site investigations to support the 
development of a managerial model. Chapter 6 focuses on a critical analysis of the research 
methodologies and the validity of a qualitative method against a quantitative approach. A 
series of PhD schematic structures is prepared and spread throughout the thesis. They 
contribute to link the research findings to the development of the fire safety management 
model. The objective of chapter 6 is to explore and compare and contrast various research 
methodologies suitable for this project, i. e. quantitative and qualitative. A literature survey of 
current and past research in the field of quantitative and qualitative research identifies a need 
to consider both methodologies at different stage of the research. 
The chapter 7 investigates current practices and attempts to present a real picture of the 
industry and the state of art in fire safety on construction sites. The qualitative analysis and 
design of the FSMM contributes to identify significant findings and based on this primary but 
not definitive analysis, to generate recommendations and conclusions for this research. 
The chapter 8 analyses the developing process of a managerial model and reviewed the 
strengths and weaknesses of existing safety models and systems. The second part of this 
chapter introduces the concept of the fire safety management model developed by the author 
and based on the research findings. Three different model are presented (Model A, B and C) 
and each version offered for review to two Expert Panel in France and the UK. The results of 
the Expert review are presented and discussed in the following chapter. 
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The last two chapters 9& 10 propose a discussion of the results and the formulation of a 
conclusion with major recommendations. The discussion's chapter intends to summarise and 
discuss the research findings and explored future development works to enhance the use of 
the proposed fire safety management model. The author explores the depth of knowledge 
covered in this PhD and how the project contributed to knowledge. The views of the Expert 
Committees is related on the steps forward and the applicability of the FSMM as a component 
in executing a broader client and contractor-oriented push towards better fire safety on site 
and managerial attitudes. Also discussed are a retrospective vision of the research and the 
interpretation of the main findings. The final chapter concludes the thesis and provides 
recommendations for future works. 
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2 FIRE SAFETY LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Introduction 
The risk of fire increases during construction or refurbishment of buildings because large 
quantities of combustibles are combined with numerous potential ignition sources. Of 618 
construction fires in 1993 in the UK, 59% were probably deliberate. The FPA confirmed in 
1999 that fires in construction industry escalate, and that 50% of serious fires occurred in 
buildings which were under conversion. Financial losses were considerable and, although 
insured, eventually must be met by society. Many of these fires could have been prevented - 
or the damage limited - by developing and implementing effective fire-safety plans and fire 
safety management systems which were strictly enforced from the outset of the procurement 
process. Fire management systems on construction projects reduced the risk of fire and its 
consequences. 
The existing legislative documents addressed this problem through a set of regulations, most 
commonly known as the Building Regulations 1991, Part B: Fire Safety, first published in 
1985 and updated in 2000. We can trace the first legislative incentive to William the 
Conqueror in Middle Ages. The legislative attempt appeared in the London Assize of 1189. 
However one specific disaster accelerated the process: The Great London fire in 1666 which 
destroyed 80% of the City. Early attempts at fire insurance were made in 1635 and 1638 by a 
mutual Friendly Society. Edinburgh was highly placed in the scene with an "Act regulating 
the Manner of Building within the Town of Edinburgh", passed in 1698 in Mary's reign. This 
Act required that in future no building should exceed five storeys. Many other events in 
England and Wales affected the evolution of the legislation throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The first Fire Prevention acts was passed in the town of Liverpool in 
1843 and 1844. Already in 1867, a Select Committee "inquire into the existing legislative 
provisions for the protection of life and property against fires in the UK, and as to the best 
23 
means to be adopted for ascertaining the causes and preventing the frequency of fires. " They 
recommended that a single Building Act for all towns in the UK should be placed. The UK 
legislation was reactive. Unfortunately, deaths needed to occur to get the system to advance 
and improve requirements. In 1897, the LCC reacted to the death of 124 people in the fire of 
a Paris Charity Bazaar, in 1881 450 people died in the Ring Theatre Vienna, 1903,566 in the 
Iroquois Theatre in Chicago, 70 children were suffocated and crushed in the Glen Cinema 
Paisley in 1929, in Liverpool 10 people were trapped in a four storey department store in 
1960; the Stardust Disco in Dublin in 1981, The Bradford City Football ground fire in 1985 
killed 56 people; The King's Cross fire in 1987, the Dusseldorf Airport fire in 1996 which 
killed 16 people. And one of the last to date The Mont Blanc Tunnel which killed 39 people. 
The first British Standard (BS) Code of Practice on "precautions against fire" was published 
in 1948 and concerned houses and flats of no more than two storeys. 
In 2000, the UK legislation is still under the Fire Precautions Act 1971, but separate 
regulations apply in England & Wales, Scotland and in Northern Ireland: 
" The Building Regulations, Edition 2000. 
0 The Building Standards (Scotland) Regulations 
0 The Building Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
Recently, fire safety regulation was reinforced by the publication of the Fire Precautions 
(Workplace) Regulation 1997, amended in 1999; the draft BSI (1997) Fire Safety Engineering 
in Buildings: Part 1. Guide to the application of fire safety engineering principles, the Loss 
Prevention Council Code of Practices which may be applicable to satisfy higher and 
different/additional standard of construction. 
Also European Directives are now being implemented by the UK government such as: 
" The Framework Directive, Council Directive 89/391/EEC, on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, coming 
into force 31 S` December 1992; 
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9 The Workplace Directive, Council Directive 89/654/EEC, concerning the minimum 
safety and health requirements for the workplace, with a deadline for implementation of 
this legislation in the Members State of 31" March 1995. 
" The 92/57/EEC directive concerns the Temporary and Mobile construction sites and 
reinforced the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements. 
Over the centuries, thousands of fires in buildings have been chronicled. These range from 
domestic fires to wholesale destruction of large and complex buildings such as the 
International Exhibition Centre at Brussels in 1910 and the Pavilion "Age of Discoveries" of 
the EXPO '92 in Seville. As technology became more and more complex, so the cost of 
building fires increased. What was of particular concern was the substantial rise in the cost 
implications of fires during the construction process, which were occurring with increasing 
regularity both on new-build sites and during refurbishment. The approach to fire safety in 
construction was unquestionably in need of review. Such a review was precipitated, 
primarily, as a result of the recent opening of the internal borders of Europe and, secondly, as 
a result of the enormous due to fires in almost completed buildings. Changes in work 
methods and attitudes in the construction process have been identified as a major factor and 
both fire precautions and management practices, urgently, to be re-assessed. 
The objective of this chapter was to analyse the legislative fire safety framework (Figure 3.1) 
in a selected number of Member States of the EU. The aim was to identify any weaknesses or 
strengths within the Member State Fire Safety Frameworks. It was anticipated that such 
investigations would raise a number of issues that would be developed in forthcoming 
chapters. 
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2.2 Fire Safety Legislation and Regulation 
In the UK, new regulations (CDM 1994) required the preparation and implementation of a 
Health & Safety Plan in every building site. However, there was a need to address fire safety 
as a fundamental requirement of such a plan. Our preliminary researches (Rullier, 1992) 
suggested that, certainly in the UK, France and Spain, there has been little appreciation within 
the EC before 1997 to address the problem of fire safety as fundamental legislated and it 
suggested that a similar situation could be encountered outside Europe and, possibly, world- 
wide. Pressures from the European Parliament (DG III: Industry) in 1994 suggested that the 
problem of fire should have been investigate where it was currently costing countries of the 
European Union approximately 1% of GDP (Geneva Association, 1997). For most European 
Countries, the cost of direct fire losses did not go above 0.40% of GDP (for Belgium) 
(Geneva Association, 1997). The UK is below this figure and therefore European Directives 
have not been identified as immediate and urgent measures for the European Union. 
However, the European Parliament urged the Council of Ministers to make a public 
announcement stating their concern over the level of fire costs in the EU, but directly 
towards the problem of fire on construction site. The Parliament also called the European 
Commission to establish a Working Party of fire experts whose terms of reference would be 
to recommend ways of tackling the fire problem. In 1996 one of the twenty proposed 
Motions put forward by a MEP to the Environment Committee stressed that fire resolution 
should "be recognised to be an issue of great importance", but it was first refused and the 
problem remains not addressed. 
For the purpose of this research, seven European countries were selected: France, United 
Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Netherlands. The analysis will cover three 
issues: Management, Implementation and Control within the European Fire Safety 
Framework, in comparison with the contemporary UK Fire Safety Framework. The approach 
towards Fire Safety in various EU Member State was thereafter compared with the Canada. 
Canada had a decentralised system which may offer further advantages upon comparison. It 
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was anticipated that by the end of this investigation, the researcher would be able to address 
the problem and identify weakness and strength within the European Framework, and 
ultimately suggested areas of improvement and further developments. 
2.3 The UK legislative framework: detailed review of legislative 
requirements in the UK. 
The problem of fire safety awareness was often exacerbated by the plethora of different 
regulations. For example, in the UK, a document, (P5) Standard Fire Precautions to be Taken 
by Contractors Engaged on Building and Engineering Works and Maintenance for the 
Department of the Environment, had been published in 1972 and a similar document to the 
Joint Code of Practice (on the Protection from Fire of Construction Sites and Buildings 
undergoing Removals) was published in 1980 by the Home Office. These last two documents 
contain many similarities and the Joint Code of Practice is mainly an improved version of P5. 
But, at the time of its publication, the later document was not viewed as a necessity, and its 
importance was not recognised until 1992. 
The UK fire legislation, as mentioned before, has to date been largely reactive. This means 
that almost every piece of legislature was the consequence of a serious fire incident. Only 
recently have new regulations been proposed or introduced pro-actively; but even these have 
been, in some circumstances, a result of European Commission Directive. 
Arrangements for the prevention of fires on construction sites should be integrated in the 
Passive Fire Protection system in the primary stage of construction and, at a later construction 
stage, there should be Active Fire Protection (refer to Figure 2.1). These points have been 
discussed later in this thesis. The regulations were implemented through a set of Standards, 
Approved Documents and Statutory instruments (refer to Figure 2.2). Concern was that in the 
UK fires on construction sites were only considered in one non-mandatory document, the 
Joint Code of Practice. The Building Regulations and their associated Approved Documents, 
and the Standards were applied during design and related only to the Fire Safety of the 
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finished product. Nothing in these documents addressed the problem of fire prevention on 
construction sites. 
Figure 2.1: General Fire Safety Framework 
UK Regulations 
Acts of Parliament: 
Fir Precautions Act 1971 
Health & safety at Work 
Act 1974 
Figure 2.2: The UK Regulations 
Approved Documents: 
Approved Document B 
BS 
Statutory Documents: 
JCOP for Fir. Prevention on 
Construction Sites 
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The problem of fire safety awareness was often exacerbated by a plethora of different 
regulations in many States. For example, in the UK, the legislative framework was contained 
within some forty-one general Acts of Parliament, five health and safety Acts, twenty-nine 
local Acts and a collection of some thirty-two sets of Regulations. To these must be added a 
further twenty-one general acts and over fifty sets of Regulations, Statutory Instruments and 
Designation Orders, all of which covered or impinged upon fire safety. This set of legislation 
was desperately in need of simplification (without, in so doing, causing an erosion of 
standards); it needed to place duties and responsibility on the right shoulders; it needed to 
inculcate, and to build on, good working practices and, above all, it should not have been a 
burden on either the enforcing authorities or on those expected to comply. 
Perhaps, in this review, minimum mandatory arrangements for the prevention of fires on 
construction sites should be introduced. However, they would not really be any substitute for 
good management practice, e. g. integrating the Passive Fire Protection system into the primary 
stage of construction and, at a later construction stage, ensuring Active Fire Protection systems 
were available. These points were discussed later in this thesis. 
2.3.1 Fire Safety Regulation for construction sites: 
The division of responsibility was beginning to be understood by the British government and, 
following a series of fire incidents, was stressed by the recent publication of a new set of 
regulations relating to Health & Safety: 
" The Joint Code of Practice for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites first published in 
1992 is now at its fourth Edition in 2000. 
" The consultative draft British Standard Code of Practice for the Application of Fire 
Safety Engineering Principles to Fire Safety in Buildings in 1997 (discussed in Section 
3.2) 
" The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations in April 1994 
The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations (CDM) imposed requirements and 
restrictions only with respect to design and management aspects of construction work. 
They 
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gave effect to European Council Directive 92/57/EEC on the implementation of minimum 
safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites. These regulations 
applied to, and are in relation to, construction work. Regulation 10 dealt with the start of the 
construction phase and states that every client shall ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
that the construction phase of any project does not start unless a Health & Safety Plan 
complying with regulation 15(4) has been prepared in respect of this project. Regulation 15 
described the requirements relating to the Health & Safety Plan and Regulation 16 the 
requirements on, and powers of, principal contractors. However, although seen as innovative 
and stringent, the CDM Regulations make no specific reference to Fire Precautions or Fire 
Safety. 
Document related to health and safety in construction and especially fire safety were fairly 
recent. The first published document on fire prevention on construction site was the P5: 
Standard Fire Precautions P5 by Department of Environment Property Services Agency, 
Directorate of Building Development. The P5 Guide recommends a set of standard fire 
precautions to be taken by the contractor engaged in building and engineering works and 
maintenance for the Department of the Environment Property Services Agency. In 1992, 
major bodies representing the construction industry for fire safety published a Code of 
Practice, the Joint Code of Practice for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites (BEC/LPC, 
1992). 
2.3.2 The Legislative situation in the UK: Discussion 
For the past ten years, the UK went through a long phase of review of its Fire Safety 
Framework. The Interdepartmental Review Team carried out the first Fire Legislation 
Review, "Fire Safety Legislation and Enforcement" (Home Office, 1997) published in June 
1994. The legislation the Review Team was asked to examine has two main strands: building 
control legislation and fire precautions legislation. The main theme of their 
findings was that 
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the current system of fire legislation would benefit from rationalisation and simplification. 
The Review Team also issued a number of recommendations and main changes. 
Nevertheless, Fire Safety measures taken in the UK were limited by the use of many modern 
techniques in engineering and architecture that have been widely developed by researchers for 
the past ten years. To overcome the inconstancies caused by the current approach to fire 
engineering, the British Standard Institute (BSI) prepared a draft document in 1991 "BS Code 
of Practice for the Application of Fire Safety Principles to Fire Safety in Buildings" (BSI, 
1996). This draft Code of Practice intends to provide standard way for building designers to 
depart from traditional fire safety concepts, providing they can demonstrate that the building 
will still achieve an acceptable level of fire safety. This approach has been also developed in 
other European Member States and it will be described later in this paper. A Working Party 
reviewed the draft Code of Practice and decided to keep it as a draft version, following a 
number of modifications. 
In 1994, there was much speculation about the weakening of fire safety regulation under the 
deregulation initiative. Two years later, Mr. John Heppell on the 11 December 1996 
suggested to the House of Commons that a Bill that would consolidate all fire safety 
legislation and would replace in part or in total more than 54 pieces of legislation on the 
statute book and put fire legislation into one single Bill (House of Commons Hansard, 1996) 
The Bill as proposed would be flexible enough to incorporate all future European legislation. 
One year later in November 1997, following a review, the Government published a 
consultation document entitled Fire Safety Legislation for the Future (Home Office, 1997). 
The consultation document sets out proposals for a new fire safety regime based on the main 
principles included in the Fire Safety Bill which in turn applied many recommendations of the 
June 1994 Interdepartmental Review of Fire Safety Legislation and Enforcement (Crichley et 
al., 1994). The proposed new regime should enable rationalisation and consolidation of 
existing legislation. 
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This new legislation simplifies the existing law, repealing and consolidating existing 
legislation where appropriate and takes full account of European Community obligations. 
The main trends of this new fire safety approach is to give more power at a local level, i. e. to 
decentralised the control of fire safety in buildings through the increasing involvement of Fire 
Authorities to ensure satisfactory arrangements for inspections. This new regime enforces the 
duty of Fire Authorities at a local level and community level. Another important feature of the 
new regulations is that they are goal-based rather than prescriptive. This fire safety 
engineering oriented approach is clearly considered under § 15 "... if employers wish to 
achieve compliance by other means, it is open to them to do so. " (Home Office, 1997). Five 
main streams have been identified throughout the new proposal: 
i. Duties on the "responsible person", i. e. owner or occupier. 
ii. Obligation to attend Fire Precautions. 
iii. Requirement to maintain adequate Fire Precautions, i. e. to review and to maintain in 
satisfactory order. 
iv. Freedom to chose the adequate fire safety solutions. 
v. All categories of premises would be covered unless exempted, i. e. single dwellings. 
Responsibility for fire safety in the UK was shared among a wide amalgam of interests, i. e. 
Government, Local Authorities and independent and professional bodies and their trade 
associations. Within the past 25 years with the implementation of the Fire Precautions Act 
1971, UK went through a series of enforcement of the fire safety Framework, and since the 
beginning of the 1990s three different reviews. However, it should be noted that, even now, 
fire safety is not explicit in the third of this document, the only one which has official 
regulatory status! Much progress has been done to integrate a fire safety approach within the 
UK framework. The edition of the JCOP in 1992, amended 4 times with the latest publication 
in 2000 (4`h' Edition) and its recognition in the JCT Forms of Contract published in 1998 made 
it a statutory requirement and non compliance under JCT a breach of contract. It took 10 years 
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to implement the concept of fire safety on construction site and make it a statutory 
requirement. 
UK has a centralised system. Figure 3.3: UK Fire Safety Framework provides an overview of 
the Framework. The Government has been writing all Acts, Building Regulations and Codes 
of Practice and Local Authorities have no power to enforce the Law and Regulations. The 
Secretary of State has the authority, under section 8 of the Building Act 1984, to relax or 
entirely dispense with the requirements of a particular Regulation in specific cases. This 
authority has also been delegated to the local authorities. While this might seem to be very 
wide sweeping power, in practice it hardly occurs at all. The reason being that almost all 
Regulations was now couched in terms requiring work to be "adequate" or "to a satisfactory 
level" 
Centralised System: 
Home Office: 
England and 
Wales 
National Regulations and 
Legislation: 
Acts of Parliament 
Building Regs 
Code of practice 
Scottish Office 
Department of the 
Environment 
Local Authorities and Fire 
Services: 
Implementation 
Figure 2.3: UK Fire Safety Framework 
Northern Ireland 
Office 
All those investigations have the same objective: reduce fire losses and improve fire safety in 
buildings. Table A in Appendix A gathered information published by the Geneva 
Association World Fire Statistics Centre (Geneva Association, 1997) in their September 
1997 bulletin 13 and two other sources of information for the Canada (Institut de Recherche 
en Construction, 1998; Human Resources Development Canada, 1998). It provided 
33 
international fire costs comparisons and especially a comparison between EU countries and 
the Canada and USA. The cost of Direct Fire Losses for the UK was estimated to be 0.16% 
of GDP, which is below the EU average (0.231% of GDP). Compare with other EU 
countries, the UK is in a very good position and over the last reduced the cost of Direct Fire 
Losses from £1,300m in 1991 to £950m in 1994. This clear reduction could have been 
explained by the Government initiative to improve the UK Fire Safety Framework and the 
series of reviews to improve the Fire Legislation. A lack of regulation for fire safety in 
dwellings and at home, and it was not a problem which had been fully addressed by the 
Government in its last investigation as single dwellings are again excluded from the 
categories of buildings. In 1999 the Home Office was asked to review the current fire safety 
strategy (Gately, 2000). The Approved Document B (Fire Safety) was reviewed to better 
address the needs for an improved level of safety in dwellings. The document was published 
in January 2000 and took effect from 1 July 2000. Gately (2000) comments on a fundamental 
need for future legislation to adopt an all-embracing approach and the need for society to 
develop a greater understanding of fire. 
2.3.3 Conclusion UK framework: 
The UK framework provided many strengths and compared to the rest of the EU and the 
world benefits from a long history. The strengths of the system lied within: 
i. The development of a separate set of regulation for fire safety on construction sites: The 
Joint Code of Practice for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites (1992 and 2000). 
ii. The JCOP was a requirement of Insurers and Clients and a specific clause of the 
Insurance contract. Compliance with the JCOP was compulsory and the insurers were 
engaged to inspect sites to check compliance and advice contractors and clients. 
iii. Under the terms of the contract (JCT Forms of Contract 1998) the Fire Code (JCOP) 
was a requirement and non-compliance is a contractual breach. 
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iv. The health and safety regulation was developed separately and thanks to the 
publications of the CDM Regulations in 1994, more emphasis is put on safety at a 
design stage. 
v. Some weaknesses must also be highlighted: 
vi. No requirement for systematic risk assessment. 
vii. Compliance with JCOP was not a requirement under other forms of contract to JCT: 
New Engineering Contract/ICE, FIDIC, Government Contracts... 
viii. A strong policy of risk inspection was required to support the implementation of fire 
safety principles on site. 
ix. Lack of recording of fire incidents didn't provide any evidence to support a possible 
improvement and reduction of fires on construction sites. 
2.4 The Legislative situation in France: 
Although the French system is not Federal and is centrally controlled by National Regulation 
and Codes there was scope for local variation through the powers of Mayors in towns and 
cities (Council) and the Prefect of a Departement (Region). 
French Regulations 
`I 
Codes du Travail 
Code de l'Urbanisme 
Code de la Construction et 
Habitation 
with the Acts Decrees 
(92/93/94), Arretes, 
Lettres Ministerielles. 
Figure 2.4: The French Regulations 
DTU: Document 
Technique Unifies 
NF: Normges Francaises 
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The World Fire Statistics Centre (Geneva Association, 1997) reported that the cost of direct 
fire losses in France is estimated at 0.25% of GDP (1992-94 statistics). The APSAD (1997) 
estimated that in 1996,145 fires cost more than 5mFF and nearly for 12% of them fire losses 
were estimated to be superior to 50mFF. The government and its different ministers have 
been regulating fire safety in France. The French system was not Federal and was centrally 
controlled by national regulations and codes that came into force in 1978. Any contractor 
owner or developer was obliged, both during the construction and the use of building to 
respect the measures of prevention and maintenance of the property to ensure the safety of the 
persons. These measures are described under a set of Codes: 
i. Code de 1'Urbanisme (Code of Urbanism) 
ii. Code de la Construction et de 1'Habitation (Construction and Building Code): this was 
the main code which provided requirements for Fire Safety for four different types of 
buildings: Dwellings (Habitation), Public Buildings (Etablissement Recevant Public), 
High Rise Construction (Immeuble de Grande Hauteur), and any Industrial and listed 
Buildings (Bätifnent Industriel et Installations Classees). 
iii. Code du Travail (Code of Work) which dealt with the requirements for places of work 
and gave details about Fire Safety Measures in the workplace. 
iv. Further technical requirements are listed under a set of regulations called Documents 
Techniques Unifies (DTU) and a number of Norms or Standards called Normes 
Francaises (NF). 
The fire protection regulations were implemented through the Arrete from the 31.01.1986 (OJ 
1540 and 1603) and detailed in the Code de l'Urbanisme and the Code de la Construction et 
de l 'Habitation. The Fire Safety Philosophy in France could be summarised in three points: 
i. Prevention of Fires, 
ii. Emergency and Evacuation Plan, 
iii. Fire Fighting Plan 
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Health and safety regulations have been implemented through the Code du Travail which 
registered all acts and regulations in the workplace in France. One Act, two Decrees (Decret) 
and one Arrete detailed the regulatory requirements applying to construction sites and safety: 
" The 1993 Act of 31 December 1993, amending the provisions of the Code du Travail 
applicable' to building and civil engineering operations, to protect the health and safety of 
workers. The European Directive 92/57/CEE of June 1992 on the Temporary and Mobile 
Construction Sites Directive was transposed in this Act. The 1993 Act was divided in 4 
sections: general principles, the prevention and coordination of construction operations 
(nomination and role of the planning supervisor), integration of safety in the design, sub- 
contractors works with a specific a reference to penalties clauses. 
" The Decree of 8 January 1965 (Decret 1965) which applied to organisations wherez 
employees carrying out, even in exceptional circumstances, some foundation works, 
construction, demolition, maintenance, refurbishment / renovation, cleaning, any other 
construction activities applying to different types of facilities and their use, as described 
in the Decree 1965. 
" The Decree of 20 February 1992 (Decret 1992): The Code du Travail provided specific 
regulatory requirements3 for construction works carried out in any facilities in use by an 
external organisation (contractor/sub-contractor). The Section 1 (General Principles), 
Article 237-1 required that when the employees of one or several organisations, named 
external organisations, executed a construction activity or participated to a construction 
' Afin d'assurer la securite et de proteger la sante de toutes les personnes qui interviennent sur un 
chantier de bätiment ou de genie civil, le maitre d'ouvrage, le maitre d'oeuvre et le coordonateur 
mentione ä Particle L. 235-4 doivent, tant au cours de la phase de conception, d'etude et d'elaboration 
du projet que pendant la realisation de l'ouvrage, mettre en oeuvre les principes generaux de prevention 
enonces dans ]'article L. 230-2 (Loi n. 93-1418 du 31 Decembre 1993). 
2 Le decret de 1965 s'applique aux entreprises "dont le personneleffectue, meme a titre occasionel, des 
travaux de terrassement, de construction, d'installation, de demolition, d'entretien, de refection, de 
nettoyage, toutes operations annexes et tous autres travaux pre vus par le present decret, portant sur des 
immeubles par nature ou par destination" (D. 8 Janv. 1965, art 1). 
3 Lorsque une ou des entreprises, dites entreprises exte reiures, font intervenir leur personnel aux fins 
d'executer une operation ou de participer ä ('execution d; une operation, quelle que soit sa nature, 
industrielle ou non, dans un etablissement d'une entreprise, dite utilisatrice, ou dans ses dependances 
ou chantiers, le chef d'entreprise utilisatrice et le ou les chefs des entreprises extdrieures sont tenus de 
se conformer aux dispositions du present chapitre. 
37 
activities, whatever their definitions, industrial or not, in the facilities of another 
organisation, named user organisation, or within any of their facilities or sites, the owner 
of the user organisation and the owner(s) of the external organisations must comply with 
the requirements set out in the Decree 1992. 
" The Arrete of 19 March 1993 fixed, in compliance with the article R. 237-8 of the Code 
du Travail, a list of works at risk for which a plan of prevention was required. The list 
details 21 construction and work activities classified as "dangerous" and with a risk: 
electrical works, welding and cutting, demolition works, maintenance activities on 
specific equipment... 
The coordination on construction sites is regulated by two Decrees: 
0 The 1992 Decree, establishing the responsibilities of the external organisation carrying 
out work activities in a facility in use and/or owned by the facility user. 
0 The 1994 Decree, more specific and limited to construction and civil engineering works. 
Both decrees couldn't be applied for the same construction activity. However several distinct 
activities could be carried out on site or in a facility and each under the scope of one decree, 
either 1992 Decree or 1994 Decree, depending on the nature of the activity. 
2.4.1 The Legislative situation in the France: Discussion 
Fire Safety Regulation and legal requirements are mainly centralised under the Government 
directive. Several Ministries are responsible for the implementation of the Fire Safety 
Regulation in different areas. The Government and Parliament develop Laws and the 
Ministries concerned elaborate settlements that were applied to the whole national territory. 
Powers are given to the Mayors and the Prefect (Le Prefet, one per Departement). 
A Safety 
Commission was implemented under the direction of the Ministry of Interior and sub-divided 
in departmental commissions responsible for the control and the compliance of 
fire safety 
measures implemented into the building. Figure 2.5 described the French 
Framework. 
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The handover of the building was a detailed process involving the issue of the Certificate of 
Conformity (Certificat de Conformite). The French Fire Authority was involved in the design 
and construction of Buildings but the Fire Service Authorities were only involved in 
Committees especially dealing with the Construction of High Rise Buildings (IGH) and 
Public Buildings (ERP). 
Centralisation: 
National Codes: 
*Code de l'Urbanisme 
*Code de la Construction 
et de l' Habitation 
*Code du Travail 
Decentralisation: 
Local I M F Fire Services: 
Authorities: *Control 
*Enforcement *Inspection 
through Planning *Monitoring 
Figure 2.5: French Fire Safety Framework 
The operation of a local fire safety committee implied more co-ordination between 
departments than in the UK where the building control officers did not have formal links with 
the fire service. 
The French law and regulations applying to fire safety and health and safety in construction 
activities was much more detail than the UK system. The depth of requirements as detailed in 
the Code du Travail and regarding health and safety in the workplace, considered a site as a 
workplace. 
The definition of a construction activity was broader in the Code du Travail than in the 
UK regulation, taking into account activities of construction and demolition, but also 
maintenance, cleaning, refurbishment and renovation works. 
The coordination of risk prevention activities on building and civil engineering sites was 
translated through the 1993 Act of 31 December 1993 and the 1994 Decree. Inter alia the Act 
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provides for the integration of safety at the work design stage, the organisation of site 
coordination and the application of health and safety legislation to self-employed workers. 
This law was comparable to the CDM Regulations in the UK and provided in depth 
requirements for health and safety in general. However, there were no specific requirements 
for fire safety, as it appeared to have been integrated under health and safety. However fire 
was recognised as a risk and the 1993 Arrete listing dangerous activities taking into account 
a range of activities involving a naked flame, welding work and hot work, as well as electrical 
work and the maintenance of technical equipment. 
A strong policy of cooperation between contractor and client or facility users and/or owners 
came across the regulation. The Code du Travail (Article L. 235-10) explained than when 
several construction activities were carried out by several contractors, all contractors must 
cooperate to prevent risks resulting from the overlapping of construction activities. The 
implementation of the 1992 Decree required a permanent exchange of information: between 
the organisations owners (contractors / subcontractors / client), between the organisations and 
the external institutions controlling the construction work activities (work inspectors, health 
and safety executives bureaux, social security... ) and between each organisation and their 
staff committees. A risk inspection carried out prior to start the construction works was 
mandatory for all organisations participating in the project. This risk analysis aimed to 
assess common risks and define technical choices and preventative measures to 
implement on site. A prevention plan is required when the construction activities cover more 
than 400h per, year and when the operations are considered as dangerous works described in 
the 1993 Arrete. 
The extensive requirements in the French regulations and laws for health and safety 
were much more developed than in the UK. However, there is no regulation to enforce 
fire 
safety on construction sites. Pressure to apply fire safety principles at a 
design stage is clear 
but aimed to protect facilities once they are completed. The fire safety of workers on site 
is 
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regulated in the Code du Travail under the general health and safety requirements. Fire is still 
considered as a dangerous activity and its prevention is addressed in the prevention plan. 
2.4.2 Conclusion French framework: 
In conclusion a list of specific issues are worth mentioning: 
i. A clear definition of construction sites taking into account construction, demolition, 
maintenance, cleaning, refurbishment/renovation works. 
ii. A strong health and safety law to protect workers on construction and civil engineering 
projects 
iii. Need for specific fire safety regulation for the prevention of fires on construction sites, 
apart from the recognition of dangerous operations like welding and cutting, electrical 
operations. 
iv. Maintain the promotion of cooperation between organisations participating to the 
construction process and its operations, through the development of a common risk 
assessment and prevention plan. 
2.5 Comparison between European / Canadian and US Approaches: 
By comparing the Canadian and US approach with the European approaches, it was 
interesting to note major difference in terms of the objectives of the Fire Safety Framework. 
The objective of the Canadian Fire Code was to improve public fire safety, and especially 
safety in the home (Fire Code will require smoke alarm in homes built before 1976. Newer 
homes had already required to have smoke alarm installed). Emphasis on prevention and 
public education was strong. In most European Member States, fire safety in home was a 
great concern but there remains no regulation to minimise the number of fires in home. 
In the 
UK the last fire safety proposal excluded single dwelling from the categories covered by the 
regulation. The last fire statistics review revealed an increase in the number of 
fires (2%) and 
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an increase of 16% in fire death over the period 1993-94 (Home Office Statistics, 1995). 
Canada had a drop of 60% of fire fatalities within the past 25 years (Canada NewsWire, 
1997c) and a decrease of 10.61% from 1993 to 1994 (Fire Prevention, 1998). 
For more than 100 years, the NFPA has been developing and updating codes and 
standards concerning all areas of fire safety. Currently there are more than 300 NFPA fire 
codes and standards used throughout the world. NFPA 1, Fire Prevention Code addressed 
basic fire prevention requirements necessary to establish a reasonable level of fire safety and 
property protection from the hazards created by fire and explosion. NFPA's code and 
standard-making process began in 1896 when a small group of concerned professionals 
met in Boston to address inconsistencies in the design and installation of sprinkler systems. 
The NFPA (2001) commented that "one of the unique things about the code and standards 
making process is that it is truly an open, consensus-based process. " The legal procedure 
for adopting a code or standard differed from one jurisdiction to another. The sense of 
decentralisation and adaptation of the regulation was stronger in the US and allowed for a 
lot of flexibility. The NFPA argued that the adoption of the fire safety documents, along with 
increased public awareness of fire safety practices, has resulted in significant reductions in the 
loss of life and property damage due to the effects of fire. The NFPA Journal (1995) argued 
that between 1937 and 1956 a number of significant fires led to changes or development in 
NFPA codes and standards. Some of the elements and requirements covered in the UK JCOP 
are covered in law in the US. The OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) of 
the United States Department of Labor, in the Occupational Safety and Health Standards for 
the Construction Industry, argued for a earlier installation of fire protection systems during 
the construction process and demolition and alteration of facilities. NFPA standards on 
fire 
risk during the construction process existed since 1930s and a major emphasis on the risk of 
hot works in confined space (roof, ships, basement, parking... ) has long 
been recognised as a 
major risk. 
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In respect of fire safety in the home, the UK Government on the 7 April 1998 accepted a 
separate report of the Community Fire Safety Task Force (Home Office, 1997). This report 
proposed a two-year strategy plan in order to reduce significantly the incidence of fire in the 
home. In 2000 the Home Office published an updated version of the Approved Document B 
(Fire Safety) (2000) and considers the fire safety of dwellings. The main idea of the new 
regime presented by the UK Government seemed to be orientated around the idea of 
decentralisation of the authority and decision making process related to Fire safety in 
buildings at a Local level rather than National. This should be achieved through a higher 
involvement of the Fire Authorities at the Community Level. It was also an attempt to put 
more pressure and responsibilities on the "responsible person" so far defined as the owner or 
occupier of the property concerned. This last point tends to join the CDM approach and 
philosophy. 
The UK decentralisation movement was not unique in Europe. France, Spain and Germany 
decentralised decision-making and organise control at the Local level. Local Authorities may 
have the power to modify or enforce the fire safety regulation either through planning or 
direct enforcement, and organised its implementation and control through inspections. 
Whilst the Canadian approach may not have been the optimal solution, Decentralisation 
within the Fire Safety Framework would certainly appear to have offered benefits for the 
European Member States Legislative Frameworks. Providing Autonomy to Local 
Authorities, Provinces / Regions would answer a number of issues raised in this chapter and 
would be more user oriented. 
It was still too early to evaluate the impact of the Canadian new framework. But 
recommendations could be made at a Member State level to consider a more flexible 
approach to fire safety through a decentralisation process. By giving more power to the 
Regions and Local Authorities and organising feedback between the different level of 
Government (National / Regional / Local), the existing fire safety framework could have been 
improved: a better control framework, a strict inspection programme with an increasing 
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involvement of the Fire Services. General regulations and standards could be agreed at a 
National level (Inputs), thereby creating a legislative framework and adoption scope by the 
regions and Local Authorities which would have the power to enforce the existing framework 
to adapt it to a particular property (Outputs). The following model is proposed: Figure 3.13: 
Proposed Fire Safety Framework. 
INPUTS: 
CENTRA- 
-LISATION 
Government: 
*Legislative 
Framework 
*Regulations & 
Standards 
DECENTRALI- 
SATION: 
Regional: 
*Enforcement of 
National 
Standards 
Figure 2.6: Proposed Fire Safety Framework 
OUTPUTS: 
AUTONOMY 
Local Authority: 
*Consultation 
*Implementation 
*Control 
*Inspection 
The Canadian experience indicated that by giving too much power to the Local Authorities, 
that is to permit the direct adoption of National Regulations, the system was not efficient. 
This approach was abandoned in Canada in 1975 and more support was given to facilitate the 
application of National Regulations at either a Regional or Local level of government. 
One major weakness has been identified in the various European Fire Safety Legislative 
Framework: the problem of Control and Feedback between the Government levels. The 
new Canadian strategy clearly addresses this problem. The whole structure might need to be 
reviewed in the majority of Member States, but too often mistakes are repeated. Those 
mistakes could be avoided if a clear control and feedback system was to be systematically 
adopted and supported by regular reviews. It is evident that we have been learning 
from 
mistakes and therefore we shouldn't ignore them. The Proposed Fire Safety 
Framework 
(Figure 3.13) clearly addresses this issue. 
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The second major point that this proposed model suggests was the idea of Consultation. 
Throughout the first part of this chapter with the comparison of EU Fire Safety Framework, 
Germany and the Netherlands presented a similar pattern: at a local level, decision-making 
was carefully made between three parties: Owner, Fire Service and Insurance Company (The 
Netherlands) or Building Surveyor (Germany). France presented a similar pattern between 
the Fire Service, the Owner and the Local Authorities at a design and completion phase. 
By identifying strength in each separate framework the author have been able to propose a 
new Fire Safety Framework model that would further facilitate the UK trend to decentralise 
decision-making and increase the power of Regional and Local Authorities. But also by 
giving more executive power to Region and Local Authorities, the Government would be able 
to reinforce the control procedure. At a Local level, Consultation between at least three 
parties would be emphasised in order to improve the standard and answer the needs of the 
users (Users-oriented). The final focus of the model was to provide Feedback from Region 
and Local Authorities to the Government. The objective of this new approach was first to 
monitor progress and secondly, to improve and adapt the general requirements, adopted 
at a National level, to the needs of the users and the Communities. 
2.6 European Directives: Fire Safety on Construction Sites in the UK and 
France. 
Pressure from the EU to implement a new set of construction directives forced European 
countries to review, update, modify and sometimes implement new measures regarding 
health 
& safety in general and fire safety in building. Among the Members 
State active regarding 
fire safety, France and the UK are two majors driving force. This chapter 
intended to review 
fire safety measures in France and the UK for construction sites and presented a comparative 
study of legislative requirements. 
The construction sector provided 7% of all workers in the community. 
For 15% of all 
industrial accidents, 30% of all fatal accidents occur in this sector 
(OJ, 1991) 
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The rates of fatalities in Member States of the EU revealed a large number of disparities 
between France and the UK. The Government Statistical Service (1997) concluded that Great 
Britain fatalities were one of the lowest in Europe and lower than in the USA. A detail of 
fatalities by industries showed that 8.9/100,000 employees were victims of fatal accidents in 
construction in the UK against 17.6/100,000 in France in 1993 (Government Statistical 
Service, 1997). In 1993 (Commission of the European Communities) revealed that the cost of 
accident on construction sites in the EC was equivalent of ECU 15,000 million for 1987 
(direct and indirect costs). 
The Commission of the European Communities (1993) also revealed that 90% of the total 
cost of construction accident (ECU 15,000 million) was carried throughout the site or 
execution phase. Fire and explosions count for 3% of the main types of accidents on 
construction sites in the EC, therefore approximately costing ECU450 million during site 
execution. Fortunately, fires were not the main cause of these accidents and few construction 
workers were fatal victims. Nevertheless, severe damages to the facilities and high economic 
losses demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of fire during the construction / demolition 
/ refurbishment in general, of buildings. 
These figures gave rise to a lot of concern about the reduction of accidents on sites and 
measures to implement to decrease the number of accidents. The answer of the EC emerged 
through several Council Directives between 1989 and 1992. An important body of 
Community legislation in the area of health and safety at work was developed and made a 
significant contribution to workplace working conditions. Prior to the 92/57/EEC Directive, 
the EC developed two major pieces of legislation: 
" The Framework Directive, Council Directive 89/391/EEC, on the introduction of 
measures to encouraged improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, which 
came into force 31 S` December 1992; 
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" The Workplace Directive, Council Directive 89/654/EEC, concerning the minimum 
safety and health requirements for the workplace, with a deadline for implementation of 
this legislation in the Members State of 31" March 1995. 
" The 92/57/EEC directive concerns the Temporary and Mobile construction sites and 
reinforced the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements. 
The table 2.1 below provided a summary of the aims and objectives of the new Directives and 
their deadlines for implementation. 
Council Title Aims and Objectives Deadline for Comments: 
Directive Implementa 
Lion 
89/391/EEC Framework The introduction of 31/12/92 General measures for 
Directive measures to encourage health and safety at 
improvements in the safety work. 
and health of workers at 
work. 
89/654/EEC Workplace To provide the minimum 31/12/92 First directive within 
Directive safety and health the meaning of Article 
requirements for the 16(1) of the Directive 
workplace. 89/391/EEC. 
92/57/EEC Temporary and The implementation of 31/12/93 Eighth individual 
Mobile minimum safety and health directive within the 
construction requirements at temporary meaning of the Article 
sites Directive or mobile work sites. 16 of Directive 
89/391 /EEC. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Council Directives 89/391/EEC, 89/654/EEC, 92/57/EEC. 
These Directives addressed the problem of health and safety at work in very different way. It 
was the duty of each individual Members State to implement every Directive. Individual 
countries interpreted and translated the legislative document, according to the 
level of 
provisions in their existing legislative documents (regulation, standards, code of practice, etc. 
) 
and their willingness to improve current level of health and safety. 
The intention of this section was to review, first of all, the European Directives and to analyse 
in details the Framework Directive related to general health and safety provisions 
in the 
workplace and the temporary and mobile construction sites 
directives which directly and 
specifically covered fire safety measures for construction works. 
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In a second time, the author compared and contrasted the UK and French legislative 
frameworks and how these Directives have been interpreted and implemented in each 
Members State, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses. 
2.7 Fire safety requirements within the Council Directives: 
The Framework Directive 89/391/EEC related to fire safety measures under the article 8, 
and required the employer to provide adequate fire fighting facilities and means of escape at 
the workplace and liaison with the emergency services internally and externally. This 
Directive introduced general health and safety requirements at the workplace. However the 
Directive did not provide a clear definition of a `workplace' and excludes a construction 
site as a workplace. The provision of Article 16 referred to the application of other directives 
for specific purposes within which the temporary and mobile directive, lately published in 
1992. 
The temporary or mobile work sites Directive 92/57/EEC defined in details a workplace 
as "any construction site at which building or civil engineering works are carried out". 
This new directive intended to implement the minimum health and safety requirements at 
temporary or mobile construction sites. These requirements should have been brought into 
force in the Member states by 3 1St December 1993. The temporary or mobile construction 
sites directive applied to any construction sites at which works were carried out, i. e. according 
to the Council Directive 92/57/EEC Annex 1: any "excavation, earthworks, construction, 
assembly of disassembly of prefabricated elements, conversion or fitting out, alterations, 
renovation, repairs, dismantling, demolition, upkeep, maintenance and drainage", for any 
construction sites on which "more than one contractor is present. " 
Specific provisions were made regarding fire safety under the Annex IV Part A, section 3 
(emergency routes and exits) and 4 (fire detection and fire fighting). These sections required 
the employer to provide minimum clear emergency procedures in case of fire and an 
operational fire protection system on temporary or mobile construction sites. Requirements 
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regarding emergency exits and routes tended to be very general except a clear provision for 
fire exit signage and emergency lighting. These requirements were completed within the 
Council Directives 77/576/EEC and 92/58/EEC for provisions of health and safety signs at 
work. However requirements regarding fire fighting and detection were much more specific 
to implement active fire protection measures, and in certain cases a temporary automatic fire 
detection system (alarms, portable detection equipment and fire extinguishers, etc. ). 
Furthermore such requirements required an adequate maintenance plan and regular checking. 
There was no indication on the frequency of this maintenance and checking plan. 
Independently to the measures detailed above, the Directive introduced a new concept and 
required the client to appoint a Planning Supervisor whose role was to develop and implement 
a Health & Safety Plan on behalf of the client. Under the Articles 4,5 and 6 the Directive 
required the Planning Supervisor to act at different stages of the construction project: 
0 Article 4: Project preparation stage where the planning supervisor must take into account 
"the general principles of prevention concerning health and safety"; 
0 Article 5: Project preparation stage, detailing the duties of coordinators: "(a) coordinate 
the implementation of the provisions [of the Directive], (b) draw up, or cause to be drawn 
up a safety and health plan, (c) prepare a file appropriate to the characteristics of the 
project. " 
0 Article 6: Project execution stage during which the Planning Supervisor is responsible for 
"(a) the implementation of the general principles of prevention and safety, (b) coordinate 
the implementation of relevant provisions, (c) make, or cause to be made, any 
adjustments required to the health and safety plan... (d) organise cooperation between 
employers and if necessary for the protection of workers, self employed persons, (e) 
coordinate arrangements, (f) take the steps necessary to ensure that only authorise person 
are allowed onto the construction site. " 
A review of the provisions required under each directive was now complete. The role of each 
member state was to implement these directives within a limited timescale. Their objectives 
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were to ensure that the prescriptive requirements were translated or interpreted through or 
within the Member State existing legislation and/or regulations. The objectives of the 
following chapters were to examine how the directives have been implemented in France and 
the UK. 
2.8 The UK Legislative framework and general requirements regarding 
fire safety on construction sites: 
A series of severe fires on UK construction sites gave rise to a lot of concerns regarding fire 
safety in facilities at which building works are carried out. The introduction of a set of 
documents between 1991 and 1999 was an answer to a need to improve the level of safety on 
site and implement appropriate prevention methods to reduce and as much as possible, 
minimise the risk of fire during the work execution. The HSE (1997) estimated that more than 
15 fires occur on construction every working day. The cost of these accidents was more 
difficult to evaluate and as a consequence, information available on this subject was not very 
reliable. Nevertheless, it could be estimated the average annual cost of fires, according to the 
study of different sources (HSE, 1997; Home Office, 1998) to be around £40-70 million. This 
figure compared with the total fire losses in the UK gives an average cost between 5-10% of 
the total fire losses. The cause of these fires, when reported to the HSE was as difficult to 
access. 
Three main sets of legislative documents were of interest in the case of fires on construction 
sites: 
i. The Loss Prevention Council Code of Practice for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites 
and in Buildings undergoing renovation, published in 1992 under the pressure of 
insurers (last edition 2000). 
ii. The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 which came into 
force 
on 3 1St March 1994 and as a result of the Council Directive 92/57/EEC. 
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iii. The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 which came into force on 1 S' 
December 1997 (amended in 1999) and also as a result of the Council Directive 
89/654/EEC. 
The UK has adopted wide deregulation policies in order to reduce the large number of general 
health and safety related legislation. The last two documents reflected this political measure 
and contributed towards the improvement of the general health and safety requirements for 
workers on construction sites. The measures detailed in these documents had the objective to 
improve the level of health and safety on construction sites and provide specific requirements 
regarding fire safety in the workplace. 
The Fire Code (LPC, 1992 and 2000), so called since its integration into the newly published 
main UK standard form of contracts JCT98 (Joint Contract Tribunal published in 1998), was 
an essential requirement for any contractor undertaking building works. This Fire Code 
highlighted a number of important principles the contractor was required to follow during the 
construction or any other type of building works. Its principles were simple, easy to 
implement and somehow logical for any mind concerned about the safety of the workforce 
and the general public. However, this document was a Code of Practice and not a legislative 
enforcement. Contractors were forced to respect the terms of this code by the pressure of 
insurers, following two majors construction related fires in 1991 and 1992, highlighted later 
in this chapter. 
Following major concerns regarding health and safety in the workplace in EU Members State, 
the ECC decided to implement a specific number of Council Directives regarding health and 
safety solely. In 1989, the Framework and Workplace Directives were prepared. 
Both 
directives gave rise to a very large number of modifications of the UK_health and safety 
legislative framework. A review of existing documents (A review of health & safety 
legislation, 1989) highlighted a need to significantly reduce the number of existing documents 
and secondly to adopt an innovative approach to reduce and minimise 
health and safety risks 
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on construction site. Following the Workplace Directive in 1992, the UK modified or 
updated twenty different sets of documents (regulations, code of practices, guidance). 
i. The Construction (General Provision Regulations) 1961. 
ii. The Construction (Lifting Operations) Regulations 1961. 
iii. The Construction (Working Places) Regulations 1966. 
iv. The Construction (Health and Welfare) regulations 1966. 
v. Six amendments of Regulation 1961 between 1974 and 1992. 
vi. Four amendments of Regulation 1996 between 1974 and 1992. 
vii. The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994. 
viii. The Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 1992. 
In 1992, contractors were flouted with the recent "six pack" of safety rules, officially called 
the Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992. Until that date, the contractors 
were solely responsible to control their own safety regime. However since 3 1S` March 1995, 
new duties have been placed upon the clients, client's agents, designers and contractors to 
rethink their approach to health and safety. The CDM (Construction (Design & Management) 
Regulations 1994 were a major step ahead regarding safety on construction sites. It focussed 
on the redistribution of responsibilities among the construction participants by transferring 
part of the risk to the clients and designers. There were also emphasis to re-organise the health 
and safety prior to the execution phase from the conception phase to the hand over and 
beyond. 
A Report commissioned by CIRIA (1997) concluded that following the implementation of the 
CDM Regulations "the profile of health and safety in the industry has increased dramatically 
and most practitioners readily admit that they are still learning. Health and safety is less and 
less seen as a site issue or as a specialist skill. " Although the report highlighted difficulties to 
understand and interpret the regulation, often linked to a lack of knowledge and incompetence 
of their participants, it "generally appeared the industry made its best to make 
CDM work. " 
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Following a study of small and medium construction companies in the UK, Tyler and Pope 
(1999) concluded that there is almost universal awareness of the existence of the regulations 
except in respect of firms with less than 5 employees. 
The CDM regulations 1994 focussed on four main areas: The role of the client, The role of 
the designer, The role of the Planning Supervisor, The Health & Safety File. 
The degree to which this regulation related to fire safety on construction is not clear. However 
the role of the Planning Supervisor is clear regarding the preparation of the health and safety 
plan and as a liaison between the parties, at pre-contract stage and throughout the execution of 
the works. Preece and al (1999) highlighted that the single most significant change the CDM 
brought was the introduction of a new role, namely the Planning Supervisor. The client 
appoints this later. 
The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 imposed duties on the employer to 
provide the employees with the adequate fire safety provisions in respect of every workplace, 
which was under the control of the employer. These requirements included the provisions of 
fire-fighting and fire detection measures in case of fire, emergency routes and exits in order to 
safeguard the safety of employees and the implementation of a "... suitable system of 
maintenance... " This regulation defined workplace as "any premises, not being domestic 
premises, used for the purposes of an employer's undertaking and which are made available 
to an employer as a place of work... " Unfortunately this definition excluded a 
construction site as place of work. However, where construction operations take place in an 
occupied facility, the directives applies. 
2.9 The French Legislative framework and general requirements 
regarding fire safety on construction sites: 
In contrary to the UK, France didn't have a track record of major fires on construction sites. 
At least, there were no statistics which demonstrate the impact of fire incidents. However, 
detail statistics were available for Paris and its region compiled by the Paris Fire 
Brigade on a 
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regular basis. For a total of 18,500 reported fires in Paris and its region, in average more than 
250 fires occur on site (Brigade des Sapeurs Pompiers de France, 1999). In France, fire safety 
legislative requirements are covered in a Decree and Order from 1992. These documents were 
published following the new Framework Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work. These texts 
introduced a specific number of preventive fire safety requirements for every facility used as 
a workplace. Prior to 1992, the French Code du Travail did not provide any requirements 
regarding fire safety at the workplace. Chapter 3.2 describes the main health and safety 
requirements on construction sites in France and the texts applying to site coordination. 
Following the Workplace Directive in 1992, France modified or updated six different set of 
documents (either Decrees or Act) compared to twenty by the UK. 
INRS ND 1993-159-95: 
i. Act N. 93-1418 of 3 ist December 1993 modifying the Code du Travail applicable to the 
building and civil engineering operations at the workplace. 
ii. Decree N. 94-1159 from the 26tß' December 1994 regarding the integration of security 
and coordination of health and safety matters at the workplace, 
iii. Order of 7`h March 1995 describing the duties of the Planning Supervisor to 
communicate a prior notice in the case a specific construction sites. 
iv. Order of 70' March 1995 detailing the requirements regarding the training of Planning 
Supervisors and the accreditation of training centres. 
v. Lettre Ministerielle of 3rd October 1995. 
vi. Lettre Ministerielle of 10`x' October 1995. 
The role of the Planning Supervisor in France is someone different 
from the UK concept. The 
first Act 1991 provides requirements which were not covered in the Code 
du Travail. The Act 
introduces specific measures on the health and safety at the workplace, and specifically 
general principles regarding the prevention of accidents. These principles should 
force the 
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construction sector to adopt an innovative approach towards the prevention and coordination 
of health and safety matters in the workplace. An analysis of the risks and a systematic 
prevention approach is promoted, taking into account technical factors and human behaviour 
in the place of work. A control and monitoring system is implemented and the role of the 
inspectors is reinforced. By using a punitive approach, and employers are forced to respect 
the law. However prior to this Act, the definition of the workplace did not fully recognised a 
site as a workplace. The 93 Act introduces the Planning Supervisor, his role and 
responsibilities throughout the construction project. Articles 1 to Article 8 are an 
interpretation of the 91/383/EEC Directive. However Article 9 present a punitive procedure, 
whereby the employer would be required to pay at least £3,000 if he doesn't respect the law. 
In certain cases, penalties reach the sum of £6,000 when a Planning Supervisor has not been 
appointed by the client, when the competencies of the Planning Supervisor are argued or if no 
Health and Safety Plan is not implemented. This punitive procedure is not a requirement of 
the UK CDM Regulations 1994. The French 93 Act requires the client to employ a competent 
Planning Supervisor under the Article 2, Section 2: Art. L. 235-4. This person must be any 
natural or legal person entrusted by the client and/or project supervisor. However according to 
the same Article, the function of the Planning Supervisor is defined in the Decree 94-1159 of 
26 December 1994, on safety integration and the organisation of the coordination in the 
interest of health and safety, stating, inter alia, the conditions inherent in the role of the 
Planning Supervisor. Two successive Orders of March 1995, fixed the content of the prior 
declaration to be made by coordinators working on certain building and civil engineering 
works (translation of the Annex III of the Directive 92/57/EEC), and on the training of 
coordinators and their training instructors, and the official accreditation of training 
organisations. 
Under the 92/57/EEC Directive, Annex IV describes the minimum safety and 
health 
requirements for construction sites. Part A of this annex provides general requirements 
for on- 
site workplaces, and cover emergency routes and exits, fire 
detection and fire fighting and 
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other health and safety issues. The French documents published following the publication of 
this Directive and others, did not cover these minimum requirements. The current French 
practice regarding fire safety separated the construction sites facilities from the building under 
construction. For the construction site facilities and as much as possible, the fire safety 
prevention measures apply. These requirements were detailed in three different Decrees (92- 
322 / 92-323 / 92-332) and one Order (04/11/93) following the Council Directive 89/391/EEC 
concerning safety and health requirements in the workplace. For the construction site under 
development and depending on its future use, the fire safety measures applying to this type of 
building were progressively applied throughout the completion. This procedure is currently 
used by the Planning Supervisors in France. Unfortunately there were no guidelines available 
to this profession. 
2.10 Comparative study France / UK and discussion: 
Interpretation and transposition of the Council Directives between 1989 and 1999: The 
comparative analysis revealed a number of discrepancies between the French and UK 
legislative procedure. An outline of the transposition of the directives in the UK and French 
legislative and regulatory framework was proposed in the table 2.2.. A discussion around the 
mechanism of transposition of the European directives in Members States on general 
perspective is presented. First of all, the initiative to develop a European Directive was built 
on a common approach on a specific issue and could emerged from the need and interest 
(political, economical... ) of various entities: commission, one or more members states, 
lobbies, European Parliament, professional institutions... A complex stage of discussion was 
materialised through the proposal of a draft, then a review (internal or external). The 
comments were expressed through a new draft proposal and the acceptance and publication of 
the text is decided. In average (except perhaps for stringent matters) we estimated a minimum 
period of three years to materialised this first stage. 
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Field France UK 
Coordination and Act 93 CDM regulations 1994 
Planning of H&S 
Mission of the Planning Decree 94 CDM Regulations 1994 
Supervisor 
Training of Planning 
Supervisor: 
Health & Safety Order of 7`h March 1995 No Text 
Fire Safety No text No Text 
General Health & Safety Act 91 Construction (Health, Safety & 
requirements at the Decree 92-323 Welfare) Regulations 1992 
Workplace Decree 65 
Fire Safety on No text LPC Code of Practice for Fire 
construction sites Prevention on Construction 
Sites 1992 
Fire Safety in the Decree 92-158 of 20 Fire Precautions (Workplace) 
workplace (excluding a February 1992 Regulations 1997 
construction site, but Arrete of 19 March 1993 
including facilities where 
construction operations 
take place while in use) 
Table 2.2: Comparative table of UK vs. France regulatory requirements 
A stage of interpretation was necessary to appreciate the content and the scope of the 
European text and the legal strategy to transpose the requirements in each member state. Each 
government must identify which part of the text was already covered under the existing 
regulations and how to apply the remaining in their legal framework. The European 
Commission estimated that a deadline of three years is necessary to interpret the directives 
and implement them in the member states. The Framework and Workplace Directives were 
published in 1989 and a deadline of implementation was required for December 1992. 
However the analysis could identify some discrepancies between the deadline for 
implementation and the publication of regulation in member states. Major differences 
between the way France and the UK address the problem of fire during construction may be 
highlighted. Following the occurrence of fires in the UK in early 1990s, specific measures 
were developed under the pressure of insurers. France did not follow a similar pattern. The 
UK approach seemed reactive unless the European one whereby a pro-active politic 
has 
been slowly developed regarding fire safety. The track record of the publication of 
Council 
57 
Directives answered a need to improve preventative health and safety measures, and 
specifically in certain cases (92/57/EEC) fire safety. It was surprising that in a deregulation 
context, overall fire safety matters gave rise to no restrictions. France decided not to 
implement fire safety requirements on the Planning Supervisor following the last European 
Directives. The work inspector (nominated by the Government) was supposed to pursue his 
role in the field of fire safety and its requirements in the workplace. However the lack of 
training and support to complete his duties was a major barrier to control and monitor the 
application of the new health and safety objectives. Furthermore no major fires justified the 
implementation of new policies. The Decree of 65 provided all the necessary requirements 
regarding general safety, except fire safety. 
On the other hand it was also important to highlight that the problem of fatalities caused by 
fires on construction sites must be distinguished from the number of fatalities where a fire 
was construction related. In the earlier case, the construction workforce was the victim and 
the later, both the workforce and the general public. Two relatively recent incidents in France 
and Germany illustrated this issue. In both cases, members of the construction workforce 
were not victims. However, members of the public were severely injured by the fire and in 
unfortunate cases were fatal victims. Dusseldorf counted 17 fatalities and 100 injured. The 
Barbotan fire in 1991 counted 21 fatal injuries. The interaction between construction site and 
facilities under normal use has not been addressed thoroughly. In France, the fire safety 
regulation for facilities receiving members of the public, provided a brief outline (Article 
GN 13 of Reglement de securite contre l 'incendie). Similar provisions also exist in the UK. 
A cost benefit approach review should be an effective tool to measure the impact of 
current regulations and codes. As far as the author is aware there were no studies available 
on this issue. It seems that the low number of victims did not justify an in-depth analysis of a 
prescriptive fire safety approach for construction sites. In fact, such requirements would drive 
both contractors and clients to invest into appropriate fire detection and fire fighting 
equipment, as well as a number of specific procedures that would require dedicated and 
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trained staff. A partial answer to these measures has been developed in the UK by using 
portable fire protection equipment. The type of measures would have an impact on the overall 
construction of the facilities. 
The UK approach regarding construction contract was very prescriptive. The extensive 
use of standard forms of contracts for the last half of a century was a useful mechanism to 
specify requirements. The author highlighted earlier in this chapter the engagement under the 
terms of the contract, of the contractor to strictly follow and apply a set of rules regarding fire 
safety during construction works. In fact the contractor was required to follow the LPC Fire 
Code and the CDM Regulations 1994. In France, the contractual link as far as the fire 
safety was concerned, couldn't be as strengthened as in the UK, due to the lack of 
specific ad hoc guidelines. 
The author demonstrated the assessment of the problem, the function of the Planning 
Supervisor and the applications of fire safety requirements tend to widely vary from a country 
to another one. Cultural and cost benefit approaches may explain differences in the way 
the problem was tackled. Overall France tend to ask for external competencies through 
accredited bodies, whereas the UK emphasis on an internal approach. As a consequence, 
the function of the Planning Supervisor varies but was a key role player throughout the whole 
process. 
2.11 Conclusion Chapter 2: 
The large number of disparities between the Fire Safety Legislative Framework 
in the EU 
countries studied made the approach to the problem quiet difficult. There were no universally 
applicable good practice examples throughout the EU that could 
be used as a guide for a 
future European Directive or a harmonised Fire Safety Legislation. Nevertheless, the 
Canadian approach and its Fire Safety Frameworks, i. e. pre-1975 approach and 
the post-1975 
approach, indicated that Decentralisation was the most effective solution. 
Some EU Member 
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States already were adopting this approach, such as Germany and Spain. The UK was slowly 
moving towards a new regime and just adopted a new strategy to reduce fires in homes and in 
buildings in general. 
It was still too early to entirely appreciate the impact and benefit of the implementation of the 
EU directives in France and the UK. Furthermore, the Member States were still improving 
their current legislation and/or regulation. There was a need to review the long term impact of 
the new directives and how did they contribute to improve the level of fire safety on 
construction sites. It was assessed that the best way to analyse the strengths and pitfalls a new 
set of regulation, was to examine a significant reduction of fires on construction sites, their 
economic losses and closely look at the causes of these incidents. The lack of clear structure 
to collect the relevant and significant range of statistical data at a European level was to date 
out of scope. The assessment and impact of the dimension of the problem of fire on sites was 
currently not on the agenda. A second stage would comprise a modification of the existing 
framework to reduce and/or eliminate the fire occurrence to zero or as close to zero. 
This chapter compared the Fire Safety Legislative situation in several European countries 
with the Canadian model and identified strengths and weaknesses within the Legislative 
Frameworks. A Fire Safety Framework has been proposed and three main issues have been 
identified: Control, Feedback and Consultation. 
More research and investigations will need to be carried out in order to identify best practice 
and create a Fire Safety Model that could be adopted throughout the EU. The objective of 
this research was to develop such a model. 
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3 FIRES ON CONSTRUCTION SITES 
This chapter aimed to provide an overview of the characteristics of a construction site, its 
definition and a detail survey using an engineering approach. In the second part of this 
introductory chapter, an attempt is made to quantify the fires on construction sites and their 
losses. A review and discussion of major literature published on the subject in presented. 
Finally the author looked at current practices and the construction companies response to a 
fire safety situation. 
3.1 Background and principles 
The growth and development of fire has been shown to be dependent to a large extent on 
the geometry and ventilation of the enclosure containing the fire. The condition necessary 
for combustion to occur was known to be one where the fuel, oxygen are present in the 
correct propositions in the presence of an ignition source. 
A fire would get through three different phases (Figure 3.1): 
0 The growth period: ignition of material and propagation of flame 
0 The steady state combustion: a fire cannot keep growing indefinitely and its development 
continues until severity is controlled or flashover occurs. 
0 The decay: as fuel supply is depleted the fire will eventually reduce in severity and die 
down. 
(*Q TWPWA M 
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Figure 3.1: Fire temperature curve 
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There are many factors affecting the fire development. A fire usually started because a 
material was ignited by a heat source. The fire development depended on: 
0 The item first ignited was sufficiently flammable to allow flame spread over its surfaces. 
9 The heat flux from the first fuel packages which in turn would begin to burn. 
" Sufficient fuel existed within the compartment otherwise the fire may simply burn itself 
out. 
" The fire may burn very slowly because of a restricted oxygen supply, e. g. in a well-sealed 
compartment the fire eventually smother itself. 
" Providing that there was sufficient fuel and oxygen available the fire may totally involve 
the compartment. 
Ignition, fuel and oxygen are three elements always available on a construction site. It would 
be feasible to control to the ignition source through the strict implementation of a non- 
smoking policy, the use of hot work permits and the proper inspection strategy to support its 
efficiency. The fuel composed of materials and of components of the building would be 
slightly more difficult to control as without materials or components the facility couldn't be 
built. However the choice of materials and its selection to restrict their combustibility was a 
positive initiative. The control of waste on site contributed to control the fire load and 
potential fuel sources. The last elements of the combustion process was the oxygen, which is 
freely available on site and throughout most of the construction process as no air flow control 
was operational nearly until completion. 
The term fire load is used to describe the heat energy which could be released by meter square 
of floor area of a compartment or storey by the combustion of the contents of the building and 
any combustible parts of the superstructure itself. The concept of fire loading attempts to 
relate the combustible contents of a building to the potential severity of a fire in that 
building 
and consequently to the fire-resisting capabilities of the elements of the structure. 
It is 
therefore assumed that the building will remain structurally intact during a complete 
burnout 
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of all combustible materials. However when we consider a construction site, there are no 
guarantee that the uncompleted facility will sustain a major fire and retain its integrity. 
The specific characteristics of a construction site lies into the constantly changing design and 
evolutionary spatial framework. The building content and the materials used in the 
construction of a facility will help engineers to determine the fire load. In the construction 
process, this fire load will increase throughout the execution phase to reach its maximum 
value when the building is complete. 
However, the ability of construction or component of a building to satisfy a determine level of 
fire resistance during the construction process is not always the same when a component is 
being installed, completely installed or even stored on site. These engineering characteristics 
will contribute to the development of a fire in a given space. 
The easier a material is to ignite and the greater the rate of heat production, the faster the 
growth of the fire. Large expanses of combustible materials such as wall and ceiling linings, 
especially unfinished and often unprotected, can contribute significantly to the rapid growth 
of a fire. 
Fire Lo, - 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the distribution of fire load throughout the construction 
process. 
It is therefore important to carefully consider what is the definition of a construction site. 
There is common belief that each construction site is unique, with its own characteristics. 
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Substructure Superstructure 1st Fitting 2nd Fit Hand over 
However the spatial characteristics of a site would greatly affect how we perceive the limit of 
a site and its boundaries. A site could be presented in many forms and specifications. 
A construction site could be a complete facility. 
Its limits would be the limits of the facility (external 
walls and area of landscape around it. 
Figure 3.3: Construction Site: Complete Facility 
A site could a limited space within a larger space 
This limits could be a room or an open space in 
the facility (atrium, car park area... ) 
The facility could be occupied at the time of the 
construction activities (maintenance, refurbishment... ) 
Figure 3.4: Construction Site: a room /a limited space in the Facility 
A site could involve the refurbishment or renovation 
of a floor in a facility. 
The rest of facility could be occupied and in use at the 
time of the construction works. 
Figure 3.5: Construction Site: A floor in a Facility 
A site could be located in an occupied facility and 
limit of one part of the facility (one wing, half of the 
facility... ). 
Figure 3.6: Construction Site: Part of the Facility 
The complexity of a construction site and its characteristics required a broader approach 
towards defining a construction site, considering its characteristics and specification. 
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The author defines construction site as any facilities where there is new construction taking 
place, where modifications are being made to the existing facilities, and/or there are 
maintenance works being undertaken in part or all of the premises. 
It is also important to define what do we mean by a construction activity: A construction 
activity is a work operation outside the normal use of the facility: new constructions, 
alterations, refurbishment, change-in-use, maintenance, demolition. 
There are a number of factors that affect the duration of the growth period of a fire and they 
are: 
" Spacing of combustible fuel packages within the compartment: storage of material on site 
can contribute to the growth of fire and its spread outside the limits of the compartment. 
" Mass and surface area of the combustible materials dispersed within the room or the 
compartment: many materials and components are highly flammable before they are 
installed in the facility, e. g. insulation materials, unprotected timber, packaging material, 
etc. 
0 Size and location of ignition sources: space could be restricted on site and forced 
contractors to store material in unprotected areas which increase the fire load. 
0 Size and location of the openings in the compartment boundaries: an unfinished or 
modified building could offer an unrestricted open space and no adequate or temporary 
not adequate compartmentation throughout the facility. Fire doors could 
be missing, 
windows not installed, roof uncomplete, liftshaft / staircases unfinished, openings without 
fire stopping, etc. 
0 Geometry of the compartment: unfinished building present an uncompleted geometry of 
its compartments. It is not rare to find large open spaces where the spread of a 
fire could 
be accelerate by the lack of passive design. 
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The elements discussed above are essential to understand the complexity of a site and its 
geometry and how in a fire situation, the damages sustain by the building could be much more 
important than in a finished facility. In situations where part of the facility is occupied and 
used during construction activities, the damages would be much more devastating to life, 
property and ultimately the business. 
3.2 Towards a fire safety engineering approach: 
The interaction of fire, facilities and their occupants provided a very complex framework and 
a large number of different scenarios. In the UK, the minimum standard were described in the 
legislative and regulatory documents and building owners and designers were required to 
provide the minimum standard. This simplistic and minimalist approach to fire safety in 
building was not always the key to success, especially when dealing with complex structures. 
Fire safety had a long history which helped to change the UK fire safety framework, often 
modified after major disasters. 
In order to enhance the level of safety of occupants in building and especially complex 
facilities, engineers designed a method, based on a fire risk assessment approach developed in 
the United States and generally known as the Building Fire safety Engineering Method - 
BFSEM (Wade and Whiting, 1997). A fire safety engineering approach may have many 
benefits over the prescriptive approaches developed in the fire safety regulations. The BSI 
ISO/TR 13387-1 (1999) argued that the FSE approach takes into account the totality of the 
fire safety package and provides a more fundamental and economic solution than traditional 
approaches to fire safety. 
The first research into fire engineering could be traced to the 1930s. We tried to understand 
the phenomenon of fire, its chemistry, its development, and to best fit the building systems to 
minimise the impact of a fire on the occupants, the property and its surrounding environment. 
FSE is the use of engineering methodology to determine the precise fire safety requirements 
and the design of the system to provide the required level of safety. FSE focus on the safety of 
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the occupants, the mitigation of losses, the prevention of fire spread, the minimisation of 
environmental damages. 
The legislative documents focused on providing adequate fire safety precautions to protect the 
life of the occupants and the property as a whole. According to BS4422, Fire precautions 
could be divided into fire prevention and fire protection. Fire prevention was concerned with 
the implementation of measures to prevent the outbreak of a fire and/or to limit its effects. 
Fire protection comprised the design features, systems, equipment, buildings, or other 
structures to reduce danger to persons and property by detecting, extinguishing or containing 
fires. It comprises any active or passive measures. 
In the UK two British Standard were of importance: 
" Draft BSI DD240: Part I and 2 (1997) Fire Safety Engineering in Buildings. This Draft 
Standard provides guidance on the application of scientific and engineering principles to 
the protection of people and property from fire. It includes guidance on the design and 
assessment of fire safety measures in building and an alternative approach to existing 
codes and guides. It is not to be regarded as a British Standard. 
0 BSI ISO/TR 13387-1 (1999) Fire Safety Engineering. This Technical Report is in 8 parts 
and still under technical development. The principles of this Standard are based on the 
BSI DD 240. However the approach will not necessarily means compliance with national 
regulations. 
Recently, the draft ISO Standard (BSI, 1997) on FSE Life Safety extended its definition and 
objectives to not only life safety and property loss, but also business interruption, 
contamination of the environment and destruction of heritage. 
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3.2.1 Fire Safety Engineering (FSE) Approach: 
BSI ISO/TR 13387-1 defined FSE as "the application of engineering principles, rules and 
expert judgement based on a scientific appreciation of the fire phenomena, of the effects of 
fire, and of the reaction and behaviour of people, in order to: 
0 Save life, protect property and preserve the environment and heritage; 
" Quantify the hazards and risk of fire and its effects; 
" Evaluate analytically the optimum protective and preventative measures necessary to 
limit, within prescribed levels, the consequences of fire. " 
The process described in the BSI DD240 (1997) had four main stages: 
a) Qualitative design review 
b) Quantitative analysis 
c) Assessment against criteria 
d) Reporting and presentation. 
Due to the complexity of the ever evolutionary design of a construction site throughout the 
construction activities, the author would like to test and challenge the FSE approach to 
enhance fire safety on sites. 
The FSE approach supposed the facility is complete and relied on a set of parameters which 
are most likely stable in time. A construction site is not and the increase of its fire load, i. e. 
the quantity of heat which could be released by the complete combustion of all the 
combustible materials in a volume, including the facing of all boundaries (BSI, 1997), will 
effect the engineering approach. However, let's consider three scenarios: 
" The construction of a new facility: the lack of precautionary measures until completion 
and the evolutionary design of the facility would make the Qualitative Design Review 
very subjective. 
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0A refurbished facility: 
0 Partially Occupied: the interaction between the site (under modification and change) 
and the facility in-use (normal occupancy and under a different set of regulations - 
workplace regulation, public assembly, warehouse... ). 
0 Not occupied: the site boundaries are clear defined and the limit in the space and 
time. Fire precautions measures might not be operative throughout the construction 
process and design arrangements would change in the time. 
0A facility being maintained: the action of an external organisation or in-house team to 
carry out some work operations (maintenance of technical equipment, day-to-day 
maintenance works... ) in a facility occupied by normal users (staff, customers and the 
public, patients... ). In this situation it is sometimes difficult to assess the boundaries of 
the site (room, an open area, a corner, a contained space... ). However we assume that the 
normal fire precautions measures are operational and that safety of the occupant is 
maintained to an acceptable and minimum level. 
3.2.2 The Qualitative Design Review: QDR 
The first phase of the FSE approach required a Qualitative Design Review (QDR), where "the 
scope and objectives of the fire safety design are defined, performance criteria established and 
one or more potential design solutions proposed" (BSI, 1997). Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 detailed 
the QDR for a new construction, a refurbishment/renovation project and a facility affected by 
maintenance activities. 
70 
o 
5 aý. ý -o °cEö 
° t'" 
gga 
cn bU 
Gn U3 0-- 
g0 
> oo `°'v u tý 
öäpö; X37 c 
oUAO ý' 0O o ý" "o OU äö ß' 50ý, . -. cu 4-4 
ßU NwUOU cli 
ä a c2. c) 
5ý ui WIýc 
,.. a', C) U0 
5t''ýoý°' 
ö "0r 
ý, eö cat cý qE a) +c 4ý 
v, 44 ? ý" In 
(L) C. 
w5o aý o0 
vii b=-° 
4--+ 
CÖ "0 ! }.. e N ... U 
fl+ UU 
ý' OaU cd 
w_^ 
'Cy n5Ný? 10 
CD =q0 
ö° 
0 r_ cu 
50 öc 
° 95. le 
n4.1 c2. ri cr, 
.oýOý . 
fl .o 
bam, aö 
055 Q) bö03 '4 U> 
V 5ý °°ýö3L, G, r 4-4 C) 
CL) cu 0Z cu 
-ý Co cd R Q) 
10 Co bU NU 
o 
cn 
v3= 
°' p a? 
öj) 
_b__ a) UOi: p ý" NU 
cn 
+ý' .GN 4ý cUd ý' 
Ü a' UU 
ycd, 
cd w 
ý" 
4 
In 
4- 9.1 uZ le 
0öppO 
, ci 
EOw 9O 
1 
ý. .ýý, .boý, cn OoU cj Z« 
ce m. 
üiöö-, 
- 
°° 
-v 0-°v 
a),. ß a) > 
°' to -v 
3 tý ° ai `2 ý, Co wav, "' t- ° CU -C 'b r 
Ü Ub bp. 
iÖ c' cd UýGb. bG'ý bOCO 
Co P. 1 
bý4O cd cd CS_ ÜyU0°U cd U 
(L) :i CU 
bO äi 
ä' 
"9 ycci. 
42 cu 
NU 
aý 
ce l"(U 
(Z 
-Ot~ 
Q) IM- 
5"ße 9U 
0 ä0-c v0> ý'. 'N ö °' 5= c 0. i -0 w C7 HHZ¢¢O ,H¢aw¢ cn vc HH as Hw 
ao 
0v vii 
CD 
4- cu c ei 
iii 
LyZ 
Ri iYi ý CO ýC 
Au,, 
a 
eC 
Q3cö>, i 
~G .: 
' bD N. 
äý äyß 
N 
C 'i C p w 
ý' 
Ö* a) cam? 
aý 
n> 
3 
0 
'ý 3 
tb 
°5 ö uE mE a) 
9 le +ý CA `i' N. 
v'. rn 5 5 tý 
öO 
N Ü 
v 
. " (0 C aý 
U_ O 
o `ý o 3 ö 13 ö . ti 
ö 
45 
U a, ° -C C 
tu g 4-4 0 ýe Q° U> 
C 
-p N d C O 
cn Co _ u "rte! Q U_ u U = ° V, 
aý 5 5 r,, 0 E o 
r 2 
aA 4 2u -s 
- 
9 
Co 
r. (A cn 
u 
cn 
cu 
0 -ci ' (U . . u M. k2 (Z L 4ý 043 =s 
zs m (lte,; a) .5 a. ) aý ° -C v 
bi Ln 
CA 
0 
+., 
cl 
u 
u ý% 0-. 
Q' 
;. a -d 
° 
0 >; 53 m a 5 , 35 "= CD« 
, ¢' 'd 5 'ý 
° ö vw 
12 M 
M; r ý u E 
"CJ ug 
&ý 
aa) 
> 
aa) 
0 ý 
(L) 
.0 CA 
0 
U 
le 
o 
ci 10 ; i; - 
ýU 
-° 
+ý j ö 
° 
ö 
UU o'° 
Lizi 5b 
[ ° * b? - 
o 
3 " 
aý b 
(L) 
ö 
U0 
aý 
.b 
ei 
N 
ö . 9ö =4 5 .ý 
ö 4 ö 0 U 
i3 mob 
CD 
O aý 4 
0 4. - 
C"° 
Q) i- 
a 
Q 
[ 
v 
ce cn ý_, 
b "ý N N OO4. 
O cn cý 
cn a) cý 4-. O 
Oa 
O CD u 
-., O ° - 
Ö= cn C ÖÖ a) x 
r. ce 
aý ýº w Co o ; " Cd O 
cu 
cn ° ° ý 
12 . Z 
9) ce 5 zi 
w 
0 5 -n u C. 5 o rm : tz 0 -o C (L) o" M (L) - C -5 g 9. C a .5 
°U ý-o JO u äC m =A ccd a) uE i 
4, b 
ö ý, ° ° OÖ 
C 'vý 5 
O 
G C -d ce 
° 
aý 
Co - 
ÖD x 
ai 
3 aý .ý3 > o 
3 o 
v °' 5 o 
b aý Oce 
0 Cd 5 C s' vÜ 
ä v2 b - °C 
. 
Äb (1) > Co 3 n - 
OUU 
° 0 
Cý t2 
: 
i+ O 
'p O 
U G ý Op 
tu s . 4- r 
p U y i 
4) >' , c1. UO o 
ä 
4tz n . C. N U 10 
.. o tu 
C tý 
a? 
3b 
C 
OU 
p, 
+ 
cam, 4, 
4- 0 . .7 
U 
C 
"d c) ß""' t'' 4-+ 
ý" A. ý 
° 
O 
CJ 
0 
O 
u aý o 0° Gn 
° 
ö 
ý, v a, O 0 ' ce 5E u03 o) V -6- +ý- +- 
u CA u r 5ý cu 
Co 
a. z M Cl- a) e "° "m -C 
= 'r3 
ý- CU 
cfj ö 
zb 
ö (Z ö 
o 
3 ti U aý. o oý ä z 1 < 
ö äv 
4 W 
aý > 
3 ( 
O 
> 
"ow 
U 
¢ 
o aU 
¢¢ 
cn 
4 - 
"; ý 4jo 
C 
U 
CC 
L 
V 
y 
u 
Cd 
u u 
W n - W O 
N 
N 
C) a) 0 9) 
4-, _° M 
9. 
U 
vi 0 U V Q 
aL c,,, a 
4-1 ca - 4ý 
(Z 
:b u 0 (n «s 
vv 
m _ 
cn u> 0 ö 2 tu ° a> c) (I) " +- 4.1 t 
tA 
, b 
3 
u -v 
F -rj .5 ö 
[. ° -U ý' Ný.. 
ý 
y. jU p 
N 
«7 9v 
.O 
U, 
C , 
'b V 
9 NC 
2 
Q) O 
ON 
C 16- . U JD ! O "0 U u 3 a 0 x 0 L' 
A ö .E ö O U pU 
= 
> N O 
cd U v U .., (L) 4 
cd 
4' ° 
ä ° 
0 
c 
4 4 `9 ä ý: c 
O -d "° 
- o "E O 4. °3 a' 3 e a '+- ° "KZ &.. 0 on eu No o r . v .e E 
5a U 
,Mä N.. 
0 4-4 
4- ý Co e tu CD. c2 
lb ZJ a "° ö -0 E e `n . 
3 
0 o u r_ E ,e Ln ý' a) U o" 
°° 
-d 5 a - . 
(A 0 rA 
9 4- (U ci X) Öl) En CD. Q) - CO 
= tu f« 
cu = r- 
ci cu 
N cd 
ems. 
0C 
cj CU 
N 
E 
f1. 
ö 
ýý "a ?U 
Z 
zi (L) bA p 
'ý 
Lý, O cri Q) 
° "5 n 11) (L) U Co 4- -u cu 
t:, 3 Co E ö r- cu 
Q 
m -0 
13 
c3 
. 
ý"ý ce ° a0 0. onö U-d .5 a; urn! 
(L) t2 g -ci 
[ öý 0 7; cn o Z Co -CJ 3 ö ý ä"N 
.ä 
Oö 
A-- a) cu " V Nv, a) a3 0 
o = 5 cn. 
5 9- t °4' 4' +Z ' a 5 
° 'u u 
äý' 
Ei ö5 "° 0 N U' N aý 
° 3 4. on a) 
3ti . 6- u 
U 
CA 0 "U 9) , 
a on °' ý p° o -'> ß ä CJ , 
u 
4-4 
a o 5 ý Gä cn ý' CA ö 
4" " Co Co p CU 
"O 
U 
Up ä 
U O °' °O °' ä" ä" T! ö 
ý 
Q ä. ° H 
x 
a. QQ 
H H -ý 
HHE 
10 e ý, 42 a) -4.0 
442 
i L 
v i (A O 
d 
O 
C ai 
92. 
r. r 
Iö w ö 
aý a ä 
u ý" 
>' 2 
: 4 . 
>' 'v; CC O S. . 
ö 
-a 
ya 
Ww 
ä 
rrý 
c 
ý 
c °' 
º. rE o. ý 
a O 
M 
S 
'C 
i. 
b 
0 
0 
z 
a 
3 
a 
. tý 
H 
3 
ö cý ö cu 
N 
ö fi Q) Z J-- 
+-' 4' vi U O 
E U 
5(A °' N. b0 aö v i 
" 
U O Q 
U 
O 
OO 
y v F. 
O 12 
'v 0 4 (2 0 ci ICA 4-4 w 
y ö 4- 
N4 
JD N bV 
U y 
ý' 
OO 
cd ý+ 
U 
Ü 
O 
(Z 4- zi vi 
"o Ü cd u° cu .5 (U 
2 ° U) . sue' 
aý 
9 
U 
O 
ý 
vý 
W 5 cý,,, 
'C7 0 
U 
o 
5 
u 
C 
> 
Q) Ln U I -+g u C O tu O TJ - +- > N ce 
U C y' 4 4 N > vý vý"- cC Cd .5° ° U °' .5 a) --ý U ý; U Q 
r+. 0 cis "d ', "Ci 
° 1 
ý. ý o ý-' 4 boa o 
5'° 
- 5 T' 
0 2 
.20 . 
ý 
0 
C 
o ;M Z 
eß 
5Ö X JZ C) 
0 
U Ö OO 
- 
5 °= dU 
0 
p 
0 
0 
a 5 ä +. c, . ý, >b .° 0 ý, U 
E ÜÜ ö°ö 0 
C" 
3 3 
nn . a ° 
u cu 
o 
MM 
a <j 0 ý ° ß 5 äo° 
a) U 
uý 
> Co op 
°= "ý' u 5 C" Cl, 
r. 0 
_ " E C an o ( 
ý; a U) 4" 
ca cn cu 
) >, 4- 
0 
u 0 
(D 
( 
C) cu 
c, 
cl 
u CU CU =- >, 5 
jo . - r 
uv 
Z .n 
-d 
Z: 
ä t 
u- m > 
ts, cý v O0 
3 o ö 0 
ö 
rs -c ' 4- 
E äa ° E U 
x a) 
x ° 9a o ° fl 
C 
° 3-. ý; oA ° 
" 
) c o aý a. 5 
4- öß -6- +J I 
S cý - .m 
.. - 
u E cu 
O 
O 
4+, 
0 
>g 
=Z 
ý, 
o 
° 
4- 
3 -ä ý -v "U ° 
4 
a 
U 
.,.. U U U 
°' 
N. 
ai a) ö 
cu ä ý b :c ö 
ö v ý 
, "ý . . e ) cr öß 
a i 
o ccs Gn 0 c°ý 
- 
4-4 Cl) 
Ob ° ' 
.5 
° 
2 o ý. 
Z: Z 
2 u =p 3 O ö r 9 ö 
C 
5 
J. 
Q) C) In . r. r. -° rv ö° - -ci "ý 
2 3 5 wu ý' 
Co 4z > 4-- q 
ao p 
o o o U o (L) b +-' 
ýý o° 5- °A " 
° ßs 0 4, o 
cu * -ý O 
ö b 
Cs Q. ý. " Z a, C- 
0 
5 u aý =, ` U acri-v c, ,c> 4- S 
0 
WQ vý 
o a o 
v wý w Q W C7 F-ý Z << Qý vD 
4 v° 
C) c 
v O 
a., L (U IM 
A ü C° 
aý c 
o r c 3 C 0 ýa L 
. 
a; bD L 'fl _ 'i 
d' 
N 
a) zC 
b '~ c`d 
cZ 
t 7 
cu uu 
.C44 
v) =U 
OM 'o N u 
b 
a'"i 
C 
`d 
yp 
0 
`n O 
( cý .. 'O TJ .. s 
0. 
"' 
cý 
(Z 12 
En 
u 5 
(Z 
- 
r- v= O 
.v 9 u O u , u c, 
- 
u 
+" -Ü 
cn q cu 
UUE 
r, b4 
y b 
O 
U 
o 
vi CZ 
U, aý aý ~ 
-' ,.., rte, 
v 
O 
lý EI N °. 
ý 
.. Q 0 
Az ö 
' r 
Q) 
O Q 4.., . 
ä > 
Gn 
2 
p 
ö .u 10 
>, 
ci 4- 
tu u ° ai 
> 
ö 
' 
ce 
' ° 
* 
C `" `e 
;_ 
bö 
u 
) > 
v 
ö 
aý 
u Öl 
-° Gn Q) ö ý ö > ä [ ° 
o 
5 gl e 5 
0 
tbU -° 
u 
c 
2 
> 
_ a cn . 
-. 
zi 
E 
-- y U 
Cö U vi U ca 
Co 3 .x vi a .5 °ý ci 
r) a 
' 
' 
ö 
+' 
4. Cg 
Ü 
'° ° 
v cat 
c f 
G 42 
. - -b 
9 0 
r. 
u aý 
3ö 
= öý u c rn . ° 05 a) U a c a) ai aý 
o 0 O aý 
. - 3 s- 
ä ö- r ° ö ä, 
In 
5 
4.4 O 
CU r 
G " U O 
45, 
Q ýý b 
4-t 
ý-. 
5 
ýý 
ce 
A 
ý 
- lb 
Z 
U 
"al = (D 
b 
. 
rz cd 
M---9 
° U 
U .D U ° 0 N 
ýe +J 
9 - U 'o co 
O 
U UM 
'S 
(L) E 
. mac 
u 
. mac 
a 
U u 'v 'ý 
c tu 
CZ N 
U ýO C) 
~ 
0 4- 4.. r.: U OU cn CVJ 
Ü 
O > O 
0 0O 
12. 
5 ö °' m 
Ei 
$ ° u ö cu --g 5 
12 2 p 
° 
`n U 
. 
x ^d in. O cu 
pip ýO, a-0i O r (Z 
Ü ccä 
ýi 
ý c ý ö "' S 
u C , 
y 
( 
i, ý a .5 
° '4 N S .c 
ö o 
- . ce j2 U - d 
'b+ý b °' 
Z CU 
-05 -ý 
cu 
öß E , u, u 
u 
ö rA 0ä öE 
CA 4-1 
o .? 
ö 
u 
c' u 
9) 
-v 
4ý ice. c 
'= Z c- 
.C 4 "! O u cu 
+ý ° -v U cn o O 
0 
ý 
(L) 4-4 
U 
> -ci ö o J oýU 3 öa ci 5 (Z 
U 
'° 
N? 0 u - O 
aý c 
M U c) . 
a 
"- - C, 3 U c 4 .o tin r- (L) (Z. 
ns U O ° r . e Co ." CU 0 j. ý. - , c i aý 
° 3i 
ai ä 
v °' -a i Q 
(ý < t2 
° 4 ö ö 
ö ö se 5 ' cs o 9. v c'3 ö 
b 
Z ° 0 ? 
Q. ö 
Gn 
U `' 
U 
iz 
U 
ýs 
(+4 
o (U 
c. b 
Oý 
(L) re Z. U 14 
Ln 
, c02 gv öo ýs aý 3 U a, U aý 
cn 
( L ä Q - aa7 ýv ý W 
> O -o. 5 0 - Z "ý H 4 4 
w Z 
GA Z C. ) 
t« c 
E -w a cu : 
w H 
;1ä 5 ýl% ý""ý cu 0 ° 
4.. d 
0 
° 
M cm 
i 
(U 
R ö 10 ce ý' 
i" U 
ce 
u 
ihl 
w ö 
zi - c71 . 92 A 
Q) 
CA 
0 
O ý, . oö 9E 
LA 2 
4-4 0 u ce 
° z E ] U a) aum +ý U .-a, -td D ,. U > U 0 
U : 
0 : 6: 2 .2 
U 
$- Z. N 
U' 0 
la 
U 
(L) U U 4'' 
o 
U 
," ' 0 
ý" 
0 
E c) - cd 
c° ý" 1 `n " O_ > .'0 `n ^ U a "ý ý, y ö t. 
' 
9 -O 
OQ 
pC 
c .. ; vZi 
0) ( c 
C - 
c2 >, Ob -2 5° o- o 
ö bn ä ý ° w 'ci 
0 s a a; 
ö 
°u 
CD. 
° a 
ý , a) "a -v U a ti "ý 
aU 0 U o 0 , ; 
, cu "U 
""v 0 
r u 
"= cn ö ,ý 'n 
ý 
v° a ý ' ä 
,° 
9 , 0 
, _ 
"o uä aý Q ý, U 
U 
x-o ö 
"= 
cn 
- 
.= ä U e ý, cn 
ý, a .o° to to 
ö3 ° cn ö 
öa' 0 > 0 sö 
-0. - cu E 
N o +- ti aý a, ) 
tu 0 A-- 4, Ei 
cu ö C) ý r_. ß ° - 
o 
ä ö ° = c (L) 
u 
3° U 
tu '° (n 
U 
c ° 
o3 Ü CU tn u ° ) 
°' ö 
( ( 0 IV 
m 
4- 5 'e = 
N ý 
ö 
0 a) 4ý -0 
a ° 
o 
4- a °' 
E 
a, gis a ° a ä 
'b 
9. o k. o -C$ 
E 
.c 
0 
CZ 
'b U a w 
o -ý U n. 3 0 c aý 
O a p +- W. 12 
Ü 
a .0 
. ° E 3 
ý. d= 
[ 4.4 o 0 ,ý 
G, o (L) -d a" 
g 
.o 
" 
, vu 
cn A oo E 
ch C. ö is 
c' °. 
, 
c cu cn e rz c ci cn 
c cn - .> 
0 . 9 , - º. 0 cu 
,? a' -- e = 
u - öö N ö `ý b 
bö bi) ý'' 'o ( 
+ý rn CA 
LZ L2 
°' 4--d - 
° CU 
-cý 
U 
- 
CU 
-0 r- ö 
o 
r. 8 "- 
UU 
.c 
cv U dz dz 
Co o :b 
_U 
o o a) -6- aý ý; -b Co o - ° ýg 27. 
12- 
Q) 
`ý 3 
ci c2. E u 42 u 
CU cn 
r- ý CY'ý -0 
. ;' u o-v a) . c, U) 
0 
, -. 
E 
o 
ý 
0 .. 
ý. o ý, ö9 ing. a) °' 5 ý. ý CU w >a a ä ß .E 
.? e 1) 
iil 
Eý 
° r- . -ci E 
; ý, . nom ZZ 
ý 
_; w ýU ý"° ý9 
öý, ý ö a .a rý °' ä. ä. ö -d ö ° aai .. 
-v : z u m 0 'o N 
12 o .ý aý a) u n 
m 
öa Z x .ý" ý' °a c 0 v o 5 ß 
w , 0 -° 
ci Q) . b ý 
ö ouö ö a ° ö '>> Gn ° "° E 
C) 0 C> 
rn r- ö U 
CD. tu o aaN .3M a) 
bd 
oU 
&.. a ý, a In r- ö >' 3 ö 
1: 1 4--4 cu M 
0 
g .., o u c a a 
g (2 9 g ,Z> Co cu +, cn yý U tu 
ý' Q °° 0 
vii yý an '" u. uj `A 
rn 
g CJ =U VC "U N Cý Q 
dQ 
M b bN 
N. 
e 
-° 
U9 
-0 Er 
> 2 
(U ) 2E an 
`oö ° Gn r. 0 u c2 3 
ý 0 ' 
¢¢ ¢ ý. ° 
« 
H Z, 
L 
42 
gi 
GA v) d C t-a 
u 
'fl GA 
Z. Q Q 
'2 1"+ 
C, E (X N L_ M. 
a y '6 
C vý 
« aV =ö w c, L. my ö Q L 
a ca vý y 
* 7 m 13 
V 
'v 
CJ p 
'° a 
16w r Gn y 
wv 
G. 
(A 
C 
m 
CE 
.. E 
S. 
a W. 
ýlo 
N 
co 
a) 
a) 
O 
c3 
a) 
c 
cd ca 
Ö> 
.jU ^' "- cd 
o3ä 
O Cn 
tz 
> 
o.. an 
äi 
Q). rz'd "ZJ 0 
U «f a G) 
O 
"Cý -0 
C>O 
a' 3 
-CJ cd 
Z-0Q 04 
Z 
Ü tO 
Op yý 
pcO 
pO 
O 
4-4 
"O 
vUi 
Ö 
vUi 
E- F- E-ý 
c 
O 
N 
OO 
3ö 
-0 -2 
j 
ý33 
UUN 
UýO 
U "- U 
d rC 
ýý 
E-" CE > 
'L7 QC 
O (D Ou 
1121 Ä '° ö 
V 
A ý[b > .LC 
aQ a) 
E a. ý 
CD., - oö .[ jO cd 
c) OE 
ýx cd 41.1 
42 .° 0 ä 
iQ"-i 
aý-va 
Ä :>I 
"2 >0= 0ou 
.o 
U 
19 -0 = ..., OOO 
Ä3E 
0) ; > a0 
- 
ccf 
.-OU 
Oö 
"COQ 
en 0 r. E, U C) OU 
-cd UN 
.O aýi 
° U Ü U O aý 
0 
cz 412 
tu 
tz - 
-0 
. U +--ý 
0) ý (Z 
(Z 
"M 
G) _c "M 
0 
0 
> ö ö 
p 'ý U 
C) 
p 
4--ý 
U U 
b 2 
U ,. cd U 
u 
u (Z 
b 
N p 4' 
" 
+. + vii 
E 
U 
m d-. b 
r. 
c) p 
-9 y Q .c 
lu 
V C 
- 
"a 
tu ° 
:Z 
ö 
O 
9 ) (A °'C l p - 5 .5 
y 
O a) O cd C C SU t 
'-' Jý 
crt 
. 
+-ý Ö 
C ^C 
- wC axi o 0 Co 
C) 
a Z 5 (4-4 - b 3 5 
c) cu 5 
a 5 C °4 . 
NO 0 O pU U -0 Gn .ý tý., uC cat + 
L' E4 
cd 
2 
- te 
4- 
O ký 
vii 0 `m. * Z: 11) 
E UO j -2 oi v 4- p U ;ý tu U ) p O u 
C b 
° 
Co 4-4 
_ 
C) 0 
"a u ' u 
c 
5 a- (U 5 ý  
ö 
3 
- n °' 8 ý. - - ms' "ý' 
, Cl 
ü) nC 
C) 
' cn E 
- E :Z U S " 10 4 (A . Eý 
ß 5 aa ' °33 ý 55 ýa 
5 E- 
= 
c 
5o au -i- 
4 
5 m 3uu 0 ° 
CD 
aV 
t= 
V 
(D u 
. 
5 , 
, cli C) 
5 
aý w 
ý o 2 C) ° 5 cu - 
° 
Z 
ö 
' ý U r_ - CD "ZI a X vm 
5 
N O 
Q) a) 
U 
9 CU U (V 3 Ö Ü. ~ 
9 
V a> L) -CJ ý vii 
- ° 
r_ 
cn 
cý 
ö öl (j _ o wU ÜN U C p 'gin U ý 
ö 
p"- b +. w m 
&. v 
°° aý ao 5 a m 
+. 
4-d E 5 4ý b 
U 
d 
V 
J-- w Z ° I° 
° °' o .o ' 
pu u -a ° Q) b v 9 Z ä 
ö (4 5° 4 aar a .ý5 
ö 
C ö" aý 3 °' aý °' N "v 
U U 
. . E-A U W Q 
Ü H H H < () H H 
u 
tu 
aý 
00 
r- 
[ 
d 
Ö O o Ö cd ^O aý 
OO 
- 
c - 
14 
- > 
+" 
cu 
Ici 
° y y 'd Z 
9) 
p 
°' 
ci 
ö > 
> CZ 4- 
ö 
o `' r. o .cU 9) 12 9) 
N Oý I.. ' p 
4- -ZJ (92 
. 
öäOw 
o 
Q) 0 -3 M 
42 r, - > E ö 
p 
> ö 3 
. 
E 
.v .? 
°ý ' aai ýn a) u c2 a c°d 3 
Z ö > ' 
0 
Ln P. U 
°... 
Q) 
9. 1 ö o Z a u 
; cn Eä 
CF 
i- E 42 
° o (A 4- ö u 3 a -. 14 -d. ý4 
u 
V t-, .O p 
N U -0 ý 
m 
NU cr.. 9 QQO p 
[-ý O aD 
G 
cd 
a 
Q) 
ctt 
O + 
C Gp 
O, -uO E- 
rn 
9) 
O 
-O 4" u O 'A 
jý 
EO +-' "12 "Um- vi 
m 
'a = E o O 0 =4., U °CU oa 
° Co ý ý ö aý 
> Z 0 ° (A u 
J2 CU 
11) 
-o ~" a) 
' E 
E_ 
lu u 'b 
O eN Z u >3 -- o 
0 ö 
c2 -C3 ° ; a ý, -0 cz C cu O a O bA c 
s C a, -0 'J O ta4 x> U 
o ff, 
, -, 4, (U > 42 - 
a) 
ae E 
O ,+. 
Ö5 
. N. 4" 
m . Q) 
e a) ° v ° au oo .b ) 
4.1 cu 
4- U o .E ; - 3 -o aý -- 
k. 0 
b E u ;. 4- ao 
4 ° ' b ä ö . °-° (U 
3 . -ä Z. o 
ä ý 
4- E Co >, v Eu u j O ý, o o o o 
ö aý 0 ý' °, 0 
° o ° 
92 
> a i °E °o d a) 
" 
42 
E x Zi 4--4 tr. A- > -c b 
cu 4-4 :14. -0 cn tu 0 
ý.., V ,p 22 
O N N b -d V il. a+ b O 
vOi 
4 
c3. r. u [ 
¢ O 
ýo 
4- > 
4-" ý,, 0 
4- 
4. 
CD öl 
b. a5 
4. a CO 
> U; E ° 12 o rý 
ö 
U y 
° o 
° cý 
.- ý 
O ýs aý > 
4-, b ,. o 
- ' ) i 
bl t, 1 
cn (D CD :i cn o '2 
ö 
o u 
öN 
Öl cu 
M > e 
(1) d- 
(U 4, N 
e 0ß 4-+ 
0 
;.., 4-+ 
0 °-ZJ a) .., 
cn .. 
O 
° d aý a 
S. Eý ,Z 
u ý . r: 1 c Co 
cu Co 5 
4-d 0 
oU o 
E E-ý 
4 , 
wH H a H 
ÖH H 
wv°ý 
H 
ä. 
ýe: v ä 
' Laa 
up 
cc 
Lý 'C 
u w, 
cva. 
y 
OE Ec 
`O 
>> LOS. 
Lä 
r 
Ü0 
'A UUuA U 
[ Oq 
g"ý E 
a0 ° 
"a Llý "v 
C CU IÜ> +. ° ý-. U o tu 
U > 
O 
3 
U 
9 r cd 
. CU U -- 
Cu aý .v 
C 
cn UU 
4-4p 
cC L" V .C 
5 +-e 
'E w o rn 
ý' 
:2 
" in OU Q, : ,, aý 3S 
ti 0[ 0 '" 
Im. 
o 
- 
C ,ý Z 'b ¢ 
co0 
uN aý 
tý o E--ý C aý a .° . , ö 4-4 cn . 
ýý cu v2 ä ark . 4- äQ, 4 4-4 - S u .5 U 0 .ä e, z4.4 
3 . 
vß 
U) 44 
U 
o 
p O ." cd 'ý' yO O O W 4.. ý' bA 
^" 4-4 
A o -fis ºr 
v °[ S S äý 0 » 
ý 
* Ma . 
9 ;j°9 Casa) 0 4- u `e ms 
Q) vý 0 9 Z;; cu 
>u°; 
' vii _ S> O 
ö 5 Ci ý C ao O p 
'ö 5 
ä5 
(Z 
ý° ° u . ä 
U CU -c Uoý. - ^d `' CX J-- j>% Q+ yu 
ö 4- 
;2 C 
CZ 
0 (Z - 
... 
ö0 N a 
Co cn n aý 
u 
- '- O ä, 
n c ° ö 9 03 r_ , 
-v w° °' u 
-° o o 
C C u u °' `ý 
(Z 
r- x. cu 
) 
-c-- cu u 
3 r° o "ý ý-b b 
ö 'J 0 °' E ui= 'cý 
ý'> Z. U° " c2 
g c Cs 4, IV U- 5 Co vbc, >ö' 
4- ° 3 ýs 5 tom' 
ö ö 
m 
g 
'°A 
'° 
u 
r= 
cu CD. Q) 0 4- n 
CU UN 0 0öß 4- 0) , 
ý ý 'b ý W C M' ý 5 r- u C) cn >4.. = .S. 
vo° . 
, 
i ö ' o i .5M. 
- 
c" 4-4 an aý aý Q CU 
+ý 
aý u :1 "e d > cu 
Z 
0 ce U, 
0 o 
ÖpU>mö (L) ö °' "" 
0 
.0 
d 
O 
`nEý c 5CJ 
- 
m >N; vii VN ° m p0 ; 00 r U 
ý, a) 3 r- ; 
IlýI S 0 C) 
CU 
ý-" 3 
Ü 
U 
O 
o U 
U .N 
ce r. 1,4 aQw 
.ý 
ö -v 
° 
,o ö 
° 
cl ° .cu cl3 czs cn fi ß cu 
g2 U ° . cWc, tu 
y. - 4- t,,., 
02 ö 
9-. CD aoc U o 
3 U, c ä 
S 
°c ý 
k. CJ U '- 
Ur- 
u_ c'- , ö0 ý. . o ý, . 
c2. = 
r3 cn 000 2 b ... ý r o u°' 0i o ° CU U ° cu 
ti u 9 4-4 
ýzä ý ýýÜ 
W 
O o- Q < < < º 
cu c 
ü 
9. , cj Goi 
m u i. CJ 
0 
cu N 
v ý O 
u 
V 
JD 
w 
* 
c3 
C 
tu ý 
W 
c 
L6. 
Ww 
-0 O 
.. ý a ö 
C) 00 
ö ti cý 
E 
u 
0 b 
4° 
0 
yU., U 
4- 
_ 
O 
4- 0 
O `n y = O `n > 
u r e Z% 
O 
c 
br 
k 
U 
U 
N 
Z 
O 
b .., O 
cý cU 
vý O 0 N CT 
3 o (n M 
° cn Öl «i ° c 
= 44 5 E c 
9 b U) 0 (U 4-4 a 
cc t N- öä 
Op ý+ N C) U 
tu O 
. - '' 
O 
4cd 4- 
0 .2 - Ei 
t 
ý tai 
N Öl u 
73 4- Q) 
p C 
b_ 
aý o 
u 
O 
(V c2 9.1 r. OU U 4 tu *i Gn 
V U A m U "C7 Cd 
Ö 
O U .U 
5 
= r_ 
Ü 
u 
9 
Q) 
( a? 
''. ' C2 
ö 
U 
a 
Co 
-0 cu 
> c) E ýJ a) Q u -E 
° 
u cu Cd U cd O 
+-' 'CJ 
4 
u 
cu 
U 
.C - 
N 
U> 
u ti- 
O 
oc 4- cz w tu a 
O N U O IU- `n U cý 
tu b b 'ý 
U 42 
> 
tö F. 
"° 
b aý 
v -d t3 
" E 
0' c, 
o 
ý 
& x ý: cQ Q 
.o - u o ß 
3 
ce 
Cd CD 
Q Uo Q\ O O O ý" 
U 
- +' 
` O '- `n Q) cel N CU N ' 
> 6z U 
V tu Lr 1- 
O E O 
p 
tu . -ý 
O 
tj 
ctý 
N 
^i 
u 
ýý ML 
O 
-: O 
O 
ý.. ý p Cp +-+ 
UU 
'b 
m 
CU 
4c2 crj j-, 0 
p CJ y U- 
tu 
ce 
, 4-d 
Q) 
4-4 
tu N ö 
01 
U öQ ), 0 
+- 
Q) 
4 
3ö 
'. 
ö 
b c, U 
U ýý 
öo , 0 
X 1. ) Co - 
> Q) a) c44 0 
a) ý , 4) 19 uuuE. x Hä i ¢¢ , ' Ti 0 HH ¢ 
y ö 
1 o fx 
.ý L A 
O 
ö 
, 
ý1 .. 
ý. 'fl yam., 
a Z 
y -E ä O wv 
00 
3.2.3 The Quantitative Analysis 
The second phase of the FSE process required a quantitative analysis of the QDR inputs. BS 
DD240 recommended splitting the analysis in to a number of parts, referred to as sub- 
systems. "The sub-systems are intended to provide guidance on the type of calculations that 
may be carried out in support of a fire engineering study and to present the appropriate 
general principles and procedures. The sub-systems are as follow: 
(a) Sub-system 1: initiation and development of fire within the enclosure of origin 
(b) Sub-system 2: spread of smoke and toxic gases within and beyond the enclosure of origin, 
(c) Sub-system 3: fire spread beyond the enclosure of origin 
(d) Sub-system 4: detection and activation of fire protection systems 
(e) Sub-system 5: fire service intervention 
( Sub-system 6: evacuation. " 
Sub-system 1: Fires at construction sites are very specific, as the enclosure of origin might 
either be a very enclosed space (roof space, basement, voids... ) or a large open area 
(unfinished and uncompartmented floor, unfinished compartment... ) which would allow a fire 
to spread beyond its enclosure of origin faster than in a completed building. 
The unfinished nature of a construction site also demonstrated that material uninstalled 
(stored or/and packed) and unfinished could be more flammable than expected: The finished 
manufactured product installed in the finished product is guaranteed for a minimum fire 
resistance of 30mm, 1 hour, 2,3,4 hours... In the Minster Court fire (1991) the LFCDA 
reports that the fire "a cardboard type covering linked to the outside face of the fire resistant 
polystyrene blocks was likely to assist with ignition when subjected to a fire situation. The 
cardboard outer sleeve is apparently to prevent damage to the polystyrene. " Until the facility 
is completed, it is often difficult to have a structure which is fire resistant and which would 
contain a fire and restrict the spread of smoke and fire within the facility and outside. The 
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unusual high quantity of flammable material and products would increase the fire load and 
produce enough fuel for a fire to develop. 
Sub-system 2 and 3: The lack of compartmentation and uncompleted passive fire safety 
measures allow the smoke and toxic gases to spread within and beyond the enclosure of 
origin. In the Minster Court fire (LFCDA, 1991) between the time of the discovery of the fire 
(07.20) and the arrival of the fire brigade (07.34), one foreman was trapped in the upper floor 
because "the smoke was too thick and he could not get out of the building. " At 07.20 another 
foreman at the upper ground floor "went towards the atrium to collect some tools and saw a 
`wall of flame' on the opposite side. " In circumstances where fire cannot be contained there is 
often no distinction between the spread of smoke and fire within and beyond the enclosure. A 
proper completed design would have contributed to contain the fire for a given period of time 
to allow the fire brigade fight the fire and restrict its spread. In the Broadgate fire (The Steel 
Construction Institute, 1991) "none of the fire doors to the staircases or lifts were in position 
when the fire occurred. " 
Sub-system 4: The Joint Code of Practice for fire prevention on construction sites (1992- 
2000) requires the implementation of a Fire Safety Plan. This FSP should detail the fire safety 
measures in place on site. There are no statutory requirements for the implementation of any 
detection and warning systems, but every reasonable and minimum measure should be 
implemented to protect the workforce against fire. The use of a fixed detection system is rare 
but recent disasters recommended the use of the existing and operational detection system as 
early as possible before completion. Portable detection systems are now available but they are 
not commonly used by contractors, and only when special risks are involved (hot works in 
historic buildings, confined spaces, industry with high risks such as chemical, nuclear power 
stations, off shore industry ... ). 
We would expect on site, no automatic detection and manual 
warning. Instructions on how to call the fire brigade is usually located in the security 
hut or 
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main office. The provisions for an active fire protection system and its activation after raising 
the alarm could also contribute to restrict the damages. In Broadgate fire the Steel 
Construction Institute (1991) recommends that "in a completed building any fire should be 
controlled in its early stages by the sprinkler system. " They highlighted "the necessity to 
consider appropriate fire precautions during the construction phase. " 
Some refurbishment sites might benefit from the use of the existing and operational fire 
protection system and maintain its operation throughout the construction works. However it 
doesn't seems to be a systematic approach. Maintenance operations are most of the time 
carried out in an occupied facility, in use and under the responsibility of the owner. In this 
situation, it is most likely that the existing fire protection system will be maintained 
throughout the maintenance operations and no interruption of the fire safety protection system 
would be allowed. We however experienced some fire where the fire protection system had 
been temporarily disconnected to complete the works and a fire broke out at the time. The 
activation of the fire protection systems (manual or automatic) might therefore be delayed by 
a crucial time which allow the fire to develop within the enclosed space. It is most likely that 
the fire would be detected by one of the occupant (workforce, user, fire watch, site manager, 
member of the public... ). In Broadgate (The Steel Construction Institute, 1991) "the building 
has a sprinkler system but this was not installed at the time of the fire. The automatic fire 
detection and alarm system was not installed when the fire occurred. " 
Sub-system 5; the intervention of the fire brigade on a construction site is crucial to control 
the development of the fire. Like in Broadgate (The Steel Construction Institute, 1991) the 
unfamiliarity of the building site was an major issue to tackle the fire: "Problems were 
encountered in locating fully operational dry risers as a consequence of unfamiliarity with the 
building layout and the access route, hoarding and inadequate signs. " There is no requirement 
under the law to force the fire brigade to visit the site on a regular basis. The contractor is 
under the obligation to inform the fire brigade of the location, size and layout of the site, as 
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well as to the Local Authorities. A Fire Safety Plan and Health and Safety Plan (respectively 
developed under the JCOP 2000 and CDM Regs 1994) requires that a set of plans of the 
facility must be available at the entrance of the site in the security hut for inspection and use 
by the fire brigade. 
Sub-system 6: the evacuation of the site would be given by a person of authority (site 
manager, health and safety manager, fire watch, security officer) and in large and complex 
site a voice system should be installed. Otherwise, the alarm is raised by the occupant. Delay 
and receiving instructions to evacuate the site can be a major factor in a fire situation. Both in 
Minster Court (LFCDA, 1990) and Broadgate (The Steel Construction Institute, 1991) some 
members of the workforce were trapped in upper floors and had to be rescued by the fire 
brigade. The changing environment of a site on daily basis could affect the evacuation 
process. Lack of signage or blocked fire escape routes are a common practice on site. 
3.2.4 Assessment against criteria: Probabilistic, Deterministic and 
Comparative. 
A probabilistic approach to assess each of the above system would be possible if our site 
characteristics were static. Moreover, the statistical data and annual probability of the 
unwanted event occurring to express a risk criteria and probabilistic approach was not 
available yet. The dearth of research, scientific theories and lack of statistical data to assess 
the problem of fires on construction sites was a major barrier to address the problem 
from a 
fire safety engineering approach. A deterministic approach would be possible 
for each of the 
system, but it would require the compilation of thousands of scenarios to address each 
fire 
situation at each stage of the construction. BS DD240 (BSI, 1997) actually comments on the 
limits of application of the deterministic criteria and precise that "justification should 
be given 
for any extrapolation of test data. " We can assess three fire scenarios 
(Figure 3.7): 
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BS DD240 (1997) states that "it can be often difficult to establish the level of safety achieved 
in absolute terms and that it may be relatively straightforward to demonstrate that the design 
provides a level of safety equivalent to that in a building that conforms to more prescriptive 
codes. " The Joint Code of Practice (2000) does not prescribe a detail set of requirements to 
use it as an outstanding document to complete the FSE method. A deterministic approach 
seems to be the most valuable and reliable solution to demonstrate a satisfactory fire safety 
strategy for construction sites (new, refurbishment/renovation, maintenance). It is essential to 
consider several fires scenarios, maybe at the most critical stages of the construction works: 
completion of the superstructure, fit out, finitions and hand over. 
3.2.5 Reporting on the validity of a FSE approach (for buildings under 
construction, refurbishment/renovation or maintenance) 
The complexity of a construction site in its changing design and fire load, the non static 
spread and mobility of occupants and the availability of combustibles and the fractile fire load 
on the imposed structure made it difficult to assess and quantify the building data to develop a 
probabilistic design. A deterministic approach was not excluded if several scenarios were 
developed at critical and high risk phases of the construction process. A comparative 
approach was to date excluded, as the JCOP was not prescriptive enough. 
However early stages of the FSE method and the QDR are very informative and would form 
an excellent basis to develop further the qualitative method. The JCOP requirements focus on 
the development and implementation of a "made to measure" fire safety strategy for the 
management and prevention of fires during construction works. The implementation of fire 
safety measures and protection systems on construction sites as soon as feasible and possible 
should be taken into account in the design and the FSE approach for the finished facility. BS 
DD240 (1997) focus on the safety of the occupant in the finished facility but not during 
construction. The QDR exercise could to be extended to consider the early implementation of 
protection system to protect construction workers in new construction and 
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refurbishment/renovation works. Maintenance sites were to be considered in a different 
category and the design and FSE approach should provide a flexible design, easy access to 
technical equipment to prevent fires during maintenance operations. 
There was room for improvement within the FSE approach to consider the stage of 
construction as well as the finished facility. However the use of the FSE approach for 
construction site safety was to date not feasible. The lack of statistical information of fires on 
construction sites was a major barrier and no probabilistic data could then be developed. 
However, as demonstrated, the QDR was very informative. The author suggested that this 
exercise should be extended to develop a detailed qualitative analysis to determine a fire 
safety strategy for the prevention and management of fires on construction sites. 
3.3 Fire Statistics 
The statistics presented in this chapter have been built with a series of published and non- 
published documents by different governmental organisations and other bodies. The 
accessibility and reliability of these figures was unfortunately uncertain and could lead to a 
misinterpretation of the true figures. The governmental organisations and bodies relied on the 
fire reports completed and forwarded by the Fire Brigades and the Insurance companies 
which most of the time protect information from the general public. Accessing those primary 
sources of information is restricted in order to protect the interest of both contract parties and 
Insurance Companies involved in the incident. It was therefore impossible to dress a real 
portrait of the situation and the problem of fire on construction site and the economic impact 
of a fire. Figure 2.6 illustrated the complexity of the framework of collection of data. 
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The second problem related to statistics was the fact that a large number of fires are 
unreported because they are without any financial and human consequences. Fortunately a 
very low number of fatal injuries has been reported this last ten years. It was therefore 
impossible to evaluate the number of unreported fires on site. Construction Safety has 
been a serious concern to most construction companies since accidents not only reduced 
productivity and damaged equipment but frequently also injured human beings. Accidents 
affected both construction costs and profitability through delays, damage to equipment and 
materials, damage to the facility under construction or through compensation payable as 
damages for accidental injury or loss of life. Every year many fires occurred in buildings under 
construction, and the occurrence of these fires contradicted the popular belief that modern 
buildings couldn't burn. Very few fires on building sites made headline news because loss of 
life was relatively small. The total damage, however, could be very costly - not only in terms of 
direct damage but also through the imposition of contract time penalties and because of the 
inflationary costs of replacement materials and labour. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarised a 
number of major fires in the UK and around the world. 
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3.4 Fire Losses 
Fire losses in the UK between 1984 and 1995 were estimated to be £152.4 million. During 
this period, two specific fire incidents should be noted. Both large fires which occurred during 
construction (at Minster Court and at Broadgate, London, in 1990 and 1991, respectively), 
they, alone, accounted for £138.5 million of losses. This sum represented 90.87% of the total 
cost of fires in the UK over the whole period. 
Date Site and Location Individual Cause 
Loss £ 
15/06/85 Building under construction 2,500,000 Naked flame ignited fire proof material Camberley, Surrey 
11/07/87 Building under refurbishment 1,000,000 ? 
Blackheath, London 
30/05/89 Building under refurbishment 3,650,000 
Marlow, Buckinghamshire 
23/06/90 Commercial building under 33,500,000 Unknown 
construction, London (Broadgate) 
08/12/90 Offices under construction 5,000,000 Unknown, possibly electrical 
Glasgow. 
19/08/90 Department store under 5,000,000 Suspected malicious ignition 
construction 
West Hurrock, Essex 
31/01/91 Historic Building undergoing 6,000,000 Suspected Arson 
refurbishment, Aberdeenshire 
15/04/91 School under refurbishment, St 2,800,000 Accidentally caused by contract workers 
Helier, Jersey on roof. 
07/08/91 Offices under refurbishment 105,000,000 Unknown, supposed naked flame 
London (Minster Court) 
17/11/91 School under refurbishment 2,000,000 Arson 
Ashford, Kent 
21/02/92 Building under construction 2,500,000 Arson 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Tyne & 
Wear 
16/05/93 Building under construction 1,320,000 ? 
Strood, Rochester, Kent 
09/02/95 Police training College under 1,250,000 Electrical or blow lamp 
renovation 
09/02/95 Building under conversion 1,250,000 ? 
(refurbishment) Slaugham, 
West Sussex 
16/03/95 Building under construction 1,000,000 Accidental ignition of roof by generator 
Rochdale, Lancashire flue 
03/08/95 High School under refurbishment, 4,400,000 Electrical Fault 
Wakefield, West Yorkshire 
19/02/98 Hotel under refurbishment 3,000,000 Hot work 
Washington, Tyne &Wear 
03/11/98 Hotel under renovation 4,250,000 Accidental / Deliberate 
Table 3.6: A sample of U. K. Construction Fire Losses exceeding £lmilion, 1984-1998 
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One might be forgiven for arguing that these two incidents should be considered as 
exceptional or due to some special circumstances of the period. However, when the causes 
were analysed, they were clearly management and/or worker attitudinal negligence. These 
studies revealed a lack of attention to prevention of fire on building sites. Preliminary 
research pointed out this problem being endemic to the industry, worldwide. Such major fire 
incidents have occurred in many countries, as listed in Table 3.5. Table 3.6 above, lists a 
sample of major construction site fires which have occurred in the U. K. during the period 
1984 to 2000. 
The limited access to the record of fires on construction sites did not allow the author to 
develop a detailed quantitative analysis and probabilistic approach. However an attempt 
to demonstrate the distribution of 50 fires between 1985 and 1998 based on their recorded 
direct losses was not completely conclusive. The restricted sample of data (50) over a 13 
years period was not representative of the real extend of the problem. Moreover the data used 
for this short statistical analysis did not take into account fires with losses below £50,000 as 
they were not recorded by the statistical bureaux (FPA, Home Office, LPC, Fire Brigade, 
HSE). The evidence collected through this research however determined that the majority of 
fires had losses below £50k (more than 80%). 
Figure 3.10: Distribution of fire losses (1985 - 1998), all fires in £000 
100 
4% 
Figure 3.11: Pie's distribution of Fires in % for the years between 1985 and 1998 (in 
£, 000) 
The statistical analysis revealed that less than 50% of the fires had losses below £500K. More 
than a quarter of the fires generates losses between £100K and £499K and the remaining 34% 
for minor losses below £99K (Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.12: Pyramidal distribution of fires in % for the years between 1985 and 1998 
(in £, 000) 
The top of the pyramid (4% in Figure 2.13) represented the two major London's fires in 1990 
and 1991 (Minster Court and Broadgate). The exceptional nature of these fires and 
consecutive losses had a major impact on the industry (an increase of 400% of premiums). 
A fire during the construction phase impacts dramatically on both contractor and client. The 
cost of fire could be illustrated by analogy with Heinrich's "Iceberg" (1959) explanation of 
industrial accidents. Heinrich's detailed study of the cost of occupational accidents to 
enterprises examined some 5000 case files. It distinguished two different kinds of cost for an 
accident: visible and invisible; and illustrated them metaphorically as an iceberg. Heinrich's 
Iceberg (Heinrich, 1959) suggests that 20% of the costs associated with accidents could be 
classed as visible or DIRECT COSTS, i. e. those usually covered by insurance, and 80% as 
INDIRECT COSTS which were invisible. This concept has been followed and re-used by a 
number of economists around the world and, moreover, this analysis was still recognised as 
the best representation of the cost of accidents, whatever the cause. 
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Rullier (1992), from UAP (a leading French insurance company), in 1992 analysed the 
economic impact of fire (Figure 3.13). In addition to the costs suggested by Rullier, it has 
become clear that there are two other aspects to this matter. The first was that there was a 
high probability that, following a major fire loss, the future cost of insurance premiums would 
rise for all insured parties as insurance companies try to recoup losses. Secondly, but more 
difficult to ascertain, was the costs to society resulting from the inconvenience caused by the 
non-availability or late completion of the building. Both were, of course, extremely difficult 
to assess and may even be non-quantifiable. Rullier alluded to these problems in his paper by 
the use of the phrase "Pertes immaterielles " (non-material losses). Rullier also argued that in 
today's economy, where management was required to be more cost-effective, control of 
fire loss and business interruption was of prime importance. Because of the human 
factor, it was impossible to entirely eliminate the possibility of fire where construction was in 
progress. Large losses, however, could be reduced significantly by taking proven loss control 
measures. 
Cost of Indemnity Direct Costs 
20% 1 
Insurance 
2to5 
Business Interruption 
40 to 100% 
Indirect losses: 
Market decline, 
Public Image 
Indirect Costs 
Figure 3.13: Impact Economique reel d'un incendie (Real economic impact of a fire), 
Rullier, P, UAP, France. 
Even after assessing risks, it was not always easy for a client to understand, and accept, their 
importance at the outline brief stage of a project. However, the problem of 
fire during the 
construction stage of a project became the problem of every participant 
in the process 
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should a fire occur. Transfer of responsibility was not the only solution and the site 
manager should not be the only person to blame. 
Accidents affect both construction costs and profitability through delays; damage to equipment 
and materials (Puybaraud & Barham (1997) and Ebner (1994)); damage to the facilities under 
construction, refurbishment, or maintenance; and/ or through compensation payable as damages 
for accidental injury or loss of life. 
The accessibility, comparability, and background of the figures were unfortunately also 
indeterminable. There is consequently some residual uncertainty about the realism and scope 
of the generalised statistical portrait, particularly when it is pushed to make assessments of 
process issues -a situation recognised for instance by Kidd (1992), Hinks (1992) and much 
later Carey (1997) and Puybaraud & Barham (1997). More valuable evidence tends to come 
from detailed reports for pivotal fire events. In the fire safety research field this problem is 
well recognised. 
The second problem related to the statistics arises because a large number of fires appear to 
be unreported, usually because they are without any major or immediate financial and human 
consequences. This invisible element of the problem will leave the lessons from the near 
misses and fires where any processes or procedures lead to successful control unreported also. 
The risk of a fire occurrence was generally recognised as being extremely high during the 
construction, refurbishment, or maintenance of buildings - because of the combination of 
large quantities of combustibles combined with numerous potential ignition sources in a 
rapidly-changing environment. In partially occupied or occupied buildings undergoing such 
works the consequences in terms of direct loss of property and/ or occupant safety are 
potentially profound, even where the fire which causes these problems may be relatively 
minor. 
The significance of this issue for business appears to still require drawing-out, perhaps 
via the Facilities Management field. The direct consequences for the core and non-core 
business from fire events in critical core or support business premises (and/ or to people) are 
104 
potentially very damaging to business continuity. However the issues appear to remain under- 
stated. 
Turning to the attempts to quantify the visible, reported, element of this problem, the UK 
Home Office (1998) reported a total loss from fires of £706m for 1996. Every year in the UK, 
the total number of incidents attended by the fire brigade averages more than a million (UK 
Home Office, (1998)). The UK Health and Safety Executive (1997) reported more than 4,000 
construction fires annually, the equivalent of more than 10 fires on construction site per day. 
Furthermore, there was evidence to suggest that of a total of 700 construction site fires during 
1993 in the UK, 70% were adjudged to have be deliberate or possibly deliberate fires (UK 
Home Office, 1997). 
The survey carried out by one of the major Insurance (Anon, 1998) provider in Europe and 
worldwide concluded that for all Contractor All Risks (CAR) policies -1,210 major losses 
between 1982 and 1996- constructions/buildings losses due to fire were the most important 
across all CAR activities (silos, roads, wet risks, tunnels, bridges, sewers and buildings). 
Losses due to fires account for 60% of total buildings losses between 1982 and 1996; 20% 
accounts for event of nature, 8% for construction methods, 3% for design, and 4% to other 
causes. The distribution of losses for buildings only across the same period (1982-1996) 
demonstrated that fires accounts for 63% in average for the period, with a significant increase 
in 1990 and 1991 due to the two major London fires (Minster Court and Broadgate). Figures 
from 1994 to 1996 showed a reduction in the percentage of loss amount due to fire but it does 
not demonstrate a significant profile of reduction. We would need to look at a longer period. 
However, following the introduction of measures of fire safety on site and during the 
construction process, 1993 showed a major reduction of losses due to fire (23%), but a major 
increase of losses due to construction methods. The survey and analysis of 485 major losses is 
the most accurate quantitative information available about construction fires and from a 
reliable source. 
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According to a number of survey sources (for example, the Fire Protection Association 
(1997); UK Home Office (1996); and the UK Health and Safety Executive (1997)) the 
average cost of construction sites fires per year exceeds £2m per year, and in 1990 and 1991 
surpassed £34m and £109m (respectively). Meanwhile, insurance companies across Europe 
report an intriguing breakdown of figures - indicating that 36% of fires on site are caused by 
a fire ignition source, such as hot works, welding, and cutting. However, a further 11% arise 
from management mistake, which may originate from a lack of supervision or training. 7% 
were considered to occur as a consequence of a design mistake; 26% were considered to arise 
from natural disasters, and 20% were categorised as indeterminable or other causes. 
El Source Ignition 
Managerial 
Mistake 
Q Natural Disaster 
Q Design Mistake 
  Others 
Figure 3.14: Generic distribution of the causes of fires 
It also appeared that 43% of these fires were caused by negligence, and cost 33% of total fire 
losses for the insurance company. Arson fires cost to this insurance company 31 % of the total 
fire losses. 
Abbott (1991) reported that the causes of damages appear to range from technical 
defects, 
dangerous work not carried out with the necessary care, unpredictable combinations of perils, 
faulty operations, and negligent observance of safety regulations all the way to arson. 
Ebner 
(1994) argued that man occupies first rank among all perils - citing negligence, carelessness, 
overrating, overstraining, insufficient training, faulty estimation of consequences, 
also intent 
as the sources of most of the fire-related damage on construction sites. 
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An in-depth analysis by the UK Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate in 1997 (UK 
1995 Fires) showed that 70% of the fire on construction sites are initiated by arsonists. This 
has also become a general concern across Europe, for instance the Arson Prevention Bureau 
(1997) revealed that "at least 40% of the cost of the total fire damage in Europe is due to 
arson. Arson is now recognised in more countries as their major fire problem -socially as 
well as economically. " Clearly the causal side of the equation is complex, locally 
unpredictable, and may include a degree of deliberation. 
Initial causes aside, the total direct financial damage to business caused by site fires could be 
very costly of course - and in addition there was the potential for the imposition of contract time 
penalties (and the inflationary costs of replacement materials and labour). Focusing on this 
issue, the real economic impacts of fires were analysed by Rullier (1992) on behalf of a French 
insurance company. According to Rullier, the distribution of fire losses is estimated to be a 
20%/ 80% distribution respectively for direct losses and indirect losses. However this approach 
only reveals a portion of the picture, and may under-emphasise the significance of indirect site 
fire consequences for the business and the Facilities Management domain. For instance, 
continuity of business, the availability of core and non-core process facilities, and/ or supply and 
flow of resources (including facilities and people). From the perspective of business continuity 
(particularly so for businesses which are particularly sensitive to process interruption or 
seasonal peaks), the real impact of a fire may reside in the indirect consequences rather than the 
direct. 
Rullier went on to argue that the control of fire loss and business interruption should be 
considered for its prime or direct importance. In a special report about fire prevention, Ebner 
(1994) expanded the context and argued that there was a temporal relationship between 
construction losses and business impact that broadly correlated with the phases of construction. 
There are several possible reasons for this - in relation to the scale and nature of exposed 
combustibles, combined with the co-operation of a combinations of hazardous activities 
in 
increasingly-confined and (sometimes rushed) operations - there is also quite obviously greater 
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amounts of added value at risk on the site as the building nears completion, and the fire load 
may pose a greater threat to the remainder of the existing premises towards the end of its 
construction. If the passive and active fire protection provisions are incomplete or not full,. 
operational (or not yet integrated where they should be with the existing systems), then the risk 
and provision could be imbalance. 
Ebner continued by observing that concerns are given to large-scale damage occurring either 
during or immediately after installation of construction site as well as damage during the final 
phase of construction or assembly works. The distribution of risk throughout the construction 
project would therefore vary between a low risk and a high risk of fire. Abbott (1992) insisted 
that the sort of material damage losses the insurance market has seen at Broadgate Phase 8, 
UK5 1990 (which accounted for £35m+ loss alone); and Minster Court, UK, 1991 (£120m+ 
loss) is to say nothing of the associated and consequential losses, i. e. the indirect cost (80%) 
associated with fire. These latter issues appear to be relatively unprobed areas for Facilities 
Management. 
The limited availability of statistical data on fires on construction sites demonstrates a 
dearth of research in this scientific area and proves to be a major barrier to develop a 
quantitative analysis of the study. A probabilistic approach is excluded and empirical 
data would need to be obtained to redirect the research towards a qualitative approach. 
3.5 Analysis of publications on fire safety management on construction 
sites 
Research on fire safety on construction sites was not widely published in the literature. 
Merchant (1976) was the first author to publish a detailed review on building and fire safety. 
The author attempted to show that fire conscious thinking needed to be applied to 
building 
during each of the five major phases of the building life cycle. The technical note aimed to 
discuss those aspects of fire safety design and technology which have a direct 
influence on the 
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design and cost of building. Marchant reviewed each of the five phases, detailing which 
issues need to be considered to prevent fires during construction works. 
From 1976 to the mid 1980s, this area of research in fire safety was left aside and major 
researchers tended to concentrate on complex scientific and engineering research to improve 
life safety in existing buildings. This dearth of research was later realised when large fire 
losses occurred on construction sites at the beginning of the 1990s. The industry then realised 
the major gap and started to initiate major investigations on the subject. The aims was to 
understand the fire mechanism and its development on construction site and which measures 
could be taken to minimise and reduce fire outbreaks and limit their impact. The UK led this 
movement by publishing in 1992 a Code of Practice for fire prevention on construction sites. 
This professional guidance developed by the Building Employers Confederation and the Loss 
Prevention Council and supported by major fire association and the insurers, answered the 
immediate need of construction participants and provide them some guidance on how to 
organise their sites to control fire outbreaks. The Munich Reinsurance seemed to be the only 
organisation who had realised the potential problem of fire on construction sites, when they 
started to publish in 1987 (Munich Re., 1987) a series of articles in the Schadenspiegel which 
led to the publication of a Technical Guide (1987) which intended to provide guidance to their 
insurers. The Guide proposed a review of fires on construction sites from 1979 to 1987, and 
presented a model for fire prevention. It recommended the implementation of a series of fire 
safety measures during construction, and issues related to insurance. Munich Re. 
Recommended the use of a brief Code of Practice or Guide for fire safety on construction 
sites, combined with a checklist to control the implementation of fire protection measures on 
sites. To enhance the use of these documents, they have been translated in 6 different 
languages. The ICE organised in 1992 a major conference on minimising the risk on 
construction sites where Abbott, Kidd, Smith, Barber, Wright and Evans (1992) 
looked 
closely at the problem, giving a professional insight. Abbott (1992) proposed a review of 
the 
current insurer's perspectives on fires on construction sites, presenting the true picture of 
the 
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problem. Abbott presented the possible explanation for the recent series of major fires: recent 
trend in modern building design and the use of modern methods of construction. The 
discussion explored methods to transfer or manage the risk of fire. It proposed the 
implementation of a strict fire safety procedure imposed through the contractual agreement 
and the insurance policy. Abbott also insisted on the need to consider a fundamental cultural 
change for the construction industry in order to sustain the implementation of a fire safety 
procedure to recognise, control and reduce all aspects of construction site fire exposure. The 
paper of Kidd (1992) reviewed the insurers' position and their requirements for fires on 
construction sites and in building undergoing renovation. Kidd reviewed the implementation 
of the BEC/LPC Code of Practice and its practicability. The Insurers' requirements could be 
split into three categories: the management of fire safety, site organisation and fire 
precautions. The paper of Smith (1992) proposed the combination of measures to take on 
construction sites to meet life safety and financial loss objectives. The paper discussed these 
aspects highlighting practical solutions. Toone (1992) described the Broadgate's fire and the 
damage caused. The paper also examined the safety and managerial system in place on the 
site. Toone proposed the implementation of safer use of materials, working practices and 
methods under four headings: 
i. Reduce fire load, 
ii. Plan out fire risk, 
iii. Improve warning of fire, 
iv. Awareness and audits 
Rimmer (1992) proposed a review of the devastating effect of fires on construction sites on a 
client's business and his project. The paper reviewed the implication of disastrous fires for 
clients and their duties and responsibilities to secure their business through 
the 
implementation of a rigorous fire safety procedures and measures by contractors. 
The 
paper presented a series of measures and common goal for reducing 
fire damage costs 
through the contractual agreement, agreed procedure, co-operation 
between clients and 
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insurers. Barber (1992) proposed to improve the fire protection of buildings under 
construction through the implementation of a fire safety strategy report for issues to 
contractors relating to the final design. The content of the fire strategy report was discussed in 
relation to high rise and atrium buildings. In his paper, Wright (1992) presented a review of 
the needs of the fire brigade when attending a fire on construction sites. It also highlighted 
specific issues the contracting organisations should consider to ease the intervention of the 
fire services. Technical problems faced by the Fire Brigade are described and issue affecting 
their fire fighting action on site. The author also deplored the lack of partnering between 
the FB and the site management to improve awareness. Finally Evans (1992) explored 
some of the legal complexities concerning fire safety on construction sites and refers to the 
recent draft publication of the EC Directive Temporary and Mobile Construction Sites. The 
legal difficulties associated with the regulations are detailed. The author highlighted the need 
for good liaison between the various interested parties. Hinks (1992) presented the 
conflicting perspectives of the various parties involved in the maintenance of fire safe 
building operations, and discuss the implementation of site fire safety policy on site using 
checklists. Hinks explored the impact a fire during the construction process would have on 
the contracting organisation and its business continuity. He argued that "fire safety planning 
will have to become an integral part of project planning and site attitudes. " And that the 
"practical application of such policies and plans was of course their implementation. " 
In 1993, the Munich Re. Pursue their investigations and Quast (1993) proposed a review of 
fires on construction sites from 1985 to 1991, and analysed major construction sites fires. 
The author recommended the enforcement of fire safety measures during construction through 
the insurance contract and the clause "Particular Conditions regarding fire fighting 
equipment" which has been reviewed and improved. Later in 1995, Vetters proposed a 
review of the damages from fires during the construction process and their 
impact on 
reinforced concrete structure. Major construction sites fires were analysed and 
recommendations formulated on the systematic use and application of 
fire safety measures 
during construction works. Meanwhile, Ebner (1994) at a EAR and CAR risks conference in 
Scotland presented a major report for insurers. The report proposed a detailed review of the 
current concern of insurers on fires on construction sites and analyses what measures could be 
taken to reduce the number of losses due to fire and to lessen their consequences. In the first 
sections, the report briefly dealt with the phenomenon explored the relevance of a fire risk 
assessment and management approach. Finally the report proposed some measures to improve 
the level of fire safety during construction works. 
However the problem was not only significance in the UK, the effect of major fires on 
construction sites is also discussed by the industry in the US and the rest of Europe. Sadler in 
1995 published an article on how to prevent construction fires. The article proposed a review 
of the problem of fires on construction sites in the US. The author presented a strategy to 
control and reduce the number of outbreaks. The author considers how construction fires 
start and spread and specify the implementation of a Fire Safety Plan. He concludes by 
highlighting the four basic elements of the FSP: prevention, inspection, training and 
firefighting. In France, the CNPP (Centre National de Prevention et de Protection) published a 
series of articles on the problem. In a paper Baratin (1997) reviewed the fires caused by hot 
works and gave reference to a wide list of major fires in France between 1990 and 1995. The 
author argued that minimum fire measures could be taken to avoid these fires and their 
consequences. Baratin proposed a short statistical analysis of the distribution of accidents and 
their consequences. Brett (1997) reviewed the welding and cutting operations involving 
hot 
works and sparks which would lead to fire ignitions during construction works. 
The author 
presented a critic of the current legislative requirements and proposed a safe approach 
towards hot works and recommended the systematic use of a Hot Work 
Permit during 
construction works. Following a series of major fires in France, Fabre 
(1997) addressed the 
responsibilities of contractors engaged in construction works to control the outbreak of 
fires, 
and those of the facilities owners. In the first part of this paper, the author reviewed 
the 
responsibilities of the parties under the law. The French law 
differentiate obligations when 
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an external enterprise carries out works in an existing facility with its own equipment, 
and when this enterprise use its equipment. The responsibilities for losses and damages 
would be under the contractor's responsibilities as possession of the site has been given, and 
this until hand-over or partial completion. In 1997 the CNPP organised a seminar (Brett, 
1997) on the problem of fire and safety on site and gathered major representatives of the 
industry. Brett (1997) related the findings of this seminar and in his paper addressed the 
implementation of fire safety measures on site under the French law. Information were extract 
from a debate gathering safety manager from major French organisations (Danone, Paris- 
Expo, Generali-France, Usinor, La Redoute, BSPP, CNPP, Abaq). The paper gathered a wide 
range of interesting comments on the integration of a fire safety approach in 
organisations. The debate covered six aspects of safety: integration of safety in the project, 
scope of safety, safety process in the organisation, SME approach, limitation of the 
regulations, recommendations and conclusions thoughts. 
Meanwhile in the UK, several papers addressed the same problem. Carey (1997) reviewed the 
specificity of fires on construction sites, some statistical data and their significance and 
measures to put in place on site to prevent fires. The author proposed a critical review of the 
Joint Code of Practice and its requirements. He concluded his paper by highlighting the 
significant lack of information on statistical data, combined with a higher pressure on 
contractor to work to tight budget and deadlines which impact on the level of safety. 
In a 
special edition of major articles on construction sites disasters published 
in Schadenspiegel, 
Munich Re. insisted on the necessity to control the risks, and especially 
fire. Puybaraud & 
Barham (1997) reviewed the need for fire management systems on major projects 
in order 
to reduce the risk of fire and its consequences to a minimum. 
They argued that the problem of 
fire safety awareness was often exacerbated by the plethora of 
different regulations. The 
emphasis, in this paper, was on the importance of an early consideration of 
the possibility of a 
fire during the construction phase. Research was being carried out 
to establish the extent to 
which the procurement process might be adapted and 
lead to an extension of supervision 
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systems might lead to provide a more fire-safe construction environment. The importance of 
an early stage assessment of fire risk for any construction or refurbishment project was 
particularly stressed; best practice management guidance for fire-safe on-site activity, coupled 
with adequate legislative provision, was essential and major research was necessary to 
underpin all of these activities. Puybaraud & Barham (1997b) argued in a later paper for a 
review of the economic impact of fire on construction site in the UK and the position of 
insurance companies, as well as the economic necessity of a management system to ensure 
fire safety during the construction process. The importance of an early stage assessment of 
fire risk was particularly stressed; best practice management guidance for fire-safe on-site 
activity, coupled with adequate legislative provision, was essential and major research was 
necessary to underpin all of these activities. 
At this stage, the industry understood not only the necessity to address the problem of 
fires on construction sites, but also realised the major impact on businesses involved in 
the construction process. 
In a research paper on Fire Safety Attitudes and Management Culture in the Construction 
Industry, Puybaraud et al. (1999) proposed three different examples and a discussion 
engendered as to how enhanced fire safety attitudes and management culture could 
reduce the risk of fire on construction sites. It was argued that some construction companies 
were moving towards the development and reinforcement of a 
Positive Fire Safety 
Implementation Process. The influence of the management culture of the company on 
employee behaviour and its impact on the control of the risk of 
fire has been identified as vital 
and critically analysed. Later Hinks & Puybaraud (1999) reported some 
interim findings from 
organisational research into site fire safety which 
looked at the relevance of Contractor and 
Facilities Manager attitudes to safety as a component of the overall safety process. 
The 
authors consider the practical problems associated with construction 
sites safety during 
alterations and change-in-use of building 
facilities. The authors proposed a Project Safety 
Model for review. 
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3.6 Analysis of Fire Safety Guides 
The availability of guidance notes to support the actions of the parties involved in the 
construction process was somehow restricted to a few valuable documents. However, the UK 
seemed to be well ahead compared to other EU and worldwide countries. 
The first guide was published in the UK in 1975. P5: Standard Fire Precautions P5 by 
Department of Environment Property Services Agency, Directorate of Building Development. 
The P5 Guide recommended a set of standard fire precautions to be taken by the contractor 
engaged in building and engineering works and maintenance for the Department of the 
Environment Property Services Agency. It required the contractor "to comply with the 
following instructions in addition to any other conditions of contract relating to fire 
precautions. " This document waited on the shelf to be fully recognised and used until 1990s, 
when the UK construction industry realised the significant problem of fire on construction 
sites and updated and re-published a new guide: BEC/LPC Joint Code of Practice (1992). The 
Joint Code of Practice on the Protection from Fire of Construction Sites and Buildings 
Undergoing Renovation applied to construction sites including those where demolition, 
alterations, fitting out, renovations, refurbishment or repair work was being carried out, to 
minimise the risk of accidental or malicious fires. The publication of this Code was supported 
by most of the industry representatives and especially the Fire Brigade which published in 
1991 a Brigade Guidance Note on fire safety measures recommended for adoption: The 
LFCDA Recommendations: Fire safety Measures recommended for adoption in buildings 
during the course of construction. Since the Code publication in 1992, it has been updated 4 
times until 2000 (last edition) to reflect the needs of the industry and adapt to the growth of 
new technologies and technical requirements. In 1998 the Joint Contract Tribunal amended 
their standard forms of contract (JCT98) to address fire prevention during construction works 
and adopt the Joint Code of Practice (Fire Code). Compliance with the JCOP was a 
requirement under the terms of the contract. The JCTs forms of contract were the most 
common form of contract in the UK and has been widely used and recognised by the industry. 
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The impact of the Joint Code was still being verified, since the lack of statistics couldn't 
demonstrate a major reduction in the number of fires and their damages. The FPA (1999) 
admitted that their figures can show that fires "can wipe out a business in a matter of 
minutes. " The FPA Director argued that "the prevention of fire through risk assessment 
should be an essential part of any business strategy. " 
The CNAC (Comite National d'Action pour la securite et 1'hygiene dans la Construction) in 
Belgium published in 1983 a Guidance Note on safety and fire risks on construction sites 
(Notes de Securite Construction. La Prevention des Risques d'Incendie dans la Construction). 
The Guidance required the implementation of specific fire safety measures on construction 
sites and aimed at raising the awareness to contractor and organisation engaged in 
construction works. This Guide was in accordance with the Article 54-quater of the 
Workplace Regulation (Reglement General pour la Protection du Travail). 
The reinsurance organisations like Munich Re. And Swiss Re. who always had an interest in 
fire safety on sites, have been very active in publishing reports on this issue and special 
guides to their insurers. In 1987, Munich Re. published a "Guide Technique ii I'intention des 
Assureurs: La securite sur chantier" comprising the Endorsement: Special conditions 
concerning fire-fighting facilities and fire safety on construction sites. Swiss Re. in 1992 
published a CAR Insurance guide, later updated in 1998. The brochure aimed to give a good 
introduction to the subject and aimed at encouraging contractors and clients to consider a 
CAR insurance cover for construction projects. In 1992 and 1993, Swiss Re. published their 
first guides on the fire protection of construction sites, later actualised in 1998. The 1992 
publication (in French) reviewed fire prevention on construction sites and provided 
recommendations for insurers. The 1993 guide (published in Spanish) explored the evolution 
of fires, their causes and consequences on sites. It recommended the implementation of fire 
safety measures. 
Historic buildings present very specific characteristics which would contribute to increase the 
potential fire load and would allow a fire to spread more rapidly. A higher potential of sources 
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of ignition within a historic facility during refurbishment and/or maintenance work activities 
increased the risk of fire outbreak. The integration of fire protection measures was often 
difficult and limited to a minimum in most of the cases. The Crown was a major owner of 
historic buildings around the UK and initiated the publications of a set of standard aimed at 
works in Crown buildings only. The HMSO standard (1995) addressed a range of fire 
protection measures against fire during construction works. The Contractor was required to 
comply with the Standard in addition to any other conditions of contract relating to fire 
precautions and he should ensure compliance by his sub-contractors. The Standard presented 
a set of instructions for contractors engaged on building and engineering works and 
maintenance in all Crown premises both civil and military. 
In 1997, the Health & Safety Executive published a HSE Guidance: Fire Safety in 
Construction Works. This Guidance was produced for clients, designers and those managing 
and carrying out construction work involving significant fire risks. The Guidance aimed at 
construction projects involving substantial fire risks and is relevant to all who have a role in 
the development, management and application of fire safety standards on construction sites. 
This Guidance was part of HSE's revised series of health and safety guidance for 
construction. 
The US has a long history of standard all their industries. The fire safety industry is under the 
authority of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) which has the duty to develop 
standards in fire safety. The NFPA published a wide range of standard which apply to fire 
safety in construction and some specifically apply to site works and construction works with a 
high risk of fire outbreak. The NFPA 241: Standard for safeguarding Construction, Alteration 
and Demolition Operations was one of them and was first published in 1933 and revised in 
1942. Adopted by the NFPA in 1958, and subsequent revisions in 1968 and 1973. The 1986 
Edition represented a complete rewrite. This edition of the NFPA 241 was approved as an 
American National Standard in 1996. This comprehensive and detail standard provided 
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specific guidance and requirements for fire safety and protection during construction works. It 
was the most comprehensive Guidance available. NFPA 241 required "the owner shall 
designate a person who shall be responsible for the fire prevention program and who shall 
ensure that it is carried out to completion" under 5-1.1*. Specific chapters of interest and 
relevant to fire safety measures are highlighted below: Chapter 3: Process and Hazards, 
Chapter 5: Fire Protection, Chapter 6: Safeguarding Construction and Alterations operations, 
Chapter 8: Safeguarding Demolition Operations, Chapter 9: Safeguarding Underground 
Operations. The Standard refers also to a series of additional standards on specific safety 
issues like the NFPA 51B: Standard for Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding 
Processes. 
Finally, South Africa seemed to propose a short guide to contractors. FPA Bulletin (1990): 
A Fire Prevention Inspection Guide, published by the Fire Protection of Southern Africa 
offers a brief checklist on measures to take for fire safety on construction sites. 
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3.7 Fire Safety Strategies: A review of current practices 
Attitude to risk in construction was mainly affected by two factors. The first was the 
awareness of the possibility of a catastrophic event to which all employees were exposed to. 
The second was the extent to which individuals, both employees and employers, believed that 
they were capable of controlling the risks that they faced. The management team would have 
an active role throughout the whole project. In this chapter three different examples were 
presented and a discussion was engendered as to how enhanced fire safety attitudes and 
management culture could reduce the risk of fire on construction sites. 
3.7.1 Background 
Fire losses on construction sites in the UK between 1984 and 1995 were estimated to be 
E152.4 million. During this period two specific large fire incidents should be noted. Both 
fires occurred during construction and they alone accounted for 90.87% of the total cost of 
fires in the UK over the whole period (FPA, 1992). 
At first sight it might be argued that these two incidents should be considered as exceptional 
or due to some special circumstances of the period. However, studies revealed a lack of 
attention to prevention of fire on building sites. Action to promote fire safety in a 
construction company should not be seen as a legal embarrassment to plague already 
overburdened managers, but as a normal and necessary part of the company's activities in 
which workers and management have a common interest. Davies & Tomasin (1996) argued 
that small contractors have neither the time nor the inclination to keep abreast of legal 
requirements and technical developments in safety matters. Risk Management could be a 
significant contributor to the success of a company in identifying the potential sources of 
risk on a site during the construction of a project and, hence as a consequence, 
help in 
reducing potential costs by avoiding fire. 
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This approach towards fire safety during the construction process has been greatly improved 
since 1991. First with the introduction in 1992 under the pressure of insurers of a new Code 
of Practice (BEC, LPC, NCG, 1992) and recently with the introduction of a new amendment 
to the JCT80 Standard Form of Contract regarding Fire Protection during the construction 
process (JCT, 1980, Amendment 17: Fire Protection, 1997) now part of the newly republished 
JCT 98. Following a series of site investigations, those regulatory improvements have been 
widely recognised and applied on-site by most major contractors in the United Kingdom 
through the written Fire Safety Plan (FSP) and/or through site practices. Small size companies 
were still facing a major financial barrier (Davies & Tomasin 1996) and change was therefore 
slow and cost targeted. But Carey (1992) was arguing that the lack of readily available 
statistical data made it difficult accurately to assess what affect, if any, the Code of Practice 
(BEC, LPC, NCG, 1992) has had on construction fire safety. 
The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 1994 (HMSO, 1994) which came into 
force on 31 March 1995, required the implementation of a Health & Safety Plan during the 
construction phase. A set of arrangements should be set out in this Plan for the management 
and organisation of the project. This could include: management, standard setting, 
communication and co-operation, identification and effective management of activities 
with risks of health and safety, emergency procedures, information and training for 
people on site, consultation with people on site etc. Many authors emphasised the 
behavioural approach to prevention (Mattila, 1988, Sluzer-Azaroff, 1990). The study 
developed by Sluzer-Azaroff (1990) proved that the behavioural programme was affected 
by safety even in the difficult setting of building. The results showed that behaviour 
modification might also be an effective tool in companies' own programme. Mattila and his 
colleagues (1988) obtained "powerful improvement" by determining where major safety 
"hot-spots" were located and intervening there first. Recently, studies carried out 
by 
Marsh (1992) revealed that behavioural goal setting and feedback on construction sites were 
an effective method to improve safety level. It appeared that, generally, 
intervention works 
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through increasing awareness of safety issues and increasing and improving communication 
between management and the workforce. Also, Allen & Blackburn (1992) argued that more 
and more organisations adopted a proactive approach in order to manage the risk of their 
business. 
In this paper, it was argued that some construction companies are moving towards the 
development and reinforcement of a Positive Fire Safety Implementation Process which was 
be generalised in the following Figure 3.15. 
Management Team Team 
Culture Building Work 
Company Training Expertise Expertise 
Culture 5 (Consultant) (Consultant) 
OSITIVE IDENTIFY FIRE SAFETYPO' M NITORING 
MANAGEMENT RISK PLAN & 
ATTIDUDES)ý. N. IMPLEMENTATION CONTROL 
Yes 
New Project REVIEW & 
NO IMPROVEME] 
Figure 3.15: Positive Fire Safety Implementation Process 
There was no evidence yet to demonstrate that all companies were following the model 
proposed in Figure 3.15. However, the influence of the management culture of the 
company on employee behaviour and its impact on the control of the risk of fire has been 
identified as vital. Marsh (1992) identified management attitude as a "central" issue to 
safety on UK construction sites. Balckburn & Allen (1992) argued that managing the risk to 
business involved taking a positive approach to the management of safety, starting with the 
very top of the organisation. Therefore, Figure 3.15 illustrated a positive fire safety 
implementation process. The development and implementation of an accurate assessment 
strategy for identifying performance is now becoming necessary to provide evidences of 
the effectiveness of such a model. 
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3.7.2 Fires on Construction Sites: a process of fire occurrence 
There were more than 3,000 construction fires annually in the UK. Approximately 100 of 
them cause more than £50,000 of damage and usually resulted in complete dislocation of 
project schedules (HSE 1997a). The HSE estimated that there was one fire per working hour 
on a construction site somewhere in the UK every working day. This represented, on average 
11 construction fires per day (HSE 1997b). 
Fires on construction sites were a new area of research and there are no information about the 
subject. However following a two year investigation and analysis (Puybaraud 1997a, 1997b, 
1998) of the available data, it has been concluded that at least 50% of the fires could have 
been avoided through a better or more effective managerial approach. Attitudes towards Fire 
Safety on Construction Sites played an important part in the control of risk during the 
construction process and lack of attention seems to be the major cause of those fires. Studies 
conducted by the FPA (1992) on major fires in the UK (loss >£50,000) revealed that more 
than 22% of major fires on building sites were deliberate or probably deliberate. Moreover, 
more than 26% involved a source of ignition that could have been controlled through an 
effective management process. There are still more than 28% of all major fires where the 
sources of ignition are unknown. The Foreword to the Code of Practice (BEC, LPC, NCG, 
1992) stated that the majority of fires could be prevented by designing out risks, taking 
simple precautions and by adopting safe working practices. 
Most construction fires had a simple cause and could be dealt with simple precautions. A 
simple chain of effects that plays a very important role in the break out of a fire. As 
mentioned earlier, lack of attention could lead to a combination of circumstances that, almost 
inevitably would result in a break out of fire during the construction process. In the past two 
decades most research into construction safety had primarily emphasised procedural, 
behavioural and social aspects (Hadipriono, 1992). Fault-tree models were very often 
developed to explain the aetiology of construction incidents. Hadipriono (1992) 
defined a 
fault-tree as a graphic model that shows parallel and sequential causes or events 
that 
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contribute to a predetermined undesired event. The fault-tree analysis approach for fires on 
construction sites (Figure 3.16) were based on a model developed by Barry (1995), the 
general fault-tree support framework. 
FIRE 
OCCURRENCE 
No system II System available but II System available 
available FAIL to operate and Operate 
System 
FIRE implementation 
DEVELOPMENT SUCCESSFUL 
Suppressed Fire Service 
"on-site" Attendance 
Damage I Damage 
Figure 3.16: Fault Tree Analysis Approach - fire on construction sites. 
Fire 
Suppressed 
Depending when the failure was discovered, it might not be too late to control the situation, 
but it was never too late to reflect on the process of action to adopt for a future site. This 
was the philosophy adopted by Bovis after the Broadgate Fire in 1990 and Minster Court Fire 
in 1991. 
3.7.3 Broadgate Phase 8 fire (1990) 
On the 23rd June 1990, a fire developed in the partly completed fourteen storey building 
in the 
Broadgate development under the responsibility of Bovis. The fire began in a 
large 
contractor's hut on the first floor and smoke spread unchecked throughout the 
building. The 
fire lasted for 4 '/2 hours with excess temperature of 1000 degree Celsius 
for 2 hours. 
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The chain of events leading to the fire demonstrates many managerial failures which 
contributed to the development, growth and spread of fire in the facility. In 1990, no statutory 
document provided guidance to the contractors on how to prevent fires on construction sites. 
Basic health and safety requirements were implemented and the CDM Regs had not yet been 
brought to light. 
The complexity of the project, its location and restricted space distribution forced contractors 
to installed site huts inside the uncompleted building (site huts in the first floor of the facility). 
The structure of the building was a steel frame with composite deck/concrete floors. The steel 
structure was partially unprotected at the time of the fire (The Steel Construction Institute, 
1991). The report by the Steel Construction Institute demonstrated that the design of the 
building was in accordance with the current codes and approved document. However, the 
occurrence of a fire at this stage of the construction could have been prevented through better 
managerial actions and decisions. Also the implementation of a proper fire protection system 
during the construction works (detection, warning and extinguishment) and especially in the 
huts could have prevented the disaster. 
The Steel Construction Institute (1991) formulated a series of recommendations as a 
consequence of their studies of the fire, its development and damages. However, most of the 
formulations at the time were on the structural failure of the building and how the structure 
behaved during the fire. (examination of the structure, frame action and structural behaviour, 
thermal modelling, connections, steel deck, cleaning... ). Recommendations 8 and 9 covered 
some managerial aspects, such as "the measures to improve general fire safety and reduce 
financial losses for building sites", and on temporary accommodation on sites; "all forms of 
construction for temporary accommodation inside buildings should adopt low combustibility 
materials which only release small quantities of smoke when exposed to fire. " Addendum I of 
the Report (The Steel Construction Institute, 1991) covered some basics principles of fire 
precautions during the construction phase: legislation (it is worse mentioning again at this 
stage that the Joint Code of Practice for fire prevention did not exist at the time of the 
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incident), objectives, site access, position of office accommodation and means of escape, 
building construction works (early installation of fire protection measures like doors, 
staircases... ), fire fighting facilities on site and their proper installation, housekeeping, 
management and communication (responsibility of the site management, security patrol) and 
some recommendations for "the use of additional comprehensive guidance on fire precautions 
measures. " The Institute also stressed the "matter of urgency" of the situation and the 
implementation of these measures. 
So how effective were these recommendations? It didn't seem that Bovis completely realised 
the red alert message this fire was sending out. The objective of the report was to focus on 
the structural survey of the building and how it responded during the fire. The 
recommendations formulated on the managerial approach to adopt were quite superficial. 
History confirmed that Bovis didn't have the time to react before another major fire occurs: 
The Minster Court fire in 1991. 
3.7.4 Minster Court Fire (1991) 
This major construction site occurred in London in 1991, and is a prime example of the kind 
of devastation that such incidents can create. The total losses for this fire were reported by the 
FPA (1996) to be £105million. The source of ignition has not been clear identified by the Fire 
Brigade (North Area Fire Brigade, 1991), but from the available evidence it was likely that an 
introduced ignition source in the form of a naked flame was the most likely source. 
Following the fire, the Building Contractor prepared a document to set out the Fire Protection 
Plan for Base Building Reinstatement Works. The Construction Industry, around that time, 
had been expressing concern at the particular vulnerability to fire of building in the course of 
construction or fitting out. The earlier catastrophic fire at Broadgate Phase 8, London, 
in 1990 
had raised specific issues in the respect and Bovis (the Minster 
Court contractor) had been 
involved in the full investigation and assessment of the fire damages in partnership with other 
major organisations. Therefore, Bovis was particularly aware of the 
devastating effect of fire 
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during the construction process and its risk. But at the time of the Minster Court fire, no Fire 
Protection Plan (FPP) or Fire Safety Plan (FSP) under the form of a Guidance or Code of 
Practice has been developed. The FPP later developed by Bovis Construction Ltd for the 
Minster Court site draws attention to the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated 
approach with the Contract of reinstatement and completion of fitting out works. 
In 1992 Bovis was engaged in the European Year of Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at 
Work. Improving safety and health on European Construction Sites was a vital necessity 
following the 1987 assessment of accidents on construction sites which revealed a cost to the 
Community of approximately ECU15,000 million, including indirect costs (Commission of 
the EU 1993). In January 1992, Bovis presented a Guidance "Fire Prevention during 
Building Operations" (Bovis, 1992). 
3.7.5 Construction Companies responses 
3.7.5.1 Large Organisations (e. g. Bovis) 
The efforts of Bovis to promote good practice and address new managerial issues have not yet 
been proven successful. Bovis has not, itself, present any results. However by promoting fire 
safety within the company at all levels, Bovis seemed to have moved towards a new 
Management Culture by: 
i/ Developing Fire Awareness, 
ii/ Making fire safety a Policy statement, 
iii/ Promoting Fire safety benefits inside and outside the Company, 
iv/ Implementing appropriate Guidance, 
v/ Monitoring the implementation and running process of the FPP; 
But again, there was no evidence provided, as far as the author know, either by Bovis or the 
FPA or HSE, to demonstrate any real improvement on construction sites. To date in 2001 the 
construction industry did not experienced major construction site fires and the JCOP 
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implementation seems to be successful. The integration of the fire prevention concept in 
organisations involved in construction works seemed to have taken 6 years, between the 
publication of the first JCOP for fire prevention in 1992 to the integration of the Fire Code in 
JCT98. Even now in 2001 there was no evidence to suggest the JCOP was complied with on 
every construction projects as some contractors and clients are still working with the JCT80. 
Watson (1994) argued that changing cultures in organisations has become central to 
management thinking. Promoting job safety in building has been proven to be successful. 
The results of the study of Mattila & Hyodynmaa (1988) demonstrated that a behavioural 
safety programme contributed to improving communication in the organisation. They also 
showed that behaviour modification might also be an effective tool in companies' own safety 
programme. However, no one has demonstrated that, by adopting a behavioural safety 
programme the risk of a fire occurrence would reduce. This is an issue that will need to be 
address in the near future. 
3.7.5.2 Medium size companies (e. g. Wimpey and Withey) 
Companies like Wimpey Construction UK developed, in 1994, a Positive Safety 
Management Concept. At the time this innovative concept demonstrated a new approach 
towards the problem of fire safety, and health and safety in general, in the Construction 
Industry. Increasing pressure from the Government and the European Commission, to 
improve the level of safety in the construction industry, reinforced the pressure on contractor 
through the implementation of new Directive setting new Safety Standard. This new 
approach should push the Construction Industry to adopt a new vision and attitude 
to 
fire safety. First with the introduction of the Construction 
(Design & Management) 
Regulations 1994 (HMSO, 1994) and secondly with revisions of Codes of Practice and 
standard Forms of Contract (in the late 1990s with the new edition of 
JCTs forms of contract). 
The Safety Plans developed by Wimpey for a site sets out the principles 
for a positive 
management of safety in contract. The objectives of 
this Safety Plan was: 
0 To plan and implement safety control procedures appropriate 
to the project. 
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" To avoid accidents and dangerous occurrences and to promote safe and healthy working 
environment. 
As an example of fire safety concern in a refurbishment project contracted by Withey in 
London has been reviewed. The work involved was the complete refurbishment of all floors 
of a four storey building on Leicester Square in London. Withey sought to implement proper 
standards of fire safety during all aspects of building development. The management have a 
stated policy of encouraging all those involved in the construction process to achieve a high 
standard of safety. Locke Carey & Associates Limited were appointed as consultants to 
develop a Fire Safety Plan (FSP) and carried out on a regular basis site inspections on behalf 
of the company. The FSP incorporates all those matters specified in the Joint Code of 
Practice on the Protection from Fire on Construction Sites and Building Undergoing 
Renovation. Notwithstanding this, the attitude of the "on-site" personnel was common to a 
large number of other site management teams in the UK: 
i. Fire safety an obligation imposed under pressure of insurers (or clients). 
ii. "There is nothing to burn on a construction site" is a very common idea. 
iii. The impact of a fire during the construction process is low. 
This demonstrated that knowledge of fire safety and of the devastating impact of fire in 
economic, technical and social terms is often unrecognised or wrong. 
3.7.6 Discussion 
Post 1992, a number of similarities have been identified in the three companies presented 
above: 
Positive management attitude: a strong positive philosophy has been implemented 
in 
company structure. Means for communicating and passing information between the project 
team and the contractor and its workers on site despite a resistance or lack of appreciation 
by 
the latter. 
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Responsive Management: Arrangements for securing co-operation between participants for 
fire safety purposes, arrangements for monitoring systems to achieve compliance with the 
FPP or FSP, developing training and consultation with all levels. 
Efficiency, Control and Monitoring of on-site standards are key issues in the implementation 
and development of fire safety culture in construction company. Wimpey members of staff 
had a responsibility for monitoring safety generally and bringing infringements of safety 
regulations to the attention of those responsible for enforcement. Transfers of responsibility 
and awareness were key issues in the positive implementation of a new Management Culture. 
In contrast, the fire safety philosophy developed by Withey was user-orientated. By 
appointing an external consultant, they relied on its expertise to provide the best FSP adapted 
to both the client's and the contractor's needs and requirements. There was a general 
awareness of the global problem of fire safety by most site employees. However they 
seemed to have problem to understanding the need to implement it strictly. The necessity of a 
FSP was seen as an obligation rather than a necessity but site managers generally had no 
objections to its implementation, control and monitoring. The role of the consultant as an 
advisor was positively welcomed and suggestions for improvement of fire safety standards 
were respected. Improvement and modification of Management Culture was usually 
developed only with time and experience. Preconceived ideas and existing knowledge about 
fire safety was very often wrong. Davies & Tomasin (1996) argued that the managerial 
knowledge of many small contractors was based on experience and often lacking in 
theoretical background. This could be interpreted as a cultural problem. How do you 
convince a site manager of 20 year's experience that fire is a major problem on his site if he 
believes fires never occur on site because he never witnessed one? This could be interpreted 
in different way. It did not prove that fire was not a problem but that there was a 
difference in the perception and interpretation of fire during the construction process. 
Further research will try to demonstrate that it was through the implementation of simple 
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measures and a slow modification of attitudes that the perception and awareness of the 
problem of fire during the construction process was improved. 
Attitudes to fire risks involved a large number of issues (Figure 3.18). 
Promote 
Prevention Fire safety 
Risk 
Control 
Risk 
Awareness Risk 
Assessment 
Site Safety 
Management 
Project Culture 
Environment 
Figure 3.17: Attitudes to Fire Risk 
Monitoring 
Safety 
Each issue if not taken into account at an early stage of the preparation of the FSP could lead 
to a major problem. As explained earlier, fires occur on construction sites most often because 
of "Lack of Attention" - it is what seemed to be the conclusion drawn from the low number 
of data available through the FPA and the research carried out within the past three years by 
Puybaraud (1997a, 1997b, 1998). In order to prevent it, it is necessary to consider the issues 
raised in Figure 3.18. 
Within the last years, the construction sector has been the subject of EU attention. Progress 
seems to be made in parallel. On one hand the UK Government was concerned about the 
problem of safety in the construction Industry and improving safety standard (HM Treasury 
1996, HMSO 1996). Its actions were reinforced by a strong pressure from the EU (EAHSW 
1997). On the other hand no efforts were made, in the UK at least, to improve the existing 
data and create new ones in order to appreciate the complexity of the problem of fires on 
construction sites and its real economic, social and technical impact. Basing the approach on 
assumptions and few evidences did not slow down the production of new standards and 
regulations to improve fire safety during the construction/refurbishment process or improving 
the existing documents. So far, this was what happened. Even now it is difficult to identify a 
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clear link between what happened and the series of modifications and/or amendments made to 
the texts. The Joint Code of Practice for Protection, 1992 (BEC, LPC & NCG, 1992) was a 
direct consequence of two major fires in London in 1990 and 1991. Puybaraud (1997a) 
argued that this document was an improved version of the document "Standard Fire 
Precautions (P5)" published in 1972. The Amendment 17 of the JCT80 Standard Form of 
Contract did not seem to be justify and added again more pressure on the contractors' 
shoulders and not especially the clients. The last and not least publication of the HSE is 
another "Guidance" (HSE, 1997a) which was even more confusing for the participants and is 
again not justify. 
In such circumstances, it would be difficult to improve the actual level of protection and fire 
safety on construction sites. It was time to move towards a harmonised approach in line 
with the requirements of the contractors - cost benefit and safety based approach, the 
clients - cost targeted and a satisfactory end product, i. e. a building, the insurance 
companies carrying the risks, the Government willing to improve the situation and 
finally the EU concerned by the harmonisation of regulation within the Member States. 
Therefore, three major issues would need to be addressed. The first is to provide a detailed 
range of evidences to assess the causes and consequences of fires on construction sites. 
Secondly, to address a response through the legal documents either by improving the 
existing documentation or producing a set of new regulations. Finally, it is of primary 
importance to measure the impact of any new measures implemented. 
3.7.7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Bovis and Withey recommend that procedures should be drawn up for any project in 
accordance with the Joint Code of Practice for Protection, 1992. However, Carey (1997) 
suggested that there has been some improvement in site fire safety and he believed this to be a 
direct result of the introduction and application of the Code. This may be pure sophistry. 
Statistics were still not available to support this suggestion and, therefore, this was an area 
where further investigation was necessary. Only on the basis of the full investigation it would 
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be possible to assess accurately the impact of the Code and how the participants in the 
construction industry perceive it. 
Much of modern UK health and safety law was goal setting -setting out what must be 
achieved, but not specifying a single method by which it must be done. This allowed the 
Contractors a lot of flexibility into their managerial approach. Employers must comply with 
the law and failure to do so is a criminal offence (Section 33 Health and Safety at Work etc. 
Act 1974). 
Bovis used this, in 1992, to develop its own guidance and implement a new Management 
Culture. However, this work was of little significance for small companies. At least 50% of 
small companies work for large companies, i. e. as subcontractors, specialist contractors, etc. 
Small companies have been forced to change and develop a new corporate approach 
towards the problem of fire safety on site. Eleven fires a day on construction sites couldn't be 
ignored. This was especially so when more than 96% - 2900 fires out of 3000 in total 
result in a fire loss <£50,000 - and potentially affect 92% of UK construction companies. 
Small companies were asking for simplified legislation, better regulation and more guidance 
as illustrating good practice (EAHSW 1997). It was widely accepted, at least in the UK, that a 
cost-benefit approach to regulation is appropriate (HM Treasury 1996). Small companies 
were very concerned about the cost implication of new standards (Davies & Tomasin 1996), 
but as described in this paper and others (Puybaraud 1997a, 1997b, Carey 1997), simple 
measures could be taken without a great financial investment. Davies & Tomasin (1996) also 
argued that the financial resources of small firms were generally insufficient to provide the 
necessary standard of safety training carried out by many large firms. 
The Government has been determined, since 1996, to make implementation and enforcement 
of regulation more business-friendly. The Government has also adopted three principles of 
good regulation (HM Treasury 1996): 
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i/ Think small first: no regulation without first making sure that firms can cope, 
ii/Proportionality: no regulation unless the benefits really justify the costs to business and 
others, 
iii/ Goal-based: no detailed rules when you can simply specify the objectives. 
3.8 Conclusion Chapter 3: 
For the last 10 years we have been witnessing a slow change of management Culture. 
However, even from the sparse information available it would appear that contrary to popular 
belief, fires on site were a major problem. Preliminary statistical information points to the 
continuance of losses. The low number of examples used and discussed in this chapter 
indicated a dearth of research in the evaluation of fire safety on construction sites. 
Clearly, part of the problem was the lack of published data. The identification of causes, such 
as "attitudinal negligence" was fraught with problems because of the rarity of major fires and 
the long periods taken to assess the causes of the incident. The published works reviewed did 
not provide a solid framework or foundation upon which the current vast problem of fire 
safety on construction sites can be confidently built. No definite conclusion could be drawn 
about the relative impact of management on the reduction of risk of fire during the 
construction/refurbishment process of buildings, neither about the effectiveness of different 
managerial techniques (Fire Safety Plan, Consultant work, developing a Positive Safety 
Attitude) nor its impact on fire safety attitude. The small number of examples studied largely 
limits present conclusions. However, additional avenues of investigations were presenting 
themselves. These include a review of the process of organisational change and its 
management for effective fire safety on site incorporating factors such as culture, 
communication, and adopting new management philosophies. It is now, therefore, 
important to orientate this research towards the effects of major organisational change on 
safety culture. The clear need for a study of fire safety during the construction process has 
now been identified and a thorough investigation of the problem in more depth through a 
series of field-based studies is now planned. 
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4 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
4.1 Introduction 
What is the difference between risk and uncertainty? The terms are often used together and 
sometimes considered to be interchangeable and synonymous, the concepts are very close. 
Most future events are uncertain to some degree since there is no perfect information about 
the future, but when some sort of consideration is given to their likelihood of occurrence, and 
magnitude of possible financial loss, uncertain events can be said to become risk events since 
some expression is being made on their probability, whether this is formally (explicit 
quantification) or informally (intuitive assessment). It is obviously more desirable to make 
decisions under risk than under uncertainty since more knowledge is gained about the event 
after its consideration. As a general rule the term risk encompasses the term uncertainty. 
Risks could also be categorised as controllable or uncontrollable. As the terms suggested a 
controllable risk was one that could be managed and controlled and its likelihood was directly 
related to competency of management. Conversely an uncontrollable risk was outside the 
control of the organisation (Kelly & Bowles, 1999). 
According to Pilcher (1996) there were different types of risk, however most practitioners 
tend to put this into 2 categories: 
" Pure risk: Normally arised from the possibility of accident or technical failure. 
" Speculative risk: Possibility of loss or gain, which may be financial, technical or physical. 
Risk did not necessarily have a downside to it; there were opportunities to be made 
from 
risk, as in many things we hope that it would turn out better than predicted. 
So an 
acknowledgement that risk was inherent within the overall environment 
focused the mind to 
upside as well as downside possibilities. Some risks could be controlled, 
in that it could be 
managed or controlled and likelihood of occurrences was correlated to the competency of 
the 
individual or team managing or performing the process, however some risks were 
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uncontrollable. A risk management framework was nominally comprised of a sequential 
number of activities that can assist the organisation in reviewing various risks that arise 
from different strategies or decisions. 
Regulation in the UK did not directly require the contractor to implement a Fire Safety Plan 
in respect of a site but was content merely to recommend the implementation of fire safety 
measures to protect the contractor's employees; thereby incidentally providing a degree of 
protection for the building under construction. The new CDM Regulations, emphasised 
health and safety on construction sites but do not directly address fire safety. 
Abbott (1991) previously anticipated a cultural change which would profoundly reshape 
attitudes towards construction site safety. Is there scope in considering the Facilities 
Management perspective on the indirect cost of site fires, probably through a business 
continuity planning lens (and temporarily placing aside the possible overbearing legal 
implications associated with any contractual or other assumed liabilities), can a Facilities 
Management input help protect the business against the indirect disruption costs of site fires? 
Is there potential in a role for the Facilities Manager as the liaison officer and co-ordinator to 
the development of the operational Fire Safety Plan (as a separate document in the Health 
and Safety Plan)? If so it will be necessary to bear in mind a number of perspectives when 
considering the wider picture of the problem presented in this chapter, for instance: 
1. The parties to the contract: the Client/Owner, the contractor (and his subcontractors), 
2. The parties occupying the building premises: the Facility Manager (acting as the liaison 
officer), the employees (working in the premises and exposed to the risk of fire), the 
workforce (working on site and also exposed to the risk of fire), 
3. The third parties: Fire Brigade (offer guidance to supplement legislation, in close liaison 
between the site management and client/owner), and in the UK the Local Authorities 
(imposing a special set of rules), the HSE/HSC (ensuring the compliance with applicable 
142 
legislation and check compliance, issue Fire Certificate15. Also act as an advising body), 
the Government (imposing a set of applicable legislation16); the insurance companies 
(imposing compliance with a set of rules or Code of Practicer7); and 
4. The general public, exposed to the risk of fire in the premises. 
This chapter examined the characteristics of risk in construction site fires and how to develop 
a sound project safety case to control and manage the risk of fire during construction 
activities. The risk of fire is spread throughout the complete life cycle of the facility from its 
conception and construction through its life and occupation and maintenance, and finally 
through its demolition. 
4.2 Risk Assessment 
4.2.1 Fire Risks 
A professional approach to Health and Safety on construction sites should take a wider view 
and place more emphasis on dealing with the problem of fire on site. Two important activities in 
a system for fire prevention were fundamental to fire safety management: 
i. the collection of information about fire risks; and 
ii. the analysis and summarising of this information. 
As explained in previous chapters, in the UK, this data is mostly collected and published by the 
Fire Prevention Association (FPA). This organisation regularly publishes fire reports and some 
very detailed studies have been completed about major fires within the last 12 years. 
15 According to the Fire Certificate (Special Premises) Regulations 1976, a Fire Certificate will not be 
required if either: 
f Not more than 20 persons are employed at any one time in the building or part of the building; or, 
f Not more than 10 persons are employed at any one time elsewhere than on the ground floor of the 
building or part of the building. 
16 Building Regulations 1991, Health & Safety at Work Act 1974, The fire Certificates (Special 
Premises) Regulations 1976, Fire Precautions Act 1971, Construction (Design & Management) 
Regulations 1994. 
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Surprisingly, fires on construction sites are a new subject of research. In the published 
documentation, the lack of information about fires during construction reflected, and increased, 
the lack of awareness of the significance of the problem. The necessity for awareness training 
and preventative measures was not seen, and would remain in this situation as long as the 
different "accidents" did not represent major losses for the construction industry in terms of 
material loss, business loss and, unfortunately, human loss. 
It is often regretted that people only seem to learn by making mistakes and that important safety 
lessons are learned - or at least acted upon - only after major disasters. Indeed if there were no 
fires, it would not be necessary to study fire safety. However, accidents gave experience that 
often can be gained in no other way. Reference has already been made to the Fire Prevention 
on Construction Sites Joint Code of Practice, jointly published by the Building Employers' 
Confederation, the Loss Prevention Council and the National Contractors' Group. This Code 
resulted from a reaction to the consequences of two major incidents in London, in 1990 and 
1991 respectively. An in-depth analysis by the Home Office Research and Statistics 
Directorate about the UK 1995 Fires showed that 70% of the fire on construction sites are 
provoked by arsonists (Arson prevention Bureau, 1997). The Arson Prevention Bureau 
(CFPA Europe, 1994) revealed that "at least 40% of the cost of the total fire damage in 
Europe is due to arson. Arson is now recognised in more countries as their major fire 
problem -socially as well as economically. " Most of these arsonists could be considered as 
opportunists or casual arsonists. Even if a `Zero Philosophy' was an unachievable goal in 
health and safety, it was believed that fires of this nature could have been prevented. Modern 
technologies and management should be developed to respond to this problem. The 
introduction of a systematic risk assessment should be the most effective way to evaluate at 
an early stage of the project the risks of a fire. The Fire Safety Plan should therefore consider 
this problem and implement an effective safety plan to prevent any fire to occur on site. 
17 Joint Code of Practise on the Protection from Fire of Construction Site and Buildings 
Undergoing 
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4.2.2 Some Issues Arising from Previous Cases of Site Fires. 
As discussed earlier, the nature of the phenomenon and consequences which may benefit the 
business from a proactive fire safety management approach probably reside within the 
indirect consequences category, and may be usefully illustrated by some documented cases. 
In the UK, two major construction-related site fires in London in 1990 and 1991 had 
significant economic consequences alone (Broadgate Phase 8 and Minster Court). These have 
been well-documented. It is also worth reviewing another important site-related fire which 
originated during some maintenance works in Dusseldorf Airport, Germany, on the 11 April 
1996 (the source of following information is ANPI (1996)). This fire not only caused 
important material damages to the building structure but more importantly lives were lost. 16 
persons died in this fire and a large number of other miraculously escaped from what was 
described by the witness as an "unavoidable death ". According to the Airport Fire Brigade 
Department, investigators from the police department (NFPA, 1996) determined that the fire 
was started by a welder who was working on expansion plates in the roadway over the lower 
level of the terminal. They believe that he ignited blocks of polystyrene insulation (8cm thick) 
which were adhered to the underside of the concrete deck in the void above the ceiling on the 
first level. The fire was able to spread upward through unprotected openings such as 
escalator, stair opening. 
The report (NFPA, 1996) into this fire established that the source of this fire was linked to 
human error: "failure of workmen to take adequate precautions during welding 
operation... ". But it is beyond any doubts that we can say this fire could have been avoided 
or at least its consequences minimised with an adequate Fire Safety Plan implemented both 
by the contracting company carried out the maintenance work and the Airport Management 
liable for the safety of the passers-by, i. e. passengers and general public and its employees. 
The NFPA Fire Investigation Report (1996) quotes a "lack of adequate communications 
capabilities between the command staff and the fire fighting units..., insufficient radio 
Renovation (1992) 
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frequencies available..., inadequate means of egress capabilities..., unprotected vertical 
openings, transmission of erroneous information... " A risk assessment has not been carried 
out and potential consequences of a fire not evaluate. Prevention and awareness combined 
with an early response of the persons directly involved in this fire could have saved the lives 
of 16 persons. In this case, every circumstance were present for a fire to occur: 
" Highly flammable Ignition Source: hot work. 
0 Lack of awareness from the workers involved in the maintenance work, i. e. nobody 
thought about fighting the fire at an early stage. 
9 Fire Detection and Protection System non-operative during the maintenance works. 
9 Inadequate evacuation system in the Airport, i. e. evacuation procedures, means of escape, 
etc. 
0 High fire load in the building 
The risk of fire was high and no precautions have been taken to eliminate or at least reduce 
this risk to minimise its consequences. 
Unfortunately Dusseldorf is not the only fire where the cause of fire the construction related. 
In order to set up a broader picture of the issues of fire safety in occupied premises, three 
significant case studies have been analysed, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of them and the lessons learnt and proposing a framework of good practice. 
In the Sight and Sound Theatre fire in Pennsylvania, 1997, USA (FEMA, 1997): The storage 
area was undergoing renovation and the theatre was closed to the public. However 200 
construction staff and employees were in the building at the time the fire started. The fire was 
caused by a construction worker welding steel plates on the stage floor decking directly above 
the point of origin. During the removal of the floor covering, screw holes were exposed which 
allowed sparks and/or a molten arc-welding rod to fall onto combustible props stored below. 
Two theatre employees who went to the storage area for equipment and saw a stored stage 
prop on fire at three points discovered the fire. At approximately the same time, "the welder 
smelled smoke but disregarded it, thinking it was the welding and the hot steel burning the 
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soles of his boots" (FEMA, 1997). The fire caused the collapse of the state-of-the-art, seven- 
year-old theatre and resulted in structural damage to most of the connecting buildings. The 
total loss was valued at over $15m, and clearly the business continuity issues were immense. 
Following this fire, the FEMA (1997) in their technical report, identified an important number 
of Fire Safety Facilities Management issues: the inadequacy of staff training was expressed 
through the lack of collective training, "... the theatre staff and the fire department had not 
trained together on managing a fire emergency... " Also contributing to greater loss, was "the 
failure of the alarm system to notify the fire dispatch communications centre and the lack of 
an adequate, readily available water supply. " If such issues had been assessed before work 
proceeded on the stage floor, the Facility Manager and contractor would likely have 
recognised the potential hazard and could have suggested fire prevention measures within 
and around the work area. 
There are also Fire Safety Facilities Management lessons from the Frigecreme factory fire 
which occurred in November 1998, France (CNPP, 1998): An ice-cream factory in an 
industrial area along the Nantes-Saint-Nazaire city bypass, in June 1998, was subject to a 
major firebreak out. Hot works carried out by some welders working on the highly insulated 
sandwich panels caused the origin of the fire, i. e. negligence as quoted in the report 
"1 'origine de 1 'incendie resulterait d'une imprudence" (CNPP, 1998). A hot work permit has 
been issued and the work was nearly completed without any incidents. The fire spread very 
quickly while the construction workers tried to extinguish the fire before raising the alarm 
(CNPP, 1998). An hour later, 3,000m2 of the factory are completely destroyed. The factory 
evacuated 250 employees and managed to save all its stock of ice cream through the careful 
implementation of a Disaster Recovery Plan (CNPP, 1998). 
Figure 4.2 indicates some emergent principles for fire safety management from these cases, - 
issues which may be relevant for the Facilities Manager as well as the contractor. 
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4.2.3 Assessing the Risk of Fire: 
The Department of Environment reported in March 1996 that 35 employees have been 
exposed to fire in 1994/95 (DEO, 1996). This figure was lower than 1992/93 results (DEO, 
1995), where 38 exposure to fire have been reported to the Health & Safety Executive's Field 
Operations Division Directorate and Local Authority in Great Britain. The HSE reported in 
its last publication, Fire Safety in Construction Work (Scones, 1994) 4000 reported 
construction fires annually. Unfortunately, the lack of detail of these accidents did not permit 
us to draw a clear analysis of the causes and consequences of these exposures to fire. 
Nevertheless, the risk of fire has been identified and recognised by the main Health and 
Safety body in the UK. 
Construction/demolition sites were already considered as places of risk but normally, only in 
relation to the construction activity itself. As a result, there was awareness amongst managers 
and reasonably good safety attitudes exist. However, managing fire safety on construction sites 
required two additional, but fundamental, attitudes: 
i/ the assimilation of fire prevention measures into management routines; and 
ii/ the promotion of the importance of fire awareness. 
Unless attitudes change in respect of these points, fires on site will continue. Planning for, and 
implementation of, construction site fire safety needs to be addressed as part of the 
procurement process. 
A typical example to reinforce this view of the importance of construction site fire safety is that 
of Minster Court, London, in 1991 (LFCDA, 1991), an 8-storey building (70 x 60m) with 2 
underground levels. A fire incident was discovered at 7.30am at an upper ground floor; later 
investigation revealed that the fire began in rubbish accumulated in the atrium (which was still 
scaffold). This incident, alone, accounted for approximately 90% of all fire losses in that year. 
The cause of the fire was assumed to be a discarded match in rubbish. In this case, human error 
is, therefore, believed to be the main cause. However, what is more surprising is that, even after 
this major disaster, only three weeks later another fire was reported which had been 
ignited by a 
149 
carelessly discarded cigarette. Fortunately, this second incident did not kill anyone, but two 
persons were badly injured. 
4.2.3.1 Roles and Obligations of the Parties: 
A key decision for any client was the choice of mechanism that will best manage these 
inter-organisational relationships during the procurement process to ensure an early 
stage fire safety contribution. It is in this context that the first component of a proposed model 
for fire safety Facilities Management is presented. 
Figure 4.3: Project Safety Strategies illustrates some issues in the preparation and 
implementation of a fire safety strategy, for a project managed on-site by a designated project 
manager or planning supervisor, is likely to be one of the most effective single measures that 
can be taken to mitigate the potential losses due to fires during construction and 
refurbishment. However, while accident prevention was understandably given top priority, 
both management and workers frequently overlook fire safety. 
The London Fire and Civil Defence Authority (LCDFA, 1991; HMSO, 1995), and the Loss 
Prevention Council (1992), for instance, recommended the formulation of a fire safety plan on 
construction site. Specifically, the Loss Prevention Council (1992,2000) Fire Code required 
that "all parties involved must work together to ensure that: adequate detection and prevention 
measures are incorporated during the contract planning stage; and, the work on site is 
undertaken to the highest standard of fire safety thereby affording the maximum level of 
protection to the building and its occupant [employees, general public, workforce... ]". 
It was recommended that the Fire Safety Plan (FSP) can, and should be (LPC, 1992,2000), 
an integral part of the overall safety program required in project specifications and should 
be addressed as part of the overall procurement process. A Fire Safety Plan should set out the 
objectives of the plan, propose a strategy to be adopted and, finally, indicate what action 
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could be taken to achieve these objectives. It should be in accordance with the existing 
emergency procedure and the Business Continuity Plan (BCP). 
By use of risk assessment on the construction site at an early stage of the project, the 
contractor would be able to: 
i. identify any potential risk of fire at an early stage; 
ii. quantify the risks for each of the stages of the construction/refurbishment programme; 
iii. allow fire safety decisions to be made within the constraints of the time and resources; 
and 
iv. provide an adequate solution and develop the scope of the analysis by specifying a set of 
measures (FSP and Contingency Planning). 
It was possible, however, that, in some circumstances, the depth of this type of assessment 
will not be enough to provide to the user with a wholly reliable solution. In such 
circumstances, it would, of course, still be necessary to seek advice from an expert who will 
be able to compare the alternative solutions and decide on the most suitable. 
As a business user, the client/employer would usually require different benefits. 
Nevertheless, the client is the future user of the property whose main interest is to be able to 
move into his property. Therefore, if the client is aware of the risk of fire during the 
construction or refurbishment of the project, this assessment will be important and will be 
viewed in a different perspective. The main concerns would be to: 
f ensure that the asset will be completed on time, on cost and to the quality specified; and 
f appreciate the level of consciousness of the contractor and the effectiveness of his 
management to control any risk of fire prior to handover. 
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This type of short method risk assessment, if proposed by the insurer as a compulsory 
first assessment, would be of use in different way. The main benefits for the insurance 
company will be to: 
i. ensure that the client is aware of the risk of fire on site; 
ii. provide a simple and reliable method of assessment; 
iii. propose immediate solution to the contractor and supply a suitable alternative, if 
required; and 
iv. use this method as a basis of calculation of the premiums. 
Nevertheless, a risk assessment should not be considered as a purely commercial tool. It is 
also a useful method to ensure the identification of hazards, evaluate their potential 
consequences and finally provide a set of solutions applicable immediately. 
4.3 Contingency Planning and Business Continuity: 
Prior to reviewing a brief outline history of business continuity the reader should familiarise 
themselves with some of the terms. The Business Continuity Institute (BCI) describes 
business continuity management (BCM) and business continuity planning (BCP) in the 
following terms: 
Business Continuity Management 
" Those management disciplines, processes and techniques which seek to provide the 
means for continuous operation of the essential business functions under all 
circumstances. 
Business Continuity Planning 
" The advance planning and preparations which are necessary to identify the impact of 
potential losses; to formulate and implement viable recovery strategies; to develop 
recovery plan(s) which ensure continuity of organisational services in the event of an 
emergency or disaster; and to administer a comprehensive training, testing and 
maintenance programme. 
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However, the one that encapsulates the overall business processes and attempts to position 
business continuity as a pro-active process has defined Business Continuity as (Herbane et al. 
1997): "the planning that identifies the organisation's exposure to internal and external threats 
and synthesises hard and soft assets to provide effective prevention and recovery, while 
maintaining competitive advantage and value system integrity. " 
Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is different from Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP) and 
this is best explained by the following terms: 
0 Business continuity is the process of planning to ensure that an organisation can survive 
an event that causes interruption to normal business processes. 
0 Disaster recovery is the process that takes place during and after an organisational crisis 
to minimise business interruption and return the organisation as quickly as possible to a 
pre-crisis state. 
However, Survive! The international user group for business continuity and disaster recovery 
planning professionals agrees with the BCI explanation of BCP, however it states that Disaster 
Recovery is: 
" The process of returning a business function to a state of normal operations either at an 
interim minimal survival level and/or re-establishing full scale operations. 
4.3.1 Disaster or Crisis? 
People's perception is that a disaster or crisis is something that results in considerable 
physical damage, usually accompanied with substantial numbers of casualties, both injuries 
and deaths. Examples of this would be earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, aircraft crashes and 
explosions and bombings. It is unlikely that this word would be applied if an earthquake 
destroyed a remote uninhabited island in the Pacific. Whereas a letter bomb that injured staff 
would be by comparison classified as a disaster. A disaster is a sudden and extraordinary 
153 
misfortune, a calamitous event, especially one occurring suddenly and causing great hardship 
or damage. 
It has been suggested that disasters do not occur and are the result of a number of events - 
preconditions that can turn a simple non-hazardous event into a chain reaction, almost like the 
escalation of a disease. 
Crisis management literature suggests that there are a series of phases (Fink, 1986; 
Shrivastava, 1992; Turner, 1994) 
For example Fink (1986) suggests the following four phases: 
i. A pre incident or "prodromal crisis" - warning stage of an impending crisis; 
ii. The incident itself - "acute crisis"; 
iii. Post-incident phase of recovery or clean up -"chronic crisis" -; and 
iv. Goal of the previous -"crisis resolution" , 
Project X 
HI & RAA 
Fire Implementation 
FSP 
Management of 
Crisis: FSP No 
Incident 
Recovery: 
Contract back 
to use 
Project V 
Key: 
HI & RAA: Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Analysis 
FSP: Fire Safety Plan, Development, maintenance, auditing and testing. 
Figure 4.2: Planning for Fire Safety: example of a model. 
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In this last regard, planning a response to the eventuality of a disaster is not a simple task. 
Again the task has two parts. The first was to ensure that site layout, site operations and 
facilities would be supportive of first-aid firefighting and other intervention requirements. 
The second objective was to be able to manage any incident that affects the continuity of 
business. One way to achieve this task was to provide a fire recovery contingency plan. 
Contingency planning is not an option; it is essential. The procurement budget, therefore, 
should be sufficient to allow for its implementation or insurance provision should be made. 
Contingency planning must address the effect of a fire incident on the continuity of both the 
contractor's, and the client's, business as a whole. 
There are four distinct phases involved (Reynolds, 1994): 
0 Review of hazards: assessment of the risks and their potential impact on the organisation 
and business. 
" Development, maintenance, auditing and testing of the contingency plans. 
0 Incident management, implementation of plans during an incident and the immediate 
aftermath. 
" Recovery to normal business operation. 
If Contingency Plans were included in the planning for fire safety, we should noted that the 
plans initially will be formulated at the inception of the project -a long period before 
application is possible. They must, therefore be constructed with a long-term view of the 
future, and will need to include an analysis of needs for business recovery. 
4.4 Risk Transfer: 
4.4.1 The Insurance: 
The building contractor would wish to ensure that he had insurance in respect of any potential 
liabilities to third parties arising from personal injury or damage to property occurring 
during 
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the course of construction. The objective was to transfer the risks remaining that cannot be 
eliminated and which are too large for the Construction Company to carry itself. He would, 
therefore, contact an insurance company ones he agreed to insure the works. Generally, he 
would assume both the liability for damage to the works due to the risks, which he had agreed 
to insure against, and the responsibility for any uninsured costs arising by reason of any 
policy exclusions and excesses. 
The objective of the contractor subscribing to an insurance contract was to attempt to protect 
against financial consequences. By putting an insurance contract into place, therefore, the 
potential cost of an incident or possible damage is minimised. For protection, the contractor 
would enter into an insurance contract that specifies the amount of indemnity in relation to the 
level of potential damage that might be suffered. In exchange for its obligation, the insurance 
company would require payment of a premium, calculated in relation with the amount of risk 
taken and, in respect of fire, the probability of that a fire might occur. The premium was 
based on the extreme monetary value of the indemnity provided, assessed at the time the 
contract is signed. The main difficulty, for insurers, was the evaluation of the premium at a 
level commensurate with the probabilistic risk of a fire occurring during construction and the 
end losses. Insurance required by a construction contract would generally be in two distinct 
areas: liability and property. The property insurance was generally known, as contractor's 
"all risks" and would cover the contract works together with unfixed goods and materials 
intended for incorporation therein. The contractor may cover his plant and equipment under 
this same policy. As mentioned before, the construction industry market was still reeling in 
the aftermath of several major fires on construction sites during the early 1990s. Not only 
were premiums rising and capacity falling, but the insurance market was starting to exercise a 
greater degree of risk management and loss control. 
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Property Insurance 
Engineering Insurance 
Type title here 
Contractor's Erection Contractor's Machinery Computer Boiler and All Risks All Risks Plant & Equipement Breakdown All Risks Pressure Vessel 
(CAR) 
- 
(EAR) (CPE) (MB) (LOWV) Explosion (BOIL) 
Figure 4.3: Type of Property Insurance 
4.4.2 Procurement Strategy 
Once the client is satisfied about feasibility within overall budgetary constraints, the design of 
the project can start. The type of contract and the procurement path was an important choice 
for the client. On the basis of professional advice the client decides how much risk to accept 
and, therefore, the client must be given a thorough and complete assessment. 
The Latham Report (1994), Constructing the Team, recommended that choosing the 
procurement route should precede the preparation of the outline (brief). This must be 
determined by the nature of the project and the client's wishes regarding acceptance of risk, 
i. e. the results of risk assessment should determine the contract strategy. Latham also 
proposed a range of procurement and contractual routes that could be used to meet a client's 
wishes - each included within one of three different approaches to construction: "Standard 
Construction", "Traditional Construction" and "Innovative Construction". 
Linking fire risk during construction with the choice of procurement route was a new 
concept. It was argued that, by the choice of an appropriate procurement route, it was 
possible to address the risk of fire. Until now, the risk of a fire incident during construction 
has been regarded as, generally, equal in all construction methods. Individually, however, it is 
mainly dependent on the risks presented during the whole of the procurement process. 
Therefore, in carrying out a risk assessment to define a procurement and contractual route, the 
client should also take into account the probability of a fire during the construction phase. 
This assessment should influence the decision as to the best procurement route, not only 
because the risks can be passed onto an insurer or contractor but also because both client and 
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contractor also actually carry a large part of the risk and bear a large part of the burden 
themselves. 
The non-statutory Joint Code of Practice for Prevention of Fires on Construction Sites 
(BEC/LPC, 1992,2000) was applied to construction sites by the "pressure" of insurers. It 
included those sites where demolition, refurbishment or repair work was being carried out. 
Compliance with this code will minimise the risk of accidental or malicious fires. The Code 
stated that proper planning for fire, safety and health must be an integral part of the overall 
preparation and budgeting for the efficient running of construction projects. The Code 
suggested that the main contractor should appoint a Site Safety Co-ordinator who would be 
responsible for assessing the degree of fire risk and who should liase with the co-ordinator of 
the design phase (usually the architect). 
In analysing the above two paragraphs, it would appear that, in order to comply' with the 
Joint Code of Practice, the main contractor needed to be appointed at an early stage of the 
project - specifically, before the design phase - as it is necessary for the main contractor to 
appoint a Site Safety Co-ordinator "for formulating and regularly up-dating the Site Fire 
Safety Plan as construction proceeds ". In this case, a traditional procurement path was not 
possible as, in the UK, the contractor tenders in stage H, "Tender Action", of the RIBA Plan 
of Work. However, with two stage tendering as a variation of the traditional system, i. e. 
where the contractor bids on the basis of a brief description of the project, it was possible to 
appoint the main contractor who then becomes a full-member of the team under the general 
direction of the architect. The contractor was then able to make technical contributions, 
through the site safety co-ordinator, as envisaged in the Code. 
This suggestion is by way of example only. However, it demonstrated that a key decision for 
any client concerns the choice of mechanism(s) to manage these inter-organisational 
procurement process relationships in the best way to ensure an early stage fire safety 
"Non compliance with the Code by the Construction Industry, by those who procure construction and 
by construction industry professionals, could result in insurance ceasing to be available or being 
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contribution. It is generally recognised that the contractual arrangements clearly established 
the stage at which each team member was able to be involved in the project. This timing also 
affected the development of the lines of communication and the allocation of responsibilities 
for providing information, patterns of co-ordination and control. The setting of project 
objectives and parameters to determine the appropriateness of Contract Strategy should, 
therefore, include consideration of required levels of site fire safety and of how it can be best 
achieved. 
4.5 Managing Risk on Site: 
Construction safety is a serious concern to most construction companies. Accidents not only 
reduce productivity and damage equipment but frequently also injure human beings. They affect 
both construction costs and profitability through delays, damage to equipment and materials, 
damage to the facility under construction or through compensation payable as damages for 
accidental injury or loss of life. 
Globally, the approach to Health and Safety on construction sites should take a wider view and 
place more emphasis on dealing with the problem of fire on site. Two important activities are 
fundamental to fire safety management: 
i/ the collection of information about fire risks and 
ii/ the analysis and summarising of this information. 
But without implementing drastic measures on site there are a number of simple and 
immediate methods to reduce the risk of fire. Vigilance and risk awareness are one of them; 
and should be accompanied by a series of activities to support an awareness programme. The 
existence of a company safety file ensures the provision and implementation of safety control 
procedures appropriate to the project. This plan should identify specific job hazards and 
address the educating of employees to enable them to conduct their work in a way that will 
withdrawn resulting in a possible breach of construction contracts which require the provision of 
such insurance... ", Joint Code of Practice, p2. 
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minimise the risk of accident or incident (Bennett, 1991). There were a number of examples 
throughout the worldwide construction industry. The Japan was one of them in terms of 
general health and safety on construction sites. But a special example came to mind. The 
company Quasco (1996) in Bologna, Italy, implemented a simple and effective way to 
develop risk awareness throughout the construction phase. They developed a series of short 
Health and Safety training they carried out on site, in the working environment of the 
workers. This method was also extensively used in other countries but most of the time they 
are standardised. In this special case, each training was adapted to the needs of the company 
and the employees working on site. Prior to the training, Quasco would investigate the site 
and carried out a pre-health and safety assessment. The main objectives of this investigation 
were to identify the risks and record them. Once these risks have been identified and clear 
classify, the role of Quasco will be to develop a certain level of risk awareness within the 
workforce, i. e. made them aware of potential risks around them and suggest them solution to 
eliminate those risks or at least reduce them. They would then adopt the right attitude. This 
concept was especially designed and related to the massive problem of health and safety on 
site. There was nothing new in the content of these training but the concept was innovative 
even if Switzerland was using it now for a long time but at a bigger scale. Nevertheless, this 
concept was proved to be successful in Italy because it was implemented within the working 
environment and so retain its reality and Quasco was now developing it. This risk awareness 
approach was one important issue to consider when discussing the problem of fire safety on 
site. A study realised in 1995 by the Plan de Construction Architecture (PCA, 1995) with four 
companies in France (INPACT & GERN), Holland (TNO) and in Italy (QUASCO) compared 
the approach towards safety on site in three European countries. The results of these 
investigations showed that training was an essential element to improve the level of safety 
in a construction company. Italy was found to be the most successful example of risk 
awareness on construction site. 
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4.5.1 Risk Identification on Site 
Risk management could be a significant contributor to the success of a company both in 
identifying the potential sources of risk on a site and during the construction of a project and, 
as a consequence, help in reducing potential costs by avoiding fire. Therefore, money and 
time was well spent assessing the risks in order to ensure that the fire risks inherent in a 
project or, at an early stage, were eliminated, controlled or transferred in the most cost 
efficient way. The assessment of the risk, therefore, involved both considerations of the risks 
themselves and the way in which those risks might affected the particular party concerned. 
There were clearly a large number of potential risks around a site and on site, the control of 
which was difficult but with direct and indirect consequences of failure which could affect the 
client business. The employer had the duty to protect his/her employees by taking adequate 
measure in order to minimise, reduce and/or eliminate those risks. Nevertheless, it was 
sometimes difficult to clearly recognise those risks and especially to evaluate their 
consequences for the construction company and the client employees directly exposed to these 
risks, and also for the general members of the public who could suffer from a possible fire. The 
key objective of a risk assessment was to identify potential risks and adequately quantify 
these risks and finally classify them. Risk Assessment should not be regarded as a solution, 
rather the first phase of investigation before the implementation of a management strategy to 
control these risks. Risk management was the adoption of a deliberate policy of risk control 
and improvement positively implemented by the contractor and other site operators and 
designed to minimise site fire risks (Abbott, 1991). 
Thus applied, risk management could be a significant contributor to identifying the potential 
sources of risk on a site and during the construction of a project and, as a consequence, may 
help reduce exposure to potential cost consequences of fire. Note that the indirect or 
otherwise internalised implications of fire possibilities for the business would not necessarily 
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be within the scope of assessments carried out by externals, or necessarily of prime concern to 
them. Here the Facilities Management link was clearly potentially valuable to the 
business. Money and time may be well-spent assessing the risks in order to ensure that the 
fire risks inherent in a project or, at an early stage a proposal, were eliminated, controlled or 
transferred in the most effective and cost efficient way. It was important to set these against 
the total potential consequences of as site fire rather than just the immediate direct losses. 
The assessment of the risk should involve both considerations of the risks themselves and the 
way in which those risks might affect the particular party concerned. Where risk management 
addressed the economics loss aspects of construction site fires to the mutual benefit of insurers, 
contractors and developers alike (Abbott, 1991). An effective risk management should aim to: 
i/ Identify potential risks 
ii/ Quantify and classify these risks 
iii/ Eliminate or Reduce these risks by a risk control activity 
iv/ Retain and transfer the risks remaining that cannot be eliminated and which are 
too large for the company to carry itself. 
However, for the full scope to be achieved, planning for, and implementation of, 
construction site fire safety needed to be addressed as part of the procurement process 
itself. In turn, for this to be achieved it is necessary to understand how the contractual and actual 
roles of Contractor, Facilities Manager, and Client will inter-relate on a project. 
The preparation of the FSP, itself, starts with a fire hazard analysis and it must be under 
constant review throughout the different stages of the procurement process and particularly 
during the on-site construction phase. These last can be grouped together for the purposes of 
the discussion, as: 
0 Substructure 
0 Superstructure 
" Finishes: i/ Primary stage ii/ Final stage of completion iii/ Hand over/completion. 
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OBJECTIVES STRATEGY ACTION 
Understanding the common causes of fires on Fire Safety Education 
construction sites and evaluating the risk - Involvement of insurance 
PREVENTING through a fire risk analysis companies 
IGNITION OF Emphasis on managerial methods Fire safety Training 
FIRES Better housekeeping Inspection (duties of the Clerk of 
Training staff Work and Project Manager) 
Fire Safety Plan Health & Safety Adviser 
Awareness of the cost of fires 
Implementation of an effective Fire Safety Plan: Fire Safety Training 
DETECTING - Security Systems (alarm, detectors, guards... ) Involvement of the Insurance 
FIRES - First Aid Fire Program Companies 
Inspections 
Health & Safety Adviser 
Manual: Fire Safety Training 
FIRE FIGHTING - Fire extinguishers Involvement of the Design Team 
METHODS - Fire Blankets Health & Safety Adviser 
Automatic 
- Early installation of Sprinklers 
First Aid Plan 
Choice of Materials -slow burning and low Involvement of the Design Team 
RESTRICTING combustibility materials. Health & Safety Adviser 
FIRE SPREAD Reducing the number of storage areas on-site Fire Safety Equipment 
Protected Storage areas Fire Safety Training 
Early installation of a passive fire protection - fire Construction Team 
doors and partitions to create containment, stairs 
for evacuation, etc. 
Access for Fire Brigade Construction Team 
PROFESSIONAL Fire detection systems 
FIREFIGHTING Protection of storage areas 
Water supply 
Table 4.1: Fire Safety Plan: an overview 
For each phase of the construction, the fire hazards must be identified. This could be 
commenced at the design stage, through an assessment of materials and components for fire 
safety. Knowledge of the performance of building elements, assemblies, contents and 
materials in fire is necessary. Evaluation of hazards and their associated risks was a very 
complicated process. According to Williamson and Dembsey (1993) the objects of hazard 
identification are: 
i. To identify combustible components and construction materials; 
ii. To define the degree of hazard for content materials; 
iii. To evaluate flame spread characteristics of "finish materials"; 
iv. To define the period of fire resistance for walls, structural frame, floors and doors and 
v. To quantify the amount of "smoke" produced by a material. 
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It was also necessary assess, in relation to each of the identified hazards, a probability of 
occurrence from which the degree of risk can be seen. From this, comes the development of 
the site fire safety plan, i. e., as a response to the assessment. This fire contingency plan (FSP) 
would, of course, need to be reviewed and changed on a regular basis as the building 
morphography and fire load changes throughout the progress of construction. Similarly, 
evacuation routes and the first-aid fire-fighting plan would need to be regularly reviewed, 
updated and promulgated. 
The preparation and implementation of a project's fire safety program, administered on-site 
by a designated programme manager, or planning supervisor, was the most effective single 
measure that could be taken to mitigate the potential losses due to fires during construction 
and refurbishment. However, while accident prevention was understandably given top 
priority, both management and workers frequently overlook fire safety. The Fire Safety Plan 
(FSP) could, and should be, an integral part of the overall safety program required in project 
specifications and should be addressed as part of the overall procurement process. Table 4.1 
showed an overview of typical content that could be included in an FSP: set out the objectives 
of the plan, propose a strategy to be adopted and, finally, indicate what action could be taken 
to achieve these objectives. 
4.6 Managing Risk in the Facility: 
The management of facilities during the construction, refurbishment, renovation or 
maintenance of building facilities which remain occupied throughout the work brought to 
light several issues: 
i. The need to ASSESS: at a pre-tender stage, pre-contract and post-contract award. 
ii. The need to DEVELOP a fire safety plan, with all parties being directly involved: 
client/owner and designer, contractor and sub-contractors, facility manager, 
fire services 
authorities. 
iii. The need to IMPLEMENT an operational fire safety plan. 
164 
iv. The need to REVIEW and UPDATE the fire safety plan, regularly and thoroughly 
throughout the construction phases. 
v. The need of a mechanism of FEEDBACK between the parties, through the Facility 
Manager. 
A proposed model was open to discussion and even if it was based on the review of existing 
models and operative models, it would not be possible to adopt such a thorough and detailed 
strategy with every project. A number of parameters would influence the development of the 
project safety case; the balancing of which seems to fall most naturally within the remit of the 
Facilities Manager: 
i. The Type of Work undertaken: new construction, renovation, refurbishment, 
maintenance works, demolition, etc. The needs of the parties will vary from a type of 
project to another one. A place of the `business' issue plays a very important role in 
every case. 
ii. The Category of Building: offices, historic buildings, commercial, public buildings, 
manufacturing, schools, hotel, etc. 
iii. The Type of Business Organisation: this includes whether there is a distinct Facilities 
Management role? If none, the designer or architect could act as the co-ordinator. 
iv. The Contracting Company employed to carry out the work: small / medium / large 
company. It will determine the knowledge of the company in terms of fire safety, which 
in turn will imply the degree of input the client FM will have to make (to protect the 
client's self interest). It will also indicate the nature of the existing Contractor 
provisions to ensure fire safety (company fire safety policy, level of training of 
employees, existing practices, methods of assessment of risks, etc. ). 
v. The Existence of a Fire Safety Manual comprising (BSI, 1997): fire safety policy 
statement, fire safety specification of the building, safety management structure, 
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continuity control and audit procedure, fire action plan, housekeeping, planned 
maintenance procedures, staff training, security, contingency plans, record keeping. 
vi. Building, Environment and Occupant Characterisation: building layout geometry, 
fire services facilities, fire protection systems, type of occupancy, evacuation 
procedures, facilities layout and occupancy layout, etc. 
vii. Knowledge and Expertise of the Parties. This may benefit from a relational contract. 
Bear in mind also that the Facilities Manager is likely to be the common denominator in 
the range of contracts which a business undertakes for its support services provision, 
and therefore the control and imposition of a consistent and sufficient approach to the 
specific fire safety needs of the client can be managed by the FM. 
viii. Risk and Hazard Assessment: low risk might mean minimum requirements and 
precautions, high risk might mean maximum precautions. Adopting a cost benefit 
approach would mean analysing the economic loss and decide on the appropriate 
precautions to implement. Sometimes paying high insurance premium combined with 
high risk is key decision-maker to assess the level of fire safety in buildings ... High 
potential losses = High Insurance premium = Maximum fire safety precautions? 
These factors would greatly affect the design, style, and Facilities Management 
implementation of a detailed fire safety case for any facility. It is probably inappropriate, at 
this stage of the research, to suggest a more structured approach for general application, and 
the above model may be better viewed as simply an indicative checklist. Each fire safety case 
is unique and affected by an unlimited number of factors. Certainly, the list above highlights 
these major factors. 
4.7 Fire Safety Process Management 
All parties should be aware of the value of fire protection, not only under the pressure of 
insurance companies and legislative requirements, but also to safeguard their own business 
166 
interest and "properties" which can't be insured, i. e. intellectual property, knowledge, public 
image and position. Clearly the owner would be involved long before the first contacts with 
the insurer are established. The influence the owner may have in the planning phase was 
rather large, but tends to be much less so in the building phase (Ebner, 1994). 
4.7.1 Project Safety Case Approach 
The HSE argued in 1997 that there were two ways to address fire in construction: to prevent it 
happening in the first place; and to prepare for and deal with the consequences if it does 
happen. Prior to this, Ebner (1994) had proposed a three-stage approach towards fire risk on 
construction site: 
f Risk appraisal, 
f Risk evaluation, 
f Planning of the measures. 
Clearly, the practical application of these principles lied at the heart of achieving control 
over risk and consequences. 
First, the evaluation of these approaches and the review of a number of major client's 
practices highlighted the need for a pre-contract and post-contract award strategy. As 
Ebner identified, the majority of insurers prioritised on a number of approaches to the 
problem: 
i. Advice and information for all parties involved in the construction project, including 
the gathering of adequate information, exchange information and seek advice. 
ii. Know-how transfer towards fire risk management, such as the systematic risk 
assessment at an early stage of project development and throughout the project. 
iii. Selective underwriting, in the context of pre-tender selection of a suitable contractor 
with proven safety records. 
iv. The need for contractual obligations to reduce risks, through a legal agreement. 
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v. Monitoring the compliance with these obligations, via audit approach, review and the 
updating of Fire Safety Planning throughout construction phases, etc. 
vi. Sanctions for cases involving the disregard of these obligations. 
Figure 4.4: Project Safety Plan indicated a broader model which develops these concepts 
further, in order to extend the considerations in pre-planning to better reflect the bespoke 
indirect consequential issues of site fire safety management. It was presented as a three-stage 
process, including who is involved. 
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Within this model, the production and implementation of the Project Safety Case (Hinks and 
Puybaraud, 1999) was sub-divided into an eight stage process, whereby all parties would 
work jointly to prepare it: 
Project Remit: this was a document outlining the safety procedure to be adopted by the 
parties and highlighting all the safety requirements. Mainly the client's requirement translated 
by the FM in one single document. This allowed for some scope for site assessment to be 
extended into pre-contract issues, and also to look at the indirect core business priorities. The 
strategic vulnerability of the core business continuity could be considered this stage of the 
process. 
Project Safety Strategy (Figure 5.5): this was a document which described the safety policy, 
organisation and project safety management arrangements applicable to the project. Reference 
to relevant regulations, code of practice and legislation outlined in this document. In 
particular this would be relevant to smaller sites - relevant also because the CDM Regulations 
(1994) were not applicable to all sites. Minor works were exempted and therefore there were 
no requirements to appoint a planning supervisor. This would be very often the case for 
maintenance work, unless explicitly required by the client or insurance companies, i. e. 
compliance with the Joint Fire Code would be an example. 
Pre-tender HSP with separate FSP: Where CDM Regulations (1994) applies, a planning 
supervisor must be appointed to produce a pre-tender HSP incorporating a separate Fire 
Safety Plan. This pre-tender Health and Safety Plan was produced for prospective contractors 
who shall take this into account in their tender bids. Where a Planning Supervisor was not 
appointed, the FM, on behalf of the client would produce such a document. 
Contractor's safety case approval: upon reception 
i. the pre-tender Health and Safety Plan from either the planning supervisor or FM, the 
contractor would prepare a construction Health and Safety Plan with a separate Fire 
Safety Plan and submit this proposal to the client for approval. The suitability and 
status of the contractor was assessed based on the contractor's safety case, prior to the 
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contract award. The contractor's safety case would comprise the company safety policy 
and its track record. The client (via the Facilities Manager) would be able to co-ordinate 
the Health and Safety Plan, the Fire Safety Plan, and the Business Continuity Plan. 
ii. Contract HSP with Separate Fire Safety Plan: at tender stage and prior to the 
contract award, the contractor was required to submit an `outline' of the Health and 
Safety Plan and Fire Safety Plan. This document would demonstrate the ability of the 
contractor to produce a satisfactory construction safety plan (Health and Safety Plan, 
and the Fire Safety Plan). As above, there was the opportunity here for the Facilities 
Manager to overview the co-ordination of the Health and Safety Plan, the Fire Safety 
Plan, and the Business Continuity Plan together with any other business process 
continuity or change issues. It must outline the proposed safety arrangements to be put 
in place to support the Project Safety Case (PSC) and ensure the requirements of the 
client (as developed by the FM) could be met: emergency plan with fire action plan 
essentially. Upon contract award, the appointed contractor shall fully develop his Health 
and Safety Plan and separate Fire Safety Plan and demonstrate compliance with the 
term of the contract and any relevant regulations and legislation which may apply. 
iii. Risk Log and Safety Risk Assessment: tracking progress with the development and 
implementation of control measures for the hazards and associated risks identified will 
be the role of the FM. It was of primary importance to the FM to know the risks and 
hazards the business and the occupants are exposed to. Risk analysis and hazard 
identification should be considered as a way to monitor, review and update the Project 
Safety Case. This could be co-ordinated by the FM with the Disaster Recovery Plan and 
Business Continuity Plan. 
iv. A Health & Safety File would be submitted to the client with information provided by 
the contractor (or planning supervisor where applicable, according to the CDM 
Regulations 1994). 
172 
v. Feedback mechanism: there was a need to review and update the FSP throughout the 
project phases and inform other parties on any variation to the initial plan. A feedback 
process involved the participation of all parties and clear communication links within 
the project. The role of FM as a co-ordinator of this review process was of major 
importance. It was also recognised that the Facilities Manager made a broad overview 
of the process after projects, in order to capture learning from controlled events (and the 
near misses), and any events which did develop as site fires. This should be considered 
using a structured scenario planning exercise involving business representation. 
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4.8 Conclusion Chapter 4: 
In the UK, new regulations (CDM) required the preparation and implementation of a Health 
& Safety Plan on every Construction Site. Therefore, by implication there was a need to 
address fire safety as a fundamental requirement of such a plan. This, automatically, 
gave rise to a range of serious implications for the method of procurement, the type of 
contract and, of course, for the management supervision of site. The preliminary research 
suggested that, certainly in the UK, France and Spain, there was little appreciation of these 
implications within the EC and it suggested that a similar situation could be encountered 
outside Europe and, possibly, world-wide. 
The emphasis, in this chapter, has been on the importance of an early consideration of the 
possibility of a fire during the construction phase. The issue needed to be addressed. As a 
first attempt to move towards an understanding of the size of the problem, and especially its 
economic implications, the research was being carried out to establish the extent to which the 
procurement process might be adapted and lead to an extension of supervision systems might 
lead to providing a more fire-safe construction environment. The importance of an early stage 
assessment of fire risk for any construction or refurbishment project was particularly stressed; 
best practice management guidance for fire-safe on-site activity, coupled with adequate 
legislative provision, was essential and major research was necessary to underpin all of these 
activities. 
Collectively, the fire safety cases demonstrated the importance of having an operational 
Emergency Plan to protect employees and the general public; the potential value of Training 
of and Awareness in (primarily) employees and the workforce, (and also the general 
public/customers for their own safety); the potential usefulness of a Fire Safety Action Plan 
(FSP) which has been developed and embraced by both by the Client/Owner and the 
Contracting Company; the value of advance liaison with the Fire Services in the unfortunate 
event of a fire occurring; and of particular relevance to the Facilities Management context of 
the indirect business process - the interface between the business continuity and the 
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temporary site operations - hence the need for Business Continuity Planning (BCP) to 
ensure minimum interruption to the normal business operations. 
In UK the Health & Safety Executive (HSE, 1997) published a new guide Fire Safety in 
Construction Work, guidance for clients, designers and those managing and carrying out 
construction work involving significant fire risks. At the launch of the guide, Nick 
Raynsford, Construction Minister said (Croner, 1997): "This guidance is aimed at reducing 
the number of fires on construction sites and thereby reducing risks to workers, fire-fighters 
and members of the public. It identifies the main causes of fires on a construction sites, as 
well as understand how to plan, organise and control fire precautions that need to be taken 
into account, from early procurement stages right through to final hand-over. " Pressures from 
the European Parliament (DG III: Industry) in 1994 suggested that the problem of fire should 
be investigate where it is currently costing countries of the European Union approximately 
1% of GDP. Unfortunately for most of the European Countries, the cost of direct fire losses 
does not go above 0.40% of GDP (i. e. for Belgium). The UK was far from this figure and 
therefore no European Directives would seem to be considered as an immediate and urgent 
measure for the European Union. However, the European Parliament urged the Council of 
Ministers to make a public announcement stating their concern over the level of fire costs in 
the EU, but directly towards the problem of fire on construction site. He also called the 
European Commission to establish a Working Party of fire experts whose terms of reference 
would be to recommend ways of tackling the fire problem. In 1996 one of the twenty 
proposed Motions put forward by a MEP to the Environment Committee stressed that fire 
resolution should "be recognised to be an issue of great importance", but it was not accepted. 
This was by no mean a definitive conclusion but it demonstrates that any measures to reduce 
or eliminate fires on construction sites will have to be implemented in each separate EU 
countries and so far there are no pressure from the European Commission to develop a 
common directive applicable in every member states of the EU. The large number of 
disparities between every EU countries made the approach to the problem quiet difficult and 
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there are no good practice examples throughout the EU that could be used as a guide for a 
future European Directive. 
More research and investigations will need to be carried out in order to identify best practice 
and create a Fire Safety model which could be adopted throughout the EU. The objective of 
this research was to develop such a model. 
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5 RESEARCH CONCEPT: 
5.1 General Overview of the research project and purpose of the research 
The previous literature review and analysis highlighted a large number of weaknesses in the 
existing safety structure summarised below. The specific nature of the project and limited 
access to quantitative data drove the researcher to consider a qualitative approach to the 
problem of fire safety on construction sites. However, further considerations on the use of 
data to develop a small scale quantitative analysis was nevertheless not excluded, a later 
chapter approached and investigated this issue. The contribution of the literature findings to 
build the fire safety management model were illustrated in Figure 5.1: Literature Review: 
Summary of the findings, and summarised in the next pages: 
 The statistics demonstrating the proportion and consequences of fires during the 
construction / refurbishment / maintenance process indicated a need to thoroughly 
review fires on construction sites. There was a need to develop a strategy in order to 
reduce and/or minimise their impact on the business (client, contractor and the any other 
parties involved into the process of work. ). An assessment of the economic impact of 
fires on construction sites both for the parties to the contract and the society as a whole, 
demonstrated a need to adopt a construction management strategy to reduce / minimise / 
eliminate fires during the construction process of building facilities. The need to adopt a 
cost benefit approach. 
A review and analysis of the current literatures and public reports of the numbers, causes and 
consequences of fires demonstrated that access to reliable and detailed statistical data was 
difficult. Furthermore a detailed analysis and comparison of different sources revealed a non 
compatibility of the figures. Nevertheless the proportion of construction sites fires over the 
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last decade revealed a need to research on the causes and consequences of these fires, their 
impact on the business of the parties to a construction contract and the society as a whole. 
Issues such as the perception of the problem by both contractors and clients, the 
preventative measures taken to reduce/avoid/minimise fire occurrence during the 
construction / refurbishment / maintenance process. 
A review of current statistical sources revealed an unsatisfactory level of information on the 
direct and indirect cost of fires on construction sites. However the limited number of 
information revealed a need to examine the economic impact of fire to the parties to the 
contract and the society as a whole. The investigations revealed that the business impact 
should not be neglected and several cases demonstrated that issue. 
 Parties to the contract consider the problem of fire during the construction process 
as a serious issue. By the pressure of clients and insurers and new regulatory 
requirements, contractors had to provide adequate fire safety measures in accordance with 
the current regulation and legislation applying and a specific number of codes of practice. 
Following two major fires on construction sites in the UK at the beginning of the 90s, 
awareness of the problem of fire during construction works and the economic / human losses 
linked to a disaster on the business has been brought to light. The LPC/FPA in collaboration 
with the insurance companies offered a code of practice for the prevention of fire on site. This 
guidance has been implemented under the pressure of insurers, and contractors and clients 
were forced to implement it. The JCOP was assessed as an essential element of the fire safety 
framework and a good operational tool. However in order to reinforce the 
fire safety 
framework, the author would like to propose the development of an executive framework to 
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support the implementation and integration of the concept of fire safety in organisations 
and at a corporate level. 
 The risk of fire was assessed prior to the commencement of the construction works 
and control and monitor periodically throughout the construction operations. The 
methods of assessment and control of the risk should be described in the FSP which also 
comprised all the necessary information to monitor the risk of fire and test the FSP. 
The research identified that the risk of fire varied throughout the completion of the works. 
The control of this risk was monitored through the FSP and proposed a clear fire safety 
strategy. The author argued for a systematic risk assessment at the conception stage and 
throughout the execution stage and exploitation. 
 The implementation of a detailed and practical fire safety plan through a clear risk 
analysis was an efficient method of control to minimise and reduce fires during the 
construction / refurbishment / maintenance of construction facilities. 
The control of fire during the construction process was expressed through the Fire Safety 
Plan. This plan developed prior to the commencement of the works considered all the risks 
and proposed a strategy to prevent, minimise and/or reduce the occurrence of fires. This 
research reviewed the use and efficiency of the fire safety management, compared and 
contrasted the way the concept was design and developed to be operational on site. 
 Attitudes towards safety and cultural differences across the European construction 
industries had a clear and positive impact on the management of fire safety during the 
construction / refurbishment / maintenance process. This would be demonstrated through 
site investigations and interviews. 
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The research intended to identify a change into the culture of construction companies 
across Europe and particularly the UK and France. The parties involved into construction 
works were concern about the issue of fire on sites and as a consequence modified their 
attitude towards the problem of fire. 
A detailed analysis of the implementation of EU directives in the Member State and its impact 
on fire safety on construction sites revealed a very different approach towards safety in 
general and more specifically fire safety. The comparative analysis revealed a number of 
discrepancies between the French and UK legislative procedure. The UK approach seemed 
reactive unless the European, whereby a pro-active politic had been slowly developed 
regarding fire safety. The track record of the publication of Council Directives answered a 
need to improve preventive health and safety measures, and specifically in certain cases 
(92/57/EEC) fire safety. 
It was still too early to entirely appreciate the impact and benefit of the implementation of the 
EU directives in France and the UK. Furthermore, the Member States were still improving 
their current legislation and/or regulation. There was a need to review the long term impact 
of the new directives and how did they contribute to improve the level of fire safety on 
construction sites. 
A standardised approach and fire safety management process were a requirement to 
create an effective way to control fire during the construction / refurbishment / 
maintenance of construction facilities. The implementation of an operational fire safety 
management model needed to be develop into a project-specific working document (or 
guidance) and procedures. 
Initiatives from the EU to harmonise the regulation across Europe forced the Member States 
to review their current legislation and regulations in order to provide an adequate 
level of fire 
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safety on construction sites. The interpretation and implementation of specific EU directives 
had a positive impact on the overall improvement of fire safety on sites. The research and site 
investigation into the problem of fires on construction sites revealed a need to develop a 
comprehensive set of rules or a standardised approach to help construction participants to 
implement an operational fire safety plan. However the site investigation also revealed that 
due to the specificity of each construction site, the Model might need to be project-specific or 
at least adaptable and flexible. 
The literature review provided superficial quantitative data on the number, cause and effect of 
fires, their patterns, cost and location which were indicative of a need to review the process of 
control of fire in such a situation. Unfortunately, the selective approach of the main fire 
bureau of statistics didn't reflect the full extend of the problem of fires on construction sites 
and there are to date a limited number of research reports and papers to support it. 
The author explored the possibility of tackling the problem from an engineering side applying 
the Fire Safety Engineering Method. The Qualitative Design Review (QDR) was relevant and 
significant results were obtained when the three scenarios were considered (new construction, 
refurbishment/renovation, maintenance). However the lack of quantitative data was a major 
barrier to develop the second part of the method. The author argued that there was room for 
improvement within the approach but that at this stage of the research in the field of fire 
safety on construction sites, the FSE method wasn't the answer to the problem. 
Eliminating a quantitative approach due to the lack of data on fires on construction sites left a 
gap to explore in the research field. The idea of a qualitative approach emerged 
based on 
the robustness of the data available from the industry and the aims and objectives of the 
research. 
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This chapter aimed to present the full research concept of this thesis and how the process of 
building theories was initiated and developed in the thesis. The chapter proposed a framework 
of the research methodologies and the method of analysis to compare and contrast data. 
This research aimed at identifying and proposing a managerial model to prevent and control 
fires during construction works. The research was based on extensive review of relevant 
literature and an in-depth post analysis of major fires in the UK and France. The outcomes 
and research findings enabled the author to develop a Fire Safety Management Model 
highlighting the implementation of safety system throughout the project life and its cycle. 
The next challenges were to propose a final FSMM for practitioners to implement the Model. 
The Managerial Model would address the problem of fire on construction sites. The aim was 
to provide to parties to a contract a strategy to assess areas of potential risks of fire on site and 
a procedure to remedy any hazard. 
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5.2 Hypothesis and research questions, aims and objectives of the thesis 
The overall approach was based on the concept that the JCOP did not provide a satisfactory 
level of control over the construction works, and that a managerial framework needed to be 
developed in parallel to support a free fire environment on site and address the fire safety 
management during the complete life cycle of the project: conception, execution and 
exploitation. The implementation of a fire safety management system needed to be 
encompass by a cultural change in organisation to support the full and successful 
integration of a total fire safety concept. 
5.2.1 Research questions: 
The following research hypotheses form the basis of the research. A set of questions has been 
identified and integrated into the research concept. 
QUESTIONS HYPOTHESES Key words / Categories 
1. Is the problem of fire on The proportion and consequences of Statistical Evidence / Quantitative 
construction sites justified? fires during the Construction / Analysis 
Refurbishment process is important Risk Analysis / Risk Management 
enough to be taken seriously. There is Risk Control 
a need to develop a strategy in order Economics 
to reduce and minimise their impact. Cost / Benefits 
2. How do contractors Fire safety on construction site is now Management 
perceive the problem of fire seen as a necessity and a major issue Government 
on construction sites? for any construction contract. By the EU pressure 
pressure of clients and insurers, External Forces / Pressures 
contractors have to provide adequate Internal Forces 
fire safety measures, and under the Enforcement 
law a FSP (LPC Code, CDM Regs + Deregulatory / Regulatory 
EU Directive). 
3. What specific strategies The implementation of a detailed and Management 
are used by contractors, in practical Fire Safety Plan through a Strategy 
the UK and France, to avoid clear Risk Analysis is the best way to FSP / H&S Plan 
fires during the minimise and reduce fires during the Control 
Construction/Refurbishment Construction / Refurbishment 
process of building? process. 
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4. What methods of Control The risk of fire is assessed before the Control 
and Assessment are used to construction operation and updated Assessment 
monitor and test the FSP on a regular basis throughout the Risk Control 
during operations? operations. The methods of control of Prevention 
the risk of fire are described in the Safety Management / Safety 
FSP which contains all the necessary Inspections / Safety Records 
information to monitor the risk of fire Monitoring strategy 
and a test the plan. Feedback 
5. Will a move towards a A set of standardised rules is a Standard 
standardised approach to necessity to form a harmonised Harmonisation 
fire safety on construction European Construction Industry EU / Directives 
sites, i. e. harmonised however each construction sites being Enforcement 
regulation and/or standard unique, the FSP will need to be Deregulation 
in EU, be solved and/or develop into a project-specific Economics 
improved the problem of working document of procedures. 
fire during the Construction Cultural and attitudinal forces would 
/ Refurbishment period? not permit such a harmonised 
approach. 
6. How would safety Attitudes towards safety and cultural Culture 
attitudes and safety cultures differences in the Construction Attitude / Behaviour 
impact on Fire Safety Industry (France / UK) have a clear Society 
Management during the and positive impact on the Cultural Evolution 
Construction / management of fire safety during the Changes 
Refurbishment process of Construction / Refurbishment Progress 
building? process. This would be demonstrating 
through the investigations. 
7. What are the benefits of a A detailed analysis of the Cost 
Fire Safety approach on implementation of EU directives in Cost Benefit Analysis 
construction sites? the Member State and its impact on Loss 
fire safety on construction sites Economics 
revealed a very different approach 
towards safety in general and more 
specifically fire safety. The 
comparative analysis revealed a 
number of discrepancies between the 
French and UK legislative procedure. 
This project attempted to answer these research questions. These questions also aimed to 
structure the standardised interview. When it came to the real interview, stimuli were 
developed with the respondent in order to explore the questions in more depth. The objective 
was to drive each respondent to respond with the same key words in order to obtain a similar 
pattern for every interview. This required a greater flexibility in the role of the interviewer. 
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A pilot work was undertaken prior to run the interviews. In parallel, the author took great care 
to design a format of interview that would answer the needs of the qualitative analysis 
program (QSR*NUDIST4). 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Phases of the research: 
The methodology followed to complete this research comprises six different stages. The 
initial formulation of basic ideas through the development of the research proposal, the 
specification of research design after the literature review, followed by the fieldwork (site 
investigations), then the data processing and statistical analysis and finally the writing of the 
final research report. 
0A detailed review and analysis of the literature in the UK and France, then other 
European countries. This thesis presented the results of the literature review in the first 
part of the documents. A large part of the analysis has been developed around the fire 
statistical data available about the occurrence and consequences of fires during the 
construction process. Then a detailed review of legislative and regulatory requirements 
across Europe was developed, compared and contrast against the UK system. 
0 Extensive site investigations in the UK were first developed. These site investigations 
targeted three categories of sites: new built, refurbishment/change-in-use/renovation and 
maintenance works. 60% of the sites were in the UK, 30% in France and the remaining 
10% in the rest of Europe. A standardised interview was first prepared and tested. The 
purpose of this standardised interview was to collect data across a large number of sites. 
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"A qualitative analysis of interviews carried out with every site was prepared with the 
support of a specialist software (QSR*NUDIST4: Qualitative Solution and Research Pty 
Ltd: Non-numerical Unstructured Data * Indexing, Searching & Theorising) whose aims 
were to aid users in handling non-numerical and unstructured data in qualitative analysis, 
by supporting processes of coding data in an index system, searching text or searching 
patterns of coding and theorising about the data. The results of the qualitative research 
were analysed and compared and contrasted. A hypothetical fire safety model was 
proposed for review. 
0A qualitative analysis of major construction site fires was prepared to identify a 
generic profile of the fires, assess the chain of effects, the causes of fires across a large 
sample of failures, analyse the consequences (damages/losses) of these fires and what 
managerial action can be taken to eliminate/minimise/control these fires through a 
detailed managerial approach. A reviewed fire safety model was presented for critic and 
analysis to the expert panels (UK and France) and the testing of the model through a 
structured interview with selected practitioners. 
0A model/strategy was presented following the qualitative analysis. An interactive 
framework was developed to promote best practice across sites. 
9 The final. stage of the research comprised a critical and academic review and analysis 
of the findings and outcomes of the qualitative data. A managerial model will be 
presented and recommendations formulated. 
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5.3.2 Research Methodologies Framework 
The research concept was illustrated in Figure 5.2 explained below: 
f To build a Hypothetical Model (Model A) based on the outcomes of the literature review 
and a short qualitative review of interviews which generated theories and identify 
example of good practice. 
f To Review the Model (Model B) following the analysis of failure scenarios of fires on 
construction sites, and generate further theories and identify bad practice. This analysis of 
fire reports enabled the researcher to define the generic profile of fires, to build a chain 
of effects, to assess the pattern of the cause of fires (Equipment failure, Human error, 
External Failure) and to identify the consequences and which managerial actions have 
been taken. 
f To propose a reviewed Model for a critical review by an expert panel. (Model C) 
Following an in-depth analysis of the qualitative data, the researcher proposed a reviewed 
Model which will address good and bad practice identified in the research investigations. 
f To run two expert and critical reviews of the Model to test the model with 
representatives and experts of the industry in France and the UK. 
f To develop a critical academic analysis of the complete process of the research and built 
a sound review of the proposed model. 
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Outcomes of the 
Literature Review 
Formulate final 
Research Methodologies 
Literature Review: review of academic publications and government and 
industrial's reports on fire safety in the construction industry to define 
hvvothesis and formulate the research auestions to develov thesis. 
Structured 
Interviews 
Formulate 
Theories 1St 
Qualitative Review 
1St Prospective Model A ('` 
Fire Reports / 
Claim Files 
Analvsis 
Profile of Fires 
Chain Effect 
Causes 
Consequences 
2nd Qualitative Analysis 
Modified Model B&C 
Report I to the 
Expert Panel 
Expert Reviews 
Critical Analysis 
Report II to 
Members of the 
Expert Panels 
Final Thesis 
Figure 5.2: Research Concept Framework 
Academic Review and Critical Analysis 
Academic 
Review 
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Final Conclusion and 
Model C Recommendations 
5.4 Expert Committees 
The findings of the research investigations and analysis were tested through two expert 
seminars, in the UK and France. The objective was to assess the validity of the findings with 
experts in the field and practitioners. The fire safety model identified and addressed the 
research findings and best practice, and took into account legislative requirements. The 
expert seminars were used as a tool to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 
model, and its validity for practitioners and the Industry. The outcomes of the seminar 
were discussed in the main thesis and a final model and guidance was presented. References 
to members of the committee were directly made and referenced in text as indicated in the 
tables. The objectives of the review were: 
i. To assess the efficiency of the proposed FSMM against the JCOP. 
ii. To review the FSMM based on a hypothetical scenario. 
iii. To propose a reviewed structure of the FSMM based on the outcomes of the initial 
review and to present a better framework. 
5.4.1 UK Expert Team & Reviewers: 
Members Position Company Representation Reference: 
Steve Birt Director Association of 
British Insurers 
Insurance Birt (2001) 
Adair Lewis Technical 
Director 
Fire Protection 
Association 
Engineer Lewis (2001) 
John Fisher FM Jabil Engineer / FM Fisher 2001 
Dr. Hinks Director CABER Research Centre Hinks 2001 
Alaistair Colvin Risk Engineer Underwriters Insurance / Risk 
Management 
Colvin (2001) 
Keith Mapp RM Engineer Underwriters Insurance / Risk 
Management 
Mapp (2001) 
Nick Ford Risk Engineer Underwriters Insurance / Risk 
Management 
Ford (2001) 
John Foley FM Swiss Life Engineer / FM Foley (2001) 
Harmut Reiner Director Munich Re Reinsurance Reiner 2001) 
Olivier 
Hautefeuille 
Technical 
Director 
Axa Corporate 
Solutions 
Insurance Hautefeuille 
2001 
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5.4.2 French Expert Team & Reviewers: 
Members Position Company Representation Reference 
J. L Houee Safety Centre Pompidou Facilities Houee (2001) 
Manager Management 
Dr. Tephany FSE Consultant Fire Safety Te han 2001) 
Mr. Polach Director CNPP Fire Safety Polach (2001) 
Training 
Mr. Schaal Safety Chateau de Historic Schaal (2001) 
Manager Versailles Building 
Mr. Bordas Risk AXA Corporate Insurance / Risk Bordas (2001) 
Mr. Celardo Engineers Solutions / Loss Celardo (2001) 
Mr. Baron Baron (2001) 
Mr. Postic Fire / FFSA Insurance / Loss Postic (2001) 
Insurers 
Association 
Mr. Landrin Risk Munich Re. Insurance / Risk Landrin (2001) 
Mr. Paulczinsky Engineers Paulczinsky 
(2001) 
5.5 Method of analysis to compare and contrast data 
This PhD investigated the problem of fire during the construction / refurbishment / 
maintenance of building facilities. 
The statistics demonstrating the occurrence of fire on construction sites, the economic losses 
and the overall impact of a fire for the parties to the contract, their business and the society as 
a whole, revealed a need to investigate the problem of fire occurring during the construction / 
refurbishment / maintenance of building facilities. A thorough review of construction 
management practices across the UK and the rest of Europe (especially France) through site 
investigations identified best practice in the control of fires during the construction process. A 
model was developed and presented in the Report to the Expert Committee and was proposed 
as the way to prevent, control, reduce/eliminate and/or minimise fires on construction sites. 
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5.5.1 Structure of the Expert Panel Review: 
Outline of the review framework: 
i. Welcome and outline programme of the day. 
ii. Research findings and review of proposed FSMM 
iii. Aims and objectives of the Expert Panel Review 
What I am trying to achieve through the review 
What I am expecting from the Expert Panel 
Anticipated outcomes of the review 
iv. Structure of the review (Group A and B) 
The Hypothetical scenario 
Step by step guide to the review and Procedure 
Presentation of the outcomes of the review of the FSMM to the other group. 
Brainstorming session 
v. Outcomes of the review and presentation of a modified FSMM 
Debate and discussion on common grounds 
vi. Summary of outcomes and closing comments 
c 
Activity 2: Activity 4: Activite B; 
Research Structure of Summary and 
Findings and 
The Model 
the Review Conclusion 
Activity 1: Activity 3: 
Activity 5: 
Outcomes of the 
Welcome and Objectives of the Expert Panel Review and Programme Discussion 
Figure 5.3: Expert Seminar's Activities Schedule 
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Activity 1: 
Welcome and outline programme of the day. 
30mins 
A thorough process of selection of the members of the Expert panel was essential to ensure 
the success of the research approach and its outcomes. Members were appointed based on 
the interest they expressed for the research, their professional knowledge and 
experience in the field of fire safety (manager, client, contractor, fire safety engineer, 
facilities manager, risk manager, insurer, loss adjuster, underwriter, representatives of 
national associations and professional institutions... ); and the relevance of this research 
findings and outcomes for their profession and the community as a whole. The members 
are considered to be professionals with an adequate knowledge and experience in fire safety 
and management, and construction works. Each member somehow participated to the 
research project and provided help on specific areas. 
A round table to give the opportunity to each member to introduce himself, the reasons why 
they accepted to join the Expert panel and their expectations. Each member was requested to 
introduce himself/herself by his or her name, position and responsibilities. 
A clear agenda was presented and distributed to be prepared and to provide enough directives 
to the members and what has to be done by the end of the day. 
The Expert Panel was divided in two groups, each one having the same tasks. 
Activity 2: 
Research findings 
40mins 
The research findings were presented through a short but detailed presentation, 
first to 
identify the scope of the research and second to propose the hypothesis or research questions 
generated from the investigations. The FSMM was explained to clarify any ambiguities on 
its 
structure, function and purpose. 
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Activity 3: 
Aims and objectives of the Expert Panel Review 
What the researcher was trying to achieve through the review 
What the researcher was expecting from the Expert Panel 
Anticipated outcomes of the review 
The Expert Panel Review aimed at: 
0 assessing the efficiency of the proposed FSMM against the JCOP. 
" reviewing the FSMM based on a hypothetical scenario. 
l5mins 
0 proposing a reviewed structure of the FSMM based on the outcomes of the initial review 
and to present a better framework. 
Activity 4 (Group A and B): 
Structure of the review (Group A and B) 
The Hypothetical scenario 
Step by step guide to the review and Procedure 
Presentation of the outcomes of the review of the FSMM to the other group. 
Brainstorming session 
90mins 
15mins 
15mins 
45mins 
15mins 
The hypothetical scenario (available in Appendix B) recreated a complex fire which 
illustrated the depth of the problem. It was anticipated that each member of the panel would 
be faced with an unknown issue in the scenario and that the FSMM was used as the tool to 
implement a successful managerial framework. 
To enable a structured review of the FSMM, a review form was provided. They used the 
matrix of the Model and highlight anything missing in it. The step by step guide helped them 
to look at different aspects of the model. 
The results of their review were then presented to the other group and compared against the 
other group findings. Throughout this session they were asked to gather any thought, 
comments or issues emerging from the review on a blank sheet of paper. 
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Activity 5: 
Outcomes of the review and presentation of a modified FSMM 
30mins 
Debate and discussion on common grounds 
The brainstorming session was run to gather all the information addressed throughout the 
review and a modified FSMM created and proposed for final debate. The outcome of this 
review was a better managerial framework. 
Activity 6: 
Summary of outcomes and closing comments 
30mins 
A summary of the outcomes of the day was then presented and discussion for further 
development was engaged. What to do next? 
5.5.2 Expert Panel Review Form: 
Each member of the expert committee was required to complete a structured evaluation form. 
On the day of the seminar, each group was requested to complete the form and submit it. The 
expert seminars were also recorded with a camera and later analysed to extract the best 
outcomes and findings from the review, the expert's approach and thoughts, their process of 
analysis and any relevant information on their process of critical analysis. Table 5.1 presented 
the format of the evaluation form. 
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Issues to address in the review: Your observations and comments: 
Compliance with the JCOP: 
Limits, scope of the JCOP, application, 
validity of the Code... 
Hot Work Permit: 
Necessity, control, application, 
effectiveness... 
Fire Risk Assessment: 
RA during the conception, execution and 
exploitation phases... 
Global approach to Fire safety Prevention: 
Conception Phase: 
Execution / Construction Phase: 
Post Construction / Life Cycle of facility: 
Format of the FSMM: 
Flexibility, adaptation to the structure of the 
organisation, validity of the Model (FSMM), 
scope, strengths and weaknesses... 
Relevance of the Systems: 
Planned System, Operational System, Active 
System, Recovery System, Continuity System. 
Planned System 
Operational System 
Active System 
Recovery System 
Continuity System 
From your experience of the limitations of 
the JCOP, what do you see as the way 
forward for the FSMM to be used? 
What are your recommendations? 
Other observations? 
Table 5.1: Expert Panel Review Form 
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5.6 Conclusion Chapter 5 
The research concept presented in this chapter emerged from a long literature review which 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the existing fire safety structure. The objective 
was to determine the most suitable way to develop further this research and how to collect 
accurate and reliable information and data to build a fire safety management model to 
encompass the existing provisions (JCOP, Health and Safety regulations). 
A move towards an extensive qualitative analysis opened new avenues of investigations and 
provided a sound research process to develop a model which would answer the needs of the 
industry. 
The scope of this research limited extensive testing of the finished model but nevertheless the 
two expert seminar greatly contributed to test the validity of the model for the industry using 
the expertise and experience of professionals. The process of critical review and analysis was 
sound and proved to be extremely successful to develop the Fire Safety Management Model. 
The next chapter will explore the validity of a qualitative approach against a quantitative 
analysis. 
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C RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
The objective of this chapter was to explore and compare and contrast various research 
methodologies suitable for this project, i. e. quantitative and qualitative. A literature survey of 
current and past research in the field of quantitative and qualitative research identified a need 
to consider both methodologies at different stage of the research. Gummesson (1991) 
identified qualitative methodology as providing powerful tools for research in management 
and business administration. 
The process of building theory for this research project focussed on a review of current 
literature on the subject and an observation of major case studies where fires occurred during 
the process of construction, refurbishment or maintenance. 
Figure 6.1: Research Approach 
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6.1 Principles and overview 
The methodology followed to complete this research comprised five different stages. The 
initial formulation of basic ideas through the development of the research proposal, the 
specification of research design after the literature review, followed by the fieldwork (site 
investigations), then the data processing and statistical analysis and finally the writing of the 
final research report. 
" Conceptual framework and background research (Qualitative and quantitative 
analysis): A detailed review of the literature in the UK and France, then other European 
countries. This thesis presents the results of the literature review in the first part of the 
document. A large part of the analysis has been developed around the fire statistical data 
available about the occurrence and consequences of fires during the construction process. 
Then a detailed review of legislative and regulatory requirements across Europe is 
developed, compared and contrast against the UK system. 
0 Fieldwork for collection of qualitative data: Extensive site investigations in the UK 
were first developed. These site investigations targeted three categories of sites: new 
built, refurbishment/change-in-use/renovation and maintenance works. 60% of the sites 
were in the UK, 30% in France and the remaining 10% in the rest of Europe. A 
standardised interview was first prepared and tested. The purpose of this standardised 
interview is to collect data across a large number of sites. 
0A qualitative analysis of interviews carried out with every site was prepared with the 
support of a specialist software (QSR*NUDIST4: Qualitative Solution and Research Pty 
Ltd: Non-numerical Unstructured Data * Indexing, Searching & Theorising) whose aims 
is to aid users in handling non-numerical and unstructured data in qualitative analysis, by 
supporting processes of coding data in an index system, searching text or searching 
patterns of coding and theorising about the data. Results of the qualitative research are 
analysed and compared and contrasted. 
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0 Case study review and analysis (Risk Assessment and Analysis): the objective of this 
investigation is to determine the cause and effect of major fires on site and identify 
common patterns of events. Again a case review and summary set of analytic comments 
will help to clarify the visual display of the event tree and focussed on the main patterns 
of the fire scenarios. 
0 Producing report: The results of the qualitative analysis will be summarised and an 
interim report will be presented to an expert panel, composed of professionals and 
practitioners who either participated to the project (through interviews) or selected for 
their particular knowledge and expertise in the field. Lo (1999) successfully used this 
technique to assess fire safety systems in existing buildings, and highlighted many criteria 
to take into account when formulating a research strategy using the input of an expert 
panel. Lo underlines the subjective evaluation as well as the question of credibility, 
according to him viewed as internal validity and external validity. 
9 The final document will present a best practice. A guidance is developed to promote 
best practice across European sites. Finally a conclusion is developed and a list of 
recommendations is presented. Consideration on the implications for theory, practice and 
action is also developed. A strategy to support the dissemination and use of the research 
findings will be presented. 
Figure 6.2: Process of Building Theory 
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Data Collection JIM Definition of 
Research questions 
Define Hypotheses 
Assess 
Research 
Data Collection 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Research Research 
Define 
Index Tree Define 
Define method of Event/Fault 
Define Data Collection Tree 
Coding 
Interviews Case Studies for 
Questionnaires 1011* Risk Assessment 
and Analysis 
Manage Categorise Sample 
Data Data Data 
Process the 
Data 
Importing Create an Search the Question the 
[__documents_j 
[__Index 
Tree [_Text Coding 
Figure 6.3: Diagrammatic process of building theories 
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6.2 Qualitative vs. Quantitative. 
Previous researches (Quinn Patton, 1999; Carlson et at, 1999) identified a need to consider 
both quantitative and qualitative data analysis in research. Hammersley (1999) in his paper on 
"Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide" views it as "a challenge and a 
methodological paradigms in social research. " In their work on drug users, Carlson et at 
(1999) concluded "qualitative research is often a prerequisite to the appropriate application of 
quantitative methods. " Bryman (1999) considered quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies as "mutually antagonistic ideal types of research" and notes that the relevance 
and utility qualitative research was rarely denied by quantitative researchers, but was often 
view as an essential exploratory way of conducting social investigations. Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) quoted that many quantitative researchers see qualitative research as being little better 
than journalistic accounts. However he continued by saying "some qualitative researchers 
firmly reject statistical and others quantitative methods as yielding a shallow or completely 
misleading information. " 
Quinn Patton (1999) argued that statistical analysis followed formulas and rules while, at the 
core, quantitative analysis was a creative process, depending on the insights and conceptual 
capabilities of the analyst. Miles and Huberman (1984) differentiated qualitative and 
quantitative research in terms of the use of words rather than numbers. Gherardi & Turner 
(1999) saw quantitative styles as the `hard' view of the research and qualitative approaches as 
a `soft' view. Bryman (1999) defined the nature of data in quantitative research as 
hard and 
reliable, compared to qualitative as rich and deep. He concluded in his paper 
(Bryman, 1999) 
that "when quantitative and qualitative research are jointly pursued, much more complete 
accounts of social reality can ensue. " 
There was a need to consider both a quantitative and qualitative review 
in any research 
project. Previous investigations in research methodologies 
identified that quantitative data 
could be used to support theories, and qualitative 
data to develop theories. Descombe (1998) 
argued that qualitative analysis tends to be associated with words, 
description, small-scale 
207 
studies, holistic perspective, researcher involvement and emergent research; when 
quantitative analysis was associated with numbers, analysis, large-scale studies, specific 
focus, researcher detachment and a predetermined research design. This research focused on 
a collection of data for a limited quantitative review to demonstrate the credibility of the 
research strategy, analysing the number, cause and effect of fires during the 
construction process and proposed a hypothesis supported by a literature review. An 
extensive qualitative research was then developed to address the research questions and 
demonstrate the hypothesis. 
Quinn Patton (1999) insisted that "a qualitative researcher has an obligation to be methodical 
in reporting sufficient details of data collection and the processes of analysis to permit others 
to judge the quality of the resulting product. " Marshall & Rossman (1995) and Quinn Patton 
(1999) considered the researcher was "the instrument" in qualitative research and inquiry. 
Denscombe (1998) underlined the importance of personal identity of the researcher and how 
the interviewee perceived the qualitative research approach. He noted particularly the sex, age 
and ethnic origins of the interviewer. 
6.3 Collection of data and document management 
In the previous part of this chapter, we considered the use of quantitative and qualitative 
research to investigate the problem of fire on construction sites. In the introduction, it was 
highlighted that access to quantitative data is limited in the field of research and therefore the 
quantitative analysis of them would be restricted. However this last one contributed to the 
process of building theory in the early stages of the research. 
The collection of core data for the empirical analysis and formulation of recommendations 
and a final model required a detailed approach and strategy. Eisenhardt 
(1999) argued that the 
development of theory is central in organisational research and aims to put together a 
testable, 
relevant and valid theory. Chapter one and two of this PhD thesis 
focussed on the relevance of 
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the research, the feasibility of the project and identified the coverage. The accuracy and 
objectivity of the research was assessed in later chapters. 
The methods of collection of information and data for this research was summarised in the 
two following points: 
9 Quantitative data: gathering statistics and preparing a quantitative review of the materials; 
0 Qualitative data: observation, interviews, documents and questionnaires. These data were 
in the form of words attached to fieldwork experience. Identifying major case studies and 
analysing the cause and effect of fires and preventative methods and reactive strategy. 
Words or numbers were the units of analysis (Denscombe, 1998). Miles and Huberman 
(1994) considered that the researcher is moving among four nodes during data analysis: data 
display, data collection, data reduction [sampling] and conclusions. They added that `final' 
conclusions were not reached until the completion of data collection. 
Quinn Patton (1999) presented triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data as a form of 
comparative analysis. Denscombe (1998) noted that "triangulation involves locating a true 
position by referring to two or more other coordinates. " This technique was used to assess to 
link categories with data-coding and create a network of documents. 
The method of collection of data for the qualitative analysis in this research has been 
completed through the following mean: 
" Short questionnaire: this technique was used to pre-select the interviewees after 
contacting them by phone or by mail. A short description of the research and its 
objectives were attached to a reply form they were required to fill and return by post or 
send by fax. 
" Problem observed: number of respondents, quality of information forwarded, 
problems of access (geographical, time constraints, workload, security/safety 
issues... ) 
" Face-to-face interview of selected candidates: a careful selection of potential 
interviewees, based on their response to the proposal, their position within the 
firm and 
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responsibilities, their willingness to participate to the project (interview, site visit and 
provision of additional information, participation to an expert seminar) and authorisation 
from their management to get involved into the research (confidentiality, public image, 
workload, transfer of knowledge... ). 
0 Problems observed: response to questions, format of interview (structured interview 
and set of questions run in an open format), location (on site, in house -single/shared 
offices, open offices, meeting/conference room), interviewee preparation for 
interview (prepared answer, spontaneous answer, structured answer, uncertainty of 
answer, hidden facts and information, restricted answer... ), researcher preparation 
and interview technique (the researcher is the instrument and his/her attitude, 
willingness, mood, frustrations, behaviour, are the drivers and barriers to a successful 
data collection during interviews. Denscombe (1998) wrote that the researcher's 
identity, values and beliefs cannot be entirely eliminated from the process. 
0 Observations: the process of collection of data required a very strict approach by the 
researcher. Observations on how the interviewee reacted to the interview questions, their 
involvement, comments on the documentation, site visits, were all built up in a case 
review and used as data for the analysis. 
0 Problems observed: each interview or case was different to any other one. The 
difficulty was to assess common ground and address them in the strategy adopted to 
collect data. Each case review highlighted -the strengths and weaknesses of the 
data 
collected. 
" Documents: part of the investigations into companies concentrated on the quality of 
documents used (fire safety plan, safety/fire policies, health and safety plan, 
fire 
instructions, fire plan, drawings / evacuation plans, form of contracts... ). 
" Problems observed: the availability of documents for each case varied. 
Also the 
quality of documents will vary on scale from poor to very good. 
This type of data is 
considered as additional information to complete each case review. 
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Interviewing was the most intensively used methods of data collection. Bryman and Burgess 
(1999) argued that there was no typical approach to interviewing in qualitative research. 
Interviews involved a face-to-face survey and direct contact between the researcher and the 
selected interviewee. 
" Case Studies: the most interesting part of the data collected in this research focussed on 
an extensive post analysis of fires on construction sites. Access to fire claims through 
insurance organisations and underwriters as well as loss adjusters enhance the quality of 
the research data and enabled the development of a detailed post analysis of construction 
fire safety failures scenarios. 
0 Problems observed: access to the data had to be keep confidential and no information 
identifying the company and the names of the parties or location of the fire could be 
provided in this research. The author chose a strict referencing system, identifying the 
"type" of site, the date of the fire and the country of location (UK, France -FR, 
United Staes -US, Belgium -BE... ). 
6.4 Exploring and analysing data. 
Two independent analysis were first developed in this research and then compared and 
contrasted in another chapter. The interviews were analysed using a qualitative software, and 
the case studies were reviewed and critically analysed in a separate section. Case studies 
have 
been grouped in different categories and analysed under three main headings: design and 
engineering, managerial strategy, contingency process. The conclusive findings were then 
interpreted into the development of a fire safety management model (Chapter 8) and all the 
findings discussed in Chapter 9. 
In contrary to general belief, using a qualitative software 
did not mean the researcher could 
avoid to engage with the data. The researcher and the processes were 
the central area of 
activity and the role of the software was to enable the researcher 
to ask questions and seek 
answer to those questions they could not or dared to ask. 
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Miles and Huberman (1994) proposed a table which highlights the main properties of a 
computer software in qualitative studies: 
Source: Miles, M. B. and Huberman, M (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook, 2m1 ed, Sage Publications. 
1. Making notes in the field 
2. Writing up or transcribing field notes 
3. Editing: correcting, extending or revising field notes 
4. Coding: attaching key words or tags to segments of text to permit later retrieval 
5. Storage: keeping text in an organised database 
6. Search and retrieval: locating relevant segments of text and making them available for inspection 
7. Data "linking": connecting relevant data segments with each other, forming categories, clusters or 
networks of information 
8. Memoring: writing reflective commentaries on some aspect of the data, as a basis for deeper 
analysis 
9. Content analysis: counting frequencies, sequence or locations of words and phrases 
10. Data display: placing selected or reduced data in a condensed, organised format, such as matrix or 
network, for inspection 
11. Conclusion drawings and verification: aiding the analyst to interpret, displayed data and to test or 
confirm findings 
12. Theory building: developing systematic, conceptually coherent explanations of findings, testing 
hypotheses 
13. Graphic mapping: creating diagrams that depict findings or theories 
14. Preparing interim and final reports 
Table 6.1: Uses of Computer Software in Qualitative Studies 
There was a growing number of computer software dedicated to assist researchers in 
qualitative analysis. Most computer softwares were a blend or a combination of word 
processors, word retrievers, text base managers, code-and-retrieve programs, theory builders 
and conceptual network builders (Miles and Huberman, 1994). According to Densombe 
(1998) the main advantage of using such software stemmed from "the superb abilities of 
computers to manage the data. " 
Some drawbacks of using a qualitative approach were recently highlighted 
by Point (1999) in 
a research paper where he discussed qualitative analysis of 
Petri Nets using ARABICA, a 
computer software. He identified two drawbacks: a large amount of time required 
to explore a 
sufficient number of scenarios, and a risk not to find critical sequences 
following the analysis 
of large number of scenarios. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) suggested that it was widely 
accepted to use a word processor to do qualitative research. 
212 
6.5 Showing results with QSR NUD*IST 4 
Gahan and Hannibal (1999) saw QSR NUD*IST4 as a tool kit to assist researcher. QSR 
NUD*IST was a Qualitative Research Software for Non-numerical Unstructured Data with 
the properties of Indexing, Searching and Theorising. This software was shaped along three 
goals: managing documents, creating ideas and managing categories, and asking questions 
and building and testing theories about the data (QSR*NUDIST, 1997). The process of setting 
up a N4 project was in four steps: importing documents, creating an index system, searching 
text and questioning the coding. However, the first step required many stages before reaching 
a stage where your document was ready to be transferred into QSR NUD*IST. First the 
collection of data and processing of data and formatting to N4 standard, then the data 
reduction and selection (sampling). 
6.5.1 Review of recent projects using QSR NUD*IST 4 
The research presented in this thesis was based on the analysis of a set of qualitative data, 
collected through interviews with practitioners. The scope of these information were broad 
and necessitated to use a tool to enhance the analysis and support a deeper understanding of 
the data. The use of a qualitative research software was thought to provide a recognised 
professional tool which would enhance the part of this research. Qualitative software have 
been used for many years and NUD*IST was a well known software which proved to be 
successful in a large range of research, in social studies, organisational research, 
management... Table 6.2 proposed a selection of research project using NUD*IST. 
It was important to accept that the software was a tool to help the researcher to explore his/her 
data and by no means provides an answer. The objective of the exercise was to track down 
accurate information and use the software to create links between different sources of data 
(interviews, documents... ) and then used these data to compare and contrast the findings 
in 
the analysis. 
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In this research, a large sample of interviews was carried out with various practitioners. To 
enable a better analysis, the author decided to design a structured interview and extract similar 
pattern of answers between each of them. The success of this research method was 
demonstrated in this thesis and the outcomes of the qualitative analysis were used to develop 
the fire safety management model. Parallel could be drawn between the literature findings and 
interviews findings to support the validity of the research. 
Subject/University Brief description 
Date 
Fire Safety Management Interview based with practitioners in CI 
Heriot-Watt University, UK 
2001 
Risk and Uncertainty Exploring the meaning of risk and uncertainty in an 
McMaster University, Canada environmentally sensitised community 
1998 
Decision Making Ethical issues and decision making in organisations 
RMIT, Australia 
1998 
Network learning The exploration of networked learning: a constructivist' approach 
University of Sheffield 
1998 
Organisational Leadership Enhancing adaptability: a grounded theory of organisational 
Monash University, Australia leadership as a social process 
1997 
Architecture education Learners as designers: computers as cognitive tools in architecture 
University of Wollongong education 
1996 
Table 6.2: A selection of recent theses using QSR NUD*IST Software 
6.6 Interpreting and discussing the results 
Interpretation of the results following a qualitative and/or quantitative analysis was one of the 
most important parts of the research. The previous part of this paper highlights the need 
to 
carefully plan the collection of data, data reduction and data display (coding, grouping) 
in 
qualitative analysis. The use of a computer software facilitated the analysis of 
data and coding 
process, and involves the braking down into units and categorising through 
the formulation of 
an index tree. The flexibility of a computer software for qualitative analysis allowed 
the 
researcher to improve its coding and add field notes, comments, reports, case 
reviews 
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alongside the way and not worrying about losing data. In a later stage of the research all these 
documents were analysed with the interviews and enabled a slow process of maturation of 
the analysis. Denscombe (1999) defined the use of memos as acting as reminder throughout 
the development of investigations, and also as "a log of the developing line of thinking. " With 
QSR NUD*IST there were three different way to reflect, revisit and review the documents: by 
storing reflections by changing text units and removing text units, by creating annotations, 
and finally by attaching a memo to a document or create a document and appending it to the 
project document. 
6.7 Conclusion Chapter 6: 
The art of interpreting, evaluating and critically analysing the qualitative data was a difficult 
exercise. The validity of the interpretation of the data lied within the ability of the researcher 
to extract significance findings and critically analyse these results to contribute to knowledge 
in the field. 
The next chapter presents the results of the qualitative analysis of the interviews and a post 
analysis of the construction fires. 
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7 CURRENT PRACTICES: SITE INVESTIGATIONS 
The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the process of building research data based 
on an extensive site investigation (through interviews) and a detailed analysis of major 
construction site fires and fires representative of the construction industry (losses >£50,000 
and <£ 1 m). 
7.1 Data collection method 
As it was expressed in the earlier chapters of the thesis, it was impossible to gather reliable 
quantitative data on fires on construction sites. The author aimed to concentrate on a 
qualitative analysis and observe the managerial system failures. 
0A qualitative analysis of interviews 
" Case study review and analysis 
7.1.1 Qualitative Analysis of Interviews 
The structured interview was designed along the lines of the research questions identified in 
Chapter 6. More than 50 contracting organisations and major clients wee contacted and 
invited to take part in the research. 15 major UK organisations accepted to take part in this 
investigation. For the purpose of this research, no information identifying their company has 
been disclosed except with their written authorisation. The members of the Expert 
Committees and collaborative establishment accepted to provide their full support and that 
their name and organisation be identified in this document. However, the organisation 
interviewed desired to retain their contact as some information provided in the 
interviews are 
confidential. 
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The site investigations and interviews of practitioners concentrated on three categories of 
sites: 
i. New built facilities 
ii. Refurbishment/Renovation/Change-in-use/Alterations 
iii. Maintenance works (facilities being occupied). 
It was estimated that a maximum of 6 sites and practitioners in each category would be 
necessary to analyse, compare and contrast the data with QSR NUD*IST4. A process of 
selection of the sites has been discussed with the supervisor, and three stages of investigation 
have been planned: 
i. Pilot study with some good examples (5 sites) 
ii. Selected site investigations of medium importance or relevance 
iii. Compare and contrast and analyse the 15 best site investigations with QSR NUD*IST4. 
The author expected to spend a lot of time indexing the data and investigating and browsing 
the documents in order to obtain the research results. 
The most important stage of the qualitative analysis depends on how to investigate and 
browse the documents with QSR NUD*IST4. A three-stage process was identified: 
i. Collecting data 
ii. Making a document management system and indexing the documents. 
iii. Investigating and browsing the documents: searching text, asking questions, analysing 
cases, importing and exporting additional documents and finally analysing, comparing 
and contrasting the results with QSR NUD*IST4. 
The table 7.1 summarises the interviews carried out for this research and it also provides a 
short indication of the responsibilities of the interviewee. 
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1 * ARLOW, Paris. France 
* Public Transport Facilities: New Construction / Refurbishment / Maintenance 
* August 2000 
* Jean-Luc Martinez, Service Securite et Prevention. 
2 * Le Centre, Paris, France 
* Museum / Library / Cultural Centre: Refurbishment / Maintenance 
* August 2000 
* Jean Luc Houee, Direction du Bätiment et de la Security, Service Securite, Coordinateur SSI 
3 * Chastenet, Paris, France 
* Historic Building: Refurbishment / Maintenance 
* 22 August, 2000 
* Structured Interview with Michel Schaal, Responsable service securite incendie 
4. * BUILDING AUTHORITY, UK 
* Airport Facilities: New Construction / Refurbishment / Maintenance 
* 25 January, 1999 
* Structured interview with Rob Stewart, Construction Manager for BUILDING AUTHORITY 
5, * Ballast Construction, Glasgow, Scotland, UK 
* Contractor for New and Refurbished Facilities 
* December 1999 
* Structured interview with Andrew Vickermam, Regional Health & Safety Manager 
6. * Barbour Homes, UK 
* Home builder, Timber Frame Structure 
* Monday 14 June 1999 
* Structured Interview with David Scott, Health & Safety Manager for Scotland & Robert Watt, Construction 
Director 
7, * KELLY Glasgow, Scotland, UK 
* New Cosntruction 
* August 2000, UK 
* Structured interview with the Health and Safety Manager. 
8. * MORSE, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK 
* New Construction and Refurbishment 
* 15 September, 1999 
* Structured interview with the health & safety manager for Scottish Projects. 
9, * Radiant 1. Radiant Property (RP), Glasgow, UK 
* Radiant facilities: New Construction / Refurbishment 
* Wednesday 20 January 1999 
* David Shirres, Safety Manager for Project Delivery & John Wood, Safety Manager 
10. * Radiant 2. Glasgow Central (GC), UK 
* Radiant facilities: Maintenance / Refurbishment 
* Friday 12 February 1999 
* Structured interview: I. Glen, Station Manager, J. Lorimer, Safety Supervisor, Mr. Dennis, Fire Precautions 
Manager 
11. * Fire Protection Association, London, UK 
* Denney FPA 
* November 2000 
* Structured Interview Jim Denney, Executive Director 
12. * McLarens Toplis, London, UK 
* Loss Adjusters: impartial claims specialist 
* October 2000 
* Unstructured interview with Roger Preedy, Director. 
13. * Fire Consultant, Edinburgh, UK 
* Fire Safety Engineering Specialist 
* March 2001 
* Unstructured interview with Dr. Eric Marchant, Fire Safety Engineer 
14. * CNPP, St Marcel, Vernon, France 
* Training Centre, Fire Safety 
* December 1999 
* Unstructured interview with Alain Polach, Managing Director and Engineer 
15. * Royal & Sun Alliance, London, UK 
* Underwriters Department 
* November 2000 
* Unstructured interview with Keith Ma pp, Risk Engineer 
Table 7.1: Interviews Details 
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7.1.2 Research samples and Case Studies: 
The objective was to assess and identify where failures occur in a selection of fire safety 
scenarios. A survey of a selective number of samples has been analysed with the Technical 
and Survey/Loss Control departments of major UK and FR insurance companies. The 
following table provided information on the selected case studies used to develop this 
research and the Fire Safety Management Model. Through the analysis of relevant cases of 
fires originating on construction sites, a comparison was made between recognised good and 
bad practices, and a proposed Fire Safety Management Model to meet the requirements for 
Fire Safely Plans was presented later in this thesis. 
Fire Report Site Cause Date / Country 
UK-Broad ate New construction Discarded material 1990, UK 
UK-Minster Court Refurbishment Unknown 1991, UK 
UK-Hampton Court Refurbishment / Maintenance Welding / Cutting 1986, UK 
UK-Retail Store I Refit/Refurbishment Deliberate/Arson 04/2000, UK 
UK-Retail Store II Refit/Refurbishment Deliberate/ Arson 05/2000, UK 
UK-Hospital Refurbishment / Maintenance Hot Work 02/2000, UK 
UK-Processing 
Factory 
New / Refurbishment / 
Maintenance 
Electrical short 
circuit 
06/1998, UK 
UK-Residential 
Facility 
New Construction Hot Work 03/1999, UK 
UK-Bank New Construction Welding 10/1999, UK 
UK-Education Refurbishment Hot Work 02/2000, UK 
FR-Frigecreme Maintenance Welding / Cutting 1996, FR 
FR-Retail Store 
Sama 
Refurbishment Hot Work 06/2000, FR 
FR-Processing 
Factory 
Refurbishment / Maintenance Electrical Fault 07/2000, FR 
FR-Bank Refurbishment Hot Work 01 /2000, FR 
FR-Residential 
/Offices Facilities 
New Construction Hot Work / Cutting 06/2000, FR 
FR-Processing 
Factory 
New Construction / Extension Hot Work 12/1996, FR 
FR-Factory Refurbishment/Maintenance Hot Work 02/1994, FR 
D-Dusseldorf Maintenance / Repair Hot work 1996, D 
B- Palais de Justice 
de Malines 
Maintenance 
Building of the XVI century. 
Naked Flame 16/10/1995 
D-Dusseldorf Maintenance / Repair Hot work 1996, D 
US- Sight & Sound 
Theatre 
Refurbishment Welding Operations 1997, US 
US- Harrisson 
Building 
Refurbishment Cutting operations 1985, US 
Figure 7.1: Construction Fires Case Studies 
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7.2 Data Analysis 
7.2.1 Analysis of Interviews with QSR NUD*IST 
There was a general belief that fires on construction sites did not happen, often because the 
frequency of these fires is lower than for general accidents and fortunately no deaths occur on 
construction sites. In the literature review the author identified a dearth of research in this area 
and a lack of quantitative data to support the hypothesis. The following chapter detailed the 
research findings extract from a qualitative analysis of data collected through interviews with 
practitioners. The objective was to draw some parallel with the literature findings and used 
these findings in the preparation of the fire safety management model. 
7.2.1.1 Fires on construction sites? We don't have any... (??? ) 
Major fires on construction sites were rare on paper. The first chapter of our literature review 
attempted to address the problem and demonstrates the extend of the problem. Amongst our 
interviewees, the majority experienced a fire on site: Le Centre (2000) had to deal with a 
major fire in the parking, aggravated by technical mistakes from the safety team (misuse of 
sprinklers systems and fire walls); Kelly (2000) explained that they were very unfortunate to 
spot a fire slightly too late ("the fire watch was asleep or he was doing something else and 
that's why the fire happened. "). Arlow (2000) experienced some fires but they never took 
catastrophic proportions. The complexity of the construction and use of flammable material 
increased the risk of fire on site. The adoption of a strict waste management policy and non- 
smoking policy was a first step ahead, but mistakes happen. Barbour 
Homes (1999) 
remembered a major incident on a site involving gas and LPG and provoking an explosion, 
seriously injuring a worker. Those involved with historic properties were 
faced with a 
different set of problems. Chastenet (2000) lost part of 
its facility with a fire during the 
refurbishment of a copper roof, involving the use of a naked 
flame to complete the works. 
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The category of fires describe above were not always recorded and were part of this large part 
of the iceberg which is not classified. They would be recorded in-house but not with the 
Home Office or FPA. When losses were minimal and no injuries reported, there was no need 
to report fires to the authority. However, if the Fire Brigade was required on site, then a fire 
report was completed and forwarded to the Home Office. Unfortunately, it was down to the 
fire investigator to mention a category for the facility and often these fires are not recorded 
under a construction site but the final purpose of the facility (office, shop, library ... ). Morse 
(1999) argued that "safety records are not really worth the paper it is written on. " We were 
still far from this ideal system of collection and classification of statistical data if this 
comment was representative of the construction industry. However the author didn't perceive 
it as a conclusive comment. 
7.2.1.2 Safety Culture, attitude and perception: 
Guldenmund (2000) in his paper on the nature of safety culture, reviewed 16 papers on 
safety climate and safety culture. Lee (1996) seemed to provide one suitable definition for the 
purpose of this research: "The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual 
and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and organisation's health and 
safety management. " This statement matched many comments raised in the interviews. 
Barbour Houses (1999) commented that "there is a safety culture. It is difficult to define what 
is a safety culture. We have an approach to safety which is quite structured, with 
defined 
responsibilities, with every individual within the company whoever they are or whatever role 
they fulfil. We have within a document a structure laid out and a set of responsibilities. 
" The 
notion of individual involvement and organisational (group) value was presented as one 
of the driver to implement a safety culture. Building Authority (1999) argued that 
"safety 
features are quite highly in everyone - it is part of the culture - 
if you look at Building 
Authority's mission statement. " Le Centre (2000) argued you 
"need of a full integration of 
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safety in the organisation through the department down to each individual. Often people are in 
a safety post and are not competent to fullfil their responsibilities. " 
However involvement and commitment was key to success. Barbour Homes (2000) added 
that " they are "happy to put that attitude forward to the troops, our staff and our 
subcontractors, we were then put into partnerships with most of them. But not all or most of 
these people take that attitude on board and accept what we are saying to them. There are 
always difficulties, we have just got to assess and address and control. " Morse (1999) also 
was commenting that " the safety culture on site is the big missing link. " A lot of work was 
still to be done to improve the safety perception and raise awareness in-house and with 
external organisation (sub-contractors, suppliers... ). Barbour homes (1999) later in the 
interview made a very strong statement that "the benefits are good, safety culture is best 
practised, it's habit forming, it lends itself if we get that right. " Success seemed to lie within 
the implementation of a good safety culture, understood by everyone from the strategic end 
to the operational side through the tactical branch. 
Perception was often linked to the way we, as individual or as a group or an organisation, we 
perceive risk. BS 6079 defined risk as a combination of the probability, or frequency, of 
occurrence of a defined threat or opportunity and the magnitude of the consequences of the 
occurrence (BS 6079). The perception of fire on construction site also followed this pattern: 
what is the risk of a fire on one of my construction site? Barbour Homes (1999) commented 
that "it's the perception that is at the soft end of the industry, and it's not always accurate. " 
Accurate? Because we can't measure it, maybe, or maybe because the society 
doesn't 
recognise it as a major risk? When asked about the use of a fire safety plan, 
Morse (1999) 
answered that their subcontractors "are made aware of it. " And added "the major risk 
is with 
accidents anyway. " As a health and safety manager it sounded 
like a big shortcut towards 
disasters on site. On the other hand, organisation which were more concerned 
about the 
perception, and especially the perception of the general public or the society as 
a whole, due 
to their market position or success in business would 
have a different approach. Some 
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managers would be more radical and admit: "I don't like when people say you will asses. 
Your opinion on a risk might be totally different from my opinion on a risk" (Barbour Homes, 
1999). The Facilities Manager of Radiant 2 (1999) stated that "there is a lot of change 
awareness in the fire issues... " The major construction manager for Building Authority 
(1999) advanced that his organisation has been forced to change to improve the perception of 
the problem of fire safety. However it proved to be a success and Building Authority added 
that "one of the things we pride ourselves on is our safety performance in construction in 
comparison with health and safety executive standards for the UK and averages. " 
Transmitting this perception of safety and changing the safety culture of an organisation 
might takes years. The health and safety manager for Barbour Homes (1999) commented that 
"it is good to hear that safety culture is developed. " However he thought that "the attitude of 
the management is more important than the attitude coming from him: "Everybody expects 
me to have a certain attitude to take reasonable hard line as I keep accident prevention. I am 
quite fortunate that the management is quite proactive. " For Morse (1999) the health and 
safety manager did not believe so much into his management. He argued that "there isn't 
enough being done across the board safety wise... and by the sub-contractors using a largely 
incompetent safety wire. " Kelly (2000) developed a "fairly complex and fairly rigorous 
safety regime... " 
The conclusions emerging from this review of safety culture, perception and attitude across 
the organisations interviewed was broad. It seemed we could divide the group in two: those 
who are proactive and implement measures before they are asked to do it by law or 
enforcement. And on the other hand those who were reactive and forced to develop a new 
approach towards safety on site. 
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7.2.1.3 Regulation and legislation: how efficient is it? 
One objective of the research was to find out if the current and existing set of legislative and 
regulatory requirements was sufficient to provide a minimum level of safety and if this 
minimum level was adequate and acceptable for the contractors, the workforce and any other 
party involved in the construction process. 
Several issues were raised in the interviews: the idea of lack of safety, weaknesses in the 
existing system, the reactive approach of the industry, pressure from insurers... 
Since the first edition of the JCOP, major construction bodies participated to update the 
document four times and apparently successfully. However, as stated in the literature review, 
there was statistical evidence to support this information. Barbour Homes (1999) believed that 
"there is a weakness in general fire control within our industry... and that the joint code of 
practice raised by insurers and the fire authorities are largely impractical for the type of work 
they are being asked to do. " Later in this research, the strengths and weaknesses of the JCOP 
were analysed, and you will find that the JCOP was definitely working and brought a 
positive culture in organisations. Morse (1999) stated that "there is a lot more countries that 
are less advanced than us. " Certainly in the first part of this thesis, the author reviewed and 
analysed the current legislative state in the EU and compared the EU approach against the 
Canadian and American framework. The author discovered that the UK fire safety 
approach was more advanced. However, the general health and safety regulations 
did have 
some weaknesses. Investment into safety was still low as profit margins and the construction 
economy were low. Barbour Homes (1999) commented that they 
had some clients asking 
them to comply with the JCOP but "in all honesty [they] 
don't price for it. " Morse (1999) 
wondered if the "people who count the money would be happy with 
it. " He continued and 
closed his explanations by the following comment: "because 
I don't think the money parties 
invest into safety will change. " 
The publication of the CDM regulation in 1994 
brought a lot of change to the industry and the 
division of responsibilities between the parties, putting more 
duties and responsibilities on the 
224 
designer. Building Authority (1999) viewed the CDM as "a very prescriptive document", 
Morse (1999) thought the CDM Regs were "too heavy" and Barbour Homes (1999) saw in 
the CDM publication a good exercise which made their organisation "sit down and think 
about the planning side and the brainstorm of how [they] were going to tackle the 
problem", but they still admitted "CDM in its structure has got a lot of problems. " 
The CDM focussed on health and safety standards with no reference to fire safety directly. 
The requirement of a health and safety plan suggested the initiation of a fire safety but not 
separately. It is nowadays a standard requirement in most of CAR/EAR insurance clauses to 
require compliance with JCOP. This insurers' rule initiated in 1992 following the two major 
UK construction site fires, enforced fire safety standard on sites. The practitioners were more 
concern about compliance with JCOP. Until 1998 and the new edition of JCTs Forms of 
Contract, the JCOP was not a requirement under the terms of the contract. But with the 
JCT98, it changed: amendment 17 was integrated in the new edition. 
What needs to be done to improve safety? The JCOP publication and, implementation were 
certainly a good step ahead and was supported by the industry, their insurers and re-insurers, 
the FPA, LPC, BEC, the Fire Brigade... So far we discovered that to be effective, the fire 
safety approach must be integrated in the organisational structure and belief ("its mission 
statement" like in Building Authority). An interesting comments was brought on by Morse 
(1999): "It's the same thing with most safety things. Disaster is waiting to happen, and then 
it 
happens, something will change. " This reactive attitude seems to be a well known approach 
in 
the industry. Certainly the pattern of evolution of fire safety standards in the UK was 
following this path. As illustrated in Figure 7.2. The Safety Manager of 
Arlow (2000) agreed 
it was regrettable to have to suffer major accidents and disaster to react and 
improve the fire 
safety level'8. The more disasters, the more the safety department advice and opinion was 
raised. Building Authority (1999) has been more concerned by the 
Dusseldorf fire in 1996, 
18 "Il est clair que dans le domaine de la securite 
incendie, c'est malheureux ä dire, mais c'est ä chaque 
fois que l'on connait une catastrophe qu'on remet un 
tour de vis supplementaire. C'est , alable 
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which killed 16 in an airport. The engineering elements which contributed to the catastrophic 
outcomes of the Dusseldorf fire raised a range of issues taken on board by major organisation 
dealing with the public and receiving large crowds in their facilities (airport authorities, 
shopping complexes, railway station... ). Building Authority (1999) explained that "the 
Dusseldorf accident had more of an impact in terms of fire safety in the building design. It 
forced us to look very closely and re-examine our fire safety procedures and re-evaluate what 
they were. " Radiant Property 1 (1999) argued that after Kings Cross fire a huge drive on fire 
safety improvement and requirements. For others, when asked if major incidents change their 
perception of fire safety, astonishing answer came across: "MCP: Are you aware of the two 
major fires in London which happened in 1990 and 1991? KELLY: Which ones are you 
talking about? " (Kelly, 2000). It might be due to the younger age of the interviewee compared 
to other participants. 
Figure 7.2: Reactive framework - Disasters vs. Regulations 
partout... plus il ya de pepins, plus il ya 
d'accident graves en securite incendie, plus on 
donne de 
moyens et plus le service de securite est ecoute. 
" (Arlow, 2000) 
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The discussion and exchange with practitioners on fire safety management and its regulatory 
requirements highlighted a number of strengths and weaknesses in the existing system. The 
series of measures taken throughout the last 15 years demonstrated the reactive behaviour of 
the government to implement stronger and better standards. The proactive actions of insurers 
in the 1990s to promote fire safety on construction sites and enforce compliance with a 
statutory guidance through the insurance covers was a success in raising awareness amongst 
practitioners and integrate a total fire safety management approach. As always it is profit 
driven, so far for the insurance industry, and contractors are now putting more pressure on 
their clients to invest into safety and raise the profile of safety in the industry. 
7.2.1.4 Which fire safety strategy? 
Since the publication in 1992 of the JCOP Code of Practice and its integration within the 
JCTs forms of contract in 1998, contractors and clients took the problem of fire safety on 
board. Major efforts were put into the development of an in-house fire safety procedure, often 
under the overall safety procedure. Fire safety was one section of the safety procedure. In the 
interviews, all organisations mentioned about their standard: 
" Safety Schemes (Barbour Homes, 1999) with a set of standard issued nationally within 
the group. 
" Standard compound drawings (Barbour Homes, 1999) 
" National procedures and group standards (Radiant 2,1999) 
"A standard format for health and safety file: a Safety Handbook (Building Authority, 
1999) 
" Tool box talk to communicate to the workforce (Building Authority, 
1999) 
" Standard procedure across the organisation and specific 
fire plan (Kelly, 2000) 
"A project board which is totally project specific 
(Building Authority, 1999). 
The image of safety was important for these organisations. 
Some will see it as a selling point. 
Barbour Homes (1999) believed that "safety can assist [them] to sell 
houses and that is [their] 
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aim. " On the other hand Arlow (2000) sees it as an "image de marque" (business image) to 
sustain. Their safety strategy differed and depended on their corporate objectives. 
However we observed some difference within the regional offices of one organisation as 
Kelly explained: "Generally, Kelly Scotland is using the same procedures but they are not 
quite as in-bread in the people, and the people are not as used to them as they are down 
south. " (Kelly, 2000). Building Authority (1999) promoted a competitive approach: "the site 
safety awareness is a competitive thing because every contractor is getting a score every week 
so we have a league table essentially. " The reward might be worse the game: "every week 
there is a contractor who wins and we draw a name out of a hat and he gets a gifts voucher. " 
One drawback of this "successful" method was the overwhelming approach of certain 
contractor not to report incidents to get the gift. It is not anymore a working rule but a game. 
The author also came across the "worst contractor of the week" game, practised when the 
contractor knows he has no chance to win the first price. Barbour Homes (1999) encouraged a 
"two way information and feedback" between the workforce and the management and 
promoted "a fairly thorough hierarchy of safety communication... and the workforce could 
pass this message to the management. " The health and safety manager for Barbour Homes 
believed "this is the way to communicate at all levels. " 
Primarily fire in historic buildings encountered very much a catch-22 situation in its 
prevention, this being the problems faced when considering methods of protection. In the case 
of an historic building there was a further dimension - the loss of property that forms part of a 
cultural resource which was finite, irreplaceable and whose architectural and historical 
integrity can be destroyed as easily by inappropriate fire precautions as by 
fire itself. When 
losses were a much onerous concern in terms of its value, like in historic 
facilities, major 
owners (private, crown owners, historic department, governments... ) got together 
to find a 
better and more appropriate solution for the type of facilities they were 
dealing with. Within 
the Raphael Symposium major historic departments from the EU 
formed a working group on 
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safety in historic buildings with one representative from each European country19. (Chastenet, 
2000). Chastenet added that they had to fight for 5 years and put pressure on the contractors 
and sub-contractors to change their attitude towards safety. They had to fire site manager who 
didn't follow the procedure. 20 This initiative aimed to improve standard across historic 
facilities and to learn how each individual and the working group as a whole, can benefit from 
the other members experience and fire safety approach in their country. A strong emphasis is 
put on the transfer of knowledge and promoting research and development in this field. 
One objective was to collect, at a European level, records and data to produce adequate and 
accurate statistical data. 
Insurers were also taking on similar initiative at a European level (Denney (FPA), 2000). The 
increase of the global market and growth of EU contracts demonstrated a dearth of research 
and common standard across the EU. European Directives were a good starting point but they 
didn't provide enough flexibility to allow a uniform adaptation of the fire safety requirements. 
7.2.1.5 European Directives: pros and/or cons? 
Minimal fire safety standard was complied with and most organisations which realise the 
potential benefits of developing their fire safety strategy started it after the publication of the 
JCOP for fire prevention on construction sites. One of the reasons why they were forced to sit 
down and think about it, was because the JCOP, as it was structured in 1992, didn't 
fit in any 
of the existing safety framework. At that time, minimum requirement was required, 
but there 
was no room for new initiatives. Insurers knew any client and contractor would 
have to 
comply with the JCOP soon or later and that it might take years to change 
the culture. 
Actually it nearly took 8 years (1990-1998). Figure 7.3 which 
illustrates the reactive approach 
19 "On particpe dans le cadre du colloque Raphael a tout un groupe 
de travail sur la se curite avec tous 
les responsables de monuments historiques de chaque pays 
d'Europe. " (Chastenet, 2000). 
20 , Nous on s'est battu pendant 5 ans et il a fallu qu'on 
fasse pression sur des entreprises, que I'on 
fasse 
virer des agents sur des chantiers qui n'ont pas respecter cette procedure. 
(Chastenet, 2000). 
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of the British system, provides a good idea of the inter-relationship between disaster/incidents 
and the publication of new regulation. 
The role of the EU in trying to harmonise the regulation across the members state required 
each country to implement the directives within a given period (usually 3 years, unless for an 
emergency). From 1992 to 1994, contractors and clients were faced with the implementation 
of the JCOP in their existing structure (under the UK law, compliance with JCOP is not 
required, the insurers required compliance through their contractual clause). In 1994 the 
government implemented the CDM Regulations 1994 and compliance with the document was 
required within 1 year (July 1995). The prescriptive requirements of the CDM disturbed the 
industry. The lack of knowledge of the regulation, the scope and purpose of the CDM put 
pressure on the construction parties to review their method and fire safety process. The CDM 
was a direct consequence of the EU Directive 92/57/EEC on the implementation of minimum 
safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Building Authority (1999) indicated that "the construction industry has changed in 
the last 10 years and it is far more aware, far more safety conscious. The general safety 
awareness, individual safety awareness is so much better, people are far more better educated 
in good safety practice. " But overall most organisation were forced to embrace the European 
standards ("Everything that Europe can throw at us" Building Authority, 1999). The general 
feeling was that the EU directives are seen as negatives and over-regulating the existing 
structure, when actually it allows governments to deregulate to better regulate 
(like the 
CDM Regs). 
7.2.1.6 Business continuity and contingency planning: does it matters? 
"We are insured anyway... 11 
If we had a fire today, do we have contingency plan?: a simple question 
to explore the depth 
of the safety approach was asked to all interviewees. 
The continuity of a business was a 
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priority for all organisations. Arlow (2000) admitted21 that if a fire was to affect their business 
the consequences could be disastrous. Arlow didn't have the infrastructure to cope with a 
major disaster and they wouldn't have the capacity to transfer part of their business activity 
to another facility. This lack of flexibility of the design of facilities and the restraints on 
construction activities in a building in use were a major source of risk of fires during the 
construction process, refurbishment works and maintenance operations. When members of 
the public were involved or at threat, different measures must be taken. Building Authority 
(2000) draw a distinct line between the boundaries of the site and the facilities in use. The use 
of fire walls and partitions was now common and an increase use of temporary fire detection 
and warning systems was encouraged. We discussed in Chapter 3 the engineering 
characteristics of a site and how its evolutionary design and construction affected the 
development of a fire. These elements of engineering were a very important parameter to 
understand the complexity of the problem. However the scope of this research was not to 
develop an engineering approach, but a qualitative research. Nevertheless, as it was discussed, 
it is important to take it into account. Building Authority (1999) looked at the "building fire 
safety into design and how to have a compartment strategy and controls in 
compartmentation. " But Building Authority (1999), like Arlow and Le Centre, was concerned 
about first "the safety of their occupants" and their public image, and second "the business 
economic impact of loosing a facility. " 
Barbour Homes (1999) who was dealing with a large number of small projects (houses) and 
some multi-storey facilities, was faced with a different set of risk. The type of construction 
played an important part in fires: timber structure tends to be prone to fire. Their approach 
was to maximise the implementation of a fire safety procedure on site to reduce the outbreak 
21 "Si on avait un incendie, est ce aujourd'hui on a un plan de gestion de la crise? Aujourd'hui si on 
perd un aerogare a cause d'un chantier on aurait un impacte sur l'exploitation qui serait tres 
important. 
On a pas des infrastructures qui nous permettraient de palier ä cela. On a pas la capacite 
de transferer 
tout le traffic sur les autres aerogares. Il y aurait des perturbations sürement tress 
importantes" (Arlow, 
2000). 
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of fires and if one were to occur, to minimise the economical impact through their insurer: 
"we are self insured for £25,000... straight off our profits. " 
From the analysis of the data collected through interviews, there was no evidence that 
contingency planning was a systematic exercise. Certainly no evidence were here to 
demonstrate that the organisations interviewed have an operational continuity planning. The 
transfer of the risk of an interruption to the insurer seemed to be the easy escape to avoid a 
recognised problem. Often, interviewees were trying to avoid to answer the question by 
providing another answer, but no one of them stated: "yes, we have a contingency plan, and if 
today a fire broke out and destroyed our facility, this is what we would do. " In contrary, 
because the risk of fire to destroy one of their facility was low or not worth considering, they 
decided not to develop a contingency procedure. The health and safety manager for Kelly 
(2000) had an interesting statement: "I imagine they (the fire brigade, his organisation... ) will 
bring in the total emergency plan. " Anyway, he never "came across considering the risk of 
spreading to adjacent offices and buildings. " 
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7.2.2 Construction Fire Safety Failures: 
The results obtained from the interviews were not conclusive and did not completely 
contributed to demonstrate the research questions. The validity of the data collected could be 
challenged and the authenticity of the information provided could be discussed. However, a 
number of interesting issues were highlighted. It was now time to concentrate on a series of 
real case scenarios and analyse where really the problem was coming from. Access to data on 
major fires was again limited unless the government carried out a public enquiry. The Minster 
Court and Broadgate fires have been widely publicised and a detailed fire investigation 
carried out by the fire authorities. However, how were these major fires representative of the 
rest of the iceberg? They were major fires (£35mand £ 110m losses), some office facilities in 
London (The City = The Media), presented a complex design (atrium, multi-storey building, 
displaying modern materials and innovative design... )... Out of the 50 fires recorded by the 
FPA between 1985-1998, Broadgate and Minster Court are at the top of the pyramidal 
distribution (4%). The objective of this chapter was to present the result of the analysis of a 
series of relevant construction site fires in the UK and France, and some in the rest of Europe 
and the US. 
The results of the analysis of these failure fire scenarios were presented in Table 7.3: 
Construction Fire safety Failures Matrix. Lessons learnt from these fires were also listed and 
later used in the preparation of the FSMM. Observations on the origin of the fire, its 
development and containment and extinguishment were highlighted. The fire safety 
management system, in place at the time of the fire, was also analysed and criticised to assess 
failures. 
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7.2.2.1 The Construction Fire Safety Failure Scenarios: 
The qualitative study of construction site fire safety scenarios looked at 21 different cases as 
listed in 7.2.2. The distribution of fires primarily concentrated on the EU and especially 
France and the UK: 
9 47% in the UK 
33% in France 
0 <10% in the rest of the EU 
" <10%intheUS 
UK 
Germany 
Belgium 
Italy 
Spain 
Figure 7.5: Selection of case studies and fire scenarios 
Different type of site were selected and with comparative cases between France and the UK. 
The distribution is as follow: 
" >28% of New Construction sites 
" >57% of refurbishment works 
"> 14% of maintenance sites. 
It was not a hazard that the majority of the cases studied 
for this research (57%) were 
refurbishment sites as the risk of fire in these construction activities 
is often very high. 
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To ease the analysis of the fire safety failure scenarios and extract valuable information on the 
safety system failure, the author concentrated on the thorough analysis of five types of 
facilities: 
0 Retail Units and Shopping Centres: UK Retail Store 1 (2000) and 11 (2000); FR Retail 
Store Sama (2000). 
0 Factory Units and Processing Industry: UK Processing Factory (1998), FR Frigecreme 
(1996), FR Factory (1994), FR Factory (1996) 
" Offices: UK Broadgate (1990), UK Minster Court (1991), UK Bank (1999), FR 
Residential and Offices Facilities (2000), FR Bank (2000) 
" Public Facilities / Entertainment: UK Hospital (2000), US Sight & Sound Theatre (1997) 
" Historic Buildings: UK Hampton Court (1986), B Palais des Malines (1995), US 
Harrisson Building (1985). 
The author aimed to compare and contrast fire failure scenarios between France and the UK 
and for this reason, similar case studies were identified on both sides. Unfortunately the 
information collected in the claim files and reports by the insurance companies, is not the 
same from both sides. The UK system seemed to be more thorough and detailed, thanks to the 
work of Loss Adjusters on behalf of the insurers. The detailed analysis of the circumstances 
of the fire and its development were not as well detailed in the French claim files. 
The table 7.3 below provided a matrix of construction site fire safety failure for each fire 
scenarios analysed in this chapter. Conclusions were extracted after the analysis and at the 
end of this chapter. Confidentiality on most of the fires, their location and companies 
involved has been retained and each scenario is identified as a code: Country / Type of Site / 
Date of Fire. 
Country: France-FR, United Kingdom-UK, Germany-D, Belgium-B, United State-US for 
example, FR Retail I (1999): France, Construction of a 
Retail Unit in 1999. 
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7.2.2.1.1 Retails Units and Shopping Centres: 
" UK Retail Store 1 (2000) and 11 (2000); FR Retail Store Sama (2000). 
The importance of the design and compartmentation in a facility was one key factor of the 
control of the spread of fire. Retail units and shopping centres have a very specific design 
which aims to allow the circulation and move of occupants in a commercial environment. The 
facilities were not only constructed top protect the occupants through the provision of 
adequate fire safety measures (detection systems, warning, extinguishment, means of escape) 
but also to get the public to buy the products on display. The consequences were a design 
usually very modern and using a range of flashy modern materials (metal, decorations and 
ornaments, display units... ) and presented in large open spaces. This design approach was not 
only found in the UK but worldwide. 
The case studies the author analysed presented similar characteristics. The two retail units in 
the UK were owned by the same retailer and the French case study concerned a typical 
renovation project in a shopping centre widely known and used by the public. Renovation 
works were taking place and a large quantity of product was stored in the facility during the 
works. In retail Unit I and II, the facilities were closed for business but due to reopen soon 
after the fire incident. For the FR Retail Store Sama the renovation took place in the 1926 
multi-storey facility for one unit retailer. 
The UK Retail Unit I was undergoing refurbishment and was being refitted by a main 
contractor and sub-contractors at the time of the fire. The Security Guard was employed 24 
hours a day and 7 days a week. A temporary security fence has been erected around the 
northern end of the building, prior to the fire, to restrict access to all of the entrances on this 
side of the premises. The building was fitted with temporary lighting which was left switched 
on overnight as a security measure. The contract commenced on site in March and was due to 
completion at the beginning of May. The contract value was in the region of £700,000. 
The loss premises are part of an industrial estate a short distance from the town centres (in the 
UK). A company of builders and a number of sub-contractors were refitting the Retail Unit at 
241 
the time of the fire. The prospective tenants of the facility were supposed to occupy the 
building after its refurbishment. 
" Show room: 23,630 sq. ft 
" Warehouse: 15,854sq. ft 
The Retail Unit I (UK) comprised a steel portal frame building clad with profiled metal sheet. 
The loss premises adjoined a similar structure from which the occupier was actively trading. 
The internal layout is similar to many modern retail units. The warehouse was partitioned off 
by jumbo stud partitioning and it is an entirely self-contained unit. The showroom has the 
usual open plan display. The premises were not sprinkled and a normal intruder alarm 
protection was fitted. There is no perimeter security. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Design failure: fire 
stopping, structural 
integrity, fire resistance. 
No evidence of proper fire 
safety management on site 
Failure to secure site 
insurance 
Fire origin: Arson attack by unknown 
intruder 
2 seats of fire 
Inadequate fire precautions measures 
Fire and Intruder alarm not operational 
No sprinklers system 
Improper fire doors fitting 
No waste disposal 
Failed fire curtains operational 
Lack of compartmentation 
No evidence of proper fire safety 
management on site 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Large Loss Advice by Insurer following the 
fire. 
Table 7.3: UK Retail Store 1 (2000) 
A number of evidence were collected and explained the circumstances of loss: 
f Evidence of arson or deliberate acts. The most likely explanation was that the fire was 
started by intruders. 
f There were two seats of fire, one in the showroom and one located in the warehouse. 
f There is evidence of a forced entry to the building and also that the building was not 
secure. 
fA 'fire door located on the southern side of the building was insecure at the time of the 
forensic examination. Despite numerous attempts this door could not be made to lock and 
so could be opened from outside the building even when it was closed. 
f The possibility that the security guards showed a lack of care cannot be ruled out. 
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f The building was insecure at the time of the fire and possibly for some time prior to the 
fire. 
fA degree of vandalism has occurred in the building. 
The Retail Store II was situated in a Retail Park in the UK in a modern out-of-town retail 
development. Constructed 7 years ago and owned by a single landlord. The occupier retail 
unit was 20,000 sq. ft facility and was one of seven similar units in a terraced multi-tenure 
retail block22. The contract value was approximately £500,000 and a contract period of 2 
months to reach completion has been agreed. 
The Premises23 was of steel portal frame construction with in-situ concrete 
foundations/ground floor with insulated composite roof and wall cladding. The individual 
letting units were sub-divided by `Jumbo stud' partition walls. The proposed internal layout 
was typical of modern stores, consisting of a large open plan display/sales area. 
The premises comprised a modern, west facing, mid-terrace retail unit with the front and rear 
walls clad with profiled sheet steel. The roof of the retail unit was clad with profiled sheet 
steel and contained plastic rooflights. 
The premises were not sprinkled. Although the new intruder alarm, fire alarm and CCTV 
installations were in place, none had been commissioned or operational at the time of the 
IOSS24. 
The retail unit25 was undergoing refurbishment which had commenced approximately 6 
weeks prior to the fire and was due to completion two weeks after the fire occurred. 
The main contractors for the refurbishment were experienced and working with sub- 
contractors. There was a strict `no smoking' policy in place in the retail area. 
22 Loss Adjuster Report (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
23 Fire and Forensic Report (2000) and Loss Adjuster Report (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
24 Loss Adjusters Report (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
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Circumstances of loss26: 
f Suspect arson in a new store being fitted out. 90% completed. 
f Existing temporary portable display unit being retained during the reinstatement of the 
facility. 
f Site patrolled by a third party Security Company, frequently employed by the Occupier. 
f Facility was not insured by the same insurer as the Principal Contractor. 
The direct fire damage27 was limited to the unit occupied by the facility occupier although 
there was reportedly minor smoke damage to adjacent units. There was extensive high level 
smoke and heat damage throughout the showroom and smoke had vented from the eaves at 
the rear of the building. Within the central floor area of the showroom there was very little 
heat damage below the suspended ceiling. The direct fire damage was isolated to the kitchen 
display aisle involving four kitchen displays. It was evident that the gypsum wallboard on the 
occupier side of the wall had been breached by the heat of the fire although the other side of 
the wall was still intact. Therefore only minimal smoke was able to spread into the 
neighbouring units via this route. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate design and Fire origin: deliberate ignition 
passive fire measures. Rapid unrestricted vertical fire spread 
Security company failed to maintain tight 
No fire protection system in security on site 
place during the No automatic detection and warning system 
construction works. No sprinklers system 
Improper intruder alarm: Access to building 
not controlled and detected 
Open space and No compartmentation 
Important smoke release 
Table 7.4: UK Retail Store 11 (2000) 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Large Loss Advice by Insurer following the 
fire. 
The Retail Store Sama (2000) was under refurbishment at the time of the fire. A sub- 
contractor was working on one of the flat roof at the 7`' floor and cutting some of the central 
heating pipes with a naked flame. Prior to renovate the facility, the main contractor was 
25 Fire and Forensic Report (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
26 Large Loss Advice (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
27 Loss Adjuster Report (2000) UK Retail Unit II 
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required to demolish part of the facility and sub-contracted the work. The main contractor 
recognised his sub-contractor caused the fire with a naked flame28. 
The loss premises were located in a city centre within enclosed buildings. The multi-storey 
shopping centre was let to several separate retailers. The lack of information on the type of 
building structure of the facility does not allow a clear identification of the contribution of the 
materials to the growth and spread of the fire. However, the building was constructed in 1926 
and we can assume the structure was built out of new product which would have a better fire 
resistance. Damages to the structure and lower floors were severe and required the installation 
of a temporary roof structure to protect the rest of the facility. Material damages were 
estimated to be 3.5mFF. A three-month delay was expected before opening. A CAR insurance 
have been contracted for this project and unfortunately it did not have any special clause for 
fire on construction sites29. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
No evidence of fire Fire origin: cutting work on heating system Evacuation of building and adjoining 
detection and warning pipes facilities by the police 
measures Rapid fire spread to above floor 
Manual fire fighting No clear evacuation procedures and plan 
No sprinklers system Negligence by SC 
operative at the time of fire No evidence of fire detection and warning No BCP by employer 
measures 
Inadequate fire No sprinklers system operative at the time of 
compartmentation in roof fire 
structure Inadequate fire compartmentation in roof 
structure 
Table 7.5: FR Retail Store Sama 
Design & Engineering: 
Across the three case studies of retail facilities, we can observe the design contributed to the 
growth and spread of fire. Failure to compartment the large open spaces meant the fire was 
free to develop and damage the existing stock and displays. Arson attacks on commercial 
properties was a common cause of fires. In the UK for 1999, the Home Office (2000) reported 
28 Assurance (2000) Avis de sinistre Important, FR Retail Store Sama, 2000. 
29 Quad (2000) Note d'expertise n. 1, FR Retail Store Sama, 2000. 
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that 39% of fires in retail and distribution were malicious fires30. The lack of adequate fire 
protection measures was also a major factor contributing to the spread of fire. In the case of 
the FR Retail Sama, a fire on a flat roof was difficult to detect if on one was around to raise 
the alarm. However the two retail units in the UK were not new construction but existing 
premises under refurbishment. At the time of the fire, the fire detection system was not 
operative and no sprinkler system was installed in the premises. The spread of the fire in the 
open unit was straightforward. The UK Retail Store II (2000) suffered from a rapid 
unrestricted vertical spread up to the face of the jumbo stud internal partition wall. In the UK 
Retail Store 1 (2000) the fire curtains installed as part of the re-fit failed to prevent the fire 
from spreading. The design fire stopping was not such that ceiling tiles formed an integral 
part of the structure. The Structure could be said to be incomplete and not offering its 
designed resistance to fire spread. As a way of example in Tesco Stores Ltd. V The Norman 
Hitchcox Partnership Ltd. (ORB; 8 October 1997) lack of compartment and fire resistance 
were also to blame for the rapid spread of fire: "The plaintiffs accepted that there were defects 
in the building, for which it was responsible and which led to the spread of fire throughout the 
building. The defendant had neglected its duty to inspect the shopping centre before and after 
construction and during and after fitting out of the interior so as to detect any defects in 
design and construction related to the need to contain the spread of fire. " The fire devastated 
the Grove Green shopping centre in Maidstone in 1993. The fire started by youths who 
deliberately set fire to some waste behind the centre. 
Managerial strategy: 
Failure to secure an insurance cover in respect with the contract also appeared to be a 
common "mistake" in the fire scenarios observed for this research. In the UK Retail Store I 
(2000) the main contractor failed to secure the CAR cover and did not comply with the JCOP 
for fire prevention. The Fire Safety Plan, as required under the JCOP, and often closely linked 
30 In 1999 there 43,600 fires recorded in buildings other than dwellings. 13% occurred in retail 
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to the Health & Safety Plan, under the CDM Regs 1994, required the implementation of 
limited managerial measures on site. In the FR Retail Store Sama (2000) inadequate measures 
to raise the alarm and fight the fire at an early stage proved to contribute to the damaging 
effect of fire and smoke. In the case of the UK Retail Store 11 (2000) because the incident 
happen at night and after a supposed arson attack, the circumstances were different. 
Nevertheless failure from the security company to maintain tight security on site, combined 
with a defective security doors to the facilities allowed the intruder to enter and leave the 
facility without being detected. 
The combination of managerial failure, equipment failure and inadequate design was 
disastrous. Poor inspection of the shell work and poor workmanship could explain the chain 
of effect. In Tesco Stores Ltd. V The Norman Hitchcox Partnership Ltd. (ORB; 8 October 
1997) the architects were found in breach of duty by failing to "observe and/or take further 
action in respect of various aspect of poor construction and workmanship. " 
Contingency process: 
The evaluation of fire risks prior to the start of the construction operations should be 
reinforced and systematically required. In commercial properties, arson attack were well 
known problem and in the light of the characteristics of the site (on retail parks, in confined 
city centre) security measures should be taken to prevent any arson attack on the facilities. 
The maintain of a fire protection systems should be essential whenever possible. Both UK 
Retail Units I and 11 had either an inadequate fire protection system or no automatic detection 
and warning system. Both did not have a sprinkler system. 
Fires as observed in earlier cases, has a devastating impact on the business. It was rare to find 
organisation with an adequate contingency planning to respond to emergency situations and 
incidents. The FR Retail Store Sama (2000) lost three months of business over the Christmas 
and Sales period (December/January/February). In some circumstances it was possible to 
transfer the business activity and maintain a strong public image on the market. The UK 
distribution (5,600 fires) and causing 52 non-fatal casualties. 
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Retail Store 1 (2000) could transfer its business activity to new premises and a local retail 
unit. A reinstatement could take long enough to destroy a business. 
7.2.2.1.2 Factory Units and the Processing Industry: 
" UK Processing Factory (1998), FR Frigecreme (1996), FR Factory (1994), FR Factory 
(1996) 
Factories shell and engineering were very specific. The design of a factory (steel frame 
structure, shell, open space, no partition, low insulation, lightweight materials) contributed to 
the fast growth of fire. The series of fire in clod stores built off sandwich panels cost the life 
of dozen of fireman (special reference to the Sun Valley Poultry Ltd, 1993). The low fire 
resistance of certain materials used in the construction of factories combined with a high fire 
load (Manufacturing and storage: 1180MJ/m2 (BSI, 1997)) created fast growing fires and low 
fire resisting structure. In 1997 the Fire Research and Development Group of the Home 
Office agreed to consider as a matter of urgency the fire safety of sandwich panels. The Fire 
Research Station (FRS, 1997) had the mission to determine the extent of the problem and 
what could be done about it. The safety of fire-fighters in buildings containing sandwich 
panels was the main concern although building occupants may also be at risk. Other factors 
were the possibility of large property losses and environmental pollution (FRS, 1997). 
Sandwich panels were made of two metal skins and fillings made of either expanded 
polystyrene (40MJ/kg), or polyurethane (23MJ/kg) or mineral fibre (around 3MJ/kg). These 
filling materials could be highly flammable compared to other material like paper (17MJ/kg) 
or bitumen (42MJ/kg). This calorific value of the dry material contributed to calculate the fire 
load density. 
Factories and manufacturing environment presented multiple risks. The construction of these 
facilities was usually simple and with lightweight material. The construction itself, did not 
present some major risks of fire. However, the maintenance or refurbishment process could be 
more critical in this working environment. The UK Processing Factory (1998) was under 
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refurbishment and comprised the construction of an extension to the existing factory. The 
high economical pressures on this type of business often means that no interruption of the 
processing activity was possible. Sub-contractors employed to repair the electricity and 
maintain the existing electrical installation are often required to work in enclosed spaces, in 
roof voids and on high technological equipment. In the UK Processing factory (1998) fire, the 
factory owner who bought the premises in 1996 an invested £1 Im in a refurbishment program 
starting in January 1998 and due to have been completed in 199831. The management of the 
Factory appointed a food technology consultant to advise on how the plant should be 
extended and to manage the extension program. The Factory directly employed the electrical 
contractors to provide supplies to new electrical panels located in a switch room in the 
slaughter house. One sub-contractor dropped a bold in a "live" breakout box and provoked an 
electrical short circuit which produced an explosion. Incentive material ejected and ignited the 
roof insulation. At the time of the fire "the quality of the buildings ranged from basic 
traditional brick-block sheds with slate or asbestos roofing; 50s style column and truss framed 
buildings with single skin metal sheeting, asbestos roofing, and part granolithic, part 
proprietary seamless industrial flooring, with the balance far more modern and comprising 
purpose built reinforced concrete/portal steel structures, with plastisol coated double skin 
insulated profiled metal sheeting panels to walling and roofing, fully laid with seamless 
industrial flooring, generally to modern food processing standards. 32" The outer walls were 
constructed from a sandwich of profiled metal sheeting, thermal insulation and profiled metal 
sheeting33 
The fire spread rapidly, activated by the large quantity of combustible materials in the roof 
void, the sandwich panels which had de-laminated and exposed polyurethane foam which had 
burned away. An analysis of the fire scenario determined that the fire spread to all the roof 
void within 2 minutes and flashover occurred 47 minutes after the explosion. The enclosed 
31 Anon (1998) Fire and Forensic Report, UK Processing Factory 1998. 
32 Anon (2000) Final report on fire claim, UK Processing Factory 1998. 
33 Anon (1998) Fire and Forensic Report, UK Processing Factory 1998. 
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location and difficult access to the site of the fire enabled the fire brigade to accurately 
estimate the extend of the fire when they arrived on site. There was dense black smoke and 
firefighters could not see the extent of the fire3a 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate Fire safety 
measures 
Poor contractual 
administration 
Fire origin: electrical short circuit in roof 
void. Igniting roof insulation 
Explosion 
Rapid fire spread 
No emergency procedures operative 
Use of portable fire extinguishers as first aid 
fire fighting 
No automatic detection and warning systems 
Poor site management 
No emergency procedures operative 
Action of fire brigade increased damages 
No BCP 
Table 7.6: UK Processing Factory (1998) 
Nothing could be done to control the spread of the fire in the facilities. The damages sustained 
both direct and indirect through the loss of the business, its activity, market shares, reputation, 
contracts, etc., reaches more then £40m. In the Insurance Property Survey Report (1996) 
mentioned that "the principle building on site is the Factory which freely communicates 
throughout to form a single fire risk35. " The report concludes that the Estimated Maximum 
Loss36 for the Building is 70%, Plant: 50% and Stock 80%. 
Anticipating maximum losses and planning for emergencies and disasters was not a 
systematic approach for an organisation owning and managing property. The risk of insuring 
works in progress remained with the contractor until handing over, practical completion or 
partial possession. However, during maintenance operations, the responsibility of the facility 
is under the owner. In France, legislation was slightly different from the UK, but the 
principles are the same: Ownership defined responsibilities for the facility. When no 
contract was signed and the responsibility for the facility was not transferred to the contractor 
(through possession of the site), the owner was responsible. The case of the FR Frigecreme 
34 Anon (1998) Fire and Forensic Report, UK Processing Factory 1998. 
35 Insurance (1996) Property Survey Report, UK Processing Factory 1998. 
36 Estimated in accordance with the ABI recommended definition: "an estimation of the maximum 
loss 
which could reasonnably be sustained from the contingencies under consideration, as a result of a 
single incident considered to be within the realms of probability taking into account all 
factors likely to 
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Factory (1998) was one of the only fire in this research which had positive outcomes. The 
management should be commanded for their contingency actions and strategy on the day of 
the fire. Unless the UK Processing Factory (1998), Frigecreme managed to save its stock and 
limit the damages to its facilities. This ice-cream factory in an industrial area along the 
Nantes-Saint-Nazaire city bypass, in June 1998, was subject to a major firebreak out. Hot 
works carried out by some welders working on the highly insulated sandwich panels caused 
the origin of the fire, i. e. negligence as quoted in the report "1 'origine de 1 'incendie resulterait 
d'une imprudence" (CNPP, 1998). A hot work permit has been issued and the work was 
nearly completed without any incidents. The fire spread very quickly while the construction 
workers tried to extinguish the fire before raising the alarm (CNPP, 1998). An hour later, 
3,000m2 of the factory are completely destroyed. The factory evacuated 250 employees and 
managed to save all its stock of ice cream through the careful implementation of a Disaster 
Recovery Plan (CNPP, 1998). 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Structural failure: sandwich 
panels. 
Use of compartmentation to 
stop spread, by zoning 
Fire origin: welding operations (Negligence) 
Rapid spread of fire 
Employees and public at risk 
Fire Emergency plan operational and 
successful 
Business interrupted + 100 employees off 
work. 
500m security perimeter to protect public 
Complete evacuation of factory plus 
another neighbouring building. 
One hospital at risk (smoke and fumes 
pollution) 
Evidence of a Recovery Plan. 
Adequate fire safety 
measures in place. 
Use of compartmentation to stop spread, by 
zoning 
Table 7.7: FR Frigecreme (1998) 
Unfortunately, this type of contingency actions was not always possible and loosing a stock 
and archives could have a devastating impact in a business. The major fire outbreak in a 
French Processing Factory (1996) was a typical example of the benefits a Contingency Plan 
could have on the day of a disaster. Hot works above a storage room caused a major fire 
increase or lessen the extent of the loss, but excluding such coincidences and catastrophes which may 
be possible but remain unlikely. " 
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outbreak and destroyed 15 years of archives of a fabric and textile factory 31. Fortunately, the 
fire didn't have the chance to spread beyond the boundaries of the storage room thanks to the 
use of a large number of extinguishers by the employees. The loss adjuster estimated that the 
direct damages (repair of the building) to be of £5,000 and indirect damages to replace the 
value of the archives and historical value around £750,000 (settled at £435,000)38. 
Circumstances leading to the fire could have increased the damaging effect of the incident. A 
hot work permit was issued39 and the workforce was working close to two fire extinguishers" 
It is also suggested that the chain of events leading to the fire could have increase the 
damaging effects of the fire, especially due to the difficult access to the fire zone, and later in 
the investigations, of the unknown value of the stock in the storage area. The investigators 
discussed the interest to replace to the total lost stock as the use of the archives was 
interrupted from 1972. The high value of the destroyed stock did not justify the lack of 
precautions in the storage room. The Factory argued the "active live and precious value of the 
stock. And that the use of the stock was the memory of the Factory and the content of the 
stock contributed to the manufacturing of fabrics for the last 30 years41. " 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Hot work permit 
No FSP or fire prevention 
Fire origin: hot work and falling burning 
material in storage room below the area of 
work. 
Fire contained in storage room. 
Manual fire fighting using a large number of 
fire extinguishers 
Inadequate FSM approach in the factory 
Loss of valuable archives used to sustain 
business activity (1972-2000) 
No evidence of a BCP 
No evidence of safe storage of copies of the 
destroyed document (back-up / hot site) 
Unique site of the factory 
measures 
No automatic detection and 
suppression system 
Inadequate FSM approach 
in the factory 
No pressure from insurer to 
promote a better FSM 
approach 
Difficult access to the fire 
zone 
No automatic detection and suppression 
system 
Table 7.8: FR Factory (1994) 
37 Tribunal de Commerce (1994) Audience de Rr fe res: Conlusions, FR Factory 1994. 
38 Expert (1995) Troisieme Rapport d'Expertise, FR Factory 1994. 
39 Expert pres des Societes d'Assurance (1994) Rapport n. 1: rapport de reconnaissance, FR Factory 
1994. 
40 Avocat ä la Cour (1994) Audience de Re feres: Conclusions, FR Factory 1994. 
41 Tribunal de Commerce (1994) Audience de Referes: Conlusions, FR Factory 1994. 
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Hot work was the source of many fires on construction sites. The use and issue of a hot work 
permit was not the single and only protection against fire of this nature. There was a natural 
belief that because a hot work permit is issued then the contractor was protected. The author 
already argued the need to implement a fire safety strategy to prevent fires during 
construction operations. This implementation required a change of culture within the 
organisation and the support of the management to implement and sustain the strategy 
(training, policy writing, control and monitoring, incentives, rewards and penalties... ). In the 
FR Factory Fire (1994), the classical scenario was often repeated and often in the same 
organisation. A waterproofing contractor was engaged on the construction of the extension of 
pharmaceutical factory. The construction works comprised different activities presenting 
different risks. However, the hot work activities on a flat roof were at high risk and required 
the implementation of a strict procedure to prevent fire. The use of ignition sources, combined 
with flammable substances (gas/LPG) was the perfect mixture for disasters. The site was 
nearly complete at the time of the fire42: Substructure/Superstructure (100%), Partitioning and 
Insulation (80%), Electricity and cabling (80%), Waterproofing (80%). The Expert Report 
suggested that a blowtorch was left unattended on the flat roof and a leak of the gas cylinders 
provoked an explosion. The fire destroyed43 300m2 of the flat roof and the five consecutive 
explosions damaged the building under construction and projected the LPG cylinders up to 
500m away from the site. The structural Expert44 estimated the extend of the damages and 
suggested remedial works on the structure: partial destruction of the floor, distortion of the 
steel frame structure, damages to the facade and internal damages to the partitions due to the 
explosion. The impact of the explosion on existing building was minimised but disruption to 
the business activities was assessed. The pharmaceutical factory manufacturing high tech 
equipment comprised special room to under dust and moisture control. The explosion 
42 Experts Construction (1996) Rapport d'Expertsie n. 1, FR Factory 1996 
43 Experts Construction (1996) Rapport d'Expertsie n. 1, FR Factory 1996 
44 Bureau de Controle (1996) Avis Technique, FR Factory 1996 
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damaged the existing equipment and services. Total damages for this facility were estimated 
at £65,000as 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate Design and 
choice of materials. 
Inadequate access to roof 
area: no permanent ladder 
No evidence of proper HSP 
or FSP or hot work permit 
No evidence of proper risk 
assessment 
Fire origin: hot work on flat roof 
Fire ignition and smoke release followed by 
an explosion of gas cylinders 
Fire spread to the entire roof area: insulation 
material combustible. 
Fire damages restricted to the flat roof 
Inadequate precautions to stock gas cylinder 
Negligence from the SC: security measures to 
ensure safety of the work after completion 
Inadequate supervision of the works 
Inadequate project management 
Major structural damages to the building 
and adjoining facilities (500m away) 
No salvage plan 
No back up and copies of archives. 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Delay to completion: 3.5 months 
Table 7.9: FR Processing factory (1996) 
Design and Engineering: 
A fire safety engineering method is possible to anticipate the worse case scenario and assess 
the damaging effect of a fire. However an uncompleted building presents a lower fire load 
density and on the other hand could the unfinished characteristics of the structure could also 
contribute to the growth of the fire on site (reservations, unfinished partitions and walls... ). 
Across the four case studies discussed above, once again the design of the facilities played a 
major role into the development of the fire. The rapid spread of fire seemed to be common 
feature. Also the lack of active protection measures delayed the discovery of the fire. The 
author already discussed the characteristics of the materials used in the construction of 
factories and manufacturing units. The combination of a large number of combustible 
materials (sandwich panels, insulation materials, flammable material like LPG, storage areas) 
with ignition sources in confined areas (roof spaces, storage room) or large open spaces (flat 
roof) contributed to the damages of the fire. Lack of compartmentation in the facility, 
especially in the case of the UK Processing factory (1998) was a key issue in this type of 
facility. 
as Experts Construction (1996) Rapport d'Expertise Definitif, FR Factory 1996 
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Managerial strategy: 
Moving away from an engineering approach which required expert knowledge, an initial 
Property Survey Reports usually conducted by the Insurers focuses on highlighting the risk in 
the premises, the fire protection measures in place, the occupation, housekeeping and waste 
management policy. Aspects of arson and security in the case of factories were a major 
concern. Commercial threats and attacks were often the cause of malicious fires. The issue of 
business continuity was also highlighted and a calculation of the Estimated Maximum Loss 
carried out in anticipation of any losses. 
Failure to administrate the contract properly tended to be a common practice on short and 
easy project, ignoring the vulnerability of the facility and relying of the easy task to complete 
the job without any problem. This lack of awareness and inadequate project management was 
the source of problem in case of emergency. The analysis of claim files revealed the deep 
extends of the problem and underlying administrative problems. This endemic problem went 
on over the fire investigations by sometimes hiding information and not collaborating with the 
experts. 
Construction activities required the supervision of the work operation by a competent 
professional: architect, planning supervisor, project manager, facilities manager for examples. 
Across the four case studies of factory's fires analysed in this chapter common managerial 
mistakes were highlighted. The lack of supervision and awareness of the risk of fire, 
inadequate fire safety strategy, inadequate risk management, poor managerial control of the 
construction activities contributed to the chain effect. 
Contingency process: 
The success of the salvage plan of the FR Frigecreme (1996) factory demonstrated the 
effectiveness of a contingency strategy. Not only the stock was saved, but a transfer of the 
activities to another facility could be envisaged at a later stage. It was common to seek help of 
competition or other factories to face an emergency situation. Thoughts into emergency 
actions and business continuity were less rare in the 21st century, but there were still 
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organisations betting on luck to sustain their business activities. The case of the fire in the 
fabric factory (FR Factory, 1994) was a typical example of the lack of concern from the 
management for the valuable historical archives of their organisation. No preventative action 
were taken to anticipate the disaster and no fire precautions measures were installed in the 
storage room to accelerate the control of the fire (smoke detectors, sprinklers system or 
gaseous system, CCTV ... ). 
However, sometimes the size of the disaster was not comparable to the extend of the losses. 
In the FR Factory 1994, the fire was contained in the storage room (5mx5mx3.5m = 87.5m3) 
and losses estimated at £450,000. The average losses per m3 are rounded at £5,143. 
Compared to the UK Processing Factory (1998), the total loss of the facilities 
(120mx8Omx5m = 48,000m3) and losses estimated at £42m. The average per m3 is £875. 
When business activities depended on the survival of the facilities, like in manufacturing 
premises, more concern should be put on a proper risk assessment and the implementation of 
a fire safety strategy to safeguard the occupants, the property and the business activity. The 
hard lessons learnt from disasters should encourage organisation involved with high risk 
activities like hot work, electrical operations, welding activities, use and storage of flammable 
material etc., to consider the impact of these activities on the normal running of the 
premises and business, and the after disaster impact (business recovery). 
7.2.2.1.3 Offices / Workplace 
" UK Broadgate (1990), UK Minster Court (1991), UK Bank (1999), FR 
Offices/Residential Facilities (1992), FR Bank (2000), US Harrisson Building (1985). 
The two major construction site fires in the UK (Broadgate UK, 1990 and Minster Court 
UK, 1991) have already been widely discussed in early chapters. The impact of these fires on 
the construction industry was important and gave rise to several research and investigations in 
the problem of fires on construction sites as discussed in chapter 3. 
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In the UK Broadgate (1990) the Steel Construction Institute (1991) argued the fire began in a 
large contractor's hut on the first floor and smoke spread unchecked throughout the building. 
The fire lasted for 4 'V2 hours with excess temperature of 1000 degree Celsius for 2 hours. The 
chain of events leading to the fire demonstrates many managerial failures which contributed 
to the development, growth and spread of fire in the facility. More information on the review 
and analysis of this fire is presented in chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Improper design approach 
Structural Failure: sandwich 
panel / lightweight panel, 
deformation of the structure 
Temporary site 
accommodation prevented 
effective fire fighting 
Inadequate fire precautions 
measures 
Fire origin: discarded material / Unknown / 
Site Hut 
Inadequate Fire Plan and Fire Fighting 
Equipment 
Rapid Fire spread 
Explosions 
Failure of fire-fighting activities 
Significant smoke damages throughout the 
entire building 
Lack of fire precautions 
No automatic fire detection and fire alarm / 
not installed 
Sprinklers not installed at the time of the fire 
Improper design approach 
Lack of compartmentation 
No proper fire escape routes 
Significant risk to loss of life and financial 
loss. 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Further to this fire, Bovis developed a R&D 
programme to improve the level of safety 
on all their sites. 
Table 7.10: UK Broadgate (1990) 
In the UK Minster Court (1991) the total losses for this fire were reported by the FPA 
(1996) to be £105million. The source of ignition has not been clear identified by the Fire 
Brigade (North Area Fire Brigade, 1991), but from the available evidence it is likely that an 
introduced ignition source in the form of a naked flame was the most likely source. The full 
review and analysis of this fire is presented in chapter 3, section 3.2.3. The summary of the 
fire safety failure was presented below. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate Design Fire origin: Naked Flame / Rubbish wastes 
Fire development: Sterling board and timber 
Inadequate Fire Safety scaffold planks 
Emergency procedures Fire detection and alarm operative 
Attempt fire fighting by workforce 
No waste management Rapid fire spread 
Improper fire escape routes 
High amount of dried rubbish 
Lack of compartmentation. 
Table 7.11: UK Minster Court (1991) 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Second fire on site a month later!! 
Bovis was the main contractor on site. 
R&D initiative under development and 
progress. 
257 
The management of buildings in the event of fire may be critical to survival of users and 
structures. Prevention was key. Understanding of the behaviour has developed greatly over 
recent years and technology moves on apace. The purpose of the building determined the type 
of occupancy. In a situation of fire, people will behave differently, depending on a large range 
of factors: their physical conditions (visual disability, patient in a hospital, old people, a 
kid... ), there awareness/non-awareness to the problem of fire (training, knowledge, 
experience... ), the environment they are in (a known/unknown facility), the system in place to 
support their action (warning system, protection system, the management of the situation of 
crisis, action from external services such as the fire brigade... ), the dependency of the 
individual (wheelchair user, blind/deaf person, prisoner in a cell... ) and many other factors. 
Fire safety in the workplace was under the responsibility of the building owner or occupier, 
i. e. the employer. 
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 set out the general duties which employers have 
towards their employees and members of the public. Employers have to ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare both of their employees and of any other 
people who may use, or have access to the workplace. 
Compliance under the following regulations was required by the employer: 
" The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (HSWA): employers 
requirement to manage health and safety. 
9 The Workplace (Health, safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992: made under the HSWA 
and regulate basic workplace health, safety and welfare. 
" The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulation 1997, with 1999 Amendment: the 
provisions relate to fire precautions in the workplace. It covers aspects of fire fighting and 
fire detection, emergency routes and exits and maintenance. 
Recently, fire safety regulation was reinforced by the publication of the Fire Precautions 
(Workplace) Regulation 1997, amended in 1999, The draft BSI (1997) Fire Safety 
Engineering in Buildings: Part I. Guide to the application of fire safety engineering principles, 
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the Loss Prevention Council Code of Practices which may be applicable to satisfy higher and 
different/additional standard of construction. The Fire Precautions (Workplace) 
(Amendment) Regulations came into force in December 1999 - the main effect being to 
impose substantive requirements directly on those employers who have control of 
workplaces46 previously exempted. 
The main trends of the UK new fire safety approach was to give more power at a local level, 
i. e. to decentralised the control of fire safety in buildings through the increasing involvement 
of Fire Authorities to ensure satisfactory arrangements for inspections. This new regime 
enforced the duty of Fire Authorities at a local level and community level. Another important 
feature of the new regulations was that they were goal-based rather than prescriptive. 
This fire safety engineering oriented approach was clearly considered under §15 "... if 
employers wish to achieve compliance by other means, it is open to them to do so". Four 
main streams have been identified throughout the new proposal: 
" Duties on the "responsible person", i. e. owner or occupier. 
0 Obligation to attend Fire Precautions. 
" Requirement to maintain adequate Fire Precautions, i. e. to review and to maintain in 
satisfactory order. 
0 Freedom to chose the adequate fire safety solutions. 
All categories of premises would be covered unless exempted, i. e. single dwellings. 
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR) generally 
makes more explicit what employers were required to do to manage health and safety under 
HSWA. These Regulations, as amended by the Fire Precautions (Workplaces) Regulations 
46 "workplace" means any premises or part of premises, not being domestic premises, used for the 
purposes of an employer's undertaking and which are made available to an employee of the employer 
as a place of work and includes: 
(a) any place within the premises to which such employee has access while at work; and 
(b) any room, lobby, corridor, staircase, road or other place - 
(i) used as a means of access to or egress from that place of work; or 
(ii) where facilities are provided for use in connection with that place of work, other than a 
public road; 
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1997 , FP (W)R, required employers to formally assess the risk of fire to their employees at 
work and in their premises47 as part of the general risk assessment required by the 
Regulations. However, responsibility for enforcing these MHSWR requirements lied with fire 
authorities and not HSE. 
Employers have ultimate responsibility for the safety of their employees in the case of fire, 
even where others have obligations to ensure that the requirements of the Regulations are 
complied with. Construction site fires in office type of building occurred at different stages of 
the life of the facility: 
" Under construction: 
0 During maintenance operations, and 
" During refurbishment works, where one part of the facility might be occupied. 
The first type of fire scenario encountered in the construction of offices, was a site in the busy 
Canary Wharf in London. The UK Bank (1999) fire involved some hot work on one of the 
tower cranes. The method statement for this site specifies that the operation would take 
approximately two full night shifts, possibly running into a third night. The circumstances 
leading to the fire showed the lack of care and negligence from the subcontractors in carrying 
out some dangerous work on site. The stringent location of the site and the possible 
devastating impact of a fire in this area of the town has been once again carelessly ignored 
even if the Broadgate and Minster Court fires showed the seriousness of construction site fires 
in city centres and enclosed sites. 
The work was duly scheduled to be carried out on Tuesday and Wednesday. The permit of 
access for the second night's work was issued prior to the work by the site owner and a hot 
work permit was also issued for the period of the work and the day. The standard precaution 
prescribed in the Hot Work Permit included that "when working... on staging... openings to 
47 "premises" includes any place and, in particular, includes - 
(a) any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft; 
(b) any installation on land (including the foreshore and other land intermittently covered by water), 
any offshore installation, and any other installation (whether floating, or resting on the seabed or the 
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other levels covered with a blanket or other non-combustible materials. 48" The Construction 
Manager signed the permit, confirming as the construction supervisor, that the specified 
precautions would be complied with and that the persons carrying out the work would be fully 
briefed on the safe method of work. 
The welding operatives fixing lugs on mast of the tower crane started their work around 22.00 
and by 02.00 the CCTV of an adjacent building (no tight security measures on site) recorded 
unequivocal evidence of molten globules of metal falling from the work platform (work areas 
was not kept tidy and free from combustible materials as required under the Hot Work Permit 
precautions to be taken). The globules of metal ignited acoustic foam insulation of the diesel 
generator set which was gutted by fire49. Within 5 to 10 minutes, the fire developed and 
appearance of flames were detected by the CCTV at 02.15. A fire patrol was in charge of the 
control on site and an incident occurring at 22.00 should have raised his awareness on the 
high risk of fire in the area of work. The individual fire patrol observed "that a small quantity 
of waste that was present at the base of the crane had become ignited. He descended one level 
and found two powder extinguishers which he operated to extinguish the fire. He explained 
that a second outbreak of fire occurred at around midnight. " No preventative actions were 
taken by the fire patrol to raise awareness of the high number of fire outbreaks to the welders 
and no further intensive fire watch was put in place to detect future possible fires later in the 
night. This poor site management from the fire patrol could be due to a lack of awareness of 
the evident possible dangers and/or negligence from his part. By 02.00 a third fire broke out 
and this time the fire patrol was unable to control it. 
Managerial failures could be observed from both the site owner and the subcontractors. The 
investigations by the Consulting Scientists and Engineers (1999) confirmed that "the cause of 
subsoil thereof, or resting on other land covered with water or the subsoil thereof), and (c) any tent or 
movable structure; 
48 Contractor (1999) Bank Project: Hot Work Permit, UK Bank 1999. 
49 Consulting scientists and engineers (1999) Report concerning the fire that occurred at the Bank 
Construction, UK Bank 1999. 
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the fire can be attributed to deficiencies in the method of working adopted by the staff of the 
welder contractor: 
0 "inadequate precautions had been taken in the immediate vicinity of the working area. " 
The Method Statement5° clearly indicates under the risk assessment section: "high risk of 
fire when welding or burning. Action: use of blankets inside the work platform to prevent 
the majority of sparks from falling from the work place. Provide a Marshall to patrol the 
area below the ground. Provide 2 no, fire extinguishers - one for the welder, one for the 
ground Marshall. " 
0 "it is self evident that no attempt was made to remove loose waste material from the base 
of the crane and/or to protect exposed combustible material from ignition of falling 
molten globules. " 
" failure to adhered to "precautionary measure of ensuring suitable fire extinguishers were 
to hand during the carrying out of hot work. " 
" The fire patrol was "sufficiently diligent in his role to identify and respond promptly to 
any ignition. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity 
System 
Inadequate fire safety measures 
Hot work permit 
No waste disposal and management 
Failed to implement proper fire safety 
management strategy 
Fire origin: Ignited acoustic foam insulation 
Fire spread rapidly 
No detection and warning system 
No fire extinguishers close to hand for first 
aid fire fighting 
Late warning by Security Guard 
CTTV system in operation on nearly 
building but not on site 
Failed to implement proper fire safety 
management strategy 
No evidence of Recovery and 
continuity planning. 
Table 7.12: UK Bank (1999) 
Managerial control and preventative measures on site were central to the prevention of fires 
on construction sites. The author already observed that the role design and engineering was 
playing in the development of a fire is major. The next fire scenarios analysed for this 
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research look also at the bank facility, however this time under refurbishment. The FR Bank 
(1997) fire had a major impact on the business activity of a bank and a toy store in the vicinity 
of the working area and site. The refurbishment works concerned the renovation of a flat roof 
above a toy store. The source of ignition was once again linked to the use of a blow torch for 
the bitumen waterproofing of the flat roof5'. As highlighted below a large number of failures 
were observed. Circumstances leading to the fire and the non-compliance of the facility with 
design requirement under the French law proved to be a major factor in the development and 
spread of the fire. The lack of compartmentation between the bank and toy store and the 
absence of fire wall in the suspending ceiling left the fire free to develop in the open and 
confined space52. A spark ignited some combustible materials stored in the toy shop was at 
the origin of the fire. An attempt to fight the fire with a fire extinguisher from above and 
through the gutter was unsuccessful and forced the workforce to leave the fire scene and 
contact the fire brigade. It seems that the delay to detect the fire could have been avoided by 
the improvement of fire precautionary measures during the construction activities. The 
appointment of a fire watch below the working area was a common practice. 
The facilities were completely destroyed by the fire and large damages to the structure and its 
integrity required the partial demolition of the building and complete refurbishment of the 
bank. The stock stored in the toy shop was destroyed and had to be replaced. Loss of income 
from the business was also assessed for at least one year. 
so Welding Subcontractor (1999) Tower Crane Build Operations Method Statement, UK Bank 1999. 
51 Experts Pres la Cour d'Appel (1997) Rapport d'expertise, FR Bank 1997. 
52 Societe d'Avocats (2000) Conclusions recapitulatives, Audience Mars 2000, FR Bank 1997. 
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Planned System 
Hot work equipment not tested and checked 
before the works 
No waste disposal of removed insulation 
material 
Storage area not protected on site 
Void / openings between main roof cladding 
and roof structure. 
Void / Opening between adjoining buildings 
Work SC to another SC unknown to the MC 
Inadequate method statement and program of 
works 
Lack of experience and qualifications of 
second sub-SC. 
Inadequate fire precautions measures Sub-SC 
did not have a contract with SC 
Inadequate knowledge of regulation 
Inadequate design of the facilities at the 
conception phase 
Unclarity of the contractual documents of SC 
Lack of training for fire safety on site 
Non respect of the contractual agreement and 
terms 
Table 7.13: FR Bank (2000) 
Operational and Active Systems 
Fire origin: Hot work in roof structure. 
Ignition of insulation material in suspended 
ceiling below work area by a spark or naked 
flame 
Rapid fire development and spread to entire 
roof structure and adjoining facilities 
No compartmentation and fire stopping in 
suspended ceiling 
Void / openings 
Inadequate fire precautions measures on site 
Attempt to fight fire before raising the alarm 
at the earliest stage 
Late fire detection and warning 
Failure to supervise and manage the SC 
works by architect 
No evidence of adequate fire safety plan and 
emergency procedure 
Recovery and 
Continuity System 
No evidence of adequate 
fire safety plan and 
emergency procedure 
No evidence of Recovery 
and continuity planning. 
Amazingly, the design failure which aggravated the fire and managerial failures were not the 
only failures on this site. The sub-contractor declared that they were not aware of the 
existence of a regulation regarding building and technology (DTU53 43.3). The examination 
of the contractual documents also revealed the unclarity of the terms and wording and 
suspicious form54. Failure to comply with the regulation was clearly stipulated in the evidence 
submitted by the expert. The responsibility of the architect, as a work supervisor, has been 
rejected as his contract stipulated the subcontractor was under the obligation to ensure respect 
ss with the law and regulation 
5' DTU: Document Technique Unifee equivalent to the British Standard. 
sa Experts Pres la Cour d'Appel (1997) Rapport d'expertise, FR Bank 1997: "l'examen de ce contrat de 
sous-traitance, tant dans sa forme que dans son fond, suscite un sentiment de malaise. L'Expert n'a 
jamais vu au cours de sa vie professionnelle de contrats de sous-traitance qui soient ä la 
fois aussi bien 
faits et aussi mal faits, aussi precis sur sertains points et flous sur d'autres. " 
ss Societe d'Avocats (1999) Conclusions devant le tribunal de grande instance, FR Bank 1997: "Ledit 
contrat precisait: `il est expressement convenu que, compte tenu de la mission partielle 
de 1'architecte, 
1'entreprise soumissionnaire assurera, sous sa propre responsabilite, le respect des reglements 
loi 
decret, reglement de police, etc... en vigueur ä la date de realisation de ces ouvarges. " 
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The impact of the fire for the toy store and the bank were very high as the activities of the 
businesses was greatly affected. The total evaluation of losses according to the experts were 
superior to £600,000 for the demolition works (£ 163,000), rent for shop and bank (£23,000), 
refurbishment and recovery of the bank facilities (internal equipment and consumables: 
£23,000; internal layout and decoration: £147,000; IT equipment: £52,000; financial losses: 
£50,000; business continuity losses: £60,000), for the shop (stock: £50,000; business 
continuity losses: £35,000). The total losses were later revised and agreed at £476,000. 
The bank also had to cope with the loss of part of their archives. Even if the impact of this fire 
and the loss of archives are not as damaging as in the case of the fire in the FR Factory 
(1994), the manufacturer of fabric, it is still a major prejudice for an organisation. 
Like in the FR Factory (1996) fire involving the explosion of gas cylinders, the FR 
Office/Residential (1992) fire involved an explosion. The unsafe use and storage of 
flammable material like gas cylinders has been a major worry in health and safety on site. In 
the UK, under the Health and safety at Work Act 1974, the storage and use of flammable 
material is a real matter of concern. Regulations on the storage of equipment and safe use of 
gas have been developed and are nowadays widely comply with. Effort to control the 
application of the law by the HSE and HSC improved safety on site. Earlier in this research, 
the author identified that certain industries, such as the off shore and chemical industry, has 
very strict rules on the use of flammable material, their storage and safe handling. A 
managerial approach of zero accident was always developing as a single mistake or misuse of 
this equipment could lead to a major disaster. 
The origin of the FR Office/Residential (1992) fire concerned some cutting work on a flat 
roof The planning permission specifies56 the construction of a multi-storey facility 
comprising a series of flats at the upper floors, and shops and offices at the ground floor. A 
subcontractor was engaged by the client to carry out the waterproofing of two flat roofs and 
15 days prior to the fire, the workforce left behind on the flat roof, their melting pot and 6 gas 
56 Expertises (1992) Rapport d' informations sur sinistres, FR Office/Residential 1992. 
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cylinders with 2 fire extinguishers. The equipment was left unprotected for 15 days until the 
day of the fire where another subcontractor sent one of his men on the flat roof to cut some 
the HVAC pipes. The worker saw some flames close surrounding the gas cylinder and 
immediately left the flat roof to raise the alarm to the site manager. By the time they came 
back to the flat roof, they heard two consecutive explosions. The cylinders were projected 
100m away from the site and 200m2 of the flat roof were completely destroyed. 
Many managerial mistakes were observed in these incidents as highlighted in the table below. 
First poor management and control seems to be at the origin of the incident. The solicitor57 
concludes that the worker involved in cutting the HVAC pipes must have manipulated the gas 
cylinders to carry out his work. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate method 
statement 
No evidence of proper risk 
assessment 
Failure to organise a proper 
health and safety 
management and 
Coordination on site 
Improper waste 
management / Tidiness of 
the site 
Fire origin: cutting work on a flat roof 
Explosions (2) of gas cylinders 
Inadequate storage facilities (for 15 days! ) 
Failure to stock the gas cylinders vertically 
Negligence into the storage of gas cylinders 
Evidence of fire extinguishers 
Inadequate project management 
Non respect of the FSP 
Damages to adjoining facilities by explosion 
Failure to comply with the obligations by 
H&S Coordinator under the terms of his 
contract 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
Lack of awareness of the 
scope of the contract 
Table 7.14: FR Office/Residential (1992) 
The report continued to highlight mismanagement: untidiness of site, the inadequate 
supervision of the work by the planning supervisor, lack of risk assessment and management, 
poor project management, etc. The expertise58 highlights the incompetence of the planning 
supervisor in assessing the major risks of fire and explosion on the flat roof and the improper 
storage of flammable material on site. 
57 Avocats Associes (1992) Conclusions aux fins de Rr tablissement, FR Office/Residential 1992: "une 
manipulation injustifiee et malencontreuse d'une bouteille de gaz, par l'ouvrier de la societe de 
ventilation. " 
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The conclusion of the expertise was significant in assessing the extend of the problem of 
project management. Responsibilities for the fire were shared amongst several parties: the 
client, the contractors (HVAC and waterproofs), the planning supervisor, the technical control 
bureau and the project manager. 
The century year old six storey Harrisson Building (1984) in the US was undergoing 
extensive renovation to provide an estimated 240,000 sq. ft. of office space and shops. The 
investigation report (Rule, 1985) analysed the fire development and spread in the facility and 
comments: "the building was approaching full fire involvement within ten minutes after fire 
department notification and was severely exposing numerous other structures on all sides, 
including an occupied shopping mall across the street that contained an estimated 25,000 
people. " The following failures were extracted from the analysis of the evidence submitted in 
the fire investigation report: 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Fire protection system 
removed during renovation 
operations 
Active and passive fire 
protection measures 
removed (firewalls, 
elevators, sprinkler and 
standpipe systems, 
stairways) 
Large open spaces of 
40,000 sq. ft of undivided 
floor area. 
Fire origin: sparks from cutting operations 
ignited combustible debris. 
Rapid fire spread: building was approaching 
full fire involvement within ten minutes after 
incident notification. 
Portion of the building started to collapse 
after 20 minutes of the arrival of FB. 
An estimated 25,000 people at risk. 
Effective management of the fire by the FB. 
Abundant water supply in the area to 
enhance fire-fighting operations 
Use of fixed fire suppression systems in 
adjacent buildings exposed to fire 
Cooperation between fire, police and 
private securities forces in evacuating a 
large number of civilians exposed to fire 
propagation. 
No Salvage Plan 
No evidence of Recovery and Continuity 
planning. 
Table 7.15: US Harrisson Building (1985) 
The renovation works affected the integrity and fire resistance of the facility, as some 
partitions old pipes and wiring had to be removed from the site. The Fire Department 
determined that sparks caused the fire from cutting operations which ignited combustible 
debris. Demolition and renovation works could bring new dangers on a construction site. 
58 Cour d' Appel (1992) Rapport d' Expertise, FR Of6fiý e/Residential 1992. 
Design and Engineering: 
A rapid spread of the fire combined with inadequate design of the facilities was a 
common combination in construction site fires. The fire scenarios the author analysed in this 
section on offices and places of work, demonstrated the importance of the implementation of 
a fire safety strategy to prevent construction site fires. 
The spread of fires through opening, holes, reservations was observed in the fire scenarios 
just analysed in this section. The lack of control measures to support a free fire environment 
needs to be developed and adapted to the site environment. In the case of the FR Bank/Shop 
fire, the uncontrolled spread of the fire from a storage area below the working area to the 
bank facility could have been avoided. First through an early detection of the fire and a better 
design and compartmentation of the facilities. Containment was not possible and the 
devastating effect of the fire was a matter of concern. 
In explosions, the integrity of the facility and its structural stability could be affected and 
major repair and recovery works have to be done to restore the facility. The threat of an 
explosion in a facility was a major concern but it doesn't seem that it was in the scenarios the 
author analysed. It seems that the "site" situation lesser the perception of explosion as a major 
concern and risk. 
Managerial Process: 
Across the fire scenarios analysed in this section, the author could observe a large number of 
managerial failures. From a failure to comply with fire safety requirements to poor 
management and control, all contributed to the fire occurrence and its spread. The case of 
the UK Bank fire in 1999, demonstrates the lack of awareness of the danger of welding work 
on site. Most surprisingly, the earlier breakout of fires on site in the 4 hours prior to the major 
incident did not serve as a lesson for the fire patrol. No recording, any action was taken to 
prevent further outbreaks. This was an inexcusable attitude from the fire patrol. The 
combination of the action of several parties is clearly demonstrated in the FR 
268 
Office/Residential fire, where the chain of effects which could be observed at least over 15 
days is unbelievable. Lack of care, failure to comply with the terms of the contract, failure to 
take appropriate actions, non compliance with the regulation, negligence, communication 
failure on site... are an unequivocal proof of the depth of the problem. 
Contingency Process: 
Many events could affect your business, the core business of your company as well as the 
supply chain. Recent articles demonstrated that Outsourcing activities was one solution 
adopted by businesses to transfer risk to another entity. Pilkington glass maker recently 
decided to outsource its store management in order to add value and they concluded that 
"running and managing stores is not of [their] core business. " Such a strategic decision was 
not unique nowadays. Companies were getting more and more conscious of the importance 
of their core business and are willing to protect it in the best way they can. However not all 
businesses can outsource and transfer risk. 
In the workplace, Employers should be concerned with several issues that would affect the 
safety, health and welfare of their employees: 
0 Building fabric and Fire Engineering aspects: Fire Protection and Design against Fire, 
Passive Fire Protection 
0 Means of escape and emergency procedure 
" Active systems and equipment 
0 Special hazards: flammable substances... 
" Construction and Maintenance of the facility 
a Coping with Arson, Terrorist Attack and Threats 
" Other general fire precautions. 
The promiscuity of facilities and working areas or sites could drag on business losses. In the 
case of the FR Bank/Shop scenario, the impact of the fire on the continuity of the business 
activities was very important (one year). The author also observed the lack of precautions in 
the bank facility and their protection of archives. Modern technology now improves the 
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storage of data and information. The computerisation of data management and the use of back 
up process are common practice. 
7.2.2.1.4 Public Facilities and Assembly: 
0 UK Hospital (2000), US Sight & Sound Theatre (1997), D Dusseldorf Airport (1996) 
Large death tolls were often encountered in fire involving facilities occupied by the general 
public. The often unknown environment, in which the occupants were moving, did not 
facilitate the evacuation process. `Public' facilities were here defined as any assemblies59, and 
facilities of mercantile occupancies60 like shopping mall, and shops, and any facility receiving 
members of the public. In France, special regulations exist for every facility receiving 
members of the public, and including as such hospital, high rise construction open to the 
public use, schools, libraries, airports... For the purpose of this research, this chapter will 
look at the analysis of several fires in public facilities and try to establish relationship between 
these incidents. 
In the UK one fire disaster involving the public was a major concern for the safety of people. 
The King Cross fire in 1987 was a rare fire of major proportion within an underground 
station. Thirty members of the public and one fireman were killed in this fire. Engleman 
(1997) commented on the station fire hazards including poor housekeeping and the ignition of 
an electrical fire in the escalator machine room and in the vicinity of a confined space where 
paint products and other materials were temporary stored. Following the fire and the 
investigations into the cause and development of the fire in the station, major 
recommendations (164) were formulated to improve the safety of the passengers in 
underground stations. All the recommendations are now applied. 
59 Sharry, J. (1997) Assembly occupancies, Section 9/Chapter 3, SFHE Fire Protection Handbook, 
Published by the NFPA: 2Assemblies occupancies can be defined as structures in which groups of 
people gather for purposes such as deliberation, worship or entertainment. " 
60 Schultz, Ed. (1997) Mercantile occupancies, Section 9/Chapter 4, SFHE Fire Protection Handbook, 
Published by the NFPA: "Mercantile occupancies are facilities in which a wide variety of goods and 
services are displayed and sold. " 
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However the King Cross fire was not construction related even if at the time of the fire, 
refurbishment works were taking place in the underground station and some of the 
construction materials were stored under the escalator (origin of the fire). Recently, a fire 
which had a major impact on the way our industry look at the fire safety in places receiving 
members of the public, is the Dusseldorf airport fire in 1996 in Germany. This disaster 
which cost the lives of 16 persons, has already been discussed in earlier chapter and 
recommendations addressed in the discussion (Section 5.2.2) and summarised below. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate fire safety 
measures. 
Lack of awareness of 
employees 
Fire origin: welding operation (Negligence) 
Slow fire growth: delayed discovery of fire 
Lack of awareness of building layout 
No detection system 
Rapid spread of fire in airport premises 
No compartmentation 
Lack of awareness of employees 
No Fire Action Plan 
Slow fire growth: delayed discovery of fire 
Transmission of erroneous information 
Inadequate emergency procedures 
Lack of awareness of building layout 
Lack of adequate communications 
capabilities 
Lack of awareness of employees 
Table 7.16: D Dusseldorf Airport (1996) 
When construction work take place in an existing facility open to the public, special 
precautions should be taken to ensure the safety of the users if a fire was to break out within 
the site boundaries. Construction sites could also affect members of the public in adjacent 
buildings and neighbouring facilities. But major concerns were raised when common work 
operations take place in the occupied facility for maintenance purpose. Often, the public 
building would not be close for the time of the work (like in Dusseldorf) and the movement of 
the public within the facility would not be restricted. The interface between the normal 
activity of the public, the employees and the construction activities was often not 
managed adequately and gives rise to multiple problems which could lead to a fire outbreak. 
The fire scenarios observed and analysed in this section took place in facilities open to the 
public or within a public environment. In the UK Hospital (2000) fire, we were dealing with 
a very specific environment. In the UK the NHS has a very strict regulation for fire safety 
in 
its facilities and also a strict code of practice for maintenance or refurbishment works. The 
UK Hospital was founded in 1921 as a nursing home that provided care to the local 
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community. Following a major expansion it was designated as an `acute' hospital in 1983 and 
at the time of the fire was a 66-bed private hospital that treated more than 5,000 patients per 
year. The wing where the fire took place was designed in 1982 and the building's design and 
construction should have been guided by the 1976 Building Regulations and any applicable 
amendments61. The refurbishment and conversion work were isolated from the rest of the 
facility and not occupied by the employees at the time of the fire. The work comprised the 
complete refurbishment of the wing into an HDU and the incorporation of some fire stopping 
into building's design. The fire occurred whilst contractors were joining together sections of 
medical gas copper pipe in the roof void with an oxy-acetylene torch. The contractor 
inadvertently set fire to combustible components of roof. The fire rapidly spread throughout 
the wing at rafter level before it could be detected by smoke detectors in the roof void. The 
intense fire allowed the fire to break through the slate covering and vent to atmosphere. 
Seconds after the spread in a south direction, the fire spread north above two other rooms62. 
The roof void partially compartmentalised and the presence of openings in the walls 
contributed to allow the fire to spread throughout the wing. The table below summarises the 
site safety failures. 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Defective design and no Fire origin: welding works in roof void 
attempt to remedy it. Rapid fire spread throughout the roof wing 
Inadequate fire compartmentation and fire 
Provisions for fire doors in roof void 
protection systems. Operational fire detection and warning 
system in roof void 
Hot work permit delivered. No sprinkler system 
Attempt manual fire fighting with Hospital 
equipment 
Poor fire precautions 
Lack of care by main contractor 
Hot work permit provided 
Maintenance technician failed to supervise 
the work adequately 
Table 7.17: UK Hospita l (2000) 
61 Expert Scientist and Engineer (2000) Fire Report, UK Hospital 2000. 
62 Insurance (2000) Preliminary Report on fire claims, UK Hospital 2000. 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
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It was understood that many mistakes occurred. The circumstances leading to the fire put in 
evidence the failure of the management, human error and negligence from the contractor. The 
initial breach of the building regulations by the designers (acting on behalf of the owner) has 
been confirmed through the fire investigations63. Adequate fire check door "should have 
prevented the passage of fire for a minimum of 30 minutes and it should have also been fitted 
with a self-closing device. " Unfortunately at the time of the fire "the absence of fire stopping, 
absence of an intumescent strip along all the closing edges of the door and absence of self 
closing device means that the relevant Building Regulations were breached. " 
The circumstances leading to the fire occurred throughout the project life cycle: design phase 
in 1982 with the non-compliance with the regulations, pre-construction stage when the risk 
assessment was not conducted and adequate fire safety measures put in place to prevent fires, 
during the construction phase by adopting improper working methods and note safely ensure 
the continuity of compartmentation in the roof void. Finally the choice of materials and 
components combined with poor workmanship lead the contractor to breach some 
regulations. 
The damages were very important considering the size and type of fire. The roof required to 
be completely replaced (660m2), as well as "the entire timber frame roof, synthetic slate 
covering and all insulation the entire services contained within, including electrical wiring 
and plumbing required complete renewal due to the widespread heat damage. 64" The recovery 
works might have required the partial replacement of the ceiling. One of the room was 
completely destroyed and required full replacement, including furniture and equipment. Other 
rooms will require minor works. 
The business interruption for the hospital has been traumatic, first for the patients and the then 
the staff. The hospital employs 220 staff and the facilities are exclusively utilised by self- 
employed consultants (99) and physicians (30). Patients had to be evacuated and relocated 
in 
the nearby hospital. 24 beds out of 54 were loss for several months and the business 
63 Expert Scientist and Engineer (2000) Fire Report, UK Hospital 2000. 
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interruption could have a major impact on the hospital's business relationship with the 
consultants. The hospital feared65 "that the turning away of potential patient bookings due to 
unavailability of rooms in the short term may lead to Consultants taking their patients to 
competitor hospitals in the longer term. " The possibility of hiring a temporary ward block was 
discussed with the hospital and the indications are that the acquisition of a 12 bed unit will be 
economic. Also the temporary conversion of a limited number of consulting rooms into day 
patient accommodation was considered. 
Transfer of the activity or business was not always possible. Special type of building cannot 
be replaced and the impact of the fire on the business continuity could be disastrous. There 
are a large variety of buildings receiving members of the public. Assemblies and places of 
entertainment are one of them. In the US Sight & Sound Theatre (1997) fire, the author 
could again observe many managerial failures summarised in the table below: 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Inadequate Design Fire origin: welding operation (Negligence) 
Rapid spread of fire. 
Structural failure Employees delayed report of fire 
Alarm system failure 
Inadequate staff training Sprinkler system waived 
No water supply 
No pre fire planning Lack of compartmentation 
Lack of exterior fire stream access 
Failure of fire brigade tactical operations 
Failure to comply with fire code 
Inadequate staff training 
Table 7.18: US Sight & Sound Theatre (1997) 
200 Employees at risk at the time of fire 
Inadequate staff training 
No pre fire planning 
No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
planning. 
The author already discussed the characteristics of this fire and its development (Section 
5.2.2): "The storage area was undergoing renovation and the theatre was closed to the public. 
However 200 construction staff and employees were in the building at the time the fire 
started. The fire was caused by a construction worker welding steel plates on the stage floor 
decking directly above the point of origin. During the removal of the floor covering, screw 
holes were exposed which allowed sparks and/or a molten arc-welding rod to fall onto 
64 Insurance (2000) Preliminary Report on fire claims, UK Hospital 2000. 
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combustible props stored below. Two theatre employees who went to the storage area for 
equipment and saw a stored stage prop on fire at three points discovered the fire. At 
approximately the same time, "the welder smelled smoke but disregarded it, thinking it was 
the welding and the hot steel burning the soles of his boots" (FEMA, 1997). The fire caused 
the collapse of the state-of-the-art, seven-year-old theatre and resulted in structural damage to 
most of the connecting buildings. The total loss was valued at over $15m, and clearly the 
business continuity issues were immense. " Sharry (1997) restated on the risk of fire in 
theatrical stages and remember the 1903 Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago. Traditional stages 
present specific characteristics and the potential of a fire can be great with the combination of 
fuel from the stage and scenery and the sides of the stage; and potential ignition sources from 
the electrical equipment and lighting. Following the Iriquois Theatre fire, fire protection 
measures were required: automatic sprinklers, ventilation over the stage and fire curtains 
(Sharry, 1997). The lessons of the Sight and Sound fire are not new. Other similar fires in 
history contributed to assess potential failures in assemblies with a large occupancy: the 1967 
Chicago III fire in the exhibition hall destroyed the facility. The hall was non-sprinkled and 
failure of the fire resistive protected steel constructed building contributed to the steel failure 
and total collapse. The maintenance crews tried unsuccessfully to control the fire and the 
notification to the fire dispatched was delayed (FEMA, 1997). 
The US Sight & Sound Theatre was a fast burning, with a high rate of heat production and 
caused complete collapse of the building. Structural failure and inadequate compartmentation 
contributed to the collapse and large damages to the facility. The failure of the alarm system 
delayed the dispatch of the fire brigade on the scene. The shortage of supply of water 
restrained the fire brigade action to control the spread of the fire. 
Fire protection measures in the facility were inadequate and the owner breached the State 
regulation which requires public assembly buildings to an automatic sprinkler system with 
buildings of a capacity greater than 500 people and a storage room of over 100 sq. ft. "The 
65 Insurance (2000) Preliminary report on business interruption, UK Hospital 2000. 
275 
owner requested that the State waive the sprinkler requirement because of the financial 
hardship caused by providing a water supply for the sprinkler system" (FEMA, 1997). The 
owner intended to rely on a centrally monitored smoke detection in the stage area, but 
following a series of false alarm, heat detectors replaced the smoke detectors. "The 
investigation by the Police revealed that the theatre management routinely shut off the alarm 
system during stage performances to prevent interference from false alarm. Instead, a fire 
watch was maintained using trained theatre staff. " 
The FEMA (1997) technical report highlighted all the failures and extracted lessons learnt and 
recommendations. Their analysis reveals that "the fire is notable for the breakdown of the 
systems originally intended to provide basic fire safety in the Theatre. " From the concept of 
the design during renovation of the original stage and auditorium in 1990, through the 
management of fire safety during the use of the facilities and repeated decisions to turn off the 
system at certain time, through the major renovation project in 1997 and the mismanagement, 
lack of awareness, negligence of the owner in appreciating the high risk of fire. 10 major 
recommendations were issued and addressed the major failure analysed in this fire. 
Design and Engineering: 
In facilities receiving members of the public, safety was a priority. The life safety concept and 
strategy to enable a safe evacuation of the occupant in case of emergency was essential. 
However, in the case of construction site related fires, the safety of the public was of prime 
importance when construction activities are linked to the mobility of the public. For 
construction and refurbishment works, the site would be clearly limited and access to the 
public forbidden or restricted. However, when maintenance operations take place, like in 
Dusseldorf Airport the public was directly linked to the working area and there were no clear 
boundaries of the site. The connection between the site of the fire and the public areas was 
evident. In the Sight & Sound Theatre fire, the building was being used and occupied by 200 
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staff at the time of the fire and the fire had a major impact on the business continuity of the 
theatre as it was completely destroyed. 
Design and engineering in these situations played a key role in the development of the fire. 
Refurbishment works often require demolition or change of the internal layout and these 
modifications would affect the structural fire resistance of the building. Also 
compartmentation and containment can be temporarily interrupted. Maintaining an integral 
fire resistance as early as possible is essential to ensure the fire could be contained and 
controlled within the facility. The high fire load of some facilities combined with an 
inadequate design contributed to a rapid spread of fire. 
Managerial strategy: 
Managerial decisions taken prior to the construction works could also have a major impact on 
fire safety during construction activities. In the cases observed and analysed, decision on 
design and alterations in prior construction works contributed to increase fire damages: 
Reducing the level of fire protection in the facility due to economical pressures, non- 
compliance with the building regulations and fire codes, poor management and control of 
high fire risk activities during the construction operations, no systematic risk assessment, 
failure to communicate information between employees and the fire brigade, employees and 
the workforce, the workforce and the site manager... 
Contingency process: 
It appeared again unacceptable that major organisation receiving members of the public in 
their facilities (either customers, patients, passengers... ) did not have a proper contingency 
strategy to face a disaster. The low churn rate of the facilities might explain the poor 
flexibility and ability to transfer some of the activities to other sites, but the poor emergency 
response and planning was not encouraging and reveals a dearth of knowledge on this aspect 
of the business threats from the owner. 
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7.2.2.1.5 Historic Buildings: 
9 UK Hampton Court (1986), B Palais des Malines (1995). 
Historic buildings included almost every building type, from crofts to palaces, warehouses to 
libraries, lighthouses to railways stations, chapels to cathedrals. It is with such a difference in 
buildings that the scale, complexity and construction of each vary. It was primarily the 
elements of construction which brought individual difference. Wall, roof, and floor 
construction require consideration in each case as to establish the best method of fire 
protection suited. 
Fire protection in historic buildings was far from the more clear cut outlook of a newly 
constructed building. In the case of an historic building there was a further dimension - the 
loss of property that forms part of a cultural resource which is finite, irreplaceable and whose 
architectural and historical integrity could be destroyed as easily by inappropriate fire 
precautions as by fire itself. It was considered that the loss of authentic historic fabric was a 
tragedy in itself, and it is upon this reasoning that fire protection must be present within 
historic buildings. But in analysis, the provision of a sufficient level of fire protection could 
be a problematic aspect of fire management. In providing adequate fire protection minimal 
intervention in conservation terms may be breached. The dilemma being in short firstly, the 
need to protect the building from fire itself and secondly, as to how an adequate level of 
protection was acquired without excessive intervention with the existing fabric. It is under 
this predicament that the issue of management becomes the amicable solution. Much can and 
should be done to minimise the likelihood of fire by the early elimination of major risks and 
by the management and control of those risks that cannot be eliminated. 
The fire scenarios the author looked at in her investigations revealed a large number of 
failures in the system. Because of the way historic building have been built and unmodified 
over the centuries, smouldering fires are not rare. However in the UK Hampton Court 
(1986) fire a rapid spread of the fire contributed to greater the damages. The investigations 
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report (DOE, 1986) supposed that a naked flame was at the origin of the fire. The slow and 
smouldering fire grown between the bed and the window of the main bedroom and break out 
at a later stage. Cold smoke spread along the roof void and the spaces behind the panelling 
followed by a "fierceness and rapid spread of the fire. " 
The unsatisfactory design feature combined with a series of technical and equipment systems 
failures would explain the devastating impact. Fortunately the rapid actions of the salvage 
squad permitted to save a large part of the art pieces while the fire spread in the facility. The 
lack of managerial control and improper management arrangements raised a lot of concern on 
the safety level in all historic buildings around the UK. The failures were summarised in the 
table below: 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
Unsatisfactory design 
feature of the fire detection 
system 
Less than inadequate 
commissioning process of 
the fire safety systems 
Lack of training of staff 
Low record of fire drills 
No operating manual for 
automatic fire detection 
system 
Lack of proper log 
Improper Management 
arrangements: line of 
responsibility and decision 
making 
Fire origin: supposed naked flame, 
smouldering fire between the bed and the 
window of the main bedroom 
Fire development: considerable spread of 
cold smoke and fierceness and rapid spread of 
the fire 
Evidence of an automatic fire detection 
system which failed to operate properly. 
Inadequate response by the custody staff 
Delay in the operation of fire alarm 
Inadvertent rendering inoperative automatic 
fire detection system 
System failures: complete system failure / 
alarm zones switched off / system switched 
off/ inadequate response to fire alarm 
Safe evacuation of occupants but one 
casualty. 
Salvage squad in operation: successful 
salvage operation 
No evidence of business continuity plan 
Table 7.19: UK Hampton Court (1986) 
The Belgium fire of the Palais de Justice de Malines (1995) was another example of the 
successful actions of a salvage team in emergency situation. This XVIth Century building 
house the local court of justice in Malines. The unsafe use of naked flame and blow torch for 
repair works were at the origin of the fire. The internal construction was made out of timber 
as well as the roof structure (ANPI, 1995). 
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In 1982 renovation works were carried out on the facility and comprised the work on the 
stability of the structure, its thermal insulation and fire safety protection. The ceilings were 
replaced to enforce the fire protection level and avoid the propagation of a fire from the 
ground floor to the upper levels and the roof. Even if proper thoughts were put into the 
improvement of the passive fire protection features, inadequate design was carried out. Some 
fire walls were improved but did not provide a continuous fire resistance up to the roof 
structure. The table below summarises the fire safety failures for this fire: 
Planned System Operational and Active Systems Recovery and Continuity System 
No evidence of a hot work permit. Fire origin: maintenance work 
gutters with a naked flame. 
Smouldering fire for several hours. 
Negligence from the workers. 
Fire spread in a confine space. 
on Extensive water damages. 
Major renovation works in 1982 
to consolidate the structure, 
improve thermal insulation and 
fire protection measures. 
Improvement of 
compartmentation. 
Inadequate design of firewalls in 
roof space 
Provision for extinguishers in the 
facility, but difficult access to fire 
zone. 
Damages to archives by water and smoke 
and heat. 
No salvage plan in place. 
Inability to use fire extinguishers to 
control the spread of fire. No evidence of Recovery and continuity 
Late automatic fire detection: planning. 
smouldering fire undetected in roof 
structure. 
Table 7.20: B Palais des Malines (1995) 
Following some repair on the drainage system outside the roof structure and using a 
blowtorch, a slow smouldering fire developed for several hours (from 15.00 to 22.00). The 
fire broke out at 22.08 and rapidly developed in the roof structure and outside. 
The rapid spread of the fire in the roof structure and around the outside of the roof, explained 
the late detection of the fire. The difficult location of the fire did not allow a safe fire fighting 
action and the presence of portable fire extinguishers was unnecessary in this situation. The 
action of the fire brigade in trying to control the fire contributed to major water damages to 
the archives and internal furniture and equipment. The attic contained a collection of 
law 
book from the 19`h century and of a great value. The collection has been seriously damaged by 
the smoke, the aches and especially the water. The salvage and adequate emergency and 
evacuation plan was proved to be extremely successful in the recovery of the facility. 
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Design and Engineering: 
It is commonly found that older buildings have been constructed with provision for very 
different methods of transferring air, heat and light around the structure, often in the form of 
ducts and shafts, these as stressed prove very problematic. It is also worthy of mention that 
with the introduction of more modern day building services, the original structure may well 
have been built over or adapted, creating further voids, again having obvious implication 
when thought is given to potential fire and smoke spread. These highlighted areas alone 
justified the benefits of a thorough investigation and survey of a building and its history prior 
to any works commencing and also the need to keep accurate records of works undertaken 
that can be consulted at a later date. The fires at Hampton Court Palace and Windsor Castle 
where such ducts, voids and shafts were evident, and contributed heavily to the fire spread 
throughout the building, are tragic examples of the potential dangers. 
Managerial Strategy: 
As one would expect there was a limitation as to the extent when the application of passive 
and active measures may be merited. With greater degrees of fire protection technology and 
processes there was a requirement for unacceptable levels of intervention, it was at this point 
effective management was required. Bodies such as Historic Scotland and the FPA advised 
that when fire precautions involve alterations, careful and sympathetic design was needed to 
minimise the effect which these have on the architectural and historic character of the 
building. Management therefore is fundamental in any approach. The best form of protection 
was to stop the fire from occurring in the first place, and it was upon this principle that the 
merits of training, management and the removal of risk are warranted. Many practical 
common sense fire precaution measures could be implemented at no significant cost, the 
approach to recommend best practice will be examined further. 
Contingency Process: 
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The criticality of the implementation of a salvage plan and a salvage team to save part of the 
invaluable treasures of a historic facility was widely demonstrated in the Hampton Court 
(1986) fire and the more recent Windsor Castle fire which was not construction related. 
7.2.2.1.6 Conclusion of the analysis: 
The selection of case studies was significantly representative of the problem of fire on 
construction sites, with a wide spread of cases and situations, but also comparative elements 
across all the fire scenarios (see Figure 7.2). 
To ease the analysis and comparative study, the sites were divided in 5 groups: retail, 
factory/manufacturing, offices, facilities receiving the general public and historic buildings. 
General findings were raised for each group under three heading: Design and engineering, 
Managerial strategy and Contingency process. The results of these findings are summarised in 
Table 7.22: Outcomes of the Construction Fire safety Failure Analysis. 
The common characteristics across all the fire scenarios were found under the three 
heading. The first element which was noticeable was the rapid growth of fire on construction 
site. Several elements could contribute to the a rapid fire growth, like the high fire load, the 
storage of flammable materials, the accumulation of waste, the storage of construction 
material on site and confine spaces, etc. However the analysis revealed that fire scenarios 
analysed in this research, became very quickly uncontrollable and the presence of manual fire 
fighting equipment appeared unnecessary at the time of the fire. This might also explain the 
large losses and damages sustained by the facility. 
The inadequate design of the facility in most of the case also contributed to the spread of the 
fire throughout the site and sometime beyond its boundaries, affecting existing and occupied 
facilities. Lack of compartmentation restrained the containment of the fire and allowed the 
fire to spread rapidly. However the fire was most of the time controlled before it could affect 
the structural stability of the building. The design of certain types of facilities, like factory and 
manufacturing units, or retail shops, could be major effect on the development of the 
fire. 
Large open spaces left the fire free to spread and the smoke to affect the all facility. Because 
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there were no obligations to provide an active fire protection system to detect fires at an 
earlier stage and raise the alarm, delay in discovering the fire would delay the fire fighting 
action. In certain circumstances, refurbishment and maintenance operations, where the active 
system could be maintain operational throughout the work operation, the case studies revealed 
that the system was often temporary turned off to avoid false alarm. 
From a managerial point of view, many criticisms could be listed under this chapter. 
However, baring in mind the difficult environment in which contractors sometimes have to 
operate and the lack of regulatory enforcement to sustain the implementation of an 
integrated strategy on site, some mistakes are unavoidable. However, simple precautionary 
measures would eliminate most of the risk of fire. Safe working practices combined with a 
proper management and supervision of the construction activities were essential to provide a 
fire free environment on sites. There was no evidence of a systematic risk assessment where 
fire risk would be clearly outlined and the development of risk management strategy 
implemented to control fire outbreaks. An inadequate fire safety strategy is always linked to a 
series of managerial failures like poor managerial control, poor site management, lack of 
awareness, etc. Across the cases studies only two sites in the UK provided evidence of a link 
and application of the `Joint Code of Practice for fire prevention on construction sites' 
(JCOP) or similar guidance apply by other countries. The author already widely debated the 
scope and use of the JCOP and its recognition by the industry as a viable guidance for 
preventing fires on construction sites. The JCT forms of contracts required compliance with 
the JCOP and most of the major insurance companies would also require full compliance 
under the insurance contractual terms. 
The contingency process was a concept not yet fully accepted by the industry and the 
author guess it took at least five years before it is recognised a sound concept. Across all the 
case studies analysed in this chapter, there was no evidence of the implementation of a 
complete contingency process. Some organisations have evidence of a short term recovery 
plan and in a crisis situation, salvage plans are ready to operate. However it was not a 
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common practice and it appeared they chose to transfer this risk to the insurer. On large and 
repeated fire losses with the same contractor, insurers would develop a risk programme and 
issue a large loss advice for their clients. Even if a business continuity insurance was issued 
and a contingency plan is required, it was difficult to control its implementation and 
effectiveness on the day of the disaster. The way out of this problem was to limit the losses to 
a maximum sum, agreed prior to sign the insurance contract. On large projects, some insurers 
would decide to transfer the risk of fire to a reinsurer for an agreed premium. 
The observations and findings of the construction fire safety failure scenarios revealed a large 
number of common characteristics. The summary of these findings was presented in Table 
7.21: Outcomes of the Construction Fire Safety Failure Analysis. From this analysis a generic 
failure scenario was designed using a fault tree technique. The results of this fault tree were 
presented in the next section of this chapter. 
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7.2.3 Generic Failure Scenario: 
Primary investigations into the causes and consequences of fires on construction sites 
contributed to the assessment of a failure scenario. This event tree illustrateed three different 
events following the fire occurrence: there was no system available to control the fire, the 
system failed to operate due to an equipment failure, Human error or an external failure. 
Finally the system was operational and succeed to control the fire. 
Model Event Tree Fire on Construction Sites 
NO SYSTEM 
available 
Fire Compartment 
Fire Containment 
System FAILED System 
to Operate SUCCESS 
operates 
External Party Fire Brigade 
Fire Warning 
Adjacent 
Facilities 
Fire 
Act of God Limit Spread 
Consultant 
- Designer 
Engineer 
Containment 
Arsonist 
Extinguishment 
Internal Party 
System 
Negligence SUCCESSFUL 
Arson Attack 
Aanaaement 
Company 
Management 
Failure 
The analysis across a large sample of fires draw the conclusion that in most cases the system 
in place at the time of the fire occurrence failed to operate due to a Human 
Error either from 
an internal or external party, or from the management directly. 
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7.2.4 Lessons Learnt from failures scenarios 
f Need for a detailed assessment of the risks and hazards before and during the construction 
stage. 
f Implementation of an operational emergency plan and test it. 
f System of control and monitoring of FSP during the construction stage. 
f Develop training and awareness among employees and the workforce about the danger of 
fire, its consequences and line of conduct in case of fire. 
f Improve communication and liaison between the Contracting company and the FM: 
compatibility of the project safety information 
f Liase with local fire services and fire brigade 
f Improve fire safety by design (fire engineering approach) 
f Pre-construction meeting necessary 
f Improve Structural fire resistance and compartmentation to limit the spread of fire in the 
building premises 
f Lack of knowledge of the legislative and regulatory requirements and obligations in 
health and safety, and fire safety. 
f Lack of knowledge of the contractual obligations under the terms of the contract. 
f Lack of knowledge and understanding of the insurance policy and its scope and limits. 
f No appreciation of the likely impact of a fire for the organisation, its -recovery and 
continuity after a fire. 
f Recovery Plan often ignored and risk transferred to Insurance Company. 
f Need for the implementation of business continuity planning for all organisations. No 
systematic fire risk assessment 
f No systematic risk assessment 
f Need for a Partnership between Client / Insurer, Client / Contractor, Contractor 
/ Sub- 
Contractor, Site Management / Emergency Services. 
f Need to consider the implementation of Recovery and Continuity Plan. 
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f Effective communication between fire, police and emergency services to control the fire 
zone and adjacent facilities and evacuate civilians and control traffic. 
f Adequate water supplies to site. 
f Successful fire ground operations. 
f Salvage Plan for facilities of an outstanding and historical value: historic monuments, 
archives, museums, and libraries... 
7.2.5 Research Findings: 
The contractual agreement was often unclear to the parties and its content unknown or not 
well assimilated. Most of UK contractor will chose a traditional and standard form of contract 
and the rest will tend to develop a bespoke form of contract or no contract is signed for the 
project. 
The knowledge of contractors on their Insurance policy was limited and often they were 
unaware of the form of policy they subscribe to. 
An Annual or Specific insurance was always subscribed but there was still great confusion 
on the distribution of responsibilities between the parties and their duties and responsibilities 
to subscribe a CAR or Joint Names Policy. 
The Joint Code of Practice (JCOP) did not address the full extent of the problem of fire on 
construction sites and concentrate solely on the construction stage. The limited spread of the 
JCOP is major weakness of the existing strategy. 
Compliance with the JCOP was very difficult to prove and require extensive monitoring and 
control of the contractor activities on site. 
Partnership was an essential ingredient of the proper collaboration between the insurance 
company, their support organisations (Loss Adjuster / Fire and Forensic 
/ Reinsurers / 
Underwriters) and the inured. 
In a fire situation, often the FSP developed prior to the commencement of the works was not 
operational or the workforce involved has not been trained to react to the 
fire in proper 
289 
manner. The consequences of late action and improper strategy to control a fire situation, lead 
to disastrous consequences, loss and damages. 
The CDM regulations and other health and safety regulations relevant to the construction 
industry, forced parties to look at health and safety issues at the design stage and throughout 
the full construction process, but does no address specifically fire safety issues on sites. 
Active fire precaution measures were not encouraged during the construction process and 
are most of the time implemented at a very stage of the project. For refurbishment and 
maintenance works, this approach has been encouraged but was not common practice 
amongst the construction industry. 
The Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 with 1999 amendments excluded a 
construction site as a place of work. The protection of construction employees against fire 
during their normal schedule of work was not addressed and their level of safety was not 
improved. 
Systematic risk assessment was not carried out at an early stage of the development of the 
project and limited partnership is maintained between the insurer and the insured. Such an 
approach would encourage insurers to provide support to their insured on establishing a risk 
programme to assess, control, monitor and prevent major fire risks on construction sites. 
The full consideration of a Disaster Recovery Plan was not promoted and the insurer 
sustains losses and damages dues to fire. The extent of the consequences of a major fire 
during the construction process was not well understood by the contractor and the client, as 
well as the impact of such a disaster for their business. 
Business Continuity Planning (BCP) was the systematic forethought to allow response 
during and immediately after an event to be based on pre-planned and optimised solutions 
which minimise the consequences for the business. 
Business Continuity Planning was not a systematic exercise for an organisation and insurers 
do not have the power to enforce this approach. The development of a Company BCP would 
limit the consequences and impact of a fire for a business. The organisation would possess an 
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operational BCP to support the early recovery of their business, assess the core and non-core 
activities of their organisation, and define an adequate strategy to limit losses and maximise 
profit. 
The BCP was a Live Document or a Live Plan and it involved securing the continuity of the 
business activities and the real estate or facilities. It was also related to the relatively 
intangible issues affecting business capital. 
Figure 7.6 illustrated how the research findings of the post analysis contributed to develop the 
fire safety management model. 
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7.3 Interim conclusions to support the development of a fire safety 
management model 
The attempt to extract major recommendations at this stage of the research was not definitive. 
as the Expert Reviews will participate to dress conclusions, which are relevant to the industry. 
However the qualitative analysis and design of the FSMM contributed to identify significant 
findings and based on this primary but not definitive analysis, to generate recommendations 
and conclusions for this report. 
The second problem related to the statistics arisen because a large number of fires appeared to 
be unreported, usually because they are without any major or immediate financial and human 
consequences. This invisible element of the problem will leave the lessons from the near 
misses fires where any processes or procedures lead to successful control, also unreported. 
The risk of a fire occurrence was generally recognised as being extremely high during the 
construction, refurbishment, or maintenance of buildings - because of the combination of 
large quantities of combustibles were combined with numerous potential ignition sources in a 
rapidly-changing environment. In partially occupied or occupied buildings undergoing such 
works the consequences in terms of direct loss of property and/ or occupant safety are 
potentially profound, even where the fire which causes these problems may be relatively 
minor. 
The significance of this issue for business appeared to still require drawing-out, perhaps via 
the Facilities Management field. The direct consequences for the core and non-core business 
from fire events in critical core or support business premises (and/ or to people) were 
potentially very damaging to business continuity. However the issues appeared to remain 
under-stated. 
The need to address globally the problem of fire safety on construction sites was significantly 
demonstrate in this report, and within prior publications on this issue. Overall it seemed that 
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significant work has been carried out by the insurance industry to consider this problem and 
limit losses on fire incidents on construction sites. Certainly the publication and continuous 
review of the LPC Code was a firm proof of the interest into the problem. It was also apparent 
that other EU countries, and especially France which was widely considered in this research, 
was well behind in terms of preventing fires on construction sites. The slow progress in 
research and development on this subject could be explained by the lack of major fire 
incidents in other EU countries to the UK (Broadgate and Minster Court in the 90s). The 
attempt to explain and review this problem and address the findings in a Managerial Model 
has been proposed in this thesis and aimed to demonstrate the validity of this Model through 
two expert reviews. A number of conclusions, which will contribute to knowledge in the field 
of fire safety on construction sites, were addressed below. 
A large scale study of fires on construction sites and a centralised system to gather data on 
the number, cause and consequences of fires: the qualitative analysis proposed in this research 
contributed to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the existing system for the prevention 
of fires on construction sites. However the unavailability of quantitative data to support this 
research was a significant barrier to demonstrate the validity of the research hypothesis. The 
existing system to collect information on fires on construction sites failed to gather accurate 
data which could be exploited. This research has identified several points to consider: 
0 Recording information on the fires: the fire report (Format and information required not 
precise, depth of information required), treatment of information by the statistical bureau 
(FPA, Home Office, Fire Brigade, HSE), the analysis of these data not completed, access 
to data often difficult and reliability of the information publicly available. 
" Incompatibility of the data between statistical offices: reasons for such differences was 
often not explained but an in-depth analysis of the collection process highlighted the 
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following problems: definition of a construction site unclear, classification and 
categorisation of facilities (site / site huts / site accommodations and offices / building 
merchants / building storage / construction company (could be a manufacturing line for 
manufactured elements) / open site / civil engineering works), the estimation of losses 
(>£50,000, direct / indirect losses), reported / unreported fires with injuries (HSE), with 
losses (Fire Brigade and FPA and Insurance Companies), with intervention of the Fire 
Brigade but losses < to £50,000. 
0 The lack of research on the subject: Insurance companies were in the best position to 
analyse their claims files and due to a lack of time and investment in research and 
development many opportunities to develop valuable analysis on major incidents were 
often denied, forgotten and not a priority for the business. The impact of a large scale 
investigation on fires on construction sites could be significant and affect the general 
health and safety provisions. Already pressures from the EU to develop new directives 
transformed our legislative framework and improved it. The Fire Brigades which 
significantly contributed to increase damages on site due to the use of a large amount of 
water, are protected their interests. 
A collaboration between the contractor, the client, the insurer: the CDM regulations aimed at 
encouraging collaboration between the construction participants on health, safety and welfare 
matters, at a earliest stage of the project. Pressure on the designers to "Think Safety First" and 
promote a "Safe Working Environment" through their design was a significant step ahead. 
However, as this research identified it, fire safety matters are not directly addressed in the 
CDM Regs. On the other hand, the publication and wide use of the LPC Joint Code of 
Practice (JCOP) for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites and Building Undergoing 
Renovation, promoted the importance of implementing fire safety measures during the 
construction / refurbishment process and obliged parties to the contract to coordinate their 
295 
approach towards fire safety. This role of coordination being assumed by the Health & Safety 
Coordinator appointed under the CDM Regs has now been widely recognised and accepted by 
the industry as a whole. However to need to consider specifically fire safety as a single and 
distinctive aspects of health, safety and welfare was to date not yet completely assumed. 
Pressure by the Insurers to comply with the JCOP contributed to change the safety culture of 
the industry and the fire safety approach on sites. Maintaining a long term collaboration 
between first Insurers and Contractors, Insurers and Clients and Clients and Contractors was 
essential to systematically adopt a fire safety approach on every site. 
A Partnership between the insurer and the insured: all construction works contain elements 
of risk. The fire risk is common to all construction works and also cause financial losses 
which were sustained by the Insurers through a transfer of this risk with the subscription of an 
Insurance Policy (CAR / Specific Perils) by the Contractor and/or Client (Joint Names). The 
implementation of a System of prevention combined with the development of a Partnering 
approach between Insurer and Insured (Contractor or Client) would promote an active 
preventative approach, develop the communication channels between the parties, enforce the 
implementation of a Risk approach and culture in the organisation. However there were some 
barrier to the implementation of this concept: the delay to implement the strategy, the 
investment to develop the concept, the opposite effect of prevention without a Partnering 
approach. 
Risk Management: a better analysis of the risks at the earlier stage of the project would 
undoubtedly provide the contractor/client and insurer a better perception of the risks involved 
and appropriate information (and maybe data) to implement a suitable strategy or procedure 
to control and monitor risks throughout the complete project cycle. The FSMM addressed 
risks issues at a very early stage with the development of a FSP and HSP and also looking at a 
long term strategy, with consideration for a Recovery procedure and Business Continuity 
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Plan, first for the organisation and also project specific. This management of the risk was 
an integral concept and depends on a change of the safety culture of the organisation. 
A Global Approach and an Integral Concept: The scope of the prospective FSMM 
highlighted the need to consider a Global approach towards fire safety, rather than a project 
specific approach. In fact, considerations for the complete project cycle and its relationship to 
the organisational and managerial strategy were essential to built up an appropriate concept 
and implement a procedure. As such consideration for the integration of the Recovery and 
Continuity Systems was essential to appropriately manage the risks of fire during construction 
works. 
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$ DEVELOPING A MANAGERIAL MODEL 
8.1 Introduction and Research Concept 
The full PhD schematic structure of this research and its outcomes and findings were 
available in each chapter. These schematic structures demonstrated the integration of the 
research findings in the development of the fire safety management model. 
0 The proposed FSMM addressed the managerial approach and presents a framework of 
implementation from inception towards hand over. The FSMM also took into account 
three different types of construction works: new built, maintenance and refurbishment. It 
offered enough flexibility to permit changes but sustain a high level of control of the risk 
over the activities on site. 
0A set of requirements has been assessed throughout each phase of the development of the 
project (Inception, feasibility, design, substructure, superstructure, fit-out / hand-over, 
maintenance, refurbishment) and its life cycle. It also integrated five safety systems: 
planned, operational, active, recovery and continuity systems. The link and overlaps 
between those systems were presented in a separate model. 
The constructive analysis was developed throughout this thesis and a thorough research 
analysis has been required to consider a number of issues and checked them against a 
hypothetical scenario. In a first instance, this chapter reviewed the strengths and weaknesses 
of existing safety models and systems. The second part of this chapter introduced the concept 
of the fire safety management model developed by the author and based on the research 
findings. Three different models are then presented and the second and third version offered 
for review to two Expert Panels in France and the UK. The results of the Expert review were 
presented and discussed in the next chapter. 
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8.2 Background to the research: 
The use of safety models or systems to assist professionals to understand the process of fire 
safety has been widely used and is nowadays recognised as a reliable assessment method. A 
summary of the papers reviewed in this section is available in Table 8.1. Watts (1997) defined 
a system as "a set of components that work together for an overall objective... the objective 
of which is to provide an acceptable level of fire safety in building. " 
Watts proposed an alternative method he defined system analysis "as simply the methodical 
study of an entity as a whole. " 
Fitzgerald (1985) proposed an engineering method for building Firesafety Analysis and 
recognised eight major parts that can be grouped into three categories to complete the 
engineering methods: performance criteria, the analysis of the facility and an engineering 
design. Molkov (1999) modelled explosions in buildings through an interpretation of real 
accidents. He argued that based on an engineering and scientific approach "the design 
procedures for avoiding the development of excessive overpressures during deflagrations 
could be improved. " Wade & Whiting (1997) described a method of fire risk assessment 
known as Building Fire safety Engineering Method (BFSEM) which main components 
included the evaluation of probability of the fire self-terminating, probability of automatic 
suppression and the probability of manual suppression by the fire service. Probabilistic 
approaches were again develop to evaluate fire risk as detailed in a paper by Ramachadran 
(1988) where he reviewed techniques using fire statistics. Beard (1999) applied the concepts 
of systems to the creation of a fire safety management system for offshore facilities. These 
researches had something in common: they relied on a detailed set of data, they were based on 
a probabilistic approach and involve engineering techniques. The problem of fire safety on 
construction should be approached through a different angle, as no statistical data were 
available in this field of the construction industry. A bare list of major fires was usually 
published, but there was no evidence to support an engineering and probabilistic approach to 
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create a Fire Safety Management Model (FSMM). Lo (1999) proposed a fuzzy fire safety 
assessment approach based on fire risk ranking techniques that may form part of the safety 
evaluation tool for existing buildings. His approach evolved from insufficient fire data to 
carry out statistical inference tests, making statistical and probabilistic studies. 
The concept of the use of a model in safety and risk management was not new. A review of 
current and past model developed in managerial research revealed that they have been used in 
research for the last decade. The form and design of these models varied a lot and it seemed 
there wasn't a clear definition of it. Models combined with the use of systems were identified 
but did not provide an adequate strategy to design them. Smallman (1994) proposed a safety 
management systems for the offshore industry. In his review of past and current safety 
management systems for offshore installations, Smallman highlighted the strengths and 
weaknesses of the safety management approach. His research and investigations highlighted a 
number of interesting issues, common to the construction industry: 
i. Need to integrate a systematic safety management approach 
ii. Lack of perception of the problem of safety by offshore organisations 
iii. Poor communication of safety culture 
iv. Problem to analyse failures and learnt from failure scenarios 
Broadening safety culture 
The offshore industry which suffered a series of major explosions and fires (Flixborough 
(1975), 28 killed; Piper Alpha (1990), 167 killed), the later gave rise to the Cullen Report 
(1990). Prior to the Piper Alpha disaster, nothing in the legislation required explosions to be 
considered at all and the fire protection systems were unsuitable for the types and severity of 
the fires. Crawley and Dalzell (1997) recognised that most people in the industry did not 
recognise explosions as a threat. Cullen identified three major concern: the need for a safety 
management system, a risk and hazards identification to protect personnel and the need for 
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temporary refuge on the installation. This concept helped Beard and Santos-Reyes (1999) to 
develop a fire safety management system. This FSMS was constructed in four steps: 
i. Prototypical FSMS by using the viable system model 
ii. Test FSMS by applying Failure Paradigm Method 
iii. Synthesis 
iv. Further testing of the FSMS 
The FSMS model aimed to maintain an acceptable level of fire risk in offshore installation 
operations. It was a systematic set of six inter-related subsystems: fire safety implementation, 
fire safety co-ordination, fire safety audit, fire safety functional, fire safety development, fire 
safety policy. This Safety System was developed from a detailed set of quantitative data and a 
strong engineering approach. The design of the model was very sophisticated and detailed but 
its principles were commonly understood. 
Moving away from the offshore industry which presented very specific characteristics, not 
always comparable to the construction industry, Models were also develop in risk 
management. Tummala & Leung (1996) proposed a risk management model to assess safety 
and reliability risks and to evaluate several alternatives response plans to reduce and control 
identified risks. The model was based on risk management process with a clear identification 
of the risks and the development of action plans with risk evaluation and risk control and 
monitoring. 
Waring (1996) developed a Model of a safety management system. In his approach Waring 
seek to outline the requirements for successful health and safety management and how this 
may be addressed systematically through strategy and safety management system. He 
proposed a clear procedure and model based on a sound managerial approach, as well as a 
detailed hierarchy of business and safety objectives. 
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Eric Marchant who has been researching on fire safety since the mid 70s, started writing 
papers on fire safety in buildings and construction site. Recently Marchant (2000) developed 
a new approach to fire safety systems. His paper looked at the technological functions of fire 
safety systems in buildings and how they interact with other systems. Marchant took into 
account the aspects of the whole building performance and fire safety design. It was a good 
approach for construction works where facilities are in-use and occupied during operations. 
Other authors like McKie (1997), Chazot (1997) from Eurotunnel, Crawley & Dalzel l (1997) 
from WS Atkins and BP Exploration, explored safety management for different type of 
incidents and accidents in various industry. Common ground such as the implementation of 
an integrated strategy were discussed and the formulation of managerial approach is argued 
and put forward. 
McKie (1997) argued that "a complete operational safety system should encompass all 
aspects of technology, systems and culture. " Therefore the system interacted with its 
environment: technological environment, cultural environment... Watts (1997) explored the 
characteristics of a systems and define them as having a boundary, an input and an output, 
some variables and a structure. 
System Boundary 
Input Structure 
Variables 
Output 
Figure 8.1: Characteristics of Systems (Source: Watts, J. (1997) Systems concepts for 
building fire safety). 
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However Watts (1997) argued that "the system may interact with its environment, but outside 
events do not themselves govern the behaviour of the system, i. e. there is no feedback 
mechanism between the system and external elements. " This is the major weakness of the 
Watts' approach. The researcher believed that to achieve an integrated approach of the 
fire safety system, the Model proposed in this research must interact with its 
environment (cultural and technological) and through a feedback mechanism evolve 
into time and change according to the modified parameters. The Model presented in this 
research was a live strategy and unique to every site. Like MacKie (1997), the author believed 
that the implementation of a fire safety management model cannot be detached from a 
cultural change within the organisation and through the management. MacKie (1997) restated 
that "a much better management process will recognise the need for rules, regulations, etc., 
but will provide a working environment, or culture, where each and every employee 
understands the need to work safely and ensures that they do so. " He later argued in his paper 
the need to develop a total safety culture. 
The Fire Safety Management Model proposed in this report is based on a detailed analysis of 
data collected through interviews and an extensive analytical review and analysis of major 
fires on construction sites. The FSMM addressed issues raised by professional interviewed 
and the findings extract from the analysis of real failure scenarios. 
The objectives of this review by two Expert Panels were to critic the hypothetical FSMM and 
highlight significant areas of improvements to develop a final Model. 
304 
8.3 Model A: Prospective Fire Safety Management Model (FSMM) for the 
Prevention of Fire on Construction Sites 
Through the analysis of relevant cases of fires originating on construction sites, a comparison 
was made between recognised good and bad practices, and a proposed Managerial Model to 
meet the requirements for Fire Safety was presented for review. 
Literature and 
Interviews 
Findings 
Figure 8.2: FSMM: Process of building the concept 
In Chapter 5, the author detailed the research concept and process of building theory (Figure 
8.3 below). At this stage, the author planned to develop several Fire Safety Management 
Models and to revise them periodically through the presentation of the Models to two Expert 
Panel. The success of the approach was based on a sound review and critical analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each model and to demonstrate their validity and applicability in 
organisation. The author already argued the scope and limit of the research, and concluded 
that the testing of the model in organisation was not possible in this research. However 
enough evidence have been collected in the Expert Reviews to justify the validity of the 
Model and how it contributed to raise awareness and provide a sound framework to develop 
an integrated fire safety management concept and process in organisations. 
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8.3.1 The Prospective Fire safety Management Model (FSMM): Model A 
The next pages present the prospective Fire Safety Management Model (Model A) for 
review and analysis by the French Expert Panel. 
Further explanations on the how to use this model and the interaction between the systems 
will be discussed on the day of the review. To enhance the analysis, a case study was put 
together in Appendix B and will form the basis for the analysis of the FSMM. 
The Model indicated the relationships between the stages of the process and was indicative of 
the flexibility of the overall framework. The use of colours for each different system aimed to 
ease the understanding of the Model and the importance of considering the phases of the 
project from Conception, through Execution / Construction and Exploitation of the facility 
(Maintenance / Refurbishment). 
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The research findings highlighted the need to consider five different systems in the 
prospective FSMM: 
1. Planned System: this system looked at the pre-construction phases to consider to develop 
the project and what specific areas need to be consider to put together the project. Health 
and safety requirements played a major part in this system as legally the parties have 
obligations under the contractual agreements, the law and regulations applying to the 
industry, the insurance policy. 
2. Operational System: This was the system in place during the construction / 
refurbishment / maintenance phases which will look at the implementation of the Fire 
Safety Plan, its control, monitoring and updating throughout the all construction phase. 
Compliance with the JCOP is compulsory and is supervised by the Insurance Company. 
3. Active System: The combination of a set of passive measures (determined at a design 
stage and in the FSP) with active measures was a key issue into the control and 
prevention of fires on construction sites. This system was particularly relevant to the 
refurbishment and maintenance sites where a high control of fire breakout was essential. 
Active and passive measures were slowly installed in the project either using temporary 
equipment or the permanent one. 
4. The implementation of Disaster Recovery Plan was not always a 
systematic exercise for facilities owners and contractors. The participation of the 
Insurance company in building up their insured files should draw to their attention the 
benefits of implementing a Disaster Recovery Plan to limit the loss and damages to their 
business (facility, activity, assets, capital, public image, shares... ) following a fire. The 
Survey Report completed by the Insurance should highlight potential risks to help the 
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Insured to develop a Risk Programme, if required and necessary, and manage the risks 
throughout the construction phase. 
5. Continuity System: Most organisations did not have a BCP. The benefits of preparing a 
BCP and anticipating a potential interruption of the business were an essential element of 
a good managerial approach in any given business. The BCP process comprised six 
phases: initiation of the BCP and Risk Assessment; business impact analysis; the analysis 
of the critical processes; the creation of the BCP; testing of the Plan and finally the 
updating of the BCP creating a feedback loop. This continuous cycle of the BCP, its 
development, implementation, improvement, made the BCP constantly up-to-date with 
the evaluative business environment, a clear and recognised risk management approach 
throughout the life cycle of the facility (construction / maintenance / refurbishment) and 
its interaction with the business objectives. 
All these systems of course interact with their environment and consider the legal system in 
place as well as the organisation. Figure 9.2 expresses these interrelationships. 
Each system was spread across the three main stages of the project cycle: Pre-Construction; 
Construction; and Post-Construction / Life Cycle / Sustainability of the facility. 
The author's definition of a construction site addressed these phases: any facilities where 
there is new construction taking place, where modifications are being made to the existing 
facilities, and/or there are maintenance works being undertaken in part or all of the premises. 
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Figure 8.5: Prospective FSMM - Model A. 
The role of the organisation to implement the fire safety management strategy was 
fundamental to the success of the Model. The project management was core to the 
development of the procedure or processes and its documentation, but interaction with the 
environment (cultural and technological), the organisational needs and objectives (both of the 
contractors and clients), the legal framework and its requirements were determining the 
overall framework of implementation of the FSMM. Figure 8.6 illustrated this interaction 
between the systems. There wasn't one single solution for all sites, but one solution of each 
different site. 
Planification Operational 
System 
>--ý 
System 
Organisation / 
Project 
Management 
Continuity 
Recovery 
System System / 
Figure 8.6: Systems Interrelationships 
Active 
Systeme 
The FSMM aimed to offer this flexibility and allow for changes: managerial changes, 
organisational, cultural, legal, environmental... The success of the Model was based on the 
full understanding of the need to consider each system independently and develop a set of 
procedures or plans around the systems, but also to consider its overlap and interaction with 
other systems either already in place, or under implementation. The FSMM also aimed to 
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achieve corporate objectives or initiatives within the company. These needs and requirements 
must also be taken into account when developing and implementing the FSMM. 
The Project Matrix below represented, in two dimensions, the essential components of the 
FSMM. Earlier in this chapter, the author defined each system and discussed the interaction 
of these systems with each other's. 
A 
N 
E 
0 
N 
U) 
mergency 
and Business 
Disaster Business 
Continuity Impact Recovery Continuity 
Systems 
Analysis Plan Plan 
Operational Risk FSP FSP 
and Active 
Systemsf Programme HSP HSP 
Planification Risk Risk 
Risk Control 
System Assessment Management and Monitoring 
Project Y Conception Execution Exploitation 
rnases OT the 
Projet 
Figure 8.7: Project Matrix 
Interaction and overlapping of the systems was one flexibility of the Model. However the 
strategy for implementation considers a clear order in the FSMM. Preventative actions are the 
main focus of the Model and it also considers a cycle as illustrated in Figure 8.8 below. 
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Active 
System 
System 
Planification 
Figure 8.8: The systems and their cycle 
8.3.2 Expert Review with French 
recommendations of the Panel. 
emergency 
System 
Continuity 
System 
Analysis and 
Expert Panel: the outcomes and 
Prior to the expert seminar, each member of the French expert committee was sent a copy of 
the interim report for review. The content of this report was discussed in chapter 6: Research 
Concept, as well as the format of analysis of the prospective fire safety management model. 
In the following section, the author analysed the results and outcomes of the expert review 
and synthesis the major recommendations of the expert panel. 
The first element of discussion focussed on the problem of definition of a site. In chapter 2 
of this thesis, the author discussed the current definition of a site and argued for a broader 
assessment of the scope of a site and a clearer definition. The author defined construction site 
as any facilities where there is new construction taking place, where modifications are being 
made to the existing facilities, and/or there are maintenance works being undertaken in part 
or all of the premises. It was also important to define what did we meant by a construction 
activity: A construction activity is a work operation outside the normal use of the facility: new 
constructions, alterations, refurbishment, change-in-use, maintenance and/or demolition. 
Members of the French expert panel supported this approach and the need to wider the scope 
of the definition to take into account the full life cycle of the facility: Execution, Exploitation, 
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Refurbishment and Demolition. One particularity of the French legislation is an overlap of the 
legislation between facilities under construction and in phase of exploitation. However 
maintenance activities were not categorised as sites, but the intervention of an external 
organisation in existing facilities and in use, is under a separate decree. 
Following on this problem of categorisation of sites and fire incidents in construction 
activities, a discussion was developed around the aspects of statistical data. Four issues were 
raised: 
0 Lack of quantitative data: like in the UK, access to reliable statistical data was difficult. 
First due to the problem of definition of a site. Statistics are collected by the Fire Brigade, 
the Association of Insurers (APSAD/FFSA) and the Government. The most 
comprehensive data are collected by the Fire Brigade which recognises different 
categories: 
" Nature / Origin of the fire: construction industry, temporary constructions (external 
risks), 
" Location of fire: site accommodations and facilities, open sites. 
" Cause of fires: energy, explosions, other sources of ignition. 
" Classification and categorisation of data unclear: once again it was impossible to collect 
an accurate number of construction sites fires and thereby carry out a quantitative 
analysis. One of the member of the Expert Panel, Schaal (2001) argued this problem of 
categorisation and Celardo (2001) argued for a need to "reformulate the statistical 
classification to enhance statistical research outside of the scope of insurance 
organisations. " He later raised the issue of the concern to categorise the fires in the right 
category, as a site, and not as its exploitation aim. Tephany (2001) restated he was 
"surprised the APASAD does not collect a sound set of information. " 
" No codification: Whether it came from a problem of classification of information or 
definition of each category, it the longer future it was argued that codification could be 
used to help the collection and classification of fires. 
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0 The collection and dissemination of the data restricted: The access to statistical data being 
restricted and unreliable, the author argued that an effort should be made by the insurance 
companies to collect and categorise their own data. Celardo (2001) argued it was due to 
"a problem of mentality and the concept was affected by time. " For historic buildings, 
Shaal (2001) added that an initiative to collect information at the EU level to coordinate 
the collection and analysis of statistics in historic buildings was developed by the Michel 
Angelo Commission. The reinsurance companies (Munich Re., Swiss Re) provide the 
most comprehensive set of data but it is restricted to CAR insurance, and not EAR and 
property insurance (Paulczinsky, 2001). 
An attempt to discuss the validity of a short quantitative analysis of construction site fires, 
across a sample of 50 major fires in the UK was presented. The outcomes of the review were 
not conclusive and the panel agreed that 5% of the fires analysed in this mini research is not 
significative and representative of the construction industry problem and the depth of the 
research. 
However in the long term, a need to develop a quantitative approach would be necessary and 
should look at the number, causes, consequences, losses/damages of construction related fires. 
An in-depth research would include a broader analysis of the data and extracting results from 
comparing: 
" Losses vs. total surface of facility: smoke could damage an atrium of 6,000m3 and the 
cost of repair could only include cleaning. However, the loss of an archive room of 30m3, 
like in the FR Factory (1994) fire, could cost £, 000s to repair and recover. This might 
actually explain the large losses following the Broadgate (1990) and Minster Court (1991) 
fires in London and the high cost of construction and destructive behaviour of the fire. 
" Losses vs. value of the facility: in certain cases, losses could be difficult to assess, 
especially where facilities are of a special value. The loss of archives and valuable stock 
usually not replaceable like art pieces, museum items, collectable items, libraries and 
special book collection; are typical example of the need to consider losses vs. value of the 
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facility. The fire safety management model argues the need to consider the 
implementation of contingency plans to response major fire disasters. 
" Losses vs. insurance premium: an insurance premium was usually around the 0.03% of 
the value of the property. Insurers would calculate the Maximum Estimated Loss and 
provide a cover for this maximum loss. 
The Expert Panel recognised the problem of access of statistics and advanced that their 
organisation (Paulczinsky, 2001) would be able "to extract proper statistics with minimum 
changes to recording method and of the process. " Celardo (2001) added that this was "a 
message to send to the organisation worldwide. " 
Pressure to approach the research from a qualitative angle, rather than quantitative: 
Because the analysis across 50 major fires (section 2.2.2) was not significant (Schaal, 2001; 
Tephany, 2001), there was pressure to move towards a qualitative analysis. 
A misunderstanding and overlapping of current and existing obligations, duties and 
responsibilities of the parties involved was a significant problem. Schaal (2001) argued that 
outside the scope of public facilities (which have a specific set of regulation in France) it was 
difficult to target the adequate and right regulation. The author advanced that in the UK, 
actions to enhance fire safety on construction sites was clear through the publication of the 
JCOP, special perils clauses in insurance contract, the new edition of the standard forms of 
contract with compulsory compliance with the Fire Code (JCOP); however it took 10 years to 
implement (1990-2000). France was far behind and-the implementation of a similar structure 
to the UK could take years. Celardo (2001) argued that "we can't say nothing exists in 
France: the health & safety plan is required. " But "the requirements is to appoint a Planning 
Supervisor but not directly in fire safety" (Tephany, 2001). Risk of the duplication of work, 
overlapping of current requirements must be taken into account when modifying the FSMM. 
As explained in chapter 2, France had a very strong health & safety regulatory framework, 
which proved to be very efficient. However there wasn't any requirements for fire safety on 
construction sites. The strengths of the UK framework lied within their fire safety approach, 
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integrated within the health & safety framework. Paulczinsky (2001) stressed the importance 
of the client's role to implement the approach because of the cost of fire safety. Consequently 
as the same time the regulatory framework is modified, a cultural change was required. 
Paulczinsky and Celardo supported this idea. This later questioned the problem of delegation 
of responsibilities and transfer of responsibilities for fire safety. Because there wasn't a clear 
definition of the responsibilities for fire safety on construction sites, often contracts were used 
to transfer the risks: 
Client 
------------- 
Contractor 
------------- 
Insurer 
Figure 8.9: Transfer of risk 
--- Contract 
Insurance 
Another problem occured between the conception and execution phase. Schaal (2001) argued 
that the Architect was often the planning supervisor but there was no obligation to appoint the 
planning supervisor at the conception stage. A problem of transfer of responsibilities could 
occur. Celardo (2001) recognised that "the contractors need to be more engaged into the 
approach. " And added, "there is only a contractual requirement to implement this. " The 
confusion on the application of the law on fire safety to construction sites still remains 
unclear. Under the French Code du Travail and Decree 1993 considered, construction sites 
were recognised but the measures include general requirements. The Decrees of 92 and 94 
were more specific on the need for a detailed risk assessment and the compliance with health 
and safety requirements, including specific provisions for fire safety. These regulatory 
documents were discussed in the section 2.2. This last comment took us back to the problem 
of the definition of a site as it was not always recognised as a place of work. And Tephany 
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(2001) argued that "it is important because a text designed for finished facilities can be apply 
to a site situation. " 
Schaal (2001) recognised there was a need for a regulatory framework under three types of 
obligations: regulatory, contractual and policy (insurance). There was a need to enhance loss 
prevention to develop awareness amongst participants to the construction process and develop 
Control, verification and inspection through the insurer. 
An adequate assessment of the risks at the conception stage was essential to identify 
potential fire hazards during the construction stage and how a transfer of the facility to the 
owner and into an exploitation stage carry on the risks. Schaal (2001) argued that the idea 
could be based around the development of a SWOT analysis in a construction situation. A 
risk assessment approach was not systematic and not a requirement under the regulation. 
Core and non-core activities could be identified and a response structure developed around 
the existing structure implemented to support a free fire environment. Tephany (2001) added 
that there are documents of reference for these aspects of the model. The International 
Standard Organisation (ISO) /Sub Committee 4 was currently working on the development of 
a standard and it seemed the analysis focus more on the exploitation phase. Baron (2001) 
highlighted the need to have a dynamic management to support the implementation of the 
model and efficient monitoring and control of the strategy. 
The second part of the expert review required the critical analysis of the Model A and to 
provide recommendations on improvement. 
The first elements of discussion focussed on the definitions of a `Model', `System', and 
`Plan'. In section 8.2, the author detailed the definition of a system and reviewed and 
discussed existing models in fire safety. This analysis was not integrated in the Interim report 
submitted for review to the Expert Panel. Also, the members of the panel were professionals 
with extensive working experience in the industry. The concept of `Model' and `System' was 
not common into their working environment and they didn't feel particularly easy about the 
use of systems. The basic understanding of a `Model' was based on the idea of a graphical 
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representation which can be followed to develop an action. The concept the author was trying 
to demonstrate was the idea of the development of a Model to enhance the implementation of 
a fire safety management strategy in organisations. However the notion of `Plan' was very 
clear in their mind. 
The Expert Panel agreed that the principles of fire safety on construction sites were all 
addressed in the FSMM: 
0 The strengths lied within: 
" Choice of systems and plans: the notion of life cycle was determinant into the 
strengths of the Model and its integration within the overall safety strategy. 
0 Integration of the full life cycle of the facility: Conception / Execution / 
Exploitation. Tephany (2001) argued that the new idea of the research lies within the 
Global approach to fire safety and prevention. 
0 Involvement of the insurer was key in the process of implementation and 
development of the fire safety framework. The earlier involvement of the insurer, 
usually at the conception stage, could be a break through the implementation of the 
fire safety strategy. With CAR insurance, often parties take a joint cover and the 
insurance policy was then transferred from the contractor at the execution stage to the 
client at the exploitation stage. Celardo (2001) stated that risk analysis was based on a 
general insurer approach and Schaal (2001) added that through a better relationship 
between client and insurer, the insurer could raise awareness of risk to the client and 
enforce the implementation of fire safety strategy. 
" Risk assessment and risk mapping approach was essential: Schaal (2001) reflected 
on the use of the model and comments that "it is the sort of model which would 
enable the client to analyse the risk which would affect its organisation's activities. 
He then might decide to delegate responsibilities or transfer some of the risks through 
the contractual agreement. " 
322 
0 Weaknesses were also highlighted in the review and analysis of the model: 
9 Inflexibility of the Model: the two page Model was totally inflexible and the author 
could observe the two teams had problem to read the document, interpret the data and 
use the model against the hypothetical scenario. They didn't know how to start and 
where to start. Because the general understanding is that a risk analysis should be 
carried out prior to develop a strategy, this risk approach was missing. Tephany 
(2001) reported that there was a need to work on the matrix of the model and develop 
a simplified approach. Celardo (2001) admitted it was "not practical" and that the 
execution phase should separate from the exploitation phase. However, as explained 
earlier, the idea of the model was to develop a global approach throughout the full life 
cycle of the project. 
" Need for a more ergonomic Model: Bordas and Baron (2001) criticised the heavy 
format of the model and its lack of ergonomics. He later recommended, without 
conviction, that a 3D model would be ideal to demonstrate the depth of the strategy 
and it fits within the overall process. 
" More adaptable to change and different project format: the model should fit 
within the existing structure, which is to date very disparate. However a strong health 
and safety structure already exist and proved to be efficient and could be modified 
and adapted to suit the integration of a fire safety approach. 
" Consider a separate Model for New construction / Maintenance / Refurbishment: 
the author believed that this comment lied within the lack of flexibility of Model A as 
presented to the French Expert Panel and at the first review. The next section of this 
chapter will detail the second development of the model and its improvement. 
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Half of the members of the expert panel were working for insurance organisations and their 
recommendations were then aimed to insurers and their own interest. However a number if 
were very relevant to the development and improvement of the FSMM A. 
Insurer's involvement: 
0 Cooperation 
0 Participation in the development of a risk assessment programme and analysis 
9 Improve risk programming 
0 Enforce risk inspection 
" Enhance loss prevention 
0 Maintain the use of specific insurance clauses: Specific perils, Business Interruption, 
CAR/EAR/CEP 
" Enforcement of the compliance with a code of practice equivalent to JCOP throughout the 
project cycle 
" Integration of a fire safety approach in the full life cycle 
The Expert Panel however concluded that the client would be in the best contractual position 
to support the implementation of the model throughout the project cycle, as there are involved 
at all stages of the project: conception (design and development of the contractual 
agreements), execution (project management and administration of the contractual 
agreements), exploitation (maintenance operations under the direction of the client, 
refurbishment works directed by the client). 
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Client 
it 
Insurer 
Information 
-------sharing 
Contractor 
Figure 8.10: Contractual relationship and the exchange of information 
8.3.2.1 Recommendations: 
The recommendations of the French expert panel could be summarised as follow and in 
Figure 8.11: 
0 Increase the flexibility of the FSMM and its ergonomics 
" Consider existing obligations 
0 Improve cooperation between Client/Insurer/Contractor(s) 
0 Project matrix needs to develop in order to enhance a better understanding of the 
approach and its global concept 
" Enforce compliance through: 
" Insurance Clauses 
0 Contractual documents and agreement 
0 Regulation 
0 Develop Risk Mapping: event/fault trees 
" Propose a ready to use Model, clear with all information available on the Model and 
presented in a simple way. 
" Consider the visual impact of the Model for the user 
"A 3D Model? 
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8.4 Model B: Modified Fire Safety Management Model (FSMM B). 
The observation and recommendations extracted from the French Expert Panel Review 
contributed to greatly modified the existing FSMM and create an interactive Model which 
would answer the need of the professionals and targeted to the principal users: the client or 
employer. 
The paper version developed in Model A presented a lot of inflexibility in its design. Based 
on the recommendations of the Expert Panel in France and their observations, the author 
remodelled the framework in a more dynamic way, allowing more changes and flexibility on 
the structure. 
One key issue addressed on the day of the expert review, was the idea of developing a project 
management tool in the shape of a project matrix. This matrix could then be developed in 3D 
or with multi-layers. The complexity of the process and the approach required a much more 
thorough analysis and in-depth format. Based on the idea of a project matrix, the FSMM A 
was redeveloped and modified to fit within a matrix. The Table 8.2 below showed this Project 
Matrix. The same information have been transferred from Model A to Model B but presented 
in a different way. 
In a second moment, the idea of risk management was developed in parallel to Model B to 
complement our existing matrix. The concept of construction fire safety as it stand, did not 
provide a proper risk management approach in construction and certainly not a systematic risk 
management. The role insurance companies played in raising awareness and promoting risk 
management was significant but not systematic. It seemed that only major projects and clients 
would benefit from this approach, especially when organisations transfer major risks to their 
insurer. The extensive work of reinsurance in developing a detailed risk management 
framework for their major clients demonstrates a raise of concern. The existing fire safety 
framework was mainly developed and implemented through the Joint Code of Practice for fire 
prevention (JCOP) and provided only a short paragraph and reference to risk management. 
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Three key issues emerged from this analysis: 
" The need to develop a more extensive and flexible fire safety framework 
0 Systematic risk assessment and the implementation of a proper risk management strategy 
0 Integrated fire safety model within the existing framework 
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8.5 Model C: Interactive Fire Safety Management Model (FSMM C) 
Model B was sent to members of the UK Expert Panel for review and analysis. The same 
interim report was submitted to the UK members but the format of the FSMM had been 
modified in accordance with the recommendations of the French Expert Panel. A second 
expert seminar was then planned and the same structure of analysis was used for the UK and 
French seminar. The hypothetical scenario did not change and the evaluation form remains 
the same. 
After reflection on the modifications of Model B, the author worked on the idea of a 3D 
model, a recommendation expressed by the French expert panel. Model B was now slightly 
more flexible and the idea of a project Matrix enhance the format of the FSMM. However, it 
was the intention of the author to develop a guide alongside the Model and transform the 
FSMM into a managerial tool for fire prevention in construction operations. A series of 
document to support the implementation of the Model was therefore developed. These 
documents provide some background on the Model development, key benefits, business key 
factors, as listed below: 
Key benefits: 
 Enhance fire safety 
contractors/subcontractors, 
awareness amongst construction participants: 
designers/consultants, insurers/re-insurers, 
clients, 
planning 
supervisor... 
 Improve control over the level of fire safety during the construction process: new 
construction, maintenance, refurbishment/renovation... 
 Minimise business interruptions and the impact on the normal running of business 
 Provide a business continuity throughout the building life cycle and its sustainability 
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Business key factors: 
 Better Business Environment: modify organisational structure, enhance strategic 
objectives, improve legal framework 
 Improve Business Strategy: project risk management (project management, safety 
management, business management) and risk identification 
 Reduction and Control of Business Interruption 
 Control of the impact of damages to life, property and the business as a whole 
Key areas of focus: 
 Failure scenarios and lessons learnt from their critical analysis. 
 Expert reviewers advice and recommendations to enhance Fire Safety Management 
Model and the overall approach 
8.5.1 A step-by-step guide to use the Interactive Fire Safety Management 
Model 
In order to support the implementation of the FSMM in organisations, it has been necessary to 
develop in parallel to the FSMM a set of guidance and notes on the use of the model and the 
interrelationship between the systems and plan, and the risk management approach. A step- 
by-step guide was developed and is presented below. The full links of the FSMIM integral 
framework can be explored in the CD-ROM provided in Appendix C. 
Step 1: Project Specifications 
Conception 
Collect Project Data and Specifications 
Go to Project Specifications 
Go to Legal and Contractual Obligations 
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Step 2: Risk Management 
i wo important activities in a system Tor tire prevention are fundamental to fire safety 
management: 
0 the collection of information about fire risks; and 
9 the analysis and summarising of this information. 
Go to Risk Approach 
Conception 
Carry out a Risk Assessment Exercise to determine a Risk Management Programme 
Devise a Risk Management Strategy 
Go to Risk Management Framework 
Go to Response Structure 
Step 3: Project Safety Case 
Build up a project safety case to support the organisation's safety management 
Go to Project Safety Case 
Operational 
Define your Health & Safety Plan and separate Fire Safety Plan 
Go to Management of Construction Safety (Croner's Guide) 
Go to JCOP for Fire Prevention on Construction Sites 
Active 
Develop a Fire Protection Plan supported by a proper Fire Safety Management Strategy 
Go to Management of Construction Safety (Croner's Guide) 
Design a contingency plan to cope with Disasters (fire, flood, lightning, shortage of 
supplies... ) 
Go to Contingency Plan 
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Continuity 
Develop a Business Continuity Plan to avoid and control business interruption 
Go to Contingency Plan 
Step 4: Risk Log and Record Keeping 
Keep adequate records of a very wide range of fire safety related actions. 
Go to Fire Safety Log Book (FPA) 
Step 5: Action Plans 
Devise some Action Plans to improve fire safety and enhance its full integration within the 
project life cycle. 
Go to Action Plans 
The Fire Safety Management Model considered a global approach towards fire prevention on 
construction sites and for a given organisation. The set of requirements highlighted in the 
Model were generic and will greatly benefit from being refined and adapted by the 
organisation using it. However the framework proposed in this research must be considered in 
full, from the conception of the project, its construction and finally throughout the stages of 
life cycle of the property: maintenance and refurbishment. It is a perpetual Model, flexible 
and adaptable to change. The critical analysis is summarised in Figure 8.12. 
8.5.2 FSMM's Schematic Framework: 
To demonstrate the interrelationship between each phases and risk assessment and 
management is articulated within the global strategy, the author prepared a schematic 
framework represented in Figure 8.13. 
Model C was then sent to the members of the UK Expert Committee 
for review. 
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8.5.3 Expert Review with the UK Expert Committee: the outcomes and 
recommendations of the Panel. 
The members of the UK expert committee had equivalent positions and responsibilities from 
the members of the French expert committee: risks engineers, facilities managers, 
representative of the association of insurers, member of the fire protection association, loss 
prevention council. Much parallel can be draw between the outcomes of the French review 
and the UK one. The next chapter compares and contrasts the findings of both expert 
seminars and discussed these results against the FSMM structure and implementation. 
The following section presents the outcomes of the UK expert Panel and analysed the results 
and did they contribute to improve the Model C. 
The members of the expert seminars expected to learn about the problem of fire safety on 
construction sites, and to try to understand the mechanism lying behind the existing fire safety 
framework. Concern on fire risk assessment (Mapp and Lewis) were raised at the beginning 
of the meeting. The JCOP was also a concern (Mapp and Hautefeuille). The idea of profits 
and minimising losses were strong in the mind of insurers, as they were directly concern by 
the losses (Hautefeuille and Reiner). The concept of control and implementation of the model 
were a strong concern for the two facilities managers (Foley and Fisher) and how it would fit 
within the existing framework. 
Categorisation of construction sites: Like in the French expert seminar, one of the first 
elements of discussion focussed on the collection of statistical data and their analysis. The 
argument for the need to move towards a qualitative approach in the absence of access to 
quantitative data was once again stressed. Lewis (FPA) confirmed that "most of the statistics 
on fires on sites in occupied buildings is lost. 80% of the total number of construction sites 
fires are classified under headings of industry, not as construction sites fires. " Fires are 
recorded but in the wrong category. 
Problem of collection of data and unavailability of a large proportion of the fires with 
losses 
£50,000 (not recorded in the statistics): Lewis (2001) confirmed, on behalf of the FPA that 
it 
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was not possible to assess the total extend of the problem and total number of fires on 
construction sites. One difficulty raised by Lewis was the problem of recording of 
information by the Fire Brigade. There was pressure to simplify the fire investigation report 
and reduce its size. However the last modifications saw a simplification from 4 pages up to 12 
pages (draft document). Moreover information were missing or misleading. 
Figure 8.14: Distribution of fires: The `Driver'. 
This last point drove issues of qualitative dimensions to the fire and the research approach. 
The author early in the research approach decided to concentrate on a qualitative review and 
analysis of construction site fire scenarios and extract major findings which contributed to 
develop the FSMM. The qualitative framework of the model emerged from a lack of 
quantitative data. 
This lack of statistical data and research on construction site fire safety proved the 
problem was not acknowledged corporately despite the JCOP compliance, The JCOP 
focussed on construction sites only, not maintenance phase. The definition of a construction 
site was not clear and there are difficulties to recognise a maintenance activities as 
construction works. 
The author argued that insurance organisations did record enough data to identify a 
construction site, and use sub-categories to clarify the situation of the facility at the time of 
the fire. Also the type of insurance subscribed (CAR/EAR) helped to identify construction 
sites and extract the right information. Unfortunately, insurance archives were destroyed after 
two years and files were classified as soon as the claim was closed. 
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These elements explained the complexity of the problem and the research. A case was built 
to examine the role of managerial and technical failures in fire scenarios in order to 
develop a sound approach to fire safety on construction sites. 
Need to raise awareness: Overall, the research findings collected in interviews and the 
outcomes of the construction fire safety failure scenarios revealed that organisations 
concerned in construction activities tend to overlook disaster recovery and business 
continuity. Other issues emerged from the cases and a list of lessons learnt was extracted. 
Hautefeuille (2001) reported that "the insurance industry finds it difficult to get clients to 
accept the higher bids which include risk assessment and a business continuity approach. " 
Risk assessment: The research also highlighted the lack of risk assessment and the non 
systematic risk approach in the construction industry. Mapp (2001) argued that the insurer has 
no influence on the design process and cannot be part of the full risk management approach. 
Design was a major cause of construction risks and construction cause unseen risks from 
design. 
0 Business risk assessment: Hautefeuille (2001) explained that "as soon as an employer 
hands over the contract to the contractor is not anymore liable for any sort of risks. There 
was a complete transfer of the risks to the contractor. It is down to the contractor to carry 
out a risk assessment during the building process. " Mapp (2001) highlighted another 
problem linked to risk assessment and design. He reported that "the risk assessment 
process should start at the conception right through to completion, and the contractor can 
place risks which are created at the design process, by lack of awareness and vice versa. " 
The contract which enables to transfer the risks throughout the procurement route is an 
important tool in the fire safety management. The contract encourages transfer down the 
chain: 
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There was no obligation to carry out a risk assessment and the insurer couldn't put too much 
pressure on their clients to enforce it. The involvement of the Fire Brigade in helping to assess 
the risk was raised. There were again no obligations to declare the site to the fire brigade but 
on large sites, the fire brigade should be aware of the site and its layout. Reiner (2001) 
reported that the fire brigade was usually happy to inspect the site but the risk assessment 
needs to pull this. However Mapp (2001) argued that the Fire Brigade didn't always come 
when invited. The majority and small sites were not inspected. At a local level it is not clear 
although there is a high level of commitment. "the fire brigade visits relates to the weather. 
When the sun shines. When asked why, they answered that they don't want to bug down on 
site while an emergency call is issued. " Reiner added that "it is a new element. " 
The author raised the minimal risk of life loss on sites which could explain the low 
involvement of the fire brigade on site. Reiner argued that they rightly focussed on life safety. 
Lewis agreed that "the fire brigade should be monitoring the high risks at areas and should 
make recommendations, and yes there can be potential for life loss on site, but where 
refurbishment and extension, the fire brigade makes inspection visits on request. 
Implementing better fire safety by design was also one of the lessons learnt from the 
construction site fire safety failures. These issues limited the scope of the contractor to 
improve design to provide a higher level of fire safety as the contractor didn't have the 
control of the design phase and couldn't influence the design. The problem was therefore at 
the conception stage and in the hand of the client and its design team. The use of a 
different 
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Transfer of risks 
procurement strategy like Design and Build would allow the contractor to modify and adapt 
the design to his needs at a construction stage. However the cost implication was predominant 
and often led client s to reject a feasible project scheme. Lewis (2001) argued the need to 
consider a fire safety engineering approach and stated: "FSE is particularly relevant where 
fire protection systems can be made functional as work goes on. Passive systems is 
impossible on a daily basis. " The use of a fire safety engineering approach for construction 
site fire safety was argued in chapter 2 of this thesis and the author concluded that the FSE 
method proposed in the BS DD240 (1997) had some limits into its application to construction 
sites. However the concept of qualitative design review was argued to provide valuable 
information for decision making at the conception stage. Mapp (2001) added that it was more 
and more common to use and installed temporary fire protection measures to ensure a 
minimum level of safety on site, combined with the zoning of the construction site in case of 
emergency. This technique would benefit from being further explore and analyse to see how it 
would fit within the existing construction process. Mapp argued for a move from prescriptive 
approach into performance specifications. However risk assessment may be neglected or 
misjudged and could lead to major consequences. Hautefeuille (2001) argued that a 
`reasonable' risk assessment varies between viewers. There was no consistent model across 
perceptions and risk assessment. Consistency protocol was needed. " This idea of protocol 
was supported by Mapp. Foley (2001) argued for the need to build in the impact of business 
matters more than cost of physical fabric at risk on site, and the concept of loss of income to 
the contractor. The author would like to see the promotion of a less adversarial stance and 
slow uptakes supported by a cultural change and Mapp added the value to agree benefits to 
implement the fire safety process. Hautefeuille (2001) argued the industry was under health 
and safety pressure with the CDM Regs and the implementation of EU directives. The 
industry seemed to provide a slow response to this change and still dealing with unknovvii 
investment issues, unknown liquidated damages. 
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The Expert Committee questioned the real extend of the problem of fire on construction 
sites and its threats to businesses. Reiner (2001) argued that fire was not the real threat for 
many projects, and insurance organisation consider flood also as a major problem. So "fire is 
not on the agenda. " Reiner considered the Dusseldorf fire as "an unfortunate mistake" rather 
than a fire which was significant of the all industry. Lewis (2001) added that the 90s fires 
have been related to an economic cycle. This issue was also raised in an interview with the 
FPA Executive Director who stressed on the relation between high losses and a high value of 
the facility. In the case of Broadgate and Minster Court, they were unusual projects with a 
higher construction budget compared to other sites. The fact both fires happened at the 
beginning of the 90s might be hazards and if they had occurred in other circumstances, at 
other time it wouldn't have had such a major impact on the industry. Other EU countries like 
France and Germany (Reiner) didn't have similar problem, or maybe they didn't experienced 
major fires like in the UK. Reiner recognised that the Munich Re. has never been worrying 
about fires on German construction sites as with the UK. Mapp (2001) commented on the 
better waste management of sites since the mid-90s which could explain a reduction of fires. 
Hautefeuille (2001) argued the radical approach of the French system compared to the UK 
with high potential fines for non compliance with health and safety law. The UK safety 
seemed to be behind maybe due to a problem of attitude, or organisations were not facing 
the same threat. The JCOP addressed a problem at the time while it wasn't a problem in 
France. Moreover France had a different organisational point. It was a cultural issue and 
strongly linked to the legislative framework. The example of Japan (Hinks, 2001) 
demonstrated the systematic improvement drive. Risks were managed on a daily basis. The 
success of this approach was based a strong collaboration of the parties. A question emerged 
in the discussion: were we dealing with the lack of system in France which actually created a 
better situation, whereby in the UK we were trying to deal with problems which did not occur 
in France? "The UK is trying to put better system to solve the problem whereby the Japanese 
focus on avoiding the problem" (Hinks, 2001). Mapp (2001) commented on the "change of 
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attitude of workers on site" and argued that an individual change of culture would be more 
efficient than a corporate change as the large proportion of fires are small fires and their 
source of ignition is down to individuals. The author insisted on the lack of penalties in the 
UK system compared to the French system, which motivates individual attitude and 
perception of safety. Hautefeuille (2001) insisted on the extend of the penalties at an 
individual level. The site manager has an individual responsibility of safety. Mapp (2001) 
argued for a need to pull out the issues in the JCOP which are directly related to the workers 
responsibility and those under the responsibility of the contractor, supported by the 
implementation of a penalty system. Hautefeuille (2001) argued for "a need to recognise the 
value of continued successful avoidance of incidents" and in a way promoting the charity 
donations as motivator to contractors. Unfortunately some of these systems encouraged under 
reporting or even competing to come at the bottom of the list (Mapp, 2001). 
There was an interesting setting of regulations according to function (Mapp, 2001) and scope 
for insurers to reward compliance and encourage risk assessment, management and control. 
The need to have a process for fire risk assessment for planners was an essential element 
of the success of a fire safety approach on construction sites. Mapp (2001) suggested the 
need to develop section 5 and 8 of the JCOP for risk assessment and "the lack of process" in 
the JCOP to support the approach. Mapp (2001) argued to "think about a dynamic process 
of construction" and the need for planners and designers to have their awareness raised. 
The idea of cultural change to support the implementation of the fire safety process was 
discussed, especially coming from the top. 
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Figure 8.15: Corporate Cultural Change 
The figure above illustrated the different layers of management and how they could activate 
change. Procedures and documented processes would come from the bottom of the pyramidal 
organisational structure up to the top. The total implementation of the process needed to be 
supported by a project management structure illustrated in the next figure. 8.15. 
Figure 8.16: Operational Cultural Change 
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On the operational side, the management would be directly concerned by the implementation 
of the fire safety management process on site. Responsibilities for developing and 
implementing the systems and plans suggested in the FSMM are spread across the pyramid 
from top to bottom. 
The implementation of the Model calls for change in organisation. Hautefeuille argued for 
the need for "a corporate decisions and push" to support the implementation of the model. 
Mapp (2001) added "the need for continual reinforcement. " Fisher (2001) insisted on the role 
of the prime contractor in implementing the model at an operational level and the scope of the 
client to push to enforce compliance with JCOP. But how to be sure the contractor has the 
expertise to implement the process? Relying on another party to implement the process 
through the transfer of risks requires commitment, trust and control. Lewis (2001) suggested 
the idea of "certificate of competency" which is already applied in Scandinavian countries. 
The full process needs to be overshadowed by the client, because "if it comes from the 
employer, they have to do it" (Reiner, 2001). The cultural change needed the overall input of 
both the workforce and the management with a complete push from employers (Mapp, 2001). 
If the employer was to analyse the full facets of the risk properly and fully, then the knock on 
effects could lead to an adequate management of the risks. Mapp argued that there is a 
possibility to assess all the risks through a business continuity analysis and realise the 
potential losses your business would face if a construction related fire was breaking out. 
The need for contingency approach combined with a risk assessment and hazards 
management was essential to implement a successful fire safety management approach. 
Hinks (2001) argued that "devolving risk to contractor would be a negligence to shareholders, 
and that there is a need to emphasis the implementation of the fire safety management process 
through the employers. 
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Pressure: 
Concern over 
`negligence' to 
Shareholders 
Report 
Weaknesses 
Risk 
1 
Figure 8.17: The effect of Shareholders Pressure 
8.5.3.1 Recommendations: 
Develop 
Risk Assessment 
Impose BCP and 
Contingency Approach 
The recommendations of the expert panel following the analysis of the Model in relation to 
the hypothetical scenarios were formulated and are highlighted below. 
Cultural change: 
i. Individual and Corporate change to support the implementation of the Model. The 
Expert Panel insisted on the key role of the employer in initiating the cultural change, 
supported by the insurer to control and inspect compliance with the statutory JCOP. 
ii. Global integration: a change of culture from the top of the managerial structure, at a 
strategic level, to the bottom of the pyramid, at the operational level is required. 
iii. Operational level of the Model: the Model will not work if it is not fully implement at 
an operational level and fully supported by the management at a strategic level. 
Investment into safety (both technically and financially) is essential. 
Statutory regulations: 
" JCOP: the JCOP was part of the existing structure and needs to be integrated within the 
framework of implementation presented in the Model. 
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i. The JCOP should be adopted as a tool 
ii. However its use was limited (no use of section 5 and 8) 
iii. Unfortunately it was applicable to construction only and does not offer enough 
flexibility for change and use in maintenance projects. 
iv. No risk assessment process in the JCOP framework 
" CDM Regs 1994: the JCOP overlapped with the CDM Regs and brought confusion on the 
duties and responsibilities of the parties in health and safety, and fire safety. The 
preparation of the HSP was a requirement of the CDM Regs and the FSP should be 
developed separately. The Model highlighted the overlaps and interaction of the systems 
and plans. 
9 CDM limited to health and safety only. 
Contractual agreement: compliance with JCOP was now compulsory under the JCTs 
contracts. However there were rules registering the bespoke forms of contracts and no 
requirement to comply with JCOP. 
i. Very rigid, i. e. the JCT forms of contract 
ii. Align a set of prescriptive requirements 
iii. Should be bespoke forms of contact 
iv. Requires compliance with JCOP 
Insurance cover: the success of the JCOP implementation lied within the role of insurers in 
enforcing its implementation and compliance through the CAR and EAR insurance. 
i. No legal rule to control compliance with JCOP 
ii. Risk inspection (random of) and record keeping essential to formulate recommendations 
to improve fire safety management approach 
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Pre-qualification process and tender documents: much issues were raised about the need to 
set standards and problem of competencies of the contractors to develop and implement a 
sound fire safety process during construction activities. More control at a tender stage on the 
qualifications of the contractors, their internal fire safety management structure. Monitoring 
and control throughout the construction activities was also essential to ensure compliance. 
i. Should highlights standard to achieve 
ii. Introduce to top management rather than site management 
iii. Recommends adoption of FSMM and the JCOP as a complement 
iv. Formulate questionnaire and check list to control progress 
Implementation of FSMM: Like the French Expert Panel, the UK Expert Panel 
recommended the implementation of the FSMM through the employer. Cooperation and 
collaboration with the insurer would be essential to sustain compliance with the JCOP and 
enforce risk management. There was still a need to convince employers of potential losses. 
i. Through the client and the insurer 
ii. The FM cannot be considered at this stage as the profession is not fully recognised by 
the industry 
iii. Role of the planners in taking on the fire safety and using their pool of knowledge 
FSMM linked all the partners together: 
" Much concerns were raised on the overlap between the contractor/designer, the client and 
the insurer. 
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9 DISCUSSION 
9.1 Analysis of the data and findings 
The methodology followed to complete this research comprises five different stages detailed 
in chapter 5. The initial formulation of basic ideas through the development of the research 
proposal, the specification of research design after the literature review, followed by the 
fieldwork (site investigations), then the data processing and qualitative analysis and finally 
the writing of the final research report. The review and critical analysis of the fire safety 
management models through the two expert seminars were an excellent exercise to test the 
viability of the developed framework, the process of fire safety management during work 
operations and how the industry perceived the new managerial process. 
The following chapter intended to summarise and discuss the research findings and explore 
future development works to enhance the use of the proposed fire safety management model. 
The author explored the depth of knowledge covered in this research and how the project 
contributed to knowledge. The views of the Expert Committees were related on the steps 
forward and the applicability of the FSMM as a component (along the RAMP and the JCOP) 
in executing a broader client and contractor-oriented push towards better fire safety on site 
and managerial attitudes. In the following discussion, the author provided a retrospective 
vision of the research and its findings which have been interpreted with "a wisdom of 
hindsight". The final chapter concluded the thesis and provided recommendations for future 
works. 
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9.1.1 Research Analysis: 
As explained in the first chapters of this thesis, the research concept emerged after a lengthy 
literature review which revealed many gaps and a dearth of research in the field of fire safety 
management on construction sites. The comparison of legislative frameworks in the UK and 
France, and other EU countries, revealed a need to improve the existing framework and 
integrate the concept of fire safety as a separate element. There were many lessons we learnt 
from other countries and how their experience in fire safety can benefit our industry to 
prevent fires during the construction process. Certainly the proactive approach of the Canada 
in decentralising the legislative framework and offering more flexibility to adapt the national 
framework to local needs was a rational approach. The long term history of the US legislation 
for fire safety proved the importance of fire safety in the earlier part of the century, and 
especially applied to the construction of ships, which offer various engineering complexities 
(shape, function, type of risks, works in confined space, use and choice of material ... ). The 
pressure of the EU for harmonising legislation in Member States demonstrated the quality of 
a common approach and comparative process of development of the directives, and still 
allowing much flexibility for the implementation of the directives in Member States. The 
success of the implementation of CDM regulations (1994) in the UK and the 1994 Decree in 
France proved to increase the level of safety on site and redistribute the responsibilities 
equally between the parties. However the scope of the planning supervisor's EU regulation 
does not provide any direct recommendations for fire safety on site. The non statutory JCOP 
for fire prevention on construction sites seemed to have been a success but the lack of 
statistics on its use and efficiency limit the conclusions we can draw from its implementation 
in 1992. 
The research first focussed on the construction industry and the current state of research in the 
field of fire safety. The author explored the possibility of using a fire safety engineering 
approach but soon realised the limitations of this method for fires on construction sites. 
A 
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review and analysis of methods and techniques used in other industries, like offshore, 
chemical, ship building, revealed that some of the principles could have been transferred to a 
building process, but others were engineering based and didn't fit the construction principles. 
It has been necessary to go back to the basic principles registering the definition of 
construction sites in order to clearly assess the scope and boundaries of a site and explore the 
characteristics of the growth of a fire. The factors affecting the duration of the growth period 
of a fire taking into account a site characteristics were analysed and illustrated the complexity 
of the site, its geometrical change and how it affects the spread of fire within the construction 
facility. 
The cycle of analysis and pattern of the research process in this thesis was sequential and 
interactive. The collection and display of data started with the management of these data, and 
in a second time with the data analysis. Storage and retrieval of data which is at the heart of 
the data management was enhanced by the use of strict classification process of raw field 
notes, transcriptions of interviews over two years and a collection of relevant documentation 
and materials. The use of the qualitative software to enable an easier analysis and pull out the 
relationships between data helped to explore the full strengths of the data and how they will 
contribute to build up the fire safety management model. 
The outcomes of the critical analysis of the qualitative data and the formulation of a series of 
fire safety management models expressed the depth of the problem researched in this thesis 
and the benefits of implementing a fire safety process to prevent fires on construction sites. 
The series of schematic structures of the thesis, spread throughout this document, illustrates 
how ideas and findings contributed to build the FSMM and extract major findings from the 
complete research process. The process of critical analysis of the models was proved to 
be 
successful by presenting the results to two expert panels. The validation of the 
data was 
carefully thought through. However the scope of this research did not comprise the testing of 
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the Model and in the conclusion, the author suggested that further research should be carried 
out to test the FSMM in industry and how it fits within an organisational framework. 
9.1.2 Research Findings: 
The progressive research and accumulation of findings in order to develop the FSMM 
have been critically analysed in the previous chapters. The way in which the findings 
contributed to build up the models are presented in chapter 7 and 8. The results of the 
critical analysis are highlighted in Figure 9.1 below. It is now the right opportunity to discuss 
those findings and see how they contributed to knowledge in the field of fire safety. 
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This research assessed that unless the government and other safety bodies (HSE/HSC, FPA, 
ABI, LPC in the UK and the APSAD, OPPBTP, FFSA in France) implement a protocol of 
data mining and analysis and recognise the true extend of the problem, fires on construction 
sites will remain and continue to happen. The patterns of distribution of these fires will 
continue to deliver a large proportion of unknown and unrecorded small fires (<f 50,000 
/75,000), a series of medium size fires (>£75,000 to £500,000) and the unusual and 
exceptional large fires (>E500,000). This voluntary protocol of data collection could be 
compared to other statistical processes whereby accidents would not be recorded under an 
estimated loss (physical, financial, moral, and political). In trying to draw a parallel between 
construction site fires and car accidents, the government could have decide not to record 
accidents if no injury happened or no physical damages occurred. Such an approach would 
not permit an accurate assessment of the level of safety of the public roads infrastructure and 
would not enable the authorities in charge to make appropriate decisions on safety 
improvement without a true idea of the extend of the problem. Unfortunately today the author 
proved in this research that information regarding fires on construction sites were not 
collected because the current system does not allow for the collection of data on fires below 
£50,000 losses and/or where no injuries occurred, which eliminates a very large (and still 
unknown) proportion of the fires. Therefore ignoring the true facet of the problem the 
government is not in a position where he can react and take decision to improve the level of 
fire safety on sites. 
The interpretation of the results obtained from the literature review to develop the prospective 
fire safety management model (Model A) focussed on three main issues: 
i. The need for a global approach throughout the full life cycle of the facility and an 
Integral concept of fire safety 
ii. The needs for systems and plans to implement the fire safety management structure 
within the existing framework 
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iii. The necessity of an integration of a contingency process in the fire safety management 
approach to ensure business recovery and continuity 
Model A was presented to the French Expert Committee for review and analysis and the 
outcomes of this expert seminar revealed many weakness in the existing structure and the 
prospective model. The recommendations focussed on several areas: the structure and 
flexibility of the model, its integration within the existing safety framework, and the 
development of risk management framework throughout the full life cycle of the facility. 
Based on these recommendations, Model B was completely redeveloped and its structure 
rethought through in order to address the recommendations of the experts. The objective was 
to present the second FSMM to the UK expert committee for a deeper critical analysis as the 
UK is more advanced than France on fire safety issues on construction sites. Model B 
addressed the recommendations of the French expert committee but did not provide enough 
flexibility and adaptability as required. The author worked on developing the model in a more 
interactive version using innovative graphic techniques. To enhance the presentation of the 
FSMM and optimise the use and display of information and their links with the research 
findings, the author decided to present the model in html format (used for web sites design). 
The results of this work was loaded on a CD-ROM where the users could explore the format 
of the FSMM, using the step-by-step guide and any supporting information linked to each 
phase of the development. Model C was created and presented as professional executive tool 
to raise awareness of fire safety during construction operation and offer to the user 
(employer/client, contractor/sub-contractor, design team, insurer... ) a ready to use executive 
tool. The quality and depth of the qualitative analysis demonstrated the success the research 
concept and how the findings fit within the development of the FSMM and its relevance 
for 
the industry. 
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Many parallel can be draw from the observations and recommendations of the expert panels 
even if they each analysed two separate models. As our literature review confirmed, there is a 
dearth of research in fire safety on construction sites, and a need to focus on a qualitative 
analysis of the problem rather than moving directly towards a quantitative analysis. 
The life cycle concept of the FSMM was widely discussed with the experts and they 
recognised that the innovative concept of the model lied within its integration throughout the 
full life cycle of the project. From an early stage of the development of the fire safety 
framework, the concept of phases (conception, execution, and exploitation) has been 
recognised, as well as the translation of these findings through systems and plans which 
interact throughout the process. The current legislative framework for safety on construction 
sites focuses on health and safety matters during the construction and refurbishment 
(execution) periods and tends to ignore other site circumstances (maintenance operations). 
The FSMM aimed to address the problem of fire safety throughout the full life cycle of the 
project, from conception through execution and exploitation. 
The adoption of the FSMM as part of the Employer's risk assessment / risk management 
strategy encourages them to consider the construction project as part of their on-going 
business activity will encourage Employers. It relieves the "mental block of having a fire" and 
they accept that their businesses might be at risk which would affect the continuity of the 
business activities for all parties. The role of the insurer in enforcing this new fire safety 
concept on construction sites already proved to be successful with the development and 
implementation of the JCOP in the 1990s. The integration of the concept in the existing 
safety structure (legislative, contractual, perceptual, social, political, financial, and 
economical) would be an essential factor to enable the organisations to adopt the FSMM as an 
integral organisational tool. The implication of cost and finance of fire safety of 
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construction operations was a major issue as there is still a general belief that safety should 
be improve but it shouldn't cost. 
The underlying rationale of Business Continuity is to prevent a crisis occurring either through 
proper identification of risks. Where these risks cannot be recognised or quantified then plans 
need to be put in place to overcome these unplanned interruptions. Planning a response to the 
eventuality of a disaster is not a simple task. The concept of the FSMM aimed to promote the 
importance of the contingency process for fire safety on construction operations. The review 
and post analysis of construction fires and their failures proved that organisations involved in 
the fire incident were not ready to respond to the disaster on time. The impact on their 
businesses proved the lack of awareness and poor managerial approach to cope with fires 
during the construction process. 
The protocol of risk assessment presented in this thesis was proved to be unrefined and 
lacking in perception. The expert panel defined it as "coarse" and lacking in perception and 
depth, and providing a loose framework. The lack of quantitative data to sustain the 
implementation of a risk management framework for fire prevention on construction sites 
restrains the development of sound risk framework. Reliance on qualitative data could be 
argued. However the concept of risk assessment cannot be rejected and therefore was 
integrated in the FSMM. The weakness of this risk concept lies within the links and overlaps 
of systems and plans from construction stage to the facility in-use as it might require the 
reformulation of risks and hazards depending on the stages of the development and life of the 
facility. The research investigations also revealed that the parties to a construction contract 
rely on their insurance cover (CAR/EAR) to respond to the disaster, ignoring that money 
cannot always repair the damages. The interruption of a business activity could lead to a loss 
of the market share and forthcoming contracts, as well as the public image of the organisation 
like for Bovis in 1990s. 
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An attempt to use a fire safety engineering approach for construction sites proved to be 
limited. However the design process is closely linked to the fire safety strategy. The early 
commissioning, of protection systems and the use of temporary fire safety measures 
combined with the choice of materials was put forward as good practice to prevent fires on 
construction sites. The validity of a qualitative design review was assessed as a successful 
method to enhance design and conception of the facility. Construction fire safety was seen as 
a separate to fire safety design issue to the design solution for finished buildings to reduce fire 
risks through an engineering approach (FSE approach). 
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9.2 Evaluation of results and their significance 
Attitude to risk in construction was mainly affected by two factors. The first was the 
awareness of the possibility of a catastrophic event to which all employees are exposed. The 
second was the extent to which individuals, both employees and employers, believe that they 
are capable of controlling the risks that they face. The management team will have an active 
role throughout the whole project. The qualitative analysis and design of the FSMM 
contributed to identify significant findings and based on the results and interpretation of these 
findings the author generated recommendations and conclusions under an action plan. The 
action plan focussed on the following issues: 
i. The integration of a Safety Culture 
ii. The development of a Risk Management Approach 
iii. The need to plan for uncertainty and risk 
iv. The improvement of Collaboration and creation of a Partnership 
v. The adoption of a Global Approach through an Integral Concept of Safety 
vi. The need to develop a large scale Quantitative Analysis 
vii. Enforcement of the Contractual Framework 
viii. Enforcement of the Insurance Policy 
ix. Enforcement of Risk Inspection on site 
x. The reduction of Fire Risk through an engineering approach 
Figure 9.1 summarised the action plan and the needs for each of them. 
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10 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective in writing up this thesis was to pitch the account of the research to meet the 
expectations of the industry whose views have always been considered as important when it 
comes to evaluate the quality of the findings. The FSMM was an expression of this account 
and it was addressed in the industry. The author's editorial decisions have been shaped by the 
researcher's needs. 
This PhD focussed on details on the qualitative data collected, the rigour of the qualitative 
analysis and its significance for the researcher, precision of the qualitative analysis and its 
research findings, the coherence of the research findings and outcomes and how they 
contributed to develop the FSMM for the industry and the originality of the research concept. 
10.1 Summary of the research findings and their significance 
This research formed a contribution to the knowledge of fire safety on construction sites and a 
leading piece of work on this subject. The evidence and originality of the research concept in 
tackling the problem from a qualitative approach showed new facts and delivered to the 
industry an independent set of findings which highlighted the depth of the problem (The full 
set of findings is available in Figure 10.1): 
0 Inadequacy of past research to reflect fully upon the factor affecting fire prevention on 
construction sites. 
"A need to stimulate the industry to re-think their perception of fires on construction sites 
and integrate a proper and unique fire safety strategy to eliminate and control 
fires during 
construction activities. 
364 
The recognition of the increasing value of qualitative studies to enhance managerial 
approaches for construction project management and an emerging attempt to determine 
the cultures of the industry. 
0 Integrate a fire safety concept in organisations through the implementation of fire safety 
strategy to prevent and control fires on construction sites. 
" Adopt a Global Approach through an Integral Concept of Safety by adopting the FSMM 
as an executive tool to integrate the fire safety management strategy. 
A qualitative development model was created from the research analysis and related findings 
and offered to the industry an executive tool developed from an analysis of construction fire 
safety failures. 
However the research also identified major outcomes articulated around the need to: 
0 Modify and adapt Legal Framework to integrate the fire safety strategy and allow for 
change (Calls for change). 
" Analyse and Improve Existing Practice to allow the integration of the FSMM and its 
concept. 
0 Develop a protocol for Data Collection to support quantitative studies of the problem. 
0 Implement systematic Risk Analysis and need to have a process for fire risk assessment 
as an essential element of success of the fire safety approach. 
0 Integrate the concept of Contingency Process combined with a risk assessment and 
hazards management. 
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Consider existing fire safety requirements 
Integrate Model within existing safety framework 
Definition of a site and its boundaries 
Need for a change of managerial culture 
Dearth of research in fire safety on construction sites 
Limited scope for the use of FSE method 
No reliable statistics on fires on sites 
No possibility to develop quantitative analysis 
Disparities in the collection of information and data 
Lack of awareness of the extend of the problem 
Need to move towards a qualitative analysis 
Risk analysis limited by the access to reliable data 
Assimilitation of fire prevention measures into mangt 
Need to develop a Project Safety Case 
Inadequate analysis of the business threats and impact 
Need to include an analysis of the needs for business recovery 
Need to consider a contingency approach 
Scope to develop a global fire safety management process 
Need to create a Fire Safety Management Model 
Assess the legal and managerial failures in post fires cases 
Create a flexible, adaptable and global FSM framework 
Weakness in the existing fire safety structure 
Lack of practicality of JCOP 
Need for the pressure of insurers to enforce compliance 
Low investment into safety 
Need for contingency planning 
Improve design decisions at conception stage 
Develop a risk management strategy 
Reinforce control and management on site 
Develop and implement a fire safety strategy 
Preparation of contingency planning for site activities and BC 
Need for a global approach throughout the full life cycle 
Develop an integral concept of fire safety 
Needs for systems and plans to implement FSM structure 
Need to ensure business recovery and continuity 
Integration of contingency process in the FSM approach 
The implementation of the Model calls for change 
3 
W 
> 
4) 
u) I- 
co 
a) 
4-. J 
V 
N_ 
N 
C 
N 
a) 
LL 
Cl) 
0 
0 
C 
c 
N 
4) 
N 
Co 
U 
a) 
a) 
c 
Co 
c 0 N 
U) 
0 I- 
L 
co 
C 
E 
a) 
Cl) 
r- 
aD 0. 
x w 
U 
C 
a) 
v 
v v v v 
v v v 
v 
v v v 
v v 
v 
v v 
v v v v 
v v 
v v 
v v v 
v 
v v v 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
VV 
VV 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
VV 
VV 
V 
V 
VVV 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
Co 
c 
E 
aI 
U) 
a) 
CL 
x 
w 
Y 
Observations l 
Flexibility of fire safety framework for adaptation to changes 
V Strategic implementation of the concept in organisations 
v Essential ingredient of the research concept 
V Integrate a safety culture approach in organisations 
Inadequacy of past research to address the problem in details 
v Complexity a nd constant evolution of a site 
V Lack of quantitative data on fires 
V Lack of cooperation of industry 
v No coordination of collection of information 
V Is there a problem...? 
V Research revealed the validity of a qualitative approach 
V Limited scope of a quantitative risk analysis 
V Need for a project management approach 
Integration of fire safety approach in existing framework 
V No recognition for contingency issues 
V No recognition for contingency issues 
V No recognition for contingency issues 
V Lead to the develoment of the FSMM 
An executive tool to enhance fire safety and prevention on sites 
Analysis based on failures scenarios 
V Adapatble to change and the fit the structure of organisations 
V Limited scope of JCOP to address the full extend of the problem 
V Depth of the JCOP to be refined an improved 
V Role of insurers in enforcing implementation of the FSMM 
V Raise the profile of fire safety on sites 
V Approach through Business Impact Analysis 
V FSE method and QDR address some of these issues 
V Limited by lack of quantitative data 
v Implementation at an operational level to support full concept 
V Strategic implementation of the concept in organisations 
v Approach through Business Impact Analysis 
V Integration of the concept from conception to exploitation. 
v Strategic implementation of the concept in organisations 
V Concept of fire safety developed through plans and systems 
v Approach through Business Impact Analysis 
v Approach through Business Impact Analysis 
v Need for corporate decisions to support implementation 
FSMM 
Figure 10.1: Matrix of Research Findings 
The innovative concept of this research and the recognition of the validity of the findings 
were a successful outcome in the light of the expert committees. The final FSMM was a 
success and the different phases of reshaping and restructuring of the original concept 
expressed the depth of the problem for the industry. Even if the scope of this research limited 
the testing of the model with the industry, the quality of the expert panels and their experience 
in construction industry and fire safety issues provided to the research an excellent critical 
analysis and review of the outcomes and findings. The author realised the need to pursue this 
research and enhance the performance of the model by fitting the concept within the existing 
safety framework and the industry and test the viability of the approach in organisations. The 
implementation of the concept and approach at a strategic level is essential. Cultural 
issues have been argued and the need for cultural change was demonstrated through the 
qualitative analysis. The recognition of the need to implement the model throughout the 
organisation, taking into account the existing organisational concept of safety, was strong 
and the role of the operational branch of the organisation necessary to implement the model 
during construction operations. Figures 8.15 and 8.16 illustrated this concept: Corporate 
cultural change / Operational cultural change. 
These "calls for change" have been completely recognised in this research, by the author and 
the industry through the interviews and the expert panels. The need for fire safety on 
construction sites was even greater in France as the industry fire safety concept is behind 
compared to the UK (JCOP implementation, JCT form of contracts and the Fire Code). On 
the other hand the UK industry could learn from the French approach especially in 
considering the implementation of a stronger health and safety structure. The implementation 
of EU directives is actually an excellent response to the need to harmonise safety framework 
and how to benefit from good or best practice from other EU member states. 
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The research revealed that the transfer of information and the fire safety concept from a 
phase to another one was proved to be difficult and to maintain a high level of safety one 
entity should be in charge ("the lever") to enforce its implementation (the client/employer 
with the support of the insurer and the cooperation of the contractors and sub-contractors). 
The FSMM is an executive tool to enhance fire safety management during construction 
operations and raise awareness of employers and contractors in developing a fire safety 
management approach along the line of the existing JCOP and health and safety requirements. 
Through the qualitative research, the author demonstrated a need to investigate the problem 
and the roots of the failures. A lack of cooperation of the industry and the government in 
providing adequate information and data on fires on construction sites, and the lack of 
awareness of the industry on the depth of the problem, limited the development of a 
quantitative analysis. However at this stage of the research and looking back at the findings 
and outcomes of this PhD project, the author would like to suggest the validity of a 
quantitative approach now that the ground and strengths and weaknesses of the problem have 
been assessed and discussed in this PhD. 
The value of this research lies within: 
i. The synthesis of information and the presentation of the findings through a fire safety 
management model in an innovative and interactive manner (CD-ROM) to ease access 
to information and its use. 
ii. The idea that a consensus between experts from different background was reach. 
The research hypothesis was based on the concept that the JCOP did not provide a 
satisfactory level of control over the construction works, and that a managerial 
framework 
needed to be developed in parallel to support a free fire environment on site and address 
the fire safety management during the complete life cycle of the project: conception, 
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execution and exploitation. The implementation of a fire safety management system 
needed to be encompass by a cultural change in organisation to support the full and 
successful integration of a total fire safety concept. 
This hypothesis has been demonstrated and the Fire Safety Management Model encompassed 
the strengths and weaknesses of the research findings. It is agreed that the JCOP was an 
essential element of the framework and the objective of the FSMM was to act as an executive 
tool to enhance the implementation of a fire safety framework in organisations. The 
implementation of this fire safety concept for the prevention and control of fires during 
construction activities should be established at a corporate level and implemented at an 
operational level. The integration of this concept required a change of organisational culture. 
The model needed to be tested in organisations to shape it and adapt it to the needs of each 
individual structure. 
10.2 Dissemination of the results 
Strong links have been established with the industry and amongst the collaborative 
establishments, some organisations expressed their interest in developing the research further 
and look at the integration and testing of the model in industry. 
The significance of the research findings and their interpretation will need to be refined in the 
future and the author stressed on the importance of disseminating the results to the industry. 
A 
series of professional seminars in the UK and France is already planned and the publication of 
research papers forthcoming. 
The international character of the study and its focus on British and French practices suggest 
that primary data will be disseminated in Europe. However this research 
being unique and 
leading in the field of fire safety on construction sites, other industries would 
benefit from the 
results and interpretation of the findings. The Canada and US could perceive this research 
as a 
major step forward towards the improvement of fire safety in construction activities. 
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10.3 Recommendations for future work 
The ground of the research and the significant failures of the existing fire safety system have 
been assessed in this thesis. The scope of the research was limited to a detailed qualitative 
analysis and it is hoped that further research will lead this field towards a large scale 
quantitative analysis. 
The author would like to stress the importance of the primary qualitative research which 
enabled the industry to realise the potential dearth of research and the extend of the problem. 
Without this leading research, the industry would still be at a standing stage and ignoring the 
true identity of the problem. 
The recommendations for future works are as follow: 
i. To raise awareness by disseminating the results of this research to the industry and the 
need to implement a fire safety concept and the FSMM along the side of the existing 
JCOP. The author is already planning to launch a fire safety campaign to raise 
awareness amongst contractors and insurers and their clients. 
ii. To test the FSMM in industry by developing industrial projects with major contractors 
and clients involved in construction activities. The collaboration with members of the 
Expert Committees provided strong links with businesses to disseminate the FSMM. 
iii. To develop a large scale quantitative analysis which will lead towards a fire safety 
engineering approach. This research requires the full cooperation of the industry in 
providing access to data and fire scenarios. The insurance organisations and insurance 
bodies would be in an excellent position to initiate and support this type of research. 
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iv. The transfer of knowledge from the construction industry to other industries (offshore. 
chemical... ) needs to be explored to enhance the use and implementation of the fire 
safety concept presented in this thesis. 
10.4 Final thoughts 
It was not a hazard or lack of work if the research took five years to be complete. The 
restricted access to publication on the subject and availability of statistical data to support the 
development of a quantitative analysis was a major barrier in the first years of the research. 
The lack of robustness of the data from the industry and their lack of cooperation by ignoring 
the problem of fire safety on sites forced the author to shift her research methodology towards 
a qualitative research concept. The success of this research concept was widely proved and 
demonstrated in this thesis, but the author wished more cooperation between industry and 
academia was made to enhance research and development in this field. The willingness of the 
industry to improve fire safety on site is obvious, however information sharing is not 
systematic. The cases used in this thesis were issued by various organisations which accepted 
to collaborate because they recognised the problem as a major issue for their organisations. 
The strengths of this research lies within the strong relationship the author developed over 
five years with members of the industry and their willingness to be part of a leading research 
in fire safety on construction sites. An earlier collaboration with industry would have been a 
major benefit in this research and would have widened the scope of the research, the testing of 
the Model and why not its implementation in organisations. 
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10.5 Lists of recommendations 
To develop the use of a qualitative approach in construction industry: The richness of the 
qualitative analysis for this type of research and the high quality of findings and how they 
contributed to formulate the FSMM. 
" The implementation of the concept described in this thesis should be forward by the 
industry in order to enhance fire safety on construction sites and prevent fires from 
occurring. The concept of contingency process is a strong selling point if the industry 
recognised the importance of business continuity to sustain their organisational survival. 
9 To develop a stringer relationship between the industry and academia to allow the 
multiplication of this type of research, not only in the construction industry but in other 
industries such as off shore, chemical, nuclear, etc. where high risk of fires during 
construction operations could lead to major disasters and a business interruption. 
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APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF EU LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
Other EU countries: 
The next part of this chapter will be concentrate on an analysis of the Fire Safety Framework 
in other Member State on the EU. Each of them will be compared with the UK Framework 
outlined above. Where international construction is concerned, Bunni (1991 )identified four 
major groups of legal systems. Two of these are the common law group, applicable to the 
UK, and the Roman-Germanic group or civil law group as its is also called, which includes 
Spain. Two principle distinguishing features of the civil law group exist. Firstly, the division 
of private and public law. Within public law, administrative law covers public works 
contracts, while private law applies to contracts between individuals and legal entities. 
Secondly, the codification of law, or the "law of the book" as Nicholas (1992) calls it, 
whereas common law is largely a law of the case created by the courts. Klimit (1998) ( 
observes that the English system has become more and more codified in recent years, for 
example, with legislation such as the CDM Regulations, the Arbitration Act and the 
Construction Act (Bunni, 1991). Though as Bunni (1991) notes, once an Act comes into 
force, and then becomes a matter of dispute, interpretation in the courts will provide 
precedents which become law itself. 
Countries within the civil law group also have distinguishing features, for example the 
adoption by some, to varying degrees, of the Napoleonic Code, which in the European Union 
includes Spain, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy, and Portugal (Bunni, 1991). In 
contrast, others such as Germany have adopted a different code. In addition, there may also 
be variances in the meaning of certain legal terms (Nicholas, 1992). Given this different 
source of law, the interpretation of legislation can be different in the two systems. English 
courts may see legislation as an inroad on the basic written law found in the decisions of the 
courts and interpret it restrictively, whereas legislation for the civil law group is the basic law 
itself Legislation drafting, particularly as in the Civil Code, can be different in approach as 
well. For example, the civil law group simply tries to establish a framework for the law to 
provide a judge with guidelines to form a decision. In contrast, the English drafting is often 
complex and aims to provide solutions to disputes by trying to anticipate every eventuality. 
This is traditionally true for the drafting style of construction contracts, for example the JCT 
forms (Fundacion Tomas Moro, 1999). Much of Spanish construction legislation though, 
while retaining a general simplicity, can be very specific and procedural. 
The Legislative situation in Spain: 
The Spanish Constitution, the highest point of authority, was approved in 1978. It defines the 
form of government, the powers of the Head of State and Executive with respect to 
Parliament and also Fundamental rights and freedoms and their protection 
(Spanish 
Constitution, 1978, Section VII). The Constitution recognises seventeen Autonomous 
Regions, Comunidades Autönomas. These have extensive legislative powers in addition to 
those at state level. Judicial power extends from local, then municipal courts, through to the 
courts of first instance and finally to the Supreme Court (Almaraz & Sanchez, 
1999). 
In the Spanish Legal system, it is essential to make a clear distinction between the 
Spanish 
Legislation and the Autonomous legislation. If the Spanish Legislation can 
be applied 
throughout the all country, the autonomous legislation in only applicable within 
the 
Autonomous Community which writes it and controls it. Spanish law is considered 
to be the 
most complex amalgamation of customary Roman, local and modern codified 
law. The 
Constitution also recognises local customary laws know as Foral Law, 
Derecho Civil Foral. 
The foral regions are Aragon, Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre, and 
Vizcaya and 
Alava (provinces of the Basque Country). Foral Law places the Civil 
Code in a position of a 
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supplementary but independent source of regulation, though not extending to contractual 
obligations (art. 13 CC). 
Under the Central Legislation (Las Cortes: el Parlamento y el Senado), in the Spanish 
Constitution of 1975, Las Cortes are defined as the Legislative powers. In Spain, Law could be either made through the citizenship (at least 500 signatures required and submitted to the 
Parliament) or through the Government (proposal to the Parliament: ). 
Spain is divided into 17 Autonomous Communities (with an Autonomous Government and an Autonomous Parliament -Parlamentos Autonomicos) which are given by the Constitution 
some power to develop their own Legislation (Competencias Trasladadas). 
There are two main pieces of law related to Fire Safety in Buildings: 
" Norma Bdsica de la Edificacion - Condiciones de Proteccion contra Incendios, 1991 
(NBE. CPI. 91) (Spanish Parliament, 1991), which deals with the general requirements 
about Fire Protection in buildings. 
" Reglamento de Instalaciones de Proteccion contra Incendios, 1994 (Spanish Parliament, 
1994) (Fire Protection Equipment Regulation 1994) which deals with the requirements 
regarding any Fire Protection Equipment. 
Figure 3.6 represents the Spanish Fire Safety Framework. 
Centralised: 
*General Requirements 
Decentralised: 
* Enforcement 
*Create own Regulations 
Spanish Legal System: 
*NßE. CPL 91 
*Fire Protection Regulation 
1994 
Autonomous Communities 
(17): 
Figure 0.1: Spanish Fire Safety Framework 
Autonomous Government 
Autonomous Parliament 
NBE. CD1.91 applies to all type of buildings that fall into the following categories: 
" New construction 
" Refurbishment and Renovation Projects 
" Change of Use Buildings 
NBE. CDI. 91 intends to establish those conditions and rules to which buildings must comply 
in order to protect the occupiers from fire and to prevent damage to third parties. A range of 
appendix provides specific information for different type of buildings, i. e. Administrative 
Establishment, Commercial Properties, Schools, Garage and Parking, Hospitals, Hotel and 
Boarding Houses and Dwellings. 
The Fire Protection Equipment Regulation 1994 describes the provision and standard of 
installation of fire protection appliances, equipment and systems. 
The Legislation and Regulations fall into two main streams: 
" The Protection against fire once the fire started 
" The Prevention falls under separate regulations 
The Spanish regulation encompasses all aspects of fire safety design. 
Regulations are 
compulsory and any deviations must be justified and make adequate 
fire safety provision. 
They are no reference about Control or Inspection throughout the legal 
documents. 
The idea of decentralisation in Spain is very strong and the power of the 
17 Autonomous 
Communities is not comparable to the UK Framework. On the other 
hand the Direct Cost of 
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Fire Losses is higher (0.25% of GDP) but Fire deaths per 100,000 persons are lower (1.19 
against 1.41 for UK) (Geneva Association, 1997) and detailed in Table A. 
The Legislative situation in Germany: 
Power to Local Authorities is also an approach adopted by the German Government. Article 
Two of Germany's Constitutional Law says that "Everybody has the right to live and to live 
unharmed" (Stein, 1997). All Laws and orders concerning fire safety are derived from this 
Article. Fire prevention and Fire Safety in Germany is covered in Federal State laws. One is 
the Building Regulations (Bauordnung), and the other is the fire service law 
(Feuerschutzgesetz). 
The basis of the building regulation in Germany is the Musterbauordnung. This model is 
prepared at the Federal level and gives guidelines for the separate regional building 
regulations (Landesbauordung) which are issued by each Land. There are now in Germany 
16 separate Laender with their own separate Landesbauordnung and each Land has the right 
to modify the regulation. The Landesbauordnung specifies that building installations shall be 
designed such that the occurrence of a fire and the propagation of fire and smoke is prevented 
and, in the event of a fire, the rescue of people and animals as well as the performance of fire 
extinguishing procedures is possible. 
The Building Regulations contain in Germany requirements to ensure public health and safety 
but also requirements related to the design and layout of buildings. Building and Planning 
law are contained in the same Federal Building Code and are operated within the same local 
authority department. 
Figure 3.7 represents the German Fire Safety Framework. 
Fire Protection measures comprise three main streams: 
0 Active Fire Protection Measures 
" Prevention of Fires and Fire Fighting Facilities. 
" Fire Safety by Design 
Centralised: 
*Strict Written Code 
*Guidelines for Regional 
Implementation 
Decentralised: 
*Enforcement through 
Modifications and adaptations 
*Control, Inspection and Monitoring 
Figure 0.2: German Fire Safety Framework 
REGIONAL BUILDING 
REGULATIONS: 
Landesbauordung 
The requirements for Fire protection in Buildings are set out 
in the regulation DIN4102: Fire 
Behaviour of building materials and building components (Deutche 
Normen DIN 4102, Teil 
4) (Deutches Institut fur Normung, 1981), and DIN 180** series for Fire Barriers, and 
DIN 
18230 on Structural Fire Protection in Industrial Buildings. 
DIN 4102 is divided in eighteen 
parts which cover everything from the behaviour of materials to the stability of structure 
and 
fire resistance, building services and fire, etc. 
FEDERAL STATE LAW: 
Musterbauordnung 
i 
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Germany has a reputation for having a strict written code of fire related regulations covering both the construction and occupation of buildings (Barham, 1996). 
The German Fire Safety Framework is decentralised compared to the UK Framework, which is now slowly moving towards it. The Surveyor's offices in Germany are responsible for 
ensuring that the rules are followed by builders and owners (Stein, 1997). In order to assess building applications, the surveyor's office asks other Authorities for advice. The idea of collaboration and teamwork is present like in Netherlands. Where fire safety is concerned, this advice is given by the professional brigades who usually maintain separate departments to deal with applications. In smaller towns and countryside, the district Authorities employ fire 
safety officers to do this job. The Fire Service is then responsible for checking requirements 
and the owner or the occupier has met operational demand. 
One stream of the new regime adopted by the UK last April joins this approach by adding duties on the "responsible person", i. e. owner or occupier. This last issue is also very close to the French system i. e. Control of fire precautions of building by the Fire Brigade, detailed 
later in this paper. 
Several issues have been identified within the German Fire Safety Framework: 
" Guidelines issued at the Federal Level. 
" Enforcement through separate regional Building Regulations. 
" Implementation and Control at a Local Level with the Fire Services. 
The cost of direct fire loss (Geneva Association, 1997) in Germany is estimated around 
0.19% of the GDP. The population comparison for Fire deaths (1992-1994) report 1.04 
deaths per 100,000 persons and is amongst the lowest of the EU countries (2nd after Spain: 
0.86 per 100,000). 
The Legislative situation in Belgium: 
Belgium is a Federal Parliamentary Democracy under a Constitutional monarch. Its Legal 
system is a Civil Law system influenced by the English constitutional theory and a judicial 
review of legislative Acts. In 1976, following a series of major fires (69 nightclubs of La 
Louvriere and the shopping centre "L 'Innovation " in Brussels which kills 322 persons), the 
Chamber worked on a new project of Law which emphasised on Prevention under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. This project became a Law on 30 July 1979, later 
modified and enforced in 1989 and 1990. It deals with two main aspects: 
" Prevention of Fire and Explosion 
" Compulsory Insurance. 
It is not until 1994 that a number of Codes of Practice have been modified and transformed 
into Laws. Those documents are now compulsory for any new construction since May 1995 
and for the category of buildings classifies as Low since January 1997. Any norm is 
applicable to any type of buildings, accessible or not to the public (including dwellings with 
more than 10 occupants). The legislation is also different between the Walloons Region, the 
Flamand Region and Brussels. 
The Direct Cost of Fire in Belgium is the highest amongst the EU with 0.40% of GDP. Fire 
Deaths are also high, 1.47 per 100,000 persons (Geneva Association, 1997). 
The 1979 Law decentralised the Decision-making process to the Commune or Bourgmestre. 
This gives the power to control the implementation of fire safety measures in buildings. The 
Bourgmestre can therefore decide to close a building if he/she considers it does not satisfy the 
regulation requirements. On the other hand the Ministry of Interior has the ability to issue 
some derogation to the conditions fixed under Articles 3 and 4 of the Arrete Royal of 7 July 
1994 modified on the 19 December 1997 which fixed the main standards and norms 
(Herousse, 1996). This creates a confusing system which leaves the Control process within 
the Fire Safety Framework unclear. Figure 3.8 presents the Belgium Fire Safety Framework. 
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General fire safety legislation: 
Decentralisation 
Autonomy and Control: 
*Enforcement 
*Implementation 
*Management 
Federal Government 
The COMMUNES 
Figure 0.3: Belgian Fire Safety Administration Framework 
The Legislative situation in Netherlands: 
Netherlands is a Constitutional Monarchy. The legal system is a Civil Law System 
incorporating French penal theory. There are three levels of Government, the state, province 
and 700 municipalities. Fire Deaths in Netherlands is the lowest of UK: 0.60 deaths per 
100,000 persons_(Geneva Association, 1997). 
The principal legislation for Building Control is the Housing Act 1972 and Physical Planning 
Act 1962. In 1993, the Ministry of Interior decided to implement a new Fire safety 
Framework in order to reduce Fire Losses. They previously identified lack into the existing 
Framework and concluded after an analysis of Fire incidents within the previous 20 years that 
(Baes, 1996): 
0 Control of fires was not efficient 
" Fire fighting operations were not operatives. 
Figure 0.4 describes the existing Fire Safety Framework in the Netherlands. 
Centralised System: 
Decentralised: 
*Implementation 
Figure 0.4: Fire Safety Framework in the Netherlands 
Fig. 0.5 
The Fire Protection Concepts or Brandveiligheidsconceoten Project was launched 
in 1993 and 
the results were published in 1995. These concepts of Fire 
Protection are not some 
regulations comprising a range of provisions but describe a new approach. 
The Netherlands 
Government is now taking into account this concept to integrate 
it into the new regulation. 
Government: 
*National Legislation 
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Prior to this new regime, the Government imposed requirements without any consideration for the philosophy of the approach. A new Project was launched in 1995 "Project BvS 2000". The aim of this project is to review the responsibilities and competence of the inspection 
offices and fitting practitioners. Control, implementation and inspection have been identified 
as three important issues within the Fire Safety Framework. Another aspect to underline within the Framework is the implementation process. 
Fire Service Insurance Company 
414 Best Fire Safety Option 
Figure 0.5: A triangular approach towards Decision-Making in Netherlands 
The Fire Service, the Insurance Company and the Owner must come together and discuss the fire measures for the particular building. Fire Service and Insurance should work together 
and highlight to the owner the fire risks and take into account his requirements to select the best fire protection solution for the building. This is illustrated below in Figure 3.10: A 
triangular approach towards Decision Making in the Netherlands. Such a process is not 
developed in any other Member State of the EU. 
A strong link between the Owner/Occupier/Insurance Company and the Fire Service is clear 
both at a pre-construction/renovation stage and during the building use. Fire Prevention is not 
only achieved through the strict application of law but other options should be considered to 
achieve the required level of safety. 
The Legislative Situation in Italy: 
Italy is a Republic based on a civil law system with a strong ecclesiastical law influence. 
Moving away from the liberal free-trade origins of the Italian State, the public administration 
has passed from making a small number of significant interventions by authoritative means. 
The Constitution's Article 5, under the organisational heading, contains the rules for 
decentralisation and autonomy. Another important element is contained in the distribution of 
competence among the necessary administrative entities: State, Region, Province and 
Commune. Article 118 of the Constitution enumerates the competence of the Region under 
ordinary statute and other constitutional level norms, while fixing the Region's administrative 
responsibilities under special statute (Anon, 1997). This signifies that the minimum 
responsibilities of the Regions are rigorously fixed and the remainders are reserved to the 
State who can allocate them, by general rules, to the Provinces and Communes. 
The Italian Legislative Framework, represented in Figure 3.11, is decentralised and power to 
provinces is much more important in this system than in other EU Member State. 
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Owner 
State: 
*General Requirements 
*Regulations and Standards 
Region: 
*Minimum Administrative 
Responsibility fixed by 
*Power allocated by State, 
by General rules. 
Figure 0.6: Italian Fire Safety Framework. 
European Community and Canada: 
Throughout the first part of the paper we detailed the different Fire Safety Framework of 
seven European Countries. We found that some of the EU countries analysed had a very 
decentralised approach towards the implementation of Fire Safety Legislative Framework. 
Germany and Spain are two excellent examples. In addition, direct fire losses (Germany: 
0.19% of GDP and Spain: 0.12% of GDP (Geneva Association, 1997)) are lower in those 
countries and fire deaths (Germany: 1.04 per 100,000 persons and 0.86 for Spain (Geneva 
Association, 1997)) is amongst the lowest, as described in Table A. Further investigations 
will be necessary to explore whether there is a direct component of the relationship implied in 
these figures and develop an accurate analysis. 
Such diversity between EU countries is not a disadvantage and should provide enough case 
studies to develop a new European Framework in the view to propose a harmonised system 
throughout the Member States. There seems to be the case that a more decentralised approach 
could be beneficial. Autonomy to the Local Authorities would provide the users, i. e. owners, 
occupiers and the all Community, a more flexible approach towards fire safety in building. 
This is a feature of the Canadian approach to Fire Safety Legislation. The structure of Canada 
has a lot of similarities with Europe. First, its size is comparable to Europe and second the 
Canadian Government decided to recognise the jurisdictional powers of provincial/territorial 
authorities to establish their own building and fire regulations, and to act in liaison with 
regulatory authorities, industry and the public. This approach is very similar to the EU 
approach. Canada comprises 10 provinces and 2 territories. Each Province/Territory have 
different needs (Legal system based on Common Law, except for Quebec where civil law 
system is based on French law prevails) and therefore their framework. 
The Canadian Framework: 
Canada is updating and enforcing their existing Fire Safety Framework since 1995. 
Under 
Canadian law, the regulation of building construction is the responsibility of provincial 
Governments, who in turn can delegate this power to their municipalities (Hansen, 
1985). 
The objectives of the fire safety requirements are to prevent fires, particularly those that may 
present a hazard to the community, and to limit damage should fire occur. 
Fire Codes in most 
provinces are administrated by the fire services. Each province has a 
fire marshal and a fire 
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commissioner whose office generally responsible for administering fire prevention acts. The 
municipal fire service normally acts on behalf of the fire commissioner or fire marshal to 
enforce fire prevention regulations. 
Until 1975, the National Fire Code established in 1956 encouraged greater uniformity in 
matters of fire safety. The first edition of the NBC was published in 1963 and was prepared 
in the form of a model by-law to permit direct adoption by a municipal authority (Hansen, 
1985). This approach was abandoned in 1975 and the Code was prepared instead a set of 
technical requirements supported by a "Guide to Enforcement" to facilitate its application at 
either the provincial, territorial or municipal level of government. Canada moved from a 
highly decentralised system (pre 1975 Model) to a more centralised approach (post 1975 
Model), as illustrated in Figure 9: Canadian Fire Safety Framework. By1991, the Canadian 
Commission on Building and Fire Codes was created to promote uniformity of policy and 
format an all Code documents (National Research Council of Canada, 1995). A five-year 
strategic plan on Building and Fire was launched in 1995 which contain 6 goals, 22 objectives 
and 58 strategies. The objectives of these goals are: 
" To provide national model codes which meet the needs of all code users in Canada: 
referenced/guideline codes at national level 
" To have future national codes adopted without modification by all authorities having 
jurisdiction in Canada. 
" To have uniform interpretation and understanding of code requirements throughout 
Canada. 
" To have a responsive, objective, efficient and effective code development system: user- 
oriented, feedback. 
The present Canadian Fire Safety Framework presents three main distinguishing 
characteristics compared with the European models discussed earlier: 
It is an open system: flexible boundaries, consider cost/economics approach 
Acceptance of new national Codes go through a process of Public Review: flexible, adaptive, 
and innovative and user orientated. 
Constantly updated: Feedback and communication between different levels of Government 
(territory, municipal and provincial), higher involvement of the Community, cycle of revision 
of the code influenced by industry needs. 
PRE- 1975 MODEL 
National 
DvinciaUTerritory 
Delegation to 
Municipalities. 
Municipalities 
I Basic Requirements 
Figure 0.7: Canadian Fire Safety Framework. 
POST 1995 MODEL 
National 
ProvinciaVTerritory 
Adoption 
Feedback 
Municipalities: 
Enforcement / 
Implementation 
F 
E 
E 
D 
B 
A 
C 
K 
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In October 1997 (Canada NewsWire, 1997a), the Fire Protection and Prevention Act was 
proclaimed into law. The new Act will enable municipalities to provide the best level of 
protection from fire in the most efficient manner. Prior to this acceptance, municipalities 
asked to reject new fire law. The main subjects of concern (Canada NewsWire, 1997b) are 
that its provisions could allow municipalities to lower level of public safety through slower 
response times, fewer fire fighters available in emergency due to the privatisation of fire 
services. Provinces feared that prevention and public education, the most important factors 
for fire safety, would be neglected. 
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APPENDIX B: HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
A processing factory (Cookies Co) is undergoing extension works. The fire breaks out on site, 
while a sub-contractor was cutting a sandwich panel to create a large opening (4000x4500) 
between the existing storage facility and the new production line and packaging area under 
completion. The spark ignited the insulation and the fire spread very rapidly inside the 
sandwich panel. Extensive fire and smoke damage to the storage area was made worse by 
water damage due to action by the fire brigade. The fire destroyed part of the new production 
line facility (50%) with extensive smoke damage to the equipment. The smoke also affected 
the existing production line and all the machines and equipment had to be cleaned by a 
specialist. The fire spread to the newly built roof under completion and the smoke released by 
the burning roof material spread into the administrative office at the first floor. This area 
sustained minor smoke damage, but the external wall along the site will need to be fully 
rebuilt. 
The processing factory: 
The factory specialised in the production of cookies, package the boxes in-house and store 
part of the production (25% stored for more than two week and 75% distributed within the 
week of production) on site, in a separate building. In order to ease the manufacturing process 
and cope with an increase of 25% of new orders in 2000 and an expected 30% in 2001, the 
management decided to invest into the construction of a new production line and a modern 
packaging area. See plan A for more details of the layout. 
Cookies Co had to maintain full production throughout the course of the extension works and 
ensure their employees were working in a safe environment. It was planned the openings 
linking three buildings together would be carried out over a holiday period or week-end in 
order to minimise the disruption of the production line. However works on the existing 
storage building could be carried out at any time, as long as the Facility Manager is aware of 
the works and a method statement is submitted. 
On the day of the fire, 200 employees were present in the facilities. 110 were working on the 
production line, 15 at the packaging area, 20 in the administrative offices above the existing 
production line. The maintenance team comprised 5 staff: the facilities manager, two 
electricians, one plumber and one general worker. 
The advancement of the works was at the fit-out stage and the main contractor was expecting 
to deliver the building one month later. At the same time, the supplier (Dutch Engineering) 
whom Cookies Co procured the new production line, had a specialist team on site (3 
engineers) to install the machines. The work was 50% complete, as only 50% of the 
equipment has been delivered. 
Events leading to the fire: 
At the time of the fire, a sub-contractor was working on one of the openings between the 
existing storage and the site. The existing wall was made of sandwich panel. The cutting 
operation released sparks which instantly ignited the insulation and very rapidly spread 
inside 
the sandwich panel. 
The alarm was raised 5 minutes after an attempt to extinguish the fire with a "half empty" 
fire 
extinguisher hang on a wall of the storage area. The alarm was raised by a member of 
Dutch 
Engineering team and signal to evacuate the entire facilities was given. The site workforce 
was forced to evacuate the building at the same time, the smoke released 
being too dangerous. 
The Fire Brigade reached the site within 5 minutes of the alarm raised and 
discovered a major 
fire: the fire had already spread to the storage area, to the new roof under completion, smoke 
was found in the existing production line but none in the administrative offices. 
They were 
told by the Main Contractor in charge of the site works, that a fire wall had 
been built 
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between the existing production line and the site, but that a protected (MO) opening had been 
built over the last week-end. However the opening between the storage area and the site was 
not protected as one of the sub-contractor was working on it at the time of the fire. 
Locaux existent de 1'Usine Cookies Co 
................ . Zone de rotation d'engins motorises 
ýý Portes d' Acces 
RDC: Ligne de 
existente et zone 
d'emballa2e. 
RDC: Stockage 
Plan A: Plan an sol de l'Usine Cookies Co avant les travaux 
GF: Existing 
Line with Packaging area. 
Ist: Existinz Administrative 
Legend: 
Origin of the fire 
EJ Site boundaries 
m Existing Factory 
GF: Existing 
'Storage 
ýmm* 
GF: Site 
New Production 
line and 
Plan B: Layout of the Project 
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GF: Extensive fire, Building: £O. Sm 
Building: £0.2m 
smoke and water Plant/Equip: £0.5m 
Plant/Equip: £0.5m 
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GF: Extensive fire Building: £ 1.5m 
GF: Minor smoke damage to 
and smoke damage. Plant/Equip: £2.5m 
eýsting ng equipment. 
50% of facility lost. 
2 weeks BI 
50% of equipment 
Plan B: Loss and Damages, Business Interruption (BI) 
Loss and Damages: 
The facility sustained major smoke and fire damages: Plan B. 
" There were extensive high level smoke and heat damage throughout the ground floor 
facilities and smoke had vented from the eaves at the rear of the building. 
" However there was very little damage to the First Floor offices. 
" The direct fire damage was spread between the new built facilities (the site) and the 
existing storage area. It was evident from the examination that the fire started in the 
opening between these areas and is most likely due to the welding works carried out in 
the opening. 
" The new facility under completion (the site) sustained extensive fire and smoke damages 
with 50% of the facility lost. On top of this, 50% of the equipment installed and stock had 
been destroyed and cannot be reused. Luckily there was a delay to supply the remaining 
50% of the equipment on site. One month prior to completion, further works following 
the fire are planned for an extra 4 months (at least) to rebuilt and repair and installed a 
new production line and packaging area. We are planning a4 month interruption after the 
original date of delivery of the facility. 
" The existing storage area sustained extensive fire and smoke damages increased by the 
use of very large quantity of water by the Fire Brigade. This area wasn't equipped with a 
sprinkler system. As a consequence of the fire and action of the Fire Brigade, 80% of the 
stock is lost. The turnaround value of the stock is estimated to be £0.5m and as much for 
equipment and plant materials. We are planning a2 month interruption of the use of this 
facility to allow rebuilt and repairs. 
" The existing production and packaging area was only damaged by smoke but all the 
equipment needs to be completely clean (health and hygiene issues) before re-use. We 
estimate one week interruption for investigations and another week to clean the 
equipment and restore the production line. The stock of ingredients used for the 
production of cookies will be destroyed and was estimated to be of a value of £0.2m. 
The 
total cost of business interruption is estimated at £1m. 
" The office, situated at the first floor of the existing production and packaging 
line 
sustained only minor smoke damages and minimal repairs is required. An 
interruption of 
the work for investigations and cleaning is estimated at 1 week. 
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Buildin : £2.7m 
Plant and E ui ment: £3.5m 
Stock: £O. 7m 
Business Interruption: £5m 
Total: £11.9m 
Business Interruption: 
The main factory was the target risk, with no possibility to transfer the business to another 
partner factory or other facility. The Estimated maximum Loss were in the region of 70 % for 
Buildings, 50% for Plant and Equipment and 80% for the Stock. The Insurance Survey 
Report highlighted major weaknesses in the design of the factory and its fire protection 
measures. No effective internal separation and fairly extensive use of composite panels were a 
major issue. Cookies Co did not have an operational Business Continuity Plan (BCP) in place, 
baring in mind the major weaknesses of the business if affected by a disaster. Their Recovery 
Plan is proved to be inefficient. 
It is difficult to limit the business interruption in such a situation as the core activities of the 
factory (the production, packaging and storage of cookies) is carried out in one single factory 
which has been partially or completely destroyed. The existing production line and packaging 
area have been affected by the smoke released during the fire and the storage facility is out of 
use for two months. Critical activities to maintain: 
" Engage the repair and cleaning of existing production line and packaging within two 
weeks. 
" To prospect for a new storage facility, within a two mile radius of the factory within two 
weeks, and arrange for transport from the factory to the new storage area. 
" Carry out repairs of the destroyed storage area within two months. 
The new production line aimed at increasing the productivity of the factory and expected a 
30% increase of orders in 2002, which is now compromised but could be limited to a 10% 
increase if the rebuilt and repair works are completed within 5 months from now. Critical 
activities: 
" Engage repair and rebuilt work as soon as possible and plan a new completion date within 
5 months. 
" Order and replace the new production line and packaging machines and equipment 
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APPENDIX C: 
Fire Safety Management Model C: CD-ROM Version 
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